Overcoming the Status of a “Limbo State” in the Context of European Integration: Clear and Concise Recommendations for Serbia

Serbia has long been facing a challenge that can be classified under the concept of a “limbo state”. Essentially, a limbo state can be defined as one whose defining characteristic becomes the inability—or perhaps unwillingness—of its leadership to break free from the status quo. However, the essence of this concept goes beyond the idea of mere stagnation, encompassing:

1. Absence of a Clear and Decisive Vision: There is a lack of clarity and determination in how the leadership envisions the country in the future. In this context, “future” refers to a timeframe that surpasses short-term goals of a few years, pointing instead to the ultimate aim or imagined “destiny” of the country.
2. Ambiguous Reforms: Reforms, if any, lack a coherent and well-defined agenda, contributing to their ambiguity. In such cases, reforms are often implemented merely to create the appearance of leadership responding to the immediate concerns of citizens rather than being part of a broader vision.
3. Persistent Social Perception of Limbo as the Only Certainty: Society widely perceives it as impossible to predict where the country will be in five to ten years, let alone several decades. This, in turn, fosters a sense of apathy, creating an environment that deepens feelings of fatigue, dissatisfaction, and hopelessness.

Although inherently pessimistic, this concept also serves as a call to action, demanding collective attention and efforts to assist the states in question to overcome their (self-imposed) challenges. The concept applies to Serbia in a threefold manner:

1. Misalignment with the EU Path: Officially, EU membership is Serbia’s strategic priority. However, reality paints a different picture. The European Commission, along with the European Parliament and member states, has consistently flagged anti-European and Eurosceptic rhetoric from Serbia’s top officials. Consequently, Serbia often acts in a direction opposite to what would be expected from a country aspiring to join the Union.
2. Ineffective Reforms: While certain reforms strongly supported by the EU—such as constitutional amendments or media law reforms—are being undertaken, these changes (even when normatively positive) are unlikely to have a significant impact on the ground. In such a scenario, the transformation of the political and social landscape—the core aim of the accession process as envisioned by the EU—will remain unrealised due to the state’s unwillingness to change the status quo.
3. Public Disillusionment: Opinion polls consistently show that a simple majority of citizens do not believe Serbia will ever become an EU member. Citizens lack motivation to engage strongly and energetically in changing the status quo, influenced by the belief that, regardless of their efforts, such a status cannot be altered.

With these three challenges, in a country like Serbia, where the future is uncertain, only one undeniable certainty emerges: a persistent sense of being in limbo. This perpetuates existing problems and deepens distrust in both domestic actors and the European integration process.

Although the path to overcoming this status is not easy, it is nonetheless achievable. Serbia must recognise that the European integration process is not merely a technical task but a profound societal transformation that requires the commitment of all segments of society. This is an opportunity not only for economic and political progress but also for building a society based on justice, equality, and solidarity—the values at the core of the EU. Now that it is openly discussed that Montenegro might become the 28^th EU member state by 2028, it is the right moment for Serbia to turn a new page. To pull itself out of the status of a “limbo state” and move closer to EU membership, Serbia ought to take the following steps:

1. Define a Clear and Decisive Vision of a European Future

The first step is to define a clear and decisive vision for Serbia’s future within the EU. This vision must transcend formal declarations and be integrated into all aspects of state policy. Leadership must demonstrate unwavering commitment to European values and standards, providing citizens with a clear direction and restoring trust in the European integration process. Ministers must uniformly embrace a pro-European agenda; otherwise, public scepticism about Serbia’s long-term prospects will persist.

2. Communicate Objectively About the Accession Process

Linked to the first step, clear communication about the European integration process is essential to building public trust. To date, this has been lacking, leaving most citizens unaware of the extent to which the EU has supported Serbia. To change this, the government must regularly inform the public about both the benefits of EU accession and the obligations Serbia must fulfil. This communication should be fact-based and free from political bias to give citizens a realistic understanding of what EU membership entails.

3. Implement the Reform Agenda Thoroughly

Clearer communication must be matched by tangible action. Reforms are at the core of the EU accession process. Democratic values form the foundation of the EU, and candidates are expected to adhere to the same standards. With Serbia recently adopting its Reform Agenda as part of the EU’s New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, it is crucial to implement the agreed-upon reform indicators consistently and effectively. Commitment to comprehensive reforms will unlock additional EU funds and improve Serbia’s standing in the EU.

4. Align Gradually with EU’s Foreign Policy Vision

A key requirement for EU membership is alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Given Serbia’s complex relationships with Eastern partners, an overnight policy shift is unrealistic. However, Serbia must demonstrate clear intent through gradual alignment with EU foreign policy positions, including stances on global issues and sanctions. Recent cooperation with the EU in aiding Ukraine and preventing sanctions evasion via Serbian territory is a positive signal, but further steps are needed. To begin opening clusters and closing chapters, further progress in foreign policy alignment will be of crucial importance.

5. Involve Civil Society as a Partner

The EU integration process is not solely a government responsibility; it requires the active participation of the entire society. Civil society—NGOs, academia, and citizens—should be involved in the reform process through consultations, public debates, and joint initiatives. Although civil society, for example, was consulted during the drafting of the Reform Agenda, the process was conducted in a way that did not allow for deeper and more substantial contributions that could have fundamentally influenced the content of the document. Collaboration with civil society should move beyond a formal ticking-the-box exercise and become an integral part of EU integration. Given the government’s previous distrustful relationship with the civil sector, often characterised by antagonism, it is essential to make a decisive shift in this regard.

6. Show Respect for all EU Institutions and Member States

It is important to remember that the EU enlargement policy is based on the principle of unanimity among member states in the EU Council. Additionally, alongside the support of the European Commission, the final stage of the process requires the approval of the European Parliament to achieve membership. However, it has been evident so far that the Serbian government has not treated EU member states and institutions equally. For example, officials from Croatia and, more recently Estonia, have frequently been targets of open attacks. Similarly, the European Parliament has often been a subject of criticism, which intensified after Croatian MEP Tonino Picula was appointed as rapporteur for Serbia. The insults directed from Belgrade at these institutions and EU member states represent behaviour inappropriate for a candidate country. Even if Serbia successfully implements all reforms, some member states might decide to veto its accession solely due to damaged relations caused by such offences. To avoid further complications and risks for the European integration process, all EU member states and institutions must be treated with equal respect, regardless of any disagreements.

7. Request Access to EU Institutions

Serbia has an opportunity to leverage gradual or staged accession to benefit from closer integration with the EU even before formal membership, thereby maximising the advantages of the pre-accession process. In this context, Serbia should take the initiative and request that the EU and its institutions open the door to broader cooperation as Serbia progresses toward membership. Specifically, Serbia could propose mechanisms that would enable it to participate in a greater number of EU bodies and working groups—without voting rights, of course—but with the aim of gaining experience, socialising and improving its image. Through direct and constructive involvement in EU institutions, Serbia could demonstrate that it is a credible partner and that its membership would have added value to strengthening the EU. To achieve this goal, a clear and strategically designed initiative from Serbia is essential, one that—ideally—aligns with efforts from other candidate countries.

8. Commit to 2027 as the Year for Meeting Obligations

Unlike Serbia, the European Commission, in its latest Enlargement Package, has endorsed the timelines proposed by Montenegro and Albania for concluding accession negotiations—Podgorica has set 2026 as its goal, while Tirana aims for 2027. Although Serbian authorities have previously publicly expressed their intention to fully align with EU legislation by the end of 2027, this was not enough for the European Commission to back a specific timeframe. Consequently, Serbia has lost its status as a leader in the negotiations, ceding that position to Albania, which, along with Montenegro, is advancing rapidly toward membership. The reason for Serbia’s lagging behind lies in a fundamental misunderstanding that the accession process is solely about legal alignment. However, it also entails foreign policy alignment and the resolution of other key issues, particularly the normalisation of relations with Pristina. Without addressing these challenges, legal alignment alone is insufficient for meaningful progress. To avoid missing the fast track, it will be of paramount importance for Serbia to convincingly demonstrate to EU institutions and member states that it genuinely plans to conclude negotiations by 2027, rather than merely achieving alignment with EU legislation.

…

Overcoming the status of a “limbo state” is a challenging but not impossible task. The opportunity to achieve this goal lies in leveraging the current momentum for EU enlargement, which undeniably exists. Montenegro and other candidate countries are using this momentum effectively, making significant progress toward their membership in the Union. Serbia, on the other hand, must urgently recognise this opportunity and take concrete steps to join this wave of rapid change. Serbia can regain its leadership position among candidate countries by implementing substantial reforms, addressing key foreign policy issues, resolving regional relations, and improving its engagement with EU institutions and member states. Achieving this requires a clearly defined strategy, strong political will, and the mobilisation of the entire society to work collectively toward the goal of EU membership.