Ireland Now Heads the EU Council – What Does it Mean for the EU and the Western Balkans?

With Ireland, a new Trio presidency begins. Together with Lithuania and Greece, marking three different corners of the EU, Ireland sets the stage by assuming the Presidency on 1 July 2026 and holding it until the end of December. Assuming the Presidency for the eighth time, Ireland has become the best-case example of how transformative EU membership can be, turning it from one of the less-developed countries in Europe into one of the most prosperous and rapidly rising. Building upon its experience, it now seeks to make the EU more fit to overcome the contemporary challenges, while making the Union ready for enlargement. Below, we unpack what the Irish Presidency brings to the table, and identify the implications it may have for both the EU and the Western Balkan countries.

Key Priorities under the Spotlight

Like other member states, Ireland will promote security; however, what makes it stand out is that it will do so as a militarily neutral country. As one of the rare non-NATO countries in the EU, its neutrality has defined its state identity, forged in the early days of the state as a means of asserting independence from Britain. What is more, it is even legally codified, insofar as the Irish Constitution prevents Ireland from joining a European army or mutual defence pact. On the EU level, its neutrality is further protected by legally binding guarantees in a Protocol attached to the Lisbon Treaty. This position allows Dublin to frame deeper cooperation not as abandonment of neutrality, but as a pragmatic response to cyber threats, hybrid warfare, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the wider geopolitical pressures created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and transatlantic uncertainty. While setting clear boundaries, the Presidency motto – “Strength with unity” – suggests that Ireland will seek to balance its distinctive position of military neutrality with security priorities, including the unification of the EU’s voice and accelerated defence integration of the Union. 

Besides continuing its support for Ukraine and maintaining punitive measures against Russia, the programme sets out a dense agenda for advancing the EU’s security and defence policy. First, Ireland will advance work on the new European Security Strategy by seeking to consolidate member-state positions on key security challenges ahead of its expected launch in the third quarter of 2026, ten years after the adoption of the EU Global Strategy. Second, it will seek to operationalise the measures contained in the White Paper on the Future of European Defence and the associated Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, including by promoting agreement on priority capability gaps and European Defence Projects of Common Interest. Third, it will focus on expanding joint defence procurement through and the revision of the Defence Procurement Directive, with the aim of making procurement more efficient, competitive and collaborative. Taken together, these points reflect Ireland’s stated ambition to promote the “evolution of the CSDP”.

Besides security – but nonetheless linked to it – from the first days of the Presidency, it is expected that competitiveness will be treated as a core priority across every Council formation. Concerning job creation, innovation and business growth, it is, as Irish Ambassador to Serbia Kevin Colgan framed it, a priority that most directly affects citizens. The centrepiece that will underpin the Presidency action in this area is the One Europe, One Market Roadmap, agreed by the EU Council, European Commission and the European Parliament in April 2026.  Shaped by the Draghi report and the shock of transatlantic trade tensions, the Roadmap rests on five building blocks: 1) reducing administrative burdens through “omnibus” simplification packages; 2) deepening the Single Market and lowering internal barriers; 3) securing economic and trade resilience by diversifying supply chains; 4) strengthening energy security alongside the green transition; and 5) boosting Europe’s digital and Artificial Intelligence capacity. The Presidency will also seek to advance flagship initiatives such as the EU Inc, among others. As the Roadmap contains half of the measures slated for the end of the year, the ability of the Irish Presidency to effectively coordinate this ambitious workload will determine the fate of the EU’s drive to make itself competitive again.

It is here that the MFF for 2028-2034 – a proposal worth close to €2 trillion – becomes the Presidency’s most delicate task, because the budget crystallises the deeper security and competitiveness dilemma dividing member states. For instance, Taoiseach Micheál Martin has pointed to “enormous pressure” from several capitals to spend more on defence and less on agriculture, while others defend or seek to increase Common Agricultural Policy funding. At the same time, the European Parliament will aim to maximise the MFF’s size, whereas multiple member states have already made it clear that the proposal, as it stands, already overextends realistic possibilities. Moreover, the time-pressure is high, particularly as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa want to secure a political agreement on the MFF before the end of 2026. In such a context, while drawing on its experience in successfully brokering an MFF in 2013, it will be up to Ireland, together with its Trio partners, to seize a narrowing window: with French elections approaching, President Macron is expected to grow more reluctant to take risky decisions, adding pressure to close a deal by the end of 2026.

What about Enlargement?

Crucially, enlargement is strongly embedded into Ireland’s priorities. Ireland held the Presidency of the Council in 2004, when the “Big Bang” enlargement took place. Now, Ireland explicitly states that it will work with all candidates and potential candidates to support them on their path to membership. It then differentiates by explicitly pointing out in its Programme that it will work towards “the completion of accession negotiations with Montenegro, and seek to make substantial progress in negotiations with Albania, Moldova and Ukraine”. Martin visited Montenegro in June and called completing everything in six months “challenging”, but confirmed it as Dublin’s goal to “break the back of this process” via intergovernmental conferences expected in the autumn. According to the Irish Ambassador to Serbia, that would be “the clearest signal that the system works”. Moreover, Dublin hopes to open the remaining clusters for Ukraine and Moldova, with Martin stating an ambition to open “as many as we possibly can” while insisting on a strictly merit-based approach. This explains why Marta Kos suggested the Irish Presidency could become “the most successful presidency after the 2004 big bang”.

While Serbia is not on the list of explicitly named countries in the Programme, it may be expected that Ireland will insist on the necessity to keep Belgrade close – where it has recently opened up an embassy as a token of recognition of its value – while insisting on the essential rule-of-law reforms to be conducted in a proper manner. As Serbia’s attempt to open Cluster 3 – with abruptly increased support by the European Commission and push by several member states – failed to materialise in the summer of 2026, this topic will surely resurface during the Irish presidency. While there is political goodwill in Dublin, it will not necessarily translate into automatic acceleration of Serbia’s path, as the outstanding issues still remain. Whatever might happen with Serbia – including other non-frontrunner countries of the region – Ireland is unusually well placed to carry the enlargement policy forward: it has never misused its veto right, has no bilateral disputes with any candidate, and is widely regarded in Brussels as a natural honest broker.

Finally, it will be up to Ireland to balance out the plans and ideas of member states on whether and to what extent to maximise the gradual integration and introduce new, specific post-accession arrangements for new member states. The ground was set for this, with several nonpapers being introduced during the summer, with Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Czechia, and Slovenia pushing for sectoral integration, Germany and France advocating for gradual institutional integration, and France and Germany coupled with the Benelux countries pushing for more robust post-accession safeguard clauses, while calling, among other things, for discussion on temporary veto limitations for newcomers. With consensus on any of these issues being far from reached, Ireland will have to account for a tight schedule for action, particularly as discussions on these matters are expected at the October European Council and possible decisions in December. This coincides with the acceleration of work on Montenegro’s Act of Accession, which is expected to be a suitable testing ground for new ideas, to be applicable to all the countries waiting in the queue.