Geopolitics and Values: In Tension or in Tandem?

More than 25 years after Serbia’s democratic transition and its turn towards European integration, public support for EU membership has fallen to its lowest level since 2000, with only 39.8% of citizens in favour, 33.8% opposed, and more than a quarter remaining undecided. This three-way division has become a structural feature of Serbian public opinion on the issue. At a time when renewed momentum for EU enlargement coincides with growing public disillusionment with the integration process in Serbia, this policy brief investigates the factors shaping citizens’ attitudes. Drawing on a nationally representative survey of 1,000 citizens, two focus groups, and statistical modelling of the mechanisms through which perceptions influence support for membership, the study finds that the erosion of trust is the key mechanism linking scepticism about the EU’s behaviour to declining support for accession. The widespread perception that the EU prioritises geopolitical and economic interests over its proclaimed values does not directly reduce support; rather, it undermines citizens’ confidence in the EU as a credible and principled actor, and this credibility deficit subsequently suppresses support for membership. Although economic expectations remain the strongest predictor of support for EU accession, they operate alongside the credibility channel rather than replacing it. Citizens with more optimistic economic expectations are more likely to perceive the EU as trustworthy, and it is through this trust that economic optimism translates into support for membership. Importantly, media consumption patterns and information sources do not significantly influence attitudes through these mechanisms, suggesting that the credibility problem stems from citizens’ assessments of the substance of the EU’s engagement and whether it adheres to its own standards, rather than from the frequency or source of EU-related information.

Three additional findings further illuminate these dynamics. First, the credibility mechanism is most pronounced among citizens who are otherwise predisposed toward EU integration. Individuals with stronger liberal-democratic and cosmopolitan orientations perceive the gap between the EU’s values and interests more acutely, resulting in a sharper decline in their support. Second, government-aligned and opposition-aligned citizens process EU-related information through different frameworks. The credibility mechanism has a meaningful effect only among opposition supporters, citizens aligned with the student movement, and politically neutral respondents, whereas the attitudes of government supporters are shaped almost exclusively by economic expectations. Third, the student movement, which has elevated issues of democratic governance closely connected to the credibility concerns identified in this research, has emerged as the second strongest political force in Serbia, surpassing all formal opposition parties combined. Consequently, if the EU is perceived as credibly supporting democratic governance requirements, it could enter a potential political transition with an existing constituency inclined toward European integration.

These findings suggest several implications for future EU engagement. Since the credibility deficit is rooted in the EU’s actions rather than in communication failures, the Union should prioritise consistency between its stated values and its policies. Resources should be shifted away from communication campaigns and toward programmes that provide citizens with direct experience of EU standards. Economic engagement, as the most powerful source of support, should become more visible at the local and individual level and should be explicitly linked to reform conditionality in order to reinforce rather than weaken the credibility channel. Pro-European citizens should not be regarded as automatically supportive; their backing depends on tangible evidence of commitment to rule-of-law standards rather than values-based rhetoric. Furthermore, the divergence between government-aligned and opposition-aligned audiences implies that a single communication strategy cannot effectively address both groups: while the former respond primarily to concrete modernisation benefits, the latter seek evidence that financial engagement is contingent upon genuine reform. Finally, the accession process itself must regain credibility by appearing achievable. A clear and staged roadmap would help address both the credibility deficit and the widespread disengagement arising from doubts that accession will ever occur, particularly if the EU demonstrates willingness to support a membership target date proposed by Serbia once the country exhibits genuine political commitment and a credible trajectory of reform.