I was in Moldova on the Election Day – Here’s What it Looked Like

The long-awaited parliamentary elections in Moldova were scheduled for 28 September 2025. The key question was whether the country, with the Party for Action and Solidarity (PAS), would move toward the West and the European Union, or whether, with the Patriotic Bloc, it would gravitate toward the East and Russia. Coincidentally, my flight to Chișinău was scheduled on the same date. Considering that political developments in Moldova are not particularly well known to the domestic public, in what follows, I share my personal impressions, analyse the results, and explain why these elections were important – relying on my own observations and conversations with Moldovan experts.

Arrival of the First Problems

Even before I set off for Moldova, I knew there was about a 30% risk that I would not even be allowed through passport control. The reason was that, as recently publicly revealed by Moldovan President Maia Sandu, pro-Russian and militant-minded foreign nationals were being trained in paramilitary camps in Serbia, with the goal of destabilising Moldova during the elections. This was not the first time such claims had appeared – something similar happened in 2024, when suspects were arrested near Banja Luka for organising such camps. This time, just a few days before my trip, two individuals of Serbian nationality were arrested in Šabac, in direct response to the Moldovan president’s appeal; they were suspected of participating in the organisation and financing of training. To make matters worse, it was reported that the camps had been active from July to September, raising the question of why domestic institutions had not reacted in a timely manner.

With that in mind, I approached passport control and noticed that the officer suddenly became serious when he saw my Serbian passport. It was obvious that he had instructions to carefully scrutinise passengers from Serbia, especially on election day. He called two of his colleagues, and after a thorough examination of my passport, a barrage of questions followed: “Why are you travelling to Moldova? How long will you stay? Where are you staying? Who invited you? What is your profession? What is the name of the organisation you work for? What is the focus of your work?”. Despite the number of questions, while other passengers were passing freely beside me, the officers were not rude – just very cautious. Once it became clear that I would not be staying in Moldova long and that I was coming for a conference organised by civil society, they let me through. This episode, however, clearly illustrated that Moldova perceives Serbia as a risk factor.

Politics from the Perspective of an Ordinary Moldovan

There is no better way to understand how the “ordinary” Moldovan sees the elections than through a conversation with a taxi driver. After an unsuccessful attempt to find someone who spoke English, I decided to address him in Serbian – and the communication worked, since for many, the Russian language is a mother tongue. Relying on the closeness of Russian and Serbian languages, and with some help from ChatGPT, I asked the driver how he viewed the elections. At first, he shook his head and gave a thumbs down – a short and clear answer. However, after a few moments of silence, he opened up and became more talkative. Although at no point did he openly say which bloc he supported, his comments revealed a sense of overall resignation and distrust in the direction the country was heading.

His key criticism of President Maia Sandu was that, in his opinion, she does not recognise the Moldovan identity. He believed that her alleged insistence that Moldovans are actually Romanians represented an act that was contrary to reality. Although he did not deny that they speak the same language, he emphasised that they are “brotherly but different nations.” That was the moment when I realised that the narrative of “de-Moldovanisation” among sceptics is directly tied to the process of the country’s Europeanization, with the fear that rapprochement with the Union would also mean forcing the integration of Moldovan and Romanian identity, which would further polarise society. Shortly after, upon the end of this interesting ride, I learned that the basis for this narrative is the fact that President Sandu holds dual citizenship – Moldovan and Romanian – and that this is precisely the theme on which the pro-Russian opposition strongly insists and spreads.

Election Day and Results

Election day in Chișinău passed peacefully. When I arrived, I did not notice any signs of tension: no crowds, incidents, protests, or police presence. Instead, classical music was playing in the central park, and passersby who happened to be there stopped to listen. All of this was taking place right next to the Government building, from which the flags of Moldova and the European Union were hanging, stretching from the roof to the ground. I had never before seen such a large EU flag, not even in member states. The atmosphere, therefore, in no way resembled an election day – a moment when the strategic orientation of an until-recently neglected Eastern European country was supposed to be decided.

Before midnight, the official results were announced. The ruling pro-European party could breathe a sigh of relief – not only had it maintained the leading position, but it had also secured enough mandates to form a government on its own. The message from voters was unambiguous: they clearly favour accession to the EU and believe that European integration can be a lever for strengthening democracy and empowering the economy. For a country where pro-Russian forces had until recently held dominant influence, and which is still considered the poorest state in Europe, such a result represents a clear signal that Moldovans want to turn a new page – both domestically and in foreign policy.

The experts I spoke with the next day were more than relieved. While we had been arranging meetings earlier, it was easy to notice that they were under pressure and that their schedules were tight. Now, however, they spoke about European integration with visible relief. Their main impression was that Moldova’s European perspective is “irreversible.” According to them, the key advantage of this outcome is that the ruling party will not have to rely on coalition partners – as the polls had initially suggested.

Moldova is Ready for Negotiations – But is the EU?

Moldovans voted for the European path, but what remains now is for the Union itself to do its part. To begin with, the continuation of the implementation of the New Growth Plan for Moldova is expected, which provides a significant financial instrument of 1.9 billion euros. This plan is valid until the end of 2027 (modelled on the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans) and represents a combination of grants and loans, with opportunities for sectoral integration even before membership is achieved. Then, it is emphasised that it is important for Moldova (together with Ukraine) to open Cluster 1 as soon as possible. As experts point out, the screening process has been successfully completed, and Moldova would be ready to open that cluster, as well as clusters 2 and 3. They are certainly looking to Albania, which managed to open almost all clusters in a short period of time. Finally, the goal of the pro-European government is to complete negotiations by 2028, so that the accession act can be ratified by 2030. It is an ambitious goal, but also a mandate that the new government must now justify.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Moldova’s path to membership will also depend on the EU’s ability to unlock Ukraine’s accession process, which until now has been mostly blocked by Hungary. Just as Albania and North Macedonia were “coupled” for years – which meant that one had to wait for the other despite its own readiness – so too are Moldova and Ukraine now linked. For the time being, Moldova does not insist on “decoupling”, bearing in mind that the EU probably would not have even considered its case if it were not for Ukraine and its struggle against Russia. As experts point out, the Union’s goal will be to appease Hungary and prevent the emergence of new “veto players”. This would send a message not only to voters in Moldova, but also to candidate countries in the Western Balkans – especially those still balancing between East and West – that the policy of sitting on two chairs does not pay off, and that with clear commitment, even the most ambitious goals can be achieved.

A shorter, but original, version of this text can be found at: EUpravozato.