As POLITICO Reports: Our Veto-limitation Proposal Gains Traction

The new member states’ veto powers could potentially be restricted, as POLITICO reports. The news resonated widely, given that it appeared in one of Brussels’ most influential media outlets covering EU affairs. The article cites Anton Hofreiter, Chair of the European Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, who stated that “future members should be required to waive their right of veto until key institutional reforms – such as the introduction of qualified majority voting in most policy areas – have been implemented”. A proposal of this kind takes on additional significance when we consider that it is intended to apply to our region – namely, the countries of the Western Balkans – as well as to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. However, this idea is not new. In fact, it was first developed by us at the European Policy Centre (CEP) in 2021 (together with Centre for European Policy Studies – CEPS), as one of the key pillars of the Template for Staged Accession. Given the public uncertainty surrounding what this idea entails and how it might affect us in the event of EU membership, I set out below to explain why we proposed and advocated it, and how it is designed to work in practice.

Origin of the idea

When we first conceived the idea of limiting veto powers for new members, the context was radically different. It was a period when few within the EU itself showed genuine interest in the enlargement policy, while domestic political elites were not particularly engaged either. The status quo – that is, a stagnant accession process – appeared to be the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future. In such difficult circumstances, we sought to “woo” the more sceptical member states by highlighting the strong potential of a credible enlargement policy to drive reforms, while also emphasising the geostrategic importance of the region – something that, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, became more than evident. We therefore tried to stress that, no matter how many other priorities the Union may have, it must not allow itself to neglect the region. However, even when our position was met with understanding, the response was usually that the Union itself was not yet ready to begin seriously considering enlargement, as it faced strong resistance to the necessary internal reforms. It was at that very moment that we experienced our “eureka moment”.

In rethinking our approach, we identified three fundamental pillars on which the solution needed to rest. First, we started from the premise that the EU’s capacity to absorb new members is one of the officially recognised criteria that must be seriously accounted for. This is why, for example, the EU implemented a series of internal reforms that enabled it to successfully integrate as many as 13 new members between 2004 and 2013. Second, we recognised that the current context is fundamentally different – it has become increasingly difficult to reach consensus on key issues, including constitutional changes – and there is a genuine risk that any internal reforms may ultimately fail to materialise. Finally, a scenario in which candidate countries meet all the membership criteria while the Union itself remains insufficiently reformed to admit them would have a devastating impact on both the Union’s credibility and the democratic processes within the candidate states. This is precisely where the idea of limiting the right of veto comes into play.

It is, therefore, a mechanism designed to ease the concerns of those member states that fear the Union could become more dysfunctional as it admits new members. Through this proposal, the EU would preserve its capacity to advance internal reforms without the risk of new members misusing their veto power. Moreover, newly admitted countries would not be able to use their voting rights to unilaterally block the accession of states still engaged in the negotiation process. In this sense, it represents a measure of last, but potentially necessary, resorts in a suboptimal scenario such as the one we are currently facing. The optimal scenario, of course, would be for the Union’s internal reforms to be implemented in a timely manner; however, experience shows that this is not very realistic at present. Today, for instance, at least ten member states have expressed reservations about moving towards qualified majority voting in the field of foreign policy – and this is only one of several areas in need of reform. That is why limiting the right of veto is increasingly being discussed as a solution that could unlock progress in the enlargement process – particularly given the growing number of candidate countries awaiting membership.

Realisation of the idea

When we first presented this idea, we encountered some resistance. On the one hand, the question was whether there was a legal basis for such a solution at all, and on the other, whether it would lead to the creation of the so-called “second-class membership”. Faced with such questions, some members instinctively raised their guard, which was in line with the “enlargement fatigue” that was present at the time. Others, on the other hand, were more open and enthusiastic – because they saw in the proposal an effective way to solve the problem of the absorption criterion – but nevertheless remained reluctant to publicly support an idea that was still in its infancy. All these kinds of concerns actually helped us further sharpen our arguments and find answers to questions that were fundamentally legitimate. This “ping-pong” process lasted for some time, with no clear indication that it would lead to a situation in which the idea could really be taken seriously. Still, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 changed everything – almost overnight, most member states became more willing to consider this approach.

This new openness has also created space for us to explain more clearly that the reasons for the initial scepticism were unfounded, especially when it comes to legal concerns. As we argued, within the framework of this proposal, candidates would still be expected to fully meet all the criteria for membership. In other words, no “shortcut” to membership has ever been advocated, because the reform path has remained the basic assumption and essence of the accession process itself. What is essential here is that, once the reforms have been completed, it is envisaged that the Act of Accession would serve as the legal basis for the introduction of the proposed measure. It is an act with the same legal force as the EU’s founding treaties – with the possibility of amending them in the context of enlargement. If all member states, including a candidate country, were to ratify an accession act containing a veto-limitation clause, there would be no obstacle to its implementation. The key element here is the mutual acceptance of the proposal, which clearly shows that it would be the result of a political compromise.

What is equally important, as we went to argue, is that this proposal avoids the creation of a “second-class membership”. Recognising that the principle of equality among member states is one of the fundamental pillars of the EU’s functioning – which, as such, cannot tolerate permanent deviations – our proposal included temporary restrictions only. In practice, these would automatically expire after a predetermined period – for example, up to ten years. Therefore, there would be no possibility of keeping new members permanently in a status without the right of veto. This idea builds on the fact that every previous enlargement of the EU has entailed certain temporary restrictions (so-called derogations) for new members – such as restrictions on the free movement of workers. Of course, limiting the right of veto is a step further but, as such, it is in line with current circumstances and the need to preserve the functionality of the Union. At the same time, the new members would have the right to vote in qualified majority decision-making – which encompasses the vast majority of policies – while even in areas requiring unanimity, the goal would still be to reach consensus, and overvoting would only be used as a last resort.

At the same time, a proposal of this kind is accompanied by additional safeguards for candidates – the so-called “emergency brake mechanism”. It ensures that a new member, despite the temporary restriction, always has the opportunity to protect its vital national interests. This mechanism would be explicitly mentioned in the Act of Accession, and our proposal read: ‘If a [new member state] declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by [unanimity], a vote shall not be taken. The [President of the Council] will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If [s/he] does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity”. The purpose of this mechanism is to prevent any possibility of outvoting on matters that explicitly relate to a new member. In this way, we aimed to demonstrate that it was possible to find a solution that simultaneously safeguards the functionality of the Union and guarantees the protection of new members’ interests.

Acceptance of the idea

While the POLITICO article was encouraging for us, we should not lose sight of the fact that this is still a proposal in progress. In order for it to be adopted, it would require the unanimity of the member states, as well as the consent of the candidate countries. The fact that this idea has now entered the public domain indicates that the goal is to feel the pulse of those to whom it would apply. In Serbia, the reaction was cautious but not dismissive, noting that “any initiative that can accelerate Serbia’s accession deserves attention” and that there is openness “to all pragmatic solutions”, provided they do not create a permanent situation. In Montenegro, reservations were somewhat more pronounced, but even there it was said that, if there is to be any renunciation by the new members, “some kind of control, that is, a control mechanism” should be introduced. In contrast, Albania has openly embraced such a proposal, recognising that it could address “very clearly expressed frustration among EU Member States” about the increasing difficulty of reaching consensus. Taking into account all these comments from decision-makers in the region, it can be concluded that there is room for further discussion and for shaping a compromise solution that would satisfy both the aspirations of the candidates and the caution of the member states.

As the region gets closer to fully meeting the membership criteria, the discussed topic will gain increasing importance. It is possible, in fact, that Montenegro might become the first concrete case in which this idea could be tested – not necessarily to impose a limitation specific to Montenegro, but rather to establish a precedent that could apply to other candidates. This is particularly relevant given that the EU could have more than 30 member states within the next decade. That is why it is important that the countries of the region – and especially Montenegro, which is at the forefront of the accession process – show willingness to consider ideas of this kind. If we take into account that each of them would have equal weight in the Council of the EU as, for example, France – whose citizens, incidentally, are among the most sceptical about enlargement, even in the context of the current momentum – the perspective changes significantly. In this sense, it would be of utmost importance for the countries of the Western Balkans to act together and send a clear message that they support those steps that make the Union more functional and better prepared to accept new members. Such a concerted and constructive attitude would demonstrate not only their commitment to membership, but also their political maturity and capacity to act in a spirit of much-needed solidarity.

Originally posted to EUpravozato.

*Disclaimer: The original title has been modified to better suit the blog format.