Italy’s Migration Gamble: The Uncertain Future of the Agreement with Albania

On 6 November 2023, Italy and Albania signed a Protocol “on Strengthening Cooperation in Migration Matters”. Applauded as an example of “out-of-the-box thinking, based on fair sharing of responsibilities with third countries in line with obligations under EU and international law” by President of the European Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen, and as a “truly European” and “historic agreement for the entire European Union” by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s office, it is part of a broader trend of border externalisation policy by EU states as an attempt to manage migration flows. However, it represents the first case of border externalisation involving an EU candidate country, one that has recently become a leader among the Western Balkan countries in terms of closeness to EU membership. By ideating and implementing a new model for externalisation of asylum processing, Meloni engaged in a political gamble, a bold move whose future is uncertain[SS1] . Her credibility, voter expectations, and EU influence partly depend on the outcome of the deal, namely, whether the centres constructed in Albania can carry out their original purpose under the agreement. The main questions driving this analysis are: 1) Has this agreement been successful in decreasing irregular migration? 2) Is it a good model that other EU MS should follow?

Popularisation of Migration Externalisation

The migration-limiting method behind the agreement is one of the most ambitious milestones of Meloni’s premiership. Under the electoral program for the 2022 elections, Meloni’s party (Brothers of Italy) introduced various proposals to curb migration, including establishing EU-managed hotspots in non-European territories to assess asylum requests directly at the source. The agreement with Albania was the first significant step in this direction, foreseeing the construction of two centres in Gjader and an entry facility at the port of Shengjin, where disembarkation and identification procedures would occur. Such areas and centres are subject to Italian jurisdiction, and the port of Shengjin and the internal area of Gjader are treated as equivalent to the Italian border or transit zones. Consequently, border procedures stemming from Italian and EU law apply. Under such legislation, accelerated border procedures are used when an application for international protection is likely to be unfounded or when there are specific grounds, such as the applicant coming from a safe country of origin or presenting false information. Under the agreement, only migrants who embarked on Italian vessels outside Italian or other EU MS territorial waters may be transferred to Albania for the sole purpose of conducting such border and repatriation procedures. While the practical effectiveness of the agreement remains to be ascertained, it has been presented as a milestone in Italy’s migration policy and as an example of a new and unconventional approach to managing migration challenges and fulfilling electoral commitments.

The agreement is part of a broader trend of border externalisation policy by EU states as an attempt to manage migration flows, which has been recently reinforced by the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will enter into force in 2026. It prioritises externalisation of control of migration movements and places an unequal burden on first-entrance countries such as Italy. Such countries are required to process and possibly repatriate migrants whose asylum claims are deemed clearly unfounded within six months, often under detention at EU border facilities. This accelerated border procedure applies automatically to those from countries with an asylum recognition rate below 20% and who arrived irregularly. Under this framework, the Italy-Albania agreement is not an isolated initiative, but rather part of a wider EU strategy whose aim is to externalize asylum processing beyond its borders.

To accept a compromise that on paper still seems unbalanced, Italy is betting on the possibility of easily repatriating migrants who are not entitled to international protection. For this reason, the government did not give the green light to the proposal until the rules for identifying “safe third countries” to which repatriations can be carried out were relaxed, overcoming Germany’s opposition. These will no longer only be countries of origin but also countries of transit. In order to complete the repatriation, it will be necessary to verify a connection between the migrant and that country (for example, a period of residence or a family tie), but this criterion will be established autonomously by each Member State. This concession is important for Italy, giving it greater flexibility in identifying safe countries. The Italy-Albania agreement is clearly part of a broader shift in EU migration policy, whose main strategy is the externalisation of border control through cooperation with third countries.

Despite being part of this prevailing trend in EU migration law, the Italy-Albania agreement is the first of its kind, differing significantly from past extraterritorial asylum models. One of the first cases was the Pacific Strategy, Australia’s agreement with Nauru, Manus Island, and Papua New Guinea. Under the program, asylum procedures were outsourced to these islands, which in turn received financial reimbursement. The policy has changed several times, but since 2013, those granted refugee status have not been allowed to enter Australia and are instead resettled in a third country. The most recent example of extraterritorial asylum processing is the UK-Rwanda agreement, signed in April 2022. Its purpose was to transfer asylum seekers to Rwanda to process their asylum applications. However, in November 2023, the UK Supreme Court ruled [SS2] that Rwanda was not a safe country due to the risk of refoulement. The UK attempted to revise the deal with additional safeguards, but the policy was officially abandoned following the Labour Party’s 2024 election victory. Unlike these deals, Italy’s agreement does not seek to permanently transfer asylum seekers to Albania. Instead, it allows successful applicants to move to Italy, making it distinct from past offshore migration policies. Therefore, it represents a new model, as it is the first case of external asylum processing where successful asylum-seekers are transferred to the receiving country.

While it is indeed true that migration to Italy has decreased, this is due to other agreements, not the Albania deal. In fact, disembarkation to Italy dropped by 58% in 2024, but this is largely due to agreements with Tunisia and Libya. Under the Memorandum of Understanding between Libya and Italy signed in 2017, Italy has provided the Libyan Coast Guard with funding and equipment to intercept migrant boats before they reach Italy. Under the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Tunisia signed in 2023, Italy and the EU have provided financial aid to Tunisia in exchange for increased border control efforts. In April 2024, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Tunisia to reinforce this approach, signing three new agreements. However, investigations have shown that migrants intercepted under these agreements face inhuman and degrading treatment in Tunisia and Libya. It is clear that the Albania agreement has played no role in reducing migration flows, raising doubts about its effectiveness. While the government led by PM Meloni has delivered on its electoral promise to decrease migration, this achievement results from Italy’s diplomatic engagements with Libya and Tunisia.

Over before it even started?

The agreement has been largely ineffective due to legal challenges from Italian courts, preventing its full implementation. Before their recent transformation into repatriation centres (CPR), no migrants initially transferred to Albania between October and January had stayed there. According to Italian law, any kind of detention has to be validated by a court within 48 hours, and the Italian courts have not validated any of the migrants’ detentions that have taken place so far. The legal reasoning behind their decisions is that Egypt and Bangladesh, the migrants’ countries of origin, are considered to be unsafe, and therefore the accelerated border procedure cannot be applied. Citing a European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling of October 2024, the courts stated that a “safe” third country must ensure safety for all social groups across the entirety of its territory. Italian courts have sought further clarification from the ECJ by submitting four preliminary questions regarding the legality of externalizing asylum processing to Albania. In the first instances of the proceedings before the ECJ on 26 February, the Commission backed Italy’s stance, arguing that EU law allows MS to designate countries as “safe” even if only for certain specific and well-defined groups of migrants. Similarly, in an opinion delivered on 10 April, Advocate General of the European Court of Justice, Richard de la Tour, stated that it is lawful for national governments to determine safe countries of origin through legislative measures, as Italy has done. The upcoming ECJ ruling, which is expected in June, will be decisive in determining whether the deal can function as intended.

As exemplified by the Italian courts’ ruling, the agreement lacks clear legal safeguards for migrants, creating legal and procedural ambiguities. As it is the first case in which a country applies EU asylum law in a third state, it raises questions about the relationship between EU and national law in extraterritorial contexts. The lack of procedural clarity increases the risk of human rights violations, as there are no explicit guarantees that detainees will have access to effective legal remedies. The ECJ will undoubtedly have to address the questions raised by the Italian courts regarding whether national governments can independently determine the list of safe third countries. However, legal experts and scholars also anticipate that the Court will examine whether EU asylum law can be applied in non-EU states and whether outsourcing asylum processing aligns with EU fundamental rights.

Due to the unclear legal and procedural safeguards provided to asylum seekers, the agreement risks violating Italy’s human rights obligations under national, EU, and international law. In particular, detention conditions in Albania could violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. Moreover, the agreement could breach Article 4, Protocol 4 ECHR, which prohibits the collective expulsion of migrants without individualized assessments. Lastly, Migrants detained under the agreement may not have access to due process, raising concerns under Article 5 (right to liberty) and Article 6 (right to a fair trial) ECHR. These risks are underscored by the European Court of Human Rights judgment in J.A. and Others v. Italy, where the Court found Italy to be in violation of Articles 3 and 5 ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 for detaining migrants at the Lampedusa hotspot without a clear legal basis and in inhumane conditions. This precedent suggests that Italy could face similar legal challenges in relation to the Albania agreement, whose lack of strong legal safeguards makes it vulnerable to human rights litigation at Italian courts, the ECJ, and the ECtHR.

Nonetheless, after months of speculation of this possibility, the Italian government turned the facilities in Albania into repatriation centers (Centro per il Rimpatrio- CPR) through a decree law. These are places where migrants who have already entered Italian territory and whose asylum requests have already been examined and rejected can be transferred. The first collective deportation of migrants from Italian territory to the CPR in Albania occurred on 11 April. Much information about the operation remains unknown, as Italian authorities have not issued any official statements. Around forty individuals were taken from several CPR facilities across the country, with their nationalities or details of their legal status still unknown. With this new development, the agreement shifts from a mechanism to manage asylum procedures to a framework for unsuccessful asylum seekers’ detention and subsequent deportation. This change should not be seen as a success of the agreement, as it only reinforces earlier criticisms of its practical and legal viability, raising further concerns regarding due process and the treatment of migrants.

Beyond Border Externalisation

The main challenge facing EU migration and asylum law is having to find a delicate balance between safeguarding human rights and preserving Member States’ interests in public order, security, and migration control. While EU law emphasises fundamental rights protections, MS are instead more concerned with maintaining control over their borders and migration flows, resulting in the so-called Fortress Europe, an expression which highlights the EU’s increasingly securitised and restrictive approach to migration regulation. Policies and legislation prioritise deterrence, externalisation, and containment instead of increasing access to protection and legal migration pathways. The Italy-Albania agreement is part of this paradigm, as it outsources asylum processing to a third-country territory, leading to significant concerns about diminished legal safeguards and compliance with human rights. This ongoing dilemma has resulted in litigation in the area of asylum and migration between the MS and the European Courts (ECJ and ECtHR). 

As a viable alternative to reconcile these competing interests, scholars advocate for the extension of Article 25 of the Visa Code, which allows MS to grant short-stay visas with limited territorial validity on humanitarian grounds. Such an approach offers several advantages: it enhances the protection of migrants’ fundamental rights by allowing them to seek asylum safely and legally, reduces their reliance on human traffickers, and consequently lowers the risks of dangerous journeys, violence, and inhuman or degrading treatment. Additionally, by creating legal pathways for migration, it contributes to the reduction of irregular migration, the main objective of Italian and EU migration policy. In conclusion, humanitarian visas offer a rights-based alternative, allowing MS to uphold international obligations while at the same time supporting their interest in managing migration effectively.