The “Reform Agenda Updates” assessment focuses on the implementation progress of country-specific obligations under the RGF. Monitoring is conducted through a set of procedural, reform implementation, and financial indicators. The core of the monitoring exercise tracks reform steps with defined deadlines, assessing their implementation status based on publicly available evidence and official documentation obtained by national authorities, and, where relevant, complemented by information from independent institutions and civil society sources. Cross-cutting attention is given to stakeholder participation and transparency.

The monitoring exercise covers selected reforms organised into so-called “policy domains,” created by coding the sub-areas of the harmonised policy areas in the Reform Agendas. The selected policy domains, which enable regional-level analyses, benchmarking, and comparability, are supported by the available human resources and the thematic expertise of the TEN network.  

For methodological notes and the reform steps selection process, see the draft methodology note at the link. 

The Reform Agenda Update is structured as follows. The Key findings and recommendations provide a high-level summary. The Legal and Institutional Arrangements and Requests and Release of Funds sections monitor overall progress in the procedural and financial aspects of implementing the Reform Agenda. The last section, Reforms in Focus: Reform Monitor policy domains, provides independent monitoring findings on selected reforms. Here, each section provides a narrative snapshot of progress and obstacles in implementing Serbia’s Reform Agenda.

The cut-off date for data collection and assessment for this update is 31.12.2025. Further policy developments may shift the status of currently pending reforms and will be reflected in subsequent updates.

These monitoring updates are not a substitute for the European Commission’s formal assessment role.

Članak Serbia – Reform Agenda Update – 2nd Semester 2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Serbia and the European Union: Geopolitics and EU Values – in Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Western Balkan PAR Monitor: PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 2024/2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This policy paper examines how Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio may evolve by 2035, combining the InvigoratEU External Influence Index with a structured strategic foresight approach. The Index documents a sharp decline and high volatility in Russian influence since 2013, driven by war dynamics, sanctions, and geopolitical rupture, alongside a more incremental expansion of Chinese and Turkish influence through economic engagement, connectivity initiatives, and socially embedded networks.

Building on these empirical patterns, the paper identifies key drivers of external influence, drawing on political, economic, and societal dimensions, and reorganising them into higher-order strategic clusters that underpin a two-axis scenario framework. The first axis captures the strength of EU anchoring in candidate countries, understood as the interaction between EU credibility and domestic alignment, while the second concerns the nature of the international system, ranging from a rules-based order to coercive, “might-makes-right” dynamics. Crossing these axes yields three plausible scenarios for 2035: Great-Power Chessboard, characterised by intensified external leverage and weakened EU anchoring; Resilient Europe, where credible EU engagement, gradual integration, and domestic governance reforms reduce vulnerabilities; and Strategic Tug-of-War, a baseline trajectory marked by sustained hybrid competition and partial EU anchoring.

Across all scenarios, the analysis shows that external influence is not predetermined but contingent on governance capacity, societal resilience, and the credibility and delivery of EU engagement. While Russia’s trajectory remains uniquely volatile and shaped by critical uncertainties linked to the war in Ukraine, China’s and Turkey’s influence evolves more predictably within structural constraints set by EU policy choices and domestic conditions. The paper concludes that strengthening EU anchoring – through credible enlargement, gradual integration, and sustained support for governance and societal resilience – remains the most effective strategy to limit destabilising external influence and reinforce long-term stability in the EU’s enlargement countries.

Članak InvigoratEU Foreign Interference of China, Russia and Turkey in the EU Enlargement Countries until 2035: Three Scenarios and Policy Implications (D6.4) se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

1 The original Model was published in 2021. Only with its second iteration, in the form of Template 2.0 for Staged Accession in the EU, the introduction of safeguard clauses. Milena Mihajlović, Steven Blockmans, Strahinja Subotić, and Michael Emerson, Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU, European Policy Centre (CEP) & Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), August 2023.

2 European Commission, EU Enlargement Forum, November 2025.

Članak Towards a New Generation of Safeguard Clauses: Making Conditionality Stick after Accession se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This report examines Turkey’s influence in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) over the past decade, focusing on political, economic, and societal dimensions. Using the InvigoratEU External Influence Index—an empirical tool specifically designed for this study—it systematically measures and compares Turkish leverage across nine EU candidate and partner countries. The Index captures shifts from 2013 to 2023, offering a cross-country and longitudinal analysis of how Ankara has engaged with the region and how these countries have responded. The findings show that Turkey’s influence is neither uniformly benign nor overtly antagonistic, but shaped by local receptivity, institutional interest, and historical or cultural proximity. Unlike coercive actors, Turkey typically avoids direct confrontation with the EU, opting instead for relational diplomacy, targeted investments, and long-term societal engagement. Political influence has grown modestly, driven by high-level visits, security cooperation, and elite alignment—especially in Kosovo, Ukraine, and North Macedonia. Economic influence has expanded more steadily, fuelled by concessional loans, preferential trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. However, macroeconomic instability in Turkey casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of this outreach. Societal influence emerges as the most persistent and embedded dimension. Through cultural diplomacy, religious networks, educational initiatives, and media presence—including popular Turkish TV series—Turkey has cultivated durable societal linkages, particularly in Muslim-majority areas of the Western Balkans. While this influence is less pronounced in the Eastern Trio, it plays a growing role in public perceptions. These trends suggest that Turkey’s influence is best understood as adaptive and opportunistic rather than expansionist or ideological. It advances where EU presence is weak, particularly at the local level, and where Turkey can act quickly and visibly.

Importantly, Turkish influence should not be seen as inherently malign. As a NATO member, Ankara has often supported Euro-Atlantic security priorities—from contributing troops to regional missions to backing collective defence measures in the Black Sea—and in some cases has complemented rather than competed with EU objectives. Yet the line between constructive engagement and problematic interference can be thin, especially when Turkey externalises its domestic political agenda through pressure on partner governments.

For the EU, this calls for a strategic response that reinforces its credibility, reclaims societal space, and avoids unnecessary antagonism with Ankara – while remaining alert to cases where Turkish influence can undermine democratic resilience in EU candidate countries. The Union’s response should therefore be less about constraining Turkey and more about investing in its own appeal and effectiveness. This means ensuring timely delivery of promised financial and infrastructure projects, making EU engagement more visible on the ground, and working directly with municipalities, universities, and civil society to generate bottom-up legitimacy. It also requires pragmatic coordination with Ankara in areas of shared concern, such as migration management or infrastructure security, while safeguarding conditionality whenever Turkish pressure risks undermining rule-of-law or human rights commitments in partner states. Preventing asymmetric dependencies will be equally important: the EU must support investment screening and provide credible alternatives through instruments like the EIB and EBRD. Finally, reclaiming the soft-power edge will demand more robust cultural and educational programmes, investment in regional media, and clear communication of the EU’s core values – secularism, inclusivity, and democratic governance –as the non-negotiable foundations of the European project. Taken together, these measures would allow the EU to channel Turkey’s presence into a more complementary direction, while ensuring that European norms and institutions remain the decisive reference point for countries on the path to accession.

Članak InvigoratEU Long Policy Report on Turkey’s Ambitions and Leverage se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

With such pertinent questions at hand, this paper examines how the hypothetical concurrent accession of all Western Balkan countries (WB6) would shape the EP. First, it estimates the implications for the allocation of seats by simulating two scenarios: 1) a short-term scenario in which temporary derogations from the treaty-based numerical cap are used to ensure immediate representation during the ongoing parliamentary term, and 2) a longer-term scenario in which seats are reallocated within existing treaty limits for the subsequent legislature. Second, the paper assesses the potential impact on parliamentary power dynamics if enlargement were to happen during the current term. It does so by mapping national party representation onto European political groups and proportionally translating domestic parliamentary strength into hypothetical EP seat distributions. Overall, the paper argues that, given the relatively small population size of the WB6, their accession would require only limited institutional adjustment of the EP’s composition while leading to a moderate reconfiguration of the EP’s political balance. Acknowledging that stable majorities across EP dossiers are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, the paper further suggests that the gradual involvement of candidate-country parliamentarians in the EP’s work could help support its post-enlargement cohesion and effectiveness.

Članak Impact of Western Balkan Accession on the European Parliament: Projecting Seat Allocation and Power Dynamics se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

At its core, REACH tested a simple premise: when citizens are given space, structure, and access to information, they can develop meaningful policy recommendations. The project focused on three interlinked themes – rule of law, environmental sustainability, and EU integration/enlargement – examined through a three-tiered process of local, national, and
transnational consultations. This structure enabled the comparison and integration of citizen perspectives across diverse political and cultural contexts.

Altogether, REACH conducted 16 local consultations, seven national consultations, and a transnational deliberative event held in Belgrade in September 2025. Each stage deepened engagement: local discussions identified challenges; national events translated them into actionable proposals; and the transnational meeting brought participants from all seven countries together to refine and align their recommendations. These deliberations produced 71 citizen-driven policy proposals addressing governance, environmental, and institutional reforms.

Methodologically, REACH is notable for its standardised and comparative design, developed by Corina Stratulat of the European Policy Centre. The shared deliberation protocol ensured consistency while allowing national flexibility. Consultations were inclusive and demographically balanced, with at least 30% youth participation. Through expert facilitation and evidence-based discussion, participants generated realistic, policy-oriented solutions on issues ranging from judicial reform and anti-corruption to renewable energy and civic education. A central insight from REACH is the mutual dependence between the rule of law, environmental policy, and EU integration. Citizens recognised that without rule of law, neither sustainability nor credible EU accession is possible, while EU integration itself drives institutional reform and civic empowerment. The transnational event marked a milestone in participatory democracy, transforming national proposals into a coherent European framework and demonstrating the value of cross-border deliberation in fostering democratic renewal.

Ultimately, REACH shows that democracy thrives beyond elections – through continuous participation, learning, and cocreation. It proves that citizens are capable partners policymaking and that Europe’s democratic renewal depends on listening to its people and turning their collective insight into tangible change

Članak Reaching Out: Citizens as Drivers of Change for Rule of Law, Environment, and EU Integration se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

WeBER 3.0 continues to promote the crucial role of CSOs in PAR, while also advocating for broader citizen engagement in this process and inclusive reform measures which are user-tailored and thus lead to tangible improvements.

By grounding actions in robust monitoring data and insights, WeBER 3.0 will empower civil society to more effectively influence the design and implementation of PAR. To foster collaborative policymaking and bridge the gap between aspirations and actionable solutions, the project will facilitate sustainable policy dialogue between governments and CSOs through the WeBER Platform and its National PAR Working Groups. Finally, through small grants for local CSOs, WeBER 3.0 bolsters local-level PAR engagement, amplifying
the voices of citizens – the final beneficiaries of the public administrations’ work.

WeBER 3.0 products and further information about them are available on the
project’s website at www.par-monitor.org

Članak Western Balkan PAR Monitor: PUBLIC SERVICE AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 2024/2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

Over the years of a stalled enlargement process and very slow and limited effect of reforms, the EU has become aware of inherent challenges. This led to the introduction of the Reform and Growth Facility (RFG) in 2024 – a new instrument of gradual integration aimed at revitalising the Western Balkans’ (WB) reforms and membership perspective.[1] By allocating EUR 6 billion and explicitly linking access to funding to the fulfilment of reform commitments, the essential goal of the Facility was to incentivise fundamental reforms.[2] As the rule of law reforms lie at the very heart of its RGF, it becomes particularly important to analyse whether Western Balkan governments’ formal commitments under the Reform Agendas translate into practice. Rather than assessing the rule of law agenda in its entirety, this paper singles out anti-corruption, as progress in this area serves as a critical proxy for overall governance and adherence to EU values. By comparatively examining this component of Reform Agendas, the analysis aims to identify emerging trends, existing gaps, and examples of promising practice.[3] The central argument is that variation in early implementation of anti-corruption reforms primarily reflects differences in political will, suggesting that the Facility’s capacity to induce transformative change, while meaningful, may remain inherently constrained.

[1] Official Journal of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, 2024/1449

[2] Reform and Growth Facility is referred to as “the Facility” or “RGF” throughout the paper.

[3] Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only WB country that has not to date adopted the Reform Agenda in 2024. The document was adopted in October 2025, but it is still awaiting EC verification during writing of this paper. Thus, five other countries are analysed: Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo* (This designation is without prejudice to status and is in line with UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) and ICJ advisory opinion on unilateral declaration of independence.

Članak Comparing Reform Agendas: Overview of Anti-Corruption Measures Among Western Balkan Countries se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

By grounding actions in robust monitoring data and insights, WeBER 3.0 will empower civil society to more effectively influence the design and implementation of PAR. To foster collaborative policymaking and bridge the gap between aspirations and actionable solutions, the project will facilitate sustainable policy dialogue between governments and CSOs through the WeBER Platform and its National PAR Working Groups. Finally, through small grants for local CSOs, WeBER 3.0 bolsters local-level PAR engagement, amplifying the voices of citizens – the final beneficiaries of the public administrations’ work. WeBER 3.0 products and further information about them are available on the project’s website at www.par-monitor.org

Članak Western Balkan PAR Monitor: SERVICE DELIVERY AND DIGITALISATION se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

By grounding actions in robust monitoring data and insights, WeBER 3.0 will empower civil society to more effectively influence the design and implementation of PAR. To foster collaborative policymaking and bridge the gap between aspirations and actionable solutions, the project will facilitate sustainable policy dialogue between governments and CSOs through the WeBER Platform and its National PAR Working Groups. Finally, through small grants for local CSOs, WeBER 3.0 bolsters local-level PAR engagement, amplifying the voices of citizens – the final beneficiaries of the public administrations’ work. WeBER 3.0 products and further information about them are available on the project’s website at www.par-monitor.org

Članak Western Balkan PAR Monitor: STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.