Albania as the New Frontrunner – Where Did That Come From?

In the context of enlargement policy, the term frontrunner – referring to a country that is ahead of others on its path to EU membership– has recently become increasingly common. This is due to the fact that, for the first time, it is being associated with Albania, a country that has managed to make rapid progress during its pre-accession process. Although it has held candidate status since June 2014, it only began accession negotiations in July 2022. At that moment, initial expectations were more than modest. However, since then – surprisingly to many, likely including the regime in Tirana – member states agreed to open as many as four clusters, or 23 chapters. This step is all the more significant considering that in three years Albania has achieved more than Serbia did in eleven years of negotiations, as the latter has only opened two clusters, or 22 chapters. To understand how this came to be, and what it means for Serbia, the following analysis explores the matter further.

Filling the Gap

From the very beginning, the term frontrunner was almost exclusively reserved for Montenegro and Serbia. This was because they were the only Western Balkan countries that managed to gain unanimous support from all member states to even start negotiations – others were not as fortunate, at least not until Russia’s aggression against Ukraine changed everything and raised the importance of enlargement policy. Montenegro started negotiations in June 2012 and opened all negotiation chapters by December 2017. Serbia, its neighbour, began talks two years later and opened around two-thirds of the chapters in the meantime. It was therefore not surprising that these two countries were viewed as entering the Union “as a package”, given the relatively small difference in their levels of preparedness. In 2018, the then-President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, even stated that he envisioned both Montenegro and Serbia as member states by 2025. That long-anticipated year has now arrived, and neither Montenegro nor Serbia has achieved that goal.

Part of the explanation for the lack of a breakthrough lay in the enlargement fatigue among the member states themselves (who did not necessarily share Juncker’s then-fresh optimism), but also in the fact that the Balkan candidates showed little concern about the “slowness” of the process. The European Commission reports repeatedly showed that all candidates lacked key reforms, without exception. However, since 2022, a divergence has emerged between Montenegro and Serbia: the former recognised the momentum created by the war in Ukraine and, despite challenging domestic political circumstances, formed a stable government, sent a clear pro-European message, and launched much-needed reforms. In contrast, Serbia continued pursuing its “four pillars” foreign policy while facing the largest civil protests in its modern history, with key reforms still lacking. As a result, Montenegro obtained the positive IBAR (Interim Benchmark Assessment Report), confirming progress in the rule of law, while Serbia still struggles to open Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth). In this context, Serbia has clearly lost its frontrunner status– something Albania has recognised and addressed through bold steps to fill that gap.

What’s Albania’s Secret?

There is no doubt that Albania long shared Serbia’s scepticism about the likelihood of opening EU membership doors. This partly explains its joint initiative with North Macedonia– Open Balkan. Although the leaders of this initiative publicly expressed a desire to accelerate and deepen regional economic integration– both in anticipation of and independent from EU membership– the initiative itself reflected the candidates’ frustration with the accession process. The EU viewed it uneasily, favouring its own initiative– the Common Regional Market – which already had the backing of all candidates. Although Tirana, along with Belgrade and Skopje, never officially rejected the EU-backed initiative, the message of Open Balkan was clear: if membership was not in sight, regional cooperation would move forward without the Union.

However, with the onset of the war in Ukraine, Prime Minister Edi Rama took actions that changed Albania’s European perspective for the better. First, Albania offered unambiguous support to Ukraine. It continued to fully align with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and implemented all related sanctions. Rama often became the vocal advocate of taking a strong stance against Russia. His speech in September 2023, as President of the UN Security Council, received broad media attention and political weight. It sent a clear message: Albania, in times of crisis, is a country the Union can count on– willing to even confront Russia if necessary. Tirana was again at the centre of European attention on 16 May 2025 when it successfully hosted the European Political Community summit. Though this format extends beyond the EU, it was no coincidence that Tirana was selected, given that the initiative aims to facilitate political dialogue and counter Russian aggression. At a time when Chapter 31 has become a de facto “blocking chapter” on which further negotiation progress depends– posing an added challenge for Serbia– for Albania, it has become a chapter of affirmation.

It is also significant that Rama successfully led a public relations campaign to present Albania as a pro-European country with strong ambitions. Noting that Montenegro had set a goal of meeting all membership criteria by the end of 2026, Albania adopted a similar approach and set its target for the end of 2027. The European Commission deemed both goals ambitious but necessary and pledged to support them. In addition, Rama succeeded in securing in 2023 the opening of a new College of Europe campus in Tirana. This prestigious university is viewed by many European officials as the foremost institution for studying and teaching EU integration and values. On top of that, Rama proved himself a pragmatic leader in 2023 by agreeing to host an Italian-managed extraterritorial migrant centre in Albania, in response to Italy’s migration challenges. Though this model ultimately did not take full shape, it held major political significance. Finally, during the parliamentary elections in May 2025, Rama based his campaign on a core promise: achieving EU membership in the near future. Thanks to these moves, Albania positioned itself not as a candidate waiting for the door to open– but one confidently unlocking it with its own initiatives.

Does Albania Have Time to Relax?

Despite its successful “PR offensive”, Albania has no time to relax. Andreas Schieder, the European Parliament rapporteur for Albania, said the country “can proudly be called a ‘front runner’ among the EU accession candidates, but we are not at the finishing line yet.” He added that it “is crucial to continue on this path with the same pace and dedication, fighting corruption and strengthening the rule of law”. In other words, Albania has quickly convinced all member states of its pro-European orientation– but much work remains to complete the needed reforms. The most significant reform package concerned vetting judges, but that alone is not enough. According to the European Commission’s October 2024 report, Albania was “moderately prepared” in the rule-of-law chapters, showing only “some progress”. The European Parliament’s March 2025 report also expressed concern about continued political interference and pressure on the judiciary. This shows that there is still a long way to go before Albania reaches the level of Montenegro, which remains the only candidate country actively closing remaining chapters– with no foreseeable new obstacles on its membership path.

Why Was Albania Able to Open So Many Clusters?

One might ask how Albania managed to open so many clusters despite clear room for improvement in the rule of law. Part of the answer lies in the methodological fact that Albania began negotiations only after the revised methodology was adopted in 2020. Under this methodology, the “roadmap for the rule of law chapters, equivalent to previous action plans, shall serve as the benchmark for opening.” In 2023, Albania received a positive report on meeting this sole benchmark, paving the way for opening the clusters. This is the key difference from Serbia, which has multiple benchmarks across different chapters– benchmarks set under the old rules. The difference, therefore, lies in the fact that the old methodology required meeting many essential reforms at the start (leading to a more even distribution of reforms across later phases), whereas the revised methodology focuses on rapid cluster opening, with more intense reforms after opening.

While it may sound trivial, this methodological shift has real political significance. If we imagine that the revised rules had been in place when Serbia began negotiations in 2014, it is likely that it would have already opened most clusters– since there would have been no benchmarks for opening. Conversely, in Albania’s case, the bulk of the work comes after clusters are opened, before chapters can be closed. The idea behind this approach was to offer strong political support to candidates by making the process less vulnerable to blockages and conditions, while sending a message to citizens that the process is dynamic and credible. Still, although Serbia agreed in 2021 to operate under these new rules– which explains the introduction of clusters in its case as well– those rules could not retroactively erase the previously established opening benchmarks. As such, it is clear that the cases of Albania and Serbia are not directly comparable. Strictly speaking, Albania may now have more open clusters/chapters, but that does not necessarily mean that it is more prepared for membership than Serbia in terms of adopting and implementing EU legislation.

A Lesson for Serbia

From the above, it becomes clear that Albania is indeed the political frontrunner, while technically it is close to– or even slightly behind– Serbia. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to overlook the significance of the substantial progress Albania has made in a short period of time. Even though it no longer faces benchmarks for opening clusters, that does not mean that one or more member states could not have used their veto when adopting the draft common position on a cluster. Therefore, Albania’s progress should be interpreted as a reflection of broad political recognition from the member states– recognition of Tirana’s commitment to seizing the current momentum. This sends an important message to Serbia, which still needs to demonstrate a similar level of political will and dedication. Serbia must understand that the accession process is no longer solely a matter of technical preparedness, but also a political process requiring clear, sincere, and multi-layered moves – those that will be unequivocally interpreted as steps toward full membership. In the event of prolonged stagnation, there is a real possibility that Albania could overtake Serbia even on the technical front in the near future. Accordingly, the current situation calls for Belgrade to wisely draw lessons from Tirana’s approach– and thus reclaim its place among those considered frontrunners in the EU accession process.

Originally published on EUpravozato.