From Belfast to Belgrade and Pristina: Lessons from the Good Friday Agreement

With the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue consistently failing to bear fruit, hope for meaningful advancements may well be weak. The year 2023 saw rising tensions, with a number of ethnic Serbs and NATO soldiers being injured in clashes in May 2023, for instance, and agreements between Serbia and Kosovo brokered by the EU lacking implementation. Amidst these challenges, the Ohrid Agreement[1] foresees self-governance for the Serbian community in line with the best European practices. This scenario finds a relevant parallel in Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement (GFA), which successfully resolved long-standing sectarian conflict through principles of autonomy and shared governance. A visit by Albin Kurti to Northern Ireland in February of this year, where the promotion of understanding between diverse communities was discussed, further illustrates that interest in the Northern Irish case does exist. Therefore, examining the progress made since the GFA’s inception in 1998 offers valuable insights and could potentially inform strategies to reinvigorate the stalled dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

The Good Friday Agreement: Passing the test of time?

In Ireland, the Troubles were a sectarian conflict between nationalists wishing to reunite Northern Ireland (NI) with the republic and unionists wishing to remain a part of the United Kingdom. It plagued the island for decades before the GFA brought an end to the violence. This February, power-sharing in Northern Ireland saw a nationalist first minister come to power for the first time. This historical event, and the rise of Irish-nationalist Sinn Féin (SF) both in Northern Ireland and the Republic, provide an opportune time to assess the situation in NI just over 25 years after the GFA and consider the value of this example for current and future conflict resolution, hoping perhaps to find hope – or cautionary tales – for negotiations surrounding Kosovo.

First of all, the fact that Michelle O’Neill becoming the first minister of NI represents a historic moment for the Emerald Ilse needs to be understood and put into context. Ever since the GFA, devolved government in NI has been defined by power-sharing between nationalists and unionists. The offices of First Minister and Deputy First Minister have always been held by one member from either community. Until this year, the top job has always been held by a unionist, with the Deputy First Minister being the highest office SF has ever filled in NI. As a nationalist party with historic links to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a group responsible for about half of all deaths during the Troubles, their victory in the 2022 elections, leaving them the largest party in the NI assembly, sent shockwaves. Given the fact that NI has never had a nationalist first minister and the sentiments many feel towards SF due to their historical baggage, one is left to wonder what this means for Northern Ireland’s future.

Collaborative attempts and political realities

While deep differences in political perspectives between nationalists and unionists remain, the leaders of NI’s new devolved government are trying to show a united front. Campaigning is one example of an area where the two communities present significant differences. Unionists are still using more traditional tactics based in fearmongering about the prospect of nationalist leadership in NI, while nationalist SF has turned to everyday policy. Upon taking office, the effort to put differences aside commences, and Michelle O’Neill has been very vocal about wanting to govern for all in Northern Ireland. She makes such promises after several actions nationalists would usually refrain from, like attending the King’s coronation, or congratulating the Queen on her jubilee. Similarly, Deputy First Minister Emma Little-Pengelly and the education minister, both members of the right-wing Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), have been visiting Gaelic Football clubs and Irish language schools to show their commitment extends to communities that they themselves may not be a part of. While seeing this may provide for some hope, only time will tell whether real, productive, collaboration between nationalists and unionists will prevail, or if it is all just gesture politics.

The fact of the matter is that many see nationalism and SF as existential threats to their identity and safety in NI. Linking SF to the IRA and the deaths caused in the past is still frequently used by parties like the DUP, considering fear of the nationalist party as entirely rational and justified because of this past. Adding a fear of political marginalisation due to a nationalist party taking over as NI’s largest party creates a scary mix for many. This fear of marginalisation is certainly not helped by the fact that unionism, a strong movement in and of itself, lacks the strong leadership which is seen on the nationalist side, with the recent political turmoil after a leadership resignation only being one example. Unfavourable political realities coupled with fears linked to a violent past may well be creating strong motivators playing on sectarian grievances.

Several perceived political injustices are even leading to some occurrences of violence already. The release of a number of prisoners detained for acts of violence during the Troubles proved an extremely divisive part of the GFA from the start and may well begin to explain why the GFA only just received majority support from unionists in 1998 (around 57%) and would likely not receive such support today (only 34% indicated they would support the deal in a recent poll by the Belfast Telegraph). The replacement of the Royal Ulster Constabulary with the Police Service of Northern Ireland shortly after the GFA, which saw the removal of the royal name and symbols and an increase in catholic recruits, was another unpopular step for the loyalist community. More recently, Brexit has led to a divide between NI and the rest of the United Kingdom (UK), with their link to Ireland arguably being deemed more important than that to the UK. This accumulation of perceived political losses has also gone beyond peaceful dissatisfaction, with the terror threat level having to be raised back up to severe in 2023 after politically motivated violence. With unionists already viewing their situation as one of constant deterioration, the prospect of a nationalist first minister may be dangerous to Northern Ireland’s delicate balance of power.

In this, it is important to note the changes SF has gone through to get where it is now and how voters are choosing the party for reasons other than Irish unity. Since 2016, the party has shifted their main focus from one fixed on uniting Ireland to an agenda hoping to appeal to the island’s anti-establishment left. Focusing on the cost-of-living crisis and improving the health service proved to be a winning strategy during the recent Northern Irish elections. For a party whose main goal has always been the unification of Ireland,  polling by the University of Liverpool found that only 19.1% of their first preference voters claim to have supported them to “advance Irish unity”. Sinn Féin has also seen new leadership, particularly a new party leader Mary Lou McDonald, since 2018. The new rhetoric this has produced, speaking of wanting to create an Ireland of equals and achieve a “planned, orderly, democratic and entirely peaceful” unification, has further appealed to many. Such shifts in focus and messaging lead one to question how these recent changes will reflect on governance and cooperation with unionists.

Having said that, SF’s main goal is still the unification of Ireland, and developments on multiple levels favour that cause. The goal itself figures immediately at the beginning of Sinn Féin’s most recent manifesto, and it’s the demographic shifts with NI now having more Catholics than Protestants that are raising some nationalists’ hopes. Furthermore, Brexit has added arguments in favour of unification, with 68% of NI citizens of the opinion that it has made a united Ireland more likely. Political developments in the Republic of Ireland have also been favourable with SF having held a strong lead in the polls. A recent reduction in support does, however, put the positive momentum into question before the general elections occur within a year. Therefore, with trends in NI undoubtedly favourable to Sinn Féin, it seems that elections coming up in the Republic of Ireland will be the ones to watch.

A case for Kosovo?

When thinking of connecting the Northern Irish case with the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations, we must take into account, that both situations present more than just similarities. So, while it is true that the EU plays a significant role in both cases and both see the international community committed to a peaceful resolution, many differences must be noted. For one, Ireland was already a fully independent country, recognized by the UK, when the GFA was being negotiated. This equates to a significant difference to the Kosovan issue, where questions about sovereignty and international law are far more fundamental. Membership in international organizations, for instance, is a big issue for Serbia in the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations, and it is a good example of the fact that the disputes are by no means the same. Adding to this the differences in geography, which may have made ending the Troubles a higher priority to nations like the United States and the UK, as well as the fact that the GFA was approved by referendum while the Ohrid agreement remains unsigned and with a questionable destiny, the differences begin to pile up. This certainly questions whether the GFA can be seen as a meaningful example to follow.

It, therefore, becomes clear that Northern Ireland certainly is not a perfect model and that the circumstances that allowed the Good Friday Agreement to come to fruition are deeply specific to the region. First of all, the fact that both Ireland and the UK were already members of the European Union allowed NI to stay part of the UK while having no hard border to the republic in the first place. Furthermore, the involvement of the United States (US) in the peace talks could only work the way it did because the US was considered a partner by both sides. Moreover, it must also be noted that the GFA represents a comprehensive agreement, while the Ohrid agreement is far from comprehensive and quite short. For this reason, the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations would have a long way to go even if the GFA presented a viable option to follow. In addition to this, with violence still occurring and the potential for future conflict still very much alive in Northern Ireland, one could also question whether the GFA actually put an end to the conflict, or if it only paused it. This leaves us facing the reality that Northern Ireland likely does not provide a viable blueprint one could follow in the Belgrade-Pristina talks. However, one can still at least find hope in the fact that the GFA does show that breakthroughs in long-standing conflicts where a resolution seems hopeless are possible.

[1] This refers to the Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, which is better known under the name taken from the city of Ohrid, where the annex was agreed upon in March 2022 (despite the agreement itself being made in February 2023 in Brussels)