FOTO: Kosovo Online

*The Kosovo designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo Declaration of Independence”

This document has been published as part of the project “Supporting the EU enlargement through the normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo: Civil society as a driver of progress” and supported by the Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) through the “Think Tanks for the Future of EU Enlargement Program” (TFEP). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only.

Članak Key Findings of the Shadow Report on Kosovo-Serbia Normalisation se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Three additional findings further illuminate these dynamics. First, the credibility mechanism is most pronounced among citizens who are otherwise predisposed toward EU integration. Individuals with stronger liberal-democratic and cosmopolitan orientations perceive the gap between the EU’s values and interests more acutely, resulting in a sharper decline in their support. Second, government-aligned and opposition-aligned citizens process EU-related information through different frameworks. The credibility mechanism has a meaningful effect only among opposition supporters, citizens aligned with the student movement, and politically neutral respondents, whereas the attitudes of government supporters are shaped almost exclusively by economic expectations. Third, the student movement, which has elevated issues of democratic governance closely connected to the credibility concerns identified in this research, has emerged as the second strongest political force in Serbia, surpassing all formal opposition parties combined. Consequently, if the EU is perceived as credibly supporting democratic governance requirements, it could enter a potential political transition with an existing constituency inclined toward European integration.

These findings suggest several implications for future EU engagement. Since the credibility deficit is rooted in the EU’s actions rather than in communication failures, the Union should prioritise consistency between its stated values and its policies. Resources should be shifted away from communication campaigns and toward programmes that provide citizens with direct experience of EU standards. Economic engagement, as the most powerful source of support, should become more visible at the local and individual level and should be explicitly linked to reform conditionality in order to reinforce rather than weaken the credibility channel. Pro-European citizens should not be regarded as automatically supportive; their backing depends on tangible evidence of commitment to rule-of-law standards rather than values-based rhetoric. Furthermore, the divergence between government-aligned and opposition-aligned audiences implies that a single communication strategy cannot effectively address both groups: while the former respond primarily to concrete modernisation benefits, the latter seek evidence that financial engagement is contingent upon genuine reform. Finally, the accession process itself must regain credibility by appearing achievable. A clear and staged roadmap would help address both the credibility deficit and the widespread disengagement arising from doubts that accession will ever occur, particularly if the EU demonstrates willingness to support a membership target date proposed by Serbia once the country exhibits genuine political commitment and a credible trajectory of reform.

Članak Geopolitics and Values: In Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Download the report per policy area:

Step reports Digital

Step reports RoL&FR

Step reports Green

Step reports BE&PSD 2

The report in Serbian will be available soon.

Članak First Independent Monitoring Report on the Implementation of the Reform Agenda se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Its overarching finding is stark: three years after Ohrid, overall Agreement implementation stands at just 21.1%, driven far more by external EU facilitation than by genuine political will on either side. The normalisation process has stalled not because political will is temporarily absent, but because the architecture of the process: unsigned commitments, ambiguous language, weak conditionality, and asymmetric incentives: has made non-implementation rational for both governments and unenforceable for the facilitator.

*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo Declaration of Independence”

This document has been published as part of the project “Supporting the EU enlargement through the normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo: Civil society as a driver of progress” and supported by the Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) through the “Think Tanks for the Future of EU Enlargement Program” (TFEP). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only.

Članak Shadow Report on the Kosovo-Serbia Normalisation Process se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Reform Agenda Snapshot (up to December ‘25) – Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The “Reform Agenda Updates” assessment focuses on the implementation progress of country-specific obligations under the RGF. Monitoring is conducted through a set of procedural, reform implementation, and financial indicators. The core of the monitoring exercise tracks reform steps with defined deadlines, assessing their implementation status based on publicly available evidence and official documentation obtained by national authorities, and, where relevant, complemented by information from independent institutions and civil society sources. Cross-cutting attention is given to stakeholder participation and transparency.

The monitoring exercise covers selected reforms organised into so-called “policy domains,” created by coding the sub-areas of the harmonised policy areas in the Reform Agendas. The selected policy domains, which enable regional-level analyses, benchmarking, and comparability, are supported by the available human resources and the thematic expertise of the TEN network.  

For methodological notes and the reform steps selection process, see the draft methodology note at the link. 

The Reform Agenda Update is structured as follows. The Key findings and recommendations provide a high-level summary. The Legal and Institutional Arrangements and Requests and Release of Funds sections monitor overall progress in the procedural and financial aspects of implementing the Reform Agenda. The last section, Reforms in Focus: Reform Monitor policy domains, provides independent monitoring findings on selected reforms. Here, each section provides a narrative snapshot of progress and obstacles in implementing Serbia’s Reform Agenda.

The cut-off date for data collection and assessment for this update is 31.12.2025. Further policy developments may shift the status of currently pending reforms and will be reflected in subsequent updates.

These monitoring updates are not a substitute for the European Commission’s formal assessment role.

Članak Serbia – Reform Agenda Update – 2nd Semester 2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Serbia and the European Union: Geopolitics and EU Values – in Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Western Balkan PAR Monitor: PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 2024/2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This policy paper examines how Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio may evolve by 2035, combining the InvigoratEU External Influence Index with a structured strategic foresight approach. The Index documents a sharp decline and high volatility in Russian influence since 2013, driven by war dynamics, sanctions, and geopolitical rupture, alongside a more incremental expansion of Chinese and Turkish influence through economic engagement, connectivity initiatives, and socially embedded networks.

Building on these empirical patterns, the paper identifies key drivers of external influence, drawing on political, economic, and societal dimensions, and reorganising them into higher-order strategic clusters that underpin a two-axis scenario framework. The first axis captures the strength of EU anchoring in candidate countries, understood as the interaction between EU credibility and domestic alignment, while the second concerns the nature of the international system, ranging from a rules-based order to coercive, “might-makes-right” dynamics. Crossing these axes yields three plausible scenarios for 2035: Great-Power Chessboard, characterised by intensified external leverage and weakened EU anchoring; Resilient Europe, where credible EU engagement, gradual integration, and domestic governance reforms reduce vulnerabilities; and Strategic Tug-of-War, a baseline trajectory marked by sustained hybrid competition and partial EU anchoring.

Across all scenarios, the analysis shows that external influence is not predetermined but contingent on governance capacity, societal resilience, and the credibility and delivery of EU engagement. While Russia’s trajectory remains uniquely volatile and shaped by critical uncertainties linked to the war in Ukraine, China’s and Turkey’s influence evolves more predictably within structural constraints set by EU policy choices and domestic conditions. The paper concludes that strengthening EU anchoring – through credible enlargement, gradual integration, and sustained support for governance and societal resilience – remains the most effective strategy to limit destabilising external influence and reinforce long-term stability in the EU’s enlargement countries.

Članak InvigoratEU Foreign Interference of China, Russia and Turkey in the EU Enlargement Countries until 2035: Three Scenarios and Policy Implications (D6.4) se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

1 The original Model was published in 2021. Only with its second iteration, in the form of Template 2.0 for Staged Accession in the EU, the introduction of safeguard clauses. Milena Mihajlović, Steven Blockmans, Strahinja Subotić, and Michael Emerson, Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU, European Policy Centre (CEP) & Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), August 2023.

2 European Commission, EU Enlargement Forum, November 2025.

Članak Towards a New Generation of Safeguard Clauses: Making Conditionality Stick after Accession se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Assessing the 2025 Enlargement Package: Glass Half Full? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This report examines Turkey’s influence in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) over the past decade, focusing on political, economic, and societal dimensions. Using the InvigoratEU External Influence Index—an empirical tool specifically designed for this study—it systematically measures and compares Turkish leverage across nine EU candidate and partner countries. The Index captures shifts from 2013 to 2023, offering a cross-country and longitudinal analysis of how Ankara has engaged with the region and how these countries have responded. The findings show that Turkey’s influence is neither uniformly benign nor overtly antagonistic, but shaped by local receptivity, institutional interest, and historical or cultural proximity. Unlike coercive actors, Turkey typically avoids direct confrontation with the EU, opting instead for relational diplomacy, targeted investments, and long-term societal engagement. Political influence has grown modestly, driven by high-level visits, security cooperation, and elite alignment—especially in Kosovo, Ukraine, and North Macedonia. Economic influence has expanded more steadily, fuelled by concessional loans, preferential trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. However, macroeconomic instability in Turkey casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of this outreach. Societal influence emerges as the most persistent and embedded dimension. Through cultural diplomacy, religious networks, educational initiatives, and media presence—including popular Turkish TV series—Turkey has cultivated durable societal linkages, particularly in Muslim-majority areas of the Western Balkans. While this influence is less pronounced in the Eastern Trio, it plays a growing role in public perceptions. These trends suggest that Turkey’s influence is best understood as adaptive and opportunistic rather than expansionist or ideological. It advances where EU presence is weak, particularly at the local level, and where Turkey can act quickly and visibly.

Importantly, Turkish influence should not be seen as inherently malign. As a NATO member, Ankara has often supported Euro-Atlantic security priorities—from contributing troops to regional missions to backing collective defence measures in the Black Sea—and in some cases has complemented rather than competed with EU objectives. Yet the line between constructive engagement and problematic interference can be thin, especially when Turkey externalises its domestic political agenda through pressure on partner governments.

For the EU, this calls for a strategic response that reinforces its credibility, reclaims societal space, and avoids unnecessary antagonism with Ankara – while remaining alert to cases where Turkish influence can undermine democratic resilience in EU candidate countries. The Union’s response should therefore be less about constraining Turkey and more about investing in its own appeal and effectiveness. This means ensuring timely delivery of promised financial and infrastructure projects, making EU engagement more visible on the ground, and working directly with municipalities, universities, and civil society to generate bottom-up legitimacy. It also requires pragmatic coordination with Ankara in areas of shared concern, such as migration management or infrastructure security, while safeguarding conditionality whenever Turkish pressure risks undermining rule-of-law or human rights commitments in partner states. Preventing asymmetric dependencies will be equally important: the EU must support investment screening and provide credible alternatives through instruments like the EIB and EBRD. Finally, reclaiming the soft-power edge will demand more robust cultural and educational programmes, investment in regional media, and clear communication of the EU’s core values – secularism, inclusivity, and democratic governance –as the non-negotiable foundations of the European project. Taken together, these measures would allow the EU to channel Turkey’s presence into a more complementary direction, while ensuring that European norms and institutions remain the decisive reference point for countries on the path to accession.

Članak InvigoratEU Long Policy Report on Turkey’s Ambitions and Leverage se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.