Following the European Commission’s 2017 Proposal for a Directive on work-life balance for parents and carers[1], the new EU Work-life Balance Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/1158)[2] was passed by the European Parliament in April 2019 and entered into force later that year, in August. The aim of this Directive is to “improve families’” access to family leave and flexible work arrangements’, and ultimately “contribute to an increase in women’s employment and families’ economic stability.”[3] Moreover, it introduces a set of legislative and non-legislative measures, i.e. policy measures, designed to modernise the existing EU frameworks in the work-life balance area.[4]

Legal measures under the Directive include the introduction of paternity leave, whereby fathers must be able to take at least 10 working days of paternity leave around the time of birth of their child, compensated at least at the level of sick pay. Secondly, this Directive ensures that two out of the four months of parental leave are non-transferable between parents and compensated at a level that is determined by the Member State. Third legal measure is the introduction of carers’ leave, meaning that workers who provide personal care or support to a relative will be entitled to five days of leave per year. And lastly, the extension of the right to request flexible working arrangements to carers and working parents of children up to eight years old.[5]

On the other hand, policy measures aimed at supporting Member States in achieving common goals are: encouraging the use of European funds to improve the provision of formal care services; ensuring protection for parents and carers against discrimination or dismissal; and removing economic disincentives for second earners within families.[6]

How will this affect Serbia?

However, it is important to note that the Directive (EU) 2019/1158 lays down minimum requirements when it comes to legal measures, meaning that Member States have the right to set higher standards than those set in the Directive.[7] This is significant for Serbia, since it prescribes a very generous paid maternity leave of 12 months for the first and second child, and 24 months for the third and fourth child. Also, the Employment Act of the Republic of Serbia already recognises the possibility of paternity leave, both for the needs of care and for the exceptional circumstances prescribed by law. Therefore, harmonisation with EU legislation, whether it happens at the pre-accession stage or after becoming a member, will not reduce the benefits aimed at supporting childbirth, but will primarily refer to compulsory paternity leave, carers, as well as part-time work.

Background

As previously mentioned, prior to 2019, a set of instruments and legislative measures tackling the matters of work-life balance was already in place.[8] In the 1990s, the EU adopted two directives in the area of family related leave, including the Pregnant Workers Directive[9] and the Parental Leave Directive,[10] as well as the Part-time Work Directive.[11] The Parental Leave Directive was repealed and replaced in 2010, when a mechanism for encouraging men to take parental leave was introduced.[12] However, in 2017, with the launch of the Social Pillar which sets out rights that are meant to ensure fairer working conditions and better social protection and inclusion, NGOs and trade unions demanded an improved and modernised work-life balance framework in the EU.[13]^, [14] In response, the Commission launched a proposal and two years later, the Work-life Balance Directive was adopted and enforced.[15]

As is often the case, the Commission’s proposal was trimmed down during the inter-state bargaining in the Council, and the actual Directive did not include some of the most ambitious provisions. Namely, the Directive puts forward a provision for carers’ leave (at least five days of leave per year), but unlike the original Proposal, it does not require the carers’ leave to be remunerated. When it comes to parental leave, the new Directive extends the minimum period of parental leave that cannot be transferred from one parent to another from one to two months while the Proposal called for four months. Finally, although the Work-life Balance Directive extends the right to request flexible working arrangements to all working parents with children up to the age of eight, as well as caregivers, it is not an enforceable legal entitlement. A parent or a caregiver has the right to request such an arrangement, but the employers are not obliged to take these requests into account.[16]

Therefore, although this Directive represents a positive development within the EU legal framework, as it aims to improve the working Europeans’ work-life balance and contributes towards achieving a wider goal of gender equality, it only lays down the minimum standards and leaves Member States with significant room for manoeuvring. However, given the generosity of the existing legislation, in the case of Serbia, the adoption of this Directive and other EU rules within this area will likely produce positive effects only.

Authors: Nebojsa Lazarevic, member of the Negotiating Team for Accession Negotiations of Serbia to the EU and co-founder of the European Policy Centre (CEP), and Marija Ćirić, Project Assistant at CEP.

[1] European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (COM/2017/0253 final – 2017/085 (COD)).

[2] Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (Work-life Balance Directive or Directive 2019/1158).

[3] European Commission (2019). Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion: EU Work-life Balance Directive enters into force. [online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=89&furtherNews=yes&langId=en&newsId=9438 [Accessed 9 September 2020].

[4] European Commission (2019). Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion: Work-life balance. [online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1311&langId=en [Accessed 9 September 2020].

[5] European Commission (2019). Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion: EU Work-life Balance Directive enters into force. [online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=89&furtherNews=yes&langId=en&newsId=9438 [Accessed 9 September 2020].

[6] Ibid.

[7] EUR-Lex (2018). European Union directives. Summary of Article 288 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – directives. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l14527&from=EN [Accessed 10 September 2020].

[8] Chieregato, E. (2020). A Work-Life Balance For All? Assessing the Inclusiveness of EU Directive 2019/1158. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 36(1). Pp: 59-80.

[9] Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (Pregnant Workers Directive or Directive 92/85/EEC).

[10] Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (Parental Leave Directive or Directive 96/34/EC).

[11] Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC.

[12] Council Directive 2010/18/EU of March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC.

[13] European Commission (2017). European Pillar of Social Rights: Building a more inclusive and fairer European Union. [online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights_en

[14] Euractiv (2018). MEPs and NGOs urge ministers to reach deal on Work-Life Balance directive. [online] Available from: https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/meps-and-ngos-urge-ministers-to-reach-deal-on-work-life-balance-directive/ [Accessed 10 September 2020].

[15] Chieregato, E. (2020). A Work-Life Balance For All? Assessing the Inclusiveness of EU Directive 2019/1158. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 36(1). Pp: 59-80.

[16] Ibid.

Članak Parenting in Serbia: What will happen when we become a part of the EU se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

On the 20^th of July this year, the doyen of European integration, Jacques Delors, will celebrate his 95^th birthday! During this time of uncertainty in the EU, unfinished enlargement processes, and confusion among the countries of the Western Balkans, it might be the right time to remember a man who, in circumstances that were just as difficult as those today, managed to leave an indelible mark on the political history of Europe. Having contributed towards creating the Single Market and formally establishing the EU and the EMU, he has earned the utmost respect from all of us involved in European Integration, regardless of whether we live in members states of the EU or in countries still in the waiting room as candidates.

Delors was appointed President of the European Commission in 1985 and served in this position for three mandates, until 1995.[1] To this day, he is considered a president and a leader responsible for some of the most innovative changes to this institution, as well as to the European Union as a whole.[2] His unique style of leadership and ability to bring different member states and opposing parties together behind a common cause are what has set him apart from the majority of his predecessors and successors. Surely, the most significant developments during his presidency include the creation of the Single Market and formation of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU), as well as the formal establishment of the European Union (EU). All of the events pre-dating and leading up to these have shown what a remarkable leader Delors was.

Many agree that Delors embodied a “dual leadership concept”,[3] being a leader of a supranational institution and operating within the intergovernmental space at the same time, which first proved successful with the 1985’s introduction of the Single Market Programme. After the Commission had published the “Completing the Internal Market” white paper, it was down to member states to do the bargaining on how to actually build the Single Market. Just as in most instances of intergovernmental decision-making, collective action problems could have stalled the process and made consensus more difficult. However, given the reputation Delors had built in his past as French Minister of the Economy and Finance, whose economic policy provided the means for overcoming “Eurosclerosis”, i.e. the period of stagnation of European integration between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s,[4] he was able to get the backing of France and Germany for his Single Market initiatives. Through them he also succeeded in winning the support of other member states as well.[5] Still, it was not only his economic policy that won him trust among European leaders, but also his ideological stand. Delors was a left-wing, social Catholic who helped the French President Mitterrand reorganise the Left during the 1970s with his ability to bridge the gap between opposing factions of the Socialist Party, earning the president’s respect.[6] Moreover, being a social Catholic, Delors could find a common ground with German Christian-democratic chancellors, thus solidifying the Franco-German partnership.[7]

In addition to Delors’ favourable position within the international community, his “entrepreneurial” and “intellectual” approaches to leadership enabled him to fulfil his ambitions.[8] Delors’ “entrepreneurial” leadership implies his ability to frame issues through his negotiating skills and to adapt to ever-changing circumstances in order to achieve his desired outcome.[9] His “intellectual” side was, on the other hand, shown in the ways he provided other participants in negotiations with an understanding of the issues at stake and helped them see beyond the old approaches.[10] Before announcing the white paper, Delors had already toured the capitals of Europe, slowly preparing national leaders for what was to come and seeding the concepts of the Single Market and the EMU in their minds, thus pre-empting opposition before the bargaining process had even begun.[11] Once negotiations had begun, the Commission helped the parties involved to find a win-win solution by showing them how completing the internal market was in everyone’s interest.[12]

Delors, of course, could not have done this by himself, but had the support of his cabinet, whose members later explained their strategy with the “Bicycle” and “Russian Doll” metaphors.[13] The former implied that once movement towards further integration had begun, it had to remain at a high speed throughout the process, not allowing the “bicycle” to fall over –  as if it did fall, getting back up and moving forward would be extremely difficult.[14] The latter meant that each step of the integration ought to contain the seeds of the following one in order to generate support in advance and strengthen the Commission’s position relative to other negotiators.[15] These methods first proved successful when the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986. This success continued during the European Council’s deliberations, in which Delors outmanoeuvred his opposition, finally resulting in the establishment of the Single Market in 1993.

Besides the Single Market, Delors and his cabinet managed to revive the idea and enthusiasm of a monetary union as well, greatly contributing to the launching of the EMU.[16] A variety of factors played a part in this process, but the single most influential one was played by Delors himself and, once again, his “entrepreneurial” style of leadership. Firstly, he placed the EMU highly on the Commission’s agenda, making it a priority issue and amplifying his own voice through this supranational institution.[17] The Commission acted as a staunch advocate and promoted the project as an obvious complement to the Single Market. Then, in 1988,  with the help of Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, Delors was appointed Chairman of the Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, better known as the Delors Committee.[18] At first, within this group composed of member states’ central bank governors and experts, he encountered strong opposition to his ideas, but eventually, thanks to the aforementioned methods, Delors managed to form strong alliances with the committee members and reshape their positions regarding the EMU. This allegiance proved strong when, in 1989, the central bank governors unanimously approved the Delors Report, the critical document outlining an incremental approach towards the formation of the EMU.[19] The intergovernmental conferences on the EMU began in 1990, in which the report was extensively discussed and certain parts of it amended. Some member states, including the UK and Germany, were split on the EMU issue, and voiced their concerns about it, fearing a loss of sovereignty.[20] As a consequence, Delors had to make use of his bargaining skills and the access he had among European elites, and, ultimately, keeping his report as the blueprint and basis, the EMU was finally established in Maastricht in 1992.[21]

Considering his achievements, Delors remains one of the most influential Commission presidents. His innovative and strategic way of thinking and leading enabled him to overcome the otherwise constrained position of the Commission in the EU institutional system.[22] His “bicycle” kept running, providing some of the most significant developments to the EU integration process. This, however, cannot be said about many other Commission presidents who have not exhibited the same ability – both those preceding and those succeeding him. Finally, although since his presidency many member states have been fearful of appointing “another Delors”, capable of continually beating them at their own bargaining game,[23] perhaps that is exactly what the EU needs right now: a leader who can bridge divisions within the Union and get the “bicycle” moving forward again.

Today, with the unfolding of Brexit, the migration crisis, the rise of nationalism and populism across Europe, and, of course, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and all of its implications, we must not forget that the average observer in the 1980s was not too optimistic about European integration and its success either. Sometimes, all it takes is the right person in the right place at the right time.

Dear Jacques Delors, we are all proud of the legacy you have left for Europe. Happy birthday, and greetings from Serbia!

The author is a member of The Negotiating team for accession negotiations of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union and the co-founder of European Policy Centre – CEP.

Photo credit: Paul Grover / The Telegraph

[1] Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute. Full Biography of Jacques Delors. [online] Available at: http://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/full-biography-jd.pdf [Accessed 1 July 2020].

^[2] Ross, G. and J. Jenson (2017). “Reconsidering Jacques Delors’ leadership of the European Union.” Journal of European Integration 39(2). Pp. 13-127. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1277718

[3] Ibid.

[4] Awesti, A. (2009). “The Myth of Eurosclerosis: European Integration in the 1970s”. L’Europe en Formation n^o 353-354. Pp. 39-53. ISSN 0014-2808

[5] Ross, G. and J. Jenson (2017). “Reconsidering Jacques Delors’ leadership of the European Union.” Journal of European Integration 39(2). Pp. 13-127. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1277718

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

^[9] Young, O. (1991) in Van Assche, T. (2005). “The Impact of Entrepreneurial Leadership on EU High Politics: A Case Study of Jacques Delors and the Creation of EMU”. Leadership 1(3). Pp: 279-298. DOI: 10.1177/1742715005054438

[10] Ross, G. and J. Jenson (2017). “Reconsidering Jacques Delors’ leadership of the European Union”. Journal of European Integration 39(2). Pp. 13-127. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1277718

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Van Assche, T. (2005). “The Impact of Entrepreneurial Leadership on EU High Politics: A Case Study of Jacques Delors and the Creation of EMU”. Leadership 1(3). Pp: 279-298. DOI: 10.1177/1742715005054438

[17] Ibid.

[18] European Central Bank (2020). The Delors Committee (1988-1989). [online] Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/access_to_documents/archives/delors/html/index.en.html [Accessed 2 July 2020].

[19] Van Assche, T. (2005). The Impact of Entrepreneurial Leadership on EU High Politics: A Case Study of Jacques Delors and the Creation of EMU. Leadership 1(3). Pp: 279-298. DOI: 10.1177/1742715005054438

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ross, G. and J. Jenson (2017). “Reconsidering Jacques Delors’ leadership of the European Union.” Journal of European Integration 39(2). Pp. 13-127. DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1277718

[23] Ibid.

Članak Jacques Delors, best wishes from Belgrade! se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

At the same time, in countries in transition there is a distinct need for the involvement of citizens and civil society in the oversight over public finances as a consequence of insufficiently developed external mechanisms of control and non-affirmed concept of financial government accountability. This Study, leaning on the extensive comparative practices and domestic experiences, […]

At the same time, in countries in transition there is a distinct need for the involvement of citizens and civil society in the oversight over public finances as a consequence of insufficiently developed external mechanisms of control and non-affirmed concept of financial government accountability. This Study, leaning on the extensive comparative practices and domestic experiences, researches the possibility for intersecting those needs in context of external audit in the Republic of Serbia and provides readymade recommendations for the State Audit Institution in Serbia for ensuring involvement of citizens and civil society in the external audit process.

This policy brief was published with CEP Study, written by Milena Lazarević, Nebojša Lazarević, Amanda Orza, Miloš Đinđić and Svelana Đuković.

Članak Civil Society and Citizens in the External Audit Process se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Within the EU integration process, Serbia has to comply with the minimum EU standards pertaining to environmental assessment of industrial and infrastructural projects, as well as planning documents.

These procedures are of immense importance for prevention and reduction of adverse environmental effects connected with human activities. What are the existing institutional solutions and capacities of the public administration with regard to implementation of the environmental assessments? To what extent does the public participate in the procedure? Is the implementation of the environmental assessments in Serbia in compliance with the EU standards? Based on comprehensive analysis, with a focus on environmental assessment of projects at the local level, the study provides answers to these and other related questions and also provides recommendations for further improvements of the procedures.

This Policy Brief was written with Study that was conducted within the project “Think-Act-Impact”, jointly implemented by the European Policy Centre in Belgrade, the Ecological Centre “Habitat” and the association of citizens Serbia on the Move. Project is financially supported by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade and co-financed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection of the Government of Republic of Serbia.

Članak Implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment in Serbia in the EU Integration Context se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The recommendations are primarily intended for decision makers in competition policy and legislation, as well as for those who are responsible for the proper implementation of the legal framework. The study is focused on the rules of the competition and their application, while the state aid control section is included to the extent necessary for the understanding of its importance in the context of a functioning system in line with EU standards.

Članak Competition Policy in Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In the process of European integration, Serbia must meet the EU’s minimum standards regarding assessing the impact of industrial and infrastructure projects and planning documents on the environment. Therefore, we are talking about procedures of significant importance for preventing and reducing the harmful effects of human activities on the environment.

What are the public administration’s existing institutional solutions and capacities regarding implementing impact assessment? To what extent does the public participate in the proceedings? Is the implementation of impact assessment in Serbia harmonized with European standards? Based on a thorough analysis, the study provides answers to these and related questions with a focus on assessing the impact of projects at the local level and offers recommendations for further improvement of the procedure.

The study was prepared as part of the “Think – act – influence” project, which the European Policy Centre jointly implements and the Ecological Center “Habitat and Organization Serbia on the Move”. The project is financed by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Belgrade and co-financed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection of the Government of Serbia.

Članak Implementation of the environmental impact assessment in Serbia in the EU integration context: current state and recommendations se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

At the same time, in countries in transition there is a distinct need for the involvement of citizens and civil society in the oversight over public finances as a consequence of insufficiently developed external mechanisms of control and non-affirmed concept of financial government accountability. This Study, leaning on the extensive comparative practices and domestic experiences, researches the possibility for intersecting those needs in context of external audit in the Republic of Serbia and provides readymade recommendations for the State Audit Institution in Serbia for ensuring involvement of citizens and civil society in the external audit process.

The authors of this Study are Milena Lazarević, Nebojša Lazarević, Amanda Orza, Miloš Đinđić and Svelana Đuković.

Članak Civil Society and Citizens in the External Audit Process se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.