Local Elections in Kosovo: The Return of the Serbian List and the Future of the Serbian Community

Introduction

During the past weekend, local elections were held throughout Kosovo*[1] in all cities and local self-government units. The elections were organized amid a political and constitutional crisis resulting from the inability to constitute the assembly and form a government following the parliamentary elections held in February. In this context, parties entered the campaign with significant uncertainty regarding the results. These local elections are particularly important because they will almost certainly influence the resolution of the political crisis and the formation of the government. The party or parties that achieve the best results will be able to influence the government-formation process from a position of power.

On the other hand, the context in which elections are being held in the north, where Serbs constitute the majority ethnic community, is significantly different from the rest of Kosovo. Namely, in 2023, Albanian mayors took over four predominantly Serbian municipalities: North (Kosovska) Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavić, due to the withdrawal from institutions and the boycott of local elections by Serbian political representatives. Although illegitimate, the Albanian mayors in these majority-Serb areas assumed office and managed local self-governments until the end of their terms. Thus, these elections represent an opportunity for Serbian political representatives to return to institutions after nearly three years and to ease the pressures and challenging position in which the Serbian community has found itself in recent years.

Election Results in Serbian-Majority Areas

            Local elections in Kosovo are largely different from those in Serbia. Specifically, mayors are elected directly, while at the same time members of local assemblies are elected through open electoral lists. This means that citizens vote preferentially, by name and surname. When it comes to mayoral elections, if no candidate receives over 50% of the votes in the first round, the two candidates with the highest number of votes proceed to a second round. Additionally, elections are held every four years simultaneously in all local self-government units. If changes or extraordinary elections occur in the period between regular elections, the mandate of councilors or mayors is valid only until the next regular local elections.

               The Serbian List (SL), after nearly three years, returned to power in all four municipalities, achieving decisive victories already in the first round. Despite strong political competition from various parties and citizen movements, such as the Serbian Democracy led by Aleksandar Arsenijević or the Civic Initiative “North for All” led by Marko Jakšić, the Serbian List managed to secure victories in all four municipalities. This outcome will certainly provide some relief to the Serbian community, which in previous years had been exposed to institutional pressures without adequate protection. The presence of special police forces, checkpoints in the north, illegal expropriation of property, construction of military posts, and street name changes are just some of the challenges Serbs have faced in the northern municipalities. Although one should not expect that a change in local authorities will immediately resolve all these problems, which it will not, the Serbian community will now at least have some form of institutional protection, even if minimal. However, the presence of special police forces and the previous practice of exceeding authority remain under the control of the central government in Pristina, so it is uncertain how much influence mayors or municipal presidents will have over the deployment of these forces. Where mayors will certainly have influence and authority is in the appointment of commanders of the Kosovo Police (KP) for the northern region. In the long term, this could help ease the situation, but the effects are still distant.        

In the enclaves south of the Ibar, the Serbian List also secured victories. It was particularly challenging in Gračanica, where several Albanian parties united on a joint list, posing a serious threat to outweigh the divided Serbian political representatives. Therefore, maintaining power in this Serbian area near Pristina represents a great relief for the remaining Serbs living there. In addition to Gračanica, the Serbian List also achieved good results in the following municipalities: Štrpce, Parteš, Ranilug, and Novo Brdo. The Central Election Commission (CEC) stated that the Serbian List won in nine out of ten municipalities with a majority Serbian population, while a second round will be held in Klokot. After participating in the parliamentary elections in February, the process of returning to the institutions of Kosovo is now gaining full momentum following the local elections. However, the return of political representatives marks only the beginning of this process.

When it comes to full reintegration, this process will almost certainly be long and arduous. Although political representatives are now fully returning to the system, this is not the case for administrative staff in the north, judges and prosecutors, or the police. Serbian representatives in the judiciary and police voluntarily left their positions in November 2022, while Serbs employed in local administration were dismissed in 2023 after Albanian mayors took over the municipalities. For now, all of them remain outside Kosovo’s institutions. Regarding the administration, the positions vacated by dismissed Serbs have, in the meantime, mostly been filled by Albanians. It will now be very difficult to dismiss the existing administration due to a lack of legal grounds. Secondly, employment in the police falls under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is controlled by Vetëvendosje (Self-determination Movement), so one should not expect willingness to open new positions in the north, and it is particularly unrealistic to expect that police officers who returned their uniforms and weapons would be reissued them. Thirdly, a similar situation can be expected in the judiciary. Albanian judges and prosecutors have filled the vacuum and taken over the cases of their Serbian colleagues. The Ministry of Justice has no incentive to reinstate Serbian legal professionals. For a mass return of Serbs to institutions, primarily in the police and judiciary, it is essential that this be part of a broader political agreement in dialogue with Belgrade and with insistence from the EU and the Quint countries. Without this, one should not be under the illusion that the government in Pristina will proactively promote reintegration.

The Community of Serbian Municipalities – One Step Closer or Not?

               Now that the return of political representatives to local institutions has been finalised, the basic condition for the creation of the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (CSMM) has been met – local governments with the political will to implement this process. However, the formation of the CSMM does not depend solely on local self-governments; it largely depends on the central authorities, which must formally initiate the process by issuing a special decree. The adoption of this decision will largely depend on who forms the government in the upcoming period. Since the constitutional crisis has ended and the assembly has been constituted, the chances of Vetëvendosje forming the government are increasing. Vetëvendosje has always been a staunch opponent of the CSMM, and if a Kurti III government is formed, the prospects for creating the CSMM remain slim. Only strong pressure from the EU and the international community could change this, but such pressures have not been successful so far.

The second scenario involves a change of government in Pristina, which would mean that the new prime minister is more receptive to the Serbian community and, more broadly, to the process of normalising relations. Opposition parties in Kosovo, primarily the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), could, in theory, form a parliamentary majority necessary to establish a government and potentially include the Serbian List in it. The Serbian List has experience cooperating with both the PDK and now the LDK, as well as with the AAK over the past ten years, which is not the case with Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje. This would likely result in a less stable government, dependent on the support of the Serbian List and more inclined to heed advice from Brussels. In such a scenario, progress could be made regarding the adoption of the CSMM statute proposed by the EU in 2023. This outcome would likely also help in lifting the restrictive measures that the EU imposed on Kosovo in June of the same year.

The third scenario, which also carries a significant likelihood, is new parliamentary elections. Considering that Vetëvendosje does not have a parliamentary majority to form a government, and the opposition parties are unable to create a united bloc against Vetëvendosje, the political deadlock will likely be resolved through extraordinary parliamentary elections after the constitutional deadlines expire. In such a situation, any issues regarding the CSMM and the autonomy of Serbs in Kosovo would inevitably be postponed until 2026, with the formation of a new government, or possibly even later.

Instead of a Conclusion: General Overview of the Results in the Rest of Kosovo

               Regarding the results of the local elections in the rest of Kosovo, according to the results published on the CEC website, mayors were elected in the first round in 21 municipalities, while in 17 municipalities the decision will be made in the second round on November 9. Notably, voter turnout was very low, averaging 39%. Vetëvendosje, previously the strongest political option in the parliamentary elections in February, suffered a significant defeat in the local elections. The only first-round victories for this movement were in smaller municipalities such as Podujeve, Kamenice, and Shtime. Major cities like Pristina (heading to a second round), Prizren, Peje, and South Mitrovica ended up in the hands of the opposition. The PDK declared victory in the local elections, having won the most municipalities in the first round and participating in the majority of municipalities heading to the second round. With this outcome, Vetëvendosje continued its negative trend, undermining its position and complicating its prospects for forming a government.

[1] This designation is without prejudice to final status of Kosovo and is in line with Resolution 1244 (1999) UNSC and advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on unilateral declaration of independence.