Denmark Now Heads the EU Council – What Does it Mean for the EU and the Western Balkans?

It is well known that Denmark has long been one of the “frugal” member states that has never been particularly keen on either deepening integration among members or expanding the borders of the Union. Now, as one of the most prosperous EU member states, it takes the helm of the Union for the eighth time, at a period of profound challenges. With the motto “A Strong Europe in a Changing World”, Denmark signals its newfound ambition to leave a mark by the end of the year and pave the way for the Union’s much-needed enhancement. Against this backdrop, the paper examines its presidency programme and outlines its potential implications for the Western Balkans.

From Sceptical to Proactive Member State

Denmark was long seen as a member state spearheading the “frugal four” alongside Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria. As one of the most prosperous countries in Europe, Denmark had little interest in changing its traditional position on various integrative policy initiatives. Its previous scepticism was evident through multiple opt-outs, including being the only member state to secure an exemption from adopting the euro and holding exceptions to Schengen rules due to strict migration policies. It also tended to limit the size of the EU budget and impose checks on joint EU borrowing, while refraining from participating in EU-led military missions, the Common Security and Defence Policy, and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This reflected Denmark’s highly cautious approach to any deeper integration that could further reduce its national sovereignty.

This reality changed with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Just months after it began, Danish citizens decisively supported, in a referendum, Denmark’s participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy for the first time. Since then, Denmark has increasingly taken geopolitical interests into account when shaping its stance on various initiatives. Upon assuming the presidency, Prime Minister Frederiksen warned that if Europe fails to rearm, “it’s game over,” stressing that defence spending must become “priority number one.” That the Danish PM would make such a statement – calling it the starting and ending point of all discussions – would have been difficult to imagine coming from Denmark in the past. At a time when the Trump administration was pressuring Copenhagen and questioning its sovereignty over Greenland, this geopolitical awakening and the need for stronger cooperation with European partners gained additional importance. With Russian aggression continuing, Denmark’s central focus will be to effectively coordinate member states in implementing the “Rearm Europe Plan – Readiness 2030,” including:

• Simplifying legislation and reducing administrative burdens to urgently close capacity gaps and support the defence industry.
• Building a true EU single defence market to enhance coordination among members and adopt common defence standards.
• Political and defence preparation for worst-case military scenarios.

With such a notable change of political course, Denmark’s EU presidency centres around building a strong and secure Europe amid rising geopolitical instability. Key priorities include enhancing EU security and defence, supporting Ukraine in all dimensions, managing migration effectively, protecting external borders, and strengthening the resilience of European democracies. Meanwhile, as one of the greenest EU states, Denmark will continue promoting its traditional priorities: a competitive and green Europe through economic reforms, single market development, digital and green transitions, technological sovereignty, and innovation. Finally, in line with the new trend aimed at combating the excessive bureaucratisation for which the Union has become known, Denmark will also advocate for the simplification of legislation in order to reduce administrative costs and strengthen competitiveness. In short, Denmark will aim to use its presidency to bridge its traditional caution with a more forward-leaning, reform-oriented leadership in response to Europe’s evolving challenges.

Denmark’s Enlargement Agenda

When assuming the presidency, every member state typically ensures that enlargement finds its place in the programme. What makes Denmark stand out is the fact that the word “enlargement” appears no fewer than 14 times in its programme. This is particularly significant given that Denmark’s support for the enlargement policy has never been something to take for granted, as it has not been among the countries known for unreserved enthusiasm on this issue. This time around, Denmark openly highlights that further EU enlargement is a “geopolitical necessity”, and thus the “only way” for the EU to effectively contribute to the stabilisation of the European continent and to strengthen the resilience of countries vulnerable to unwanted external influence. Accordingly, Denmark will prioritise both longstanding and newer candidate countries – namely, the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio. Given that Poland, Denmark’s predecessor, also prioritised enlargement, maintaining this kind of continuity is crucial when it comes to ensuring a consistent and credible enlargement agenda.

However, this does not mean that leniency is to be expected, especially considering that the accession criteria originated precisely in Copenhagen—essential reforms without which EU membership is unthinkable. In light of the Copenhagen criteria in mind, when Denmark speaks of a “merit-based approach” in its programme, it refers specifically to the following: 1) The candidate country must develop stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and protection of minorities (political criterion); 2) It must establish a functional market economy and demonstrate the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (economic criterion); and 3) It must show the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (legal criterion). In short, while candidates can count on Denmark’s support, it will be of little value unless they demonstrate a genuine commitment to reform.

Looking at the enlargement policy from a practical perspective, the coming period is expected to bring measurable progress with regard to candidate countries. Notably, Montenegro is set to close several chapters by the end of the year. The fact that it managed to close one of the most demanding chapters – Chapter 5, on public procurement—will pave the way for continued momentum and allow it to continue closing more chapters, thus keeping up its pace toward membership. As for Albania, having emerged as the new frontrunner, it has opened four out of six clusters so far. If this momentum continues, it could open the remaining clusters during Denmark’s presidency. In addition, Denmark is expected to prioritise resolving Hungary’s veto on Ukraine – and, by extension, on Moldova, since the two are still being treated as coupled. With the Council’s conclusions on enlargement due by the end of the year, Denmark is likely to push for concrete progress in this area, while also working to prevent any unwarranted vetoes by one or more member states that could derail candidates’ advancement.

As for the remaining candidates, the path ahead is more uncertain and challenging. Serbia, for instance, is currently under scrutiny due to the regime’s violent escalation against protesters and the overall shrinking space for free expression and civil society engagement. As things stand, there is no consensus on opening Cluster 3 – owing both due to these developments and Serbia’s continued lack of alignment with the EU’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that Serbia, having already received 7% in pre-financing under the New Growth Plan – amounting to over €100 million – will continue to receive funds as it meets individual reform steps. However, this process not depend on the Council Presidency, as the keys to the New Growth Plan lie entirely in the hands of the European Commission. Regardless, given Denmark’s significant influence and reputation as a member state, it will be in the interest of Serbia, and all other candidates from the Western Balkans, to demonstrate a clear reform-oriented approach over the next six months if they hope to achieve membership in the foreseeable future.

EU Internal Reforms – A Prerequisite for Successful Enlargement

At the same time, one of the prerequisites for successful enlargement is strengthening the EU’s so-called “absorption capacity”. The Union’s ability to integrate new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration is a key element of general interest – both for the EU itself and for the candidate countries. For this reason, Denmark emphasises in its programme that, in order to prepare the EU for enlargement, its Presidency will continue to work on securing the Union’s internal reforms. The aim is to ensure that the EU can act independently and decisively in the current geopolitical environment, while effectively delivering on the political objectives set out in the European Council’s Strategic Agenda. These efforts will particularly rely on forthcoming in-depth pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews by the European Commission, thereby providing a strong, analytically grounded foundation for the next reform steps.

As part of this preparation, Denmark will insist on a careful examination of four areas of reform:

1. Values – As a member state with an impeccable record on democracy, Denmark will advocate for more effective protection and implementation of core values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights – both within the Union’s own borders and in candidate countries. The aim is to strengthen mechanisms for monitoring and preventing democratic backsliding in both current and future member states. One proposed approach is to make access to EU funds more strongly conditional on the state of democracy.
2. Individual Policies – Key EU policies, such as those on agriculture, energy, and migration, will need to be adapted in order to function within an expanded Union with more member states. This is particularly important in the context of Ukraine, whose membership could overstrain current policies and the Union’s capacity if no reforms are made. This is especially true of agricultural policy, which is a particularly sensitive area.
3. Budget – Consideration will be given to how to ensure an effective and sustainable distribution of financial resources in an enlarged EU, including the potential introduction of new sources of revenue. This is a particularly relevant issue at the moment, as negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – covering the period from 2028 to 2034 – will begin during Denmark’s presidency. At the same time, there are strong expectations that the EU will use the upcoming MFF to underscore its commitment to future members by earmarking a portion of funds – clearly signalling that enlargement is anticipated in the coming decade.
4. Decision-Making Processes – The EU will seek ways to reform its institutions and decision-making mechanisms in order to remain functional and effective in a Union with more than 30 members. Since becoming more ambitious in response to the war in Ukraine, Denmark joined the “Group of Friends” in late 2023 – a group advocating for the introduction of qualified majority voting in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Instead of unanimity, this method would allow decisions to be adopted if supported by at least 15 out of 27 member states, representing at least 65% of the EU’s population. Under such conditions, it is not unthinkable that Denmark could also support this voting method to some technical or interim steps of the enlargement policy.

In short, this Presidency is expected to be a transformative one for Denmark, providing an opportunity to partially rebrand itself and to demonstrate a greater readiness than ever before to engage in initiatives that promote both deeper integration among member states and accelerated yet merit-based enlargement.

Previously published on EUpravozato.