Towards the Opening of the “Infamous” Cluster 3

A “cluster” is a foreign word that has become commonplace in the Serbian language in the context of European integration, referring to the thematic grouping of individual chapters. Introduced in 2020 with the revised enlargement methodology, this almost forgotten term gained renewed attention in the latter half of 2024, as discussions increasingly centred on the potential opening of Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth). Following a three-year stagnation since Cluster 4 (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity) was opened at the end of 2021, Cluster 3 has returned to political and media discourse. After difficult negotiations, EU member states adopted conclusions on enlargement, recognising the European Commission’s assessment that Serbia is ready for Cluster 3. However, they emphasised that its opening will depend on further progress in negotiations, particularly regarding the rule of law and normalisation of relations with Pristina. This indicates that Cluster 3 has not yet been opened but that a pathway for its opening is being paved. Below, it is outlined how this situation arose and highlighted what must be done for Cluster 3 to open in 2025.

How Did We Get Here?

1. It All Starts with the Commission

The European Commission is the engine of enlargement. Acting as the “good cop”, Ursula von der Leyen has repeatedly stated that Serbia has been ready for the opening of Cluster 3 for several years. Despite criticisms of being “too positive” towards Serbia given the unresolved issues, she stressed the need to encourage Serbia, like other candidates, to pursue reforms. This rhetoric continued under the new Commission leadership. The new Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos echoed her predecessor, Olivér Várhelyi, in asserting that Serbia deserves to be rewarded. Likewise, the Director-General for Enlargement Gert Jan Koopman pointed to the technical and substantive steps Serbia has taken, expressing optimism that progress can be achieved despite reservations from certain member states. Without such strong support from the Commission, discussions on Cluster 3 would not have reached their current prominence.

2. Hungary’s Outgoing Presidency

While the Commission sets the stage, decisions ultimately rest with the EU Council, where unanimity among all 27 member states is required—even for “technical” matters like opening clusters. If any country other than Hungary had held the EU Council presidency, it is unlikely that Cluster 3 would have remained such a high priority on the agenda, even after numerous failed attempts. It is certainly unusual to keep the issue of opening a cluster so high on the agenda “at the eleventh hour”, especially after multiple unsuccessful attempts. Hungary has made no secret that EU enlargement is one of its top priorities and has committed to ensuring that Serbia, like other candidate countries, achieves the much-needed progress on its path toward EU membership. In this context, Hungary took a somewhat unconventional approach by framing a technical move—approving a letter inviting Serbia to submit its negotiating positions for Chapter 16 (Taxation) and Chapter 19 (Social Policy and Employment)—as a significant political breakthrough in the negotiation process. These are the only two chapters in Cluster 3, out of a total of eight, for which Serbia has yet to submit its positions. Under normal circumstances, such news might not be particularly noteworthy. However, given Serbia’s current situation, this move is designed to encourage decision-makers and demonstrate that opening Cluster 3 is indeed possible.

3. Poland’s Incoming Presidency

While it is undeniable that Hungary has prioritised Serbia, it should not be overlooked that excessive prioritisation can sometimes have counterproductive effects. Given that Hungary is often viewed within the Union as a “black sheep”, member states were not too keen on fulfilling all its demands. Instead, it is widely recognised that Poland, as the new powerhouse of Central Europe, holds greater credibility. As a country emphasising the need for EU enlargement both to the East and Southeast, Poland has additional leverage that Hungary lacks. As previously indicated, there were clear signs for months that this issue would have to wait for Poland’s EU presidency. That is exactly what happened—Hungary paved the way, while the official process of opening Cluster 3 was left to Poland and its potential mandate. The fact that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly supported Serbia on its EU path further reinforced the perception that Poland will be a reliable partner and will not create obstacles to the cluster’s opening. However, it should not be forgotten that as many as eight member states still block the opening of Cluster 3, including Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia, and Bulgaria. Their position is reflected in the Council’s conclusions, which again emphasise the need for more comprehensive and credible reforms in the rule of law, the continuation of dialogue with Pristina, and a stronger alignment of Serbia’s foreign policy with that of the EU. Therefore, negotiations on opening Cluster 3 will not be easy, even under Poland’s leadership.

4. Serbia’s Non-Paper and Reform Agenda

While it is positive that Poland is on Serbia’s side, Serbia will have to roll up its sleeves to address the identified issues. Recognising the complexity of the negotiations, Serbia submitted a so-called non-paper at the end of 2024, expressing its commitment to resolving the remaining obstacles to opening Cluster 3. This document emphasises obligations undertaken as part of the Reform Agenda. Among the most critical tasks are the election of new members to the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) Council and a thorough revision of the voter registry, with a note that these tasks are expected to be adequately addressed in a matter of weeks or months. The document also highlights progress in foreign policy alignment, which increased from 51% to 58% over the year, with a commitment to continue improving this figure. Although Serbia has not imposed sanctions, it stressed that its overall aid to Ukraine exceeds that of all other Western Balkan countries combined. Finally, Serbia confirmed it would harmonise its visa policy with the EU’s, a step promptly demonstrated by introducing visas for Mongolia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman. Despite progress in visa policy alignment, Serbia still faces significant challenges, particularly as it seems likely that even internal deadlines for fulfilling these commitments may be missed. If Serbia aims to capitalise on Poland’s EU presidency to build on the Council’s conclusions, implementing the Reform Agenda and fulfilling all commitments will be crucial for softening the stances of member states.

5. The Roles of France and Germany

Since Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Serbia in summer 2024, France has demonstrated its commitment to supporting Serbia’s EU membership. Not only were various cooperation agreements signed, the most notable being the purchase agreement for Rafale fighter jets, but it was also publicly emphasised that the EU cannot achieve its strategic autonomy without Serbia. Strategic autonomy, a concept favoured by President Macron, has gained particular importance after the EU became aware of its dependence on China during the pandemic and on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. Despite a domestic political crisis, France remains a reliable partner for Serbia. This is particularly significant given that French voters are highly sceptical of the EU’s enlargement policy. Conversely, Germany deliberated until the last moment on how to position itself regarding the opening of Cluster 3. It is evident that Germany still harbours serious reservations about the state of the rule of law in Serbia. Amid the ongoing protests, German authorities warned of the necessity of ensuring the right to free and safe assembly and protecting freedom of expression. Additionally, Germany strongly advocated for the prosecution of those responsible for the incident in Banjska in 2023 and for uncovering the truth about the attack on the Ibar-Lepenac canal in November 2024. Given these reservations, Germany has opted for strategic ambivalence—it was not necessarily prepared to issue a veto but also refrained from offering robust support to Serbia, as France did.

What’s Next?

Serbia must continue informing its citizens about the necessity of advancing toward European Union membership as its top strategic priority. Emphasising that the enlargement policy is solely a geopolitical tool cannot be the only approach to managing public expectations. Reality consistently reminds us that, alongside foreign policy and the normalisation of relations with Pristina, the development of the rule of law remains a key prerequisite for membership. Therefore, alongside ongoing communication with citizens about the challenges and achievements on this path, the state must demonstrate determination and commitment to all areas crucial for European integration. The current plans to promptly start drafting an Accession Treaty with Montenegro highlight the EU’s serious intention to move forward with enlargement by 2030. With the Reform Agenda at the forefront, decision-makers now have an opportunity to take the necessary steps to progress toward membership. This will not only enable access to additional funds but also allow Serbia to demonstrate in the first quarter of 2025 that it is ready and capable of adhering to self-imposed goals. Such an approach would align with the aforementioned non-paper.

Going forward, Serbia should not focus solely on France and Germany. It is often overlooked in Serbia that all EU member states have equal voting rights in the Council. While France and Germany are key players in the enlargement process, both countries are currently grappling with serious internal political crises, particularly as both have experienced government collapses. Under such circumstances, these states are unlikely to exert significant influence over the decisions of other EU members. Instead, Serbia must develop an equitable approach to all EU member states, regardless of their size or geographical position. The best way to achieve this is through consistent and regular communication via diplomatic channels, but more importantly, through the implementation of concrete and required measures that will enable further progress toward membership. If Serbia truly aims to meet all membership criteria by the end of 2026, the first quarter of 2025 will be critical. With Poland, a supportive country, presiding over the EU during that time, Serbia will have a significant opportunity for progress—if it is prepared to seize it.

This blog is initially published at EUpravozato.