Ursula von der Leyen on Thin Ice – How to Interpret the Vote of No Confidence Against the President of the European Commission?

Less than a year after the new European Commission was formed, a vote of no confidence was already being held against the leader occupying the highest executive position in the European Union. For many, this news came out of nowhere – not only because of the political weight of such an act, but also because this kind of procedure is extremely rarely initiated. In European political culture, a vote of no confidence signals growing discontent and serves as a symbolic “yellow card”. That is precisely why the current attempt to pass a vote of no confidence against Ursula von der Leyen has attracted so much attention – both within political circles and among the wider public. Although the vote ultimately failed, it has opened up many questions and sparked debates regarding the future work of the Commission. Given the importance of this issue, the following text will explain whether this move constitutes a precedent in EU history, how the voting results should be interpreted, how the decision to initiate the procedure came about, what the key criticisms of the Commission President’s work are, and what all this could mean for her future political career.

Is This a Precedent and How Should the Voting Results Be Interpreted?

In the modern history of the EU, a formal procedure has occurred only once – in 2014, against von der Leyen’s predecessor, Jean-Claude Juncker. The initiative against him was launched following the “LuxLeaks” scandal, when it emerged that, while serving as Prime Minister of Luxembourg, he had enabled multinational companies to avoid paying taxes through aggressive tax agreements. Unlike that attempt, which ended unsuccessfully and without major political consequences, the mere threat of a vote of no confidence had far more serious consequences in 1999. At that time, the entire Commission under the leadership of Jacques Santer collectively resigned, under pressure from allegations of corruption, favouritism, and mismanagement of funds. It was the first and only time that the Union’s executive body brought itself down – an event that simultaneously strengthened the role of the European Parliament. Of these two historical examples, Ursula von der Leyen’s case more closely resembles that of Jean-Claude Juncker, given that in both instances a vote of no confidence was initiated – but ultimately failed.

The fact that a two-thirds majority of MEPs was required to force a dismissal significantly raised the bar and, from the outset, limited the realistic possibility of bringing down the Commission. Assuming her political family – the European People’s Party (EPP) – remained loyal, it would have been necessary for the second-largest group, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), along with another group (Liberals, Greens or the Left), to join forces with all the groupings to the right of the EPP (Conservatives and Reformists, Patriots and Sovereignists). Such a scenario was difficult to imagine, considering the consistent stance of most left of centre political families that they should under no circumstances cooperate with the far right – not even when they share serious criticisms of von der Leyen’s performance. Nevertheless, the Socialdemocrats shrewdly seized the moment to score a political point, conditioning their support on the preservation of the European Social Fund, which is aimed at fighting poverty and supporting vulnerable groups as part of the upcoming negotiations on the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework. Ultimately, such intricacies explain the final result: 175 votes in favour of dismissal, 360 against, 18 abstentions – while as many as 160 MEPs did not vote at all.

How Did the Vote of No Confidence Come About?

The vote of no confidence against Ursula von der Leyen did not come out of the blue, even though it may have seemed that way to the broader public. The initiative was originally launched by a Romanian MEP from the eurosceptic and right-leaning group European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), as a direct response to the so-called “Pfizergate” scandal. Von der Leyen has been criticised for failing to disclose all private messages she exchanged with the CEO of pharmaceutical giant Pfizer during negotiations over vaccine procurement for the EU at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Her counterargument from the very beginning was that the content of those messages was not significant enough to be classified as official documents – and therefore were neither recorded nor subject to public or media disclosure.

Although several years have passed since the scandal first broke, it has returned to the forefront due to the fact that the European Court of Justice ruled on 14 May 2025 that the Commission had breached the principle of good administration by failing to provide a credible explanation as to why those messages were never disclosed. In addition, as the initiators of the vote of no confidence point out, the investigation by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), launched in 2022 against the European Commission, is still ongoing in 2025. Taking all this into account, along with other criticisms, the authors of the initiative argue that the vote of no confidence is essentially a vote on the necessity to “uphold the principles of transparency, accountability, and good governance essential to a democratic Union”. The fact that only one tenth of the total number of MEPs was needed to initiate the vote made it easier for critics of the current EU administration to turn the European Parliament’s plenary session into a megaphone to win extra points among the eurosceptic population – even though it was widely expected that von der Leyen would “survive” this removal attempt.

What Else Is Ursula von der Leyen Criticised For?

Although she emerged unexpectedly in 2019, on the recommendation of Emmanuel Macron, as a product of political compromise, von der Leyen gradually built an image during her term as an independent, strong, and determined leader. While these traits were expected to be her political strengths, for her critics, they have instead become the basis for intensifying accusations of excessive centralisation of power. It is increasingly said that the most important decisions are made suddenly and in consultation with a narrow circle of close advisers, bypassing the broader institutional structure. On the one hand, the European Parliament – which traditionally seeks to strengthen its role as the EU’s most democratic institution with directly elected members – has voiced dissatisfaction with this practice. On the other hand, member states also often lack trust in this leadership style, as they are reluctant for the supranational Commission to assume too dominant a role – especially in areas where member states have historically taken the lead.

What her critics call a “centralisation of power”, von der Leyen views as a necessary method for enabling the Union to respond more quickly and effectively to the multiple crises surrounding it. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Commission President’s leadership style has, in such circumstances, often left both member states and the European Parliament facing a fait accompli. This approach was particularly evident during the pandemic, when the Commission’s role as the main negotiator increased, and it preferred to conduct talks with pharmaceutical companies behind closed doors. A more illustrative but considerably less controversial example often cited is the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Although it is an initiative with a positive political aim, its development was so swift and centralised that even the European Commission admitted there had been no time for meaningful consultations with all relevant stakeholders – something that would ordinarily be considered standard practice.

What does this mean for her political future?

Despite numerous criticisms, the potential consequences of von der Leyen’s leadership style should not necessarily be overstated. If dissatisfaction among members of the European Parliament had truly been that significant, von der Leyen would not have been re-elected in 2024. Similarly, if the member states had seriously objected to her way of governance, it would not have been possible to reach a consensus, for a second time, on her nomination in the European Council. In terms of individual policies, the EU has actually been a leader – despite accusations of insufficient transparency – when it came to providing citizens of the Union with access to vaccines during the pandemic, including citizens from candidate countries. Regarding the New Growth Plan, although it was adopted quickly due to the fact that the previous institutional cycle was nearing its end, today no one disputes its importance and value; on the contrary, it has become a much-needed impetus for the candidate countries.

As for the specific Pfizergate affair, the Commission will now likely have to reconsider the initial request for access, conduct an appropriate search, and provide new legal justification if it again refuses to release the requested documents. The Court of Justice of the EU has noted that the Commission’s interpretation of what qualifies as a document – and how long such documents must be retained – does not strip anyone of the right to request access to documents, nor does it exempt the Commission from the obligation to search for them. The Commission’s internal practices may now come under additional scrutiny, and this EU institution may need to clarify its own internal rules. This ruling, along with the political pressure that will increasingly accompany the Commission’s work in the coming period, actually creates an opportunity for the institution to commit even more strongly to transparency issues.

At a time when the EU is facing growing internal pressure – primarily through the strengthening of Eurosceptic parties – the way in which institutions, particularly the European Commission, respond to demands for greater transparency and accountability will become a key indicator of their democratic capacity. Addressing these issues will not be merely technical or procedural – it will shape the narrative of the Union’s credibility in the coming years. Considering that the next European Parliament elections are expected in 2029 – when von der Leyen could once again aim to remain at the helm of the Commission – the message is clear: time is running out. Her next challenge comes as early as next week, when she will present the draft of the Multiannual Financial Framework, the most important document of this mandate, which is supposed to cover the period from 2028 to 2034. The way von der Leyen leads this process will serve as a test of her political skills, as well as an indicator of the actual support she enjoys among member states and members of the European Parliament.

Previously published on EUpravozato.