Serbia’s Election Scenarios: Four Things We Got Right

Three days before Serbia’s snap parliamentary election of 25 October 2026, the European Policy Centre (CEP) published four scenarios for the road to a 126-seat majority. The scenarios assumed turnout of between 65% and 70%, between 1.5 and 1.7 million votes for the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), and different outcomes for the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), depending on whether it passes the 3% threshold. In all of them, we assumed that European Serbia and Authentic Right would fall below the threshold. Our central question was whether the winner of the elections could govern alone, or whether the outcome would depend on post-election bargaining. The preliminary results now provide an answer: Scenario 4 (“SL majority (alone) with SPS below 3%”) proved to be the right one. Below, we examine how close the results were to our estimates under this scenario, and where they differed.

1. Turnout was the key

We identified turnout as the key factor in deciding the outcome. While turnout in 2023 was almost 59%, in our analysis all scenarios assumed that it would fall between 65% and 70%. It came in at 68.8%, the highest in more than three decades, and it worked in the Student List’s favour. Our reasoning was that the further turnout rose above 65%, the less likely the regime would be able to secure its political survival.

2. The SNS ceiling was within our range

We argued that the SNS has a relatively stable voter base, made up of committed supporters and so-called “capillary” votes, mobilised through party and clientelist networks, and that it could realistically reach up to 1.7 million votes. The outcome stayed at about that level: the SNS received about 1.68 million votes (39.15%). We also added that, because the party was facing its most serious challenge to date, its inability to attract new voters could cost it power.

3. The SPS and the smaller lists missed the threshold

A key assumption under Scenario 4 was that the SPS would end up below 3%. In that case, the SNS, in every one of our modelled cases, would have had no chance of forming a government even with the support of all minority parties. While the SPS only achieved around 2%, we were right to assume that European Serbia and Authentic Right would also fall below the threshold. Votes cast for lists below the threshold are lost, and the seats are redistributed proportionally among the lists that pass it, which favours the largest list, in this case the SL.

4. The Student List governs alone

The scenario most favourable to the students materialised. Under Scenario 4, in five of the six cases we modelled, the SL won a majority on its own. Only in one case (65% turnout and the SNS at the top of its range) would the SL have needed the support of just three seats from minority parties. In the cases where it could govern alone, we estimated that the SL would win between 129 and 144 seats. With 97.5% of polling stations counted, the SL is at the upper end of this range: it received about 2.27 million votes (52.73%), which translates into around 140 seats, a comfortable majority 14 seats above the 126 required.

Looking ahead

The “winning” scenario implied a National Assembly dominated by two lists, with only a handful of minority representatives. The other scenarios assumed that the SPS would clear the threshold and that post-election bargaining, possibly involving minority parties, might decide the outcome. With the results of 25 October, this uncertainty has disappeared: a single list holds a majority and does not depend on any coalition partner. Turnout rose by about ten percentage points compared with 2023, to its highest level in more than three decades, and, as our scenarios anticipated, high participation reshaped the outcome.

The lesson of this election reaches beyond the seat count. For analysts, this is a reminder that transparent, assumption-based modelling can help citizens, experts and international audiences understand what is at stake before the votes are cast. More importantly, the next tests are institutional rather than arithmetic. A clear mandate and a mobilised electorate offer a rare opportunity to turn civic energy into lasting trust in elections and institutions, and how that opportunity is used will matter as much as the result itself.