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	<title>European Policy Centre</title>
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	<title>European Policy Centre</title>
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<site xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">243999105</site>	<item>
		<title>The Role of OLAF and EPPO in the Western Balkans: Combating Fraud Ahead of EU Membership</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-role-of-olaf-and-eppo-in-the-western-balkans-combating-fraud-ahead-of-eu-membership/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Strahinja Subotić]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 12:27:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=19495</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Despite having an EU perspective since 2003, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-role-of-olaf-and-eppo-in-the-western-balkans-combating-fraud-ahead-of-eu-membership/">The Role of OLAF and EPPO in the Western Balkans: Combating Fraud Ahead of EU Membership</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img decoding="async" width="255" height="82" src="https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Screenshot-2025-10-13-155155.png" alt="" class="wp-image-19297"/></figure>



<p><em>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.</em></p>



<p>Despite having an EU perspective since 2003, the Western Balkans continues to face persistent corruption-related challenges, underscoring the need for stronger oversight mechanisms. As reflected in the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024">2024 Corruption Perceptions Index</a>, Montenegro ranks as the least corrupt country among the Western Balkans Six (WB6) at 65<sup>th</sup> place globally, followed by Kosovo (73), Albania (80), North Macedonia (88), Serbia (105), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (114), which ranks the lowest. Although some countries have registered modest improvements in recent years<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a>, others still struggle with long-standing problems such as weak institutions, limited oversight, and poor governance practices. These issues continue to slow institutional development and undermine public trust. These risks are not just abstract. The tragic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9wrp7g05xro">canopy collapse</a> in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024 further highlighted the consequences of unchecked corruption, weak procurement oversight, and misuse of funds. As the WB6 advance on their path toward EU membership, in particular Montenegro and Albania as frontrunners, the urgency of strengthening cooperation with European anti-fraud bodies becomes increasingly important.&nbsp; Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to assess the current state of cooperation between the WB6 and <a href="https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu/index_en">the European Anti-Fraud Office</a> (OLAF) and <a href="https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en">the European Public Prosecutor’s Office</a> (EPPO).</p>



<p>Although the role of these institutions is essential in safeguarding EU financial interests, their work remains largely unknown in the region and even underexplored in the existing analyses. Accordingly, and in line with the ongoing attempts to gradually integrate the region with the EU even before membership, the paper examines both the extent of existing engagement between these bodies and regional authorities and the prospects for its further enhancement. The research drew on an in-depth review of publicly available reports and documents, complemented by interviews with representatives of OLAF and the EPPO, as well as Western Balkan officials working in the area of anti-corruption. This multilayered approach ensured a comprehensive, evidence-based analysis that informed the development of policy recommendations intended to guide key stakeholders and raise awareness among the wider public. The basic argument is that deeper engagement with the OLAF and the EPPO is essential, not only to protect EU financial interests but also to reinforce the rule of law and enhance public confidence in these countries as they prepare to assume obligations of EU membership.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-role-of-olaf-and-eppo-in-the-western-balkans-combating-fraud-ahead-of-eu-membership/">The Role of OLAF and EPPO in the Western Balkans: Combating Fraud Ahead of EU Membership</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">19495</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Lex Specialis as Modus Operandi: Analysing Public Procurement Systems in the Western Balkans</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/lex-specialis-as-modus-operandi-analysing-public-procurement-systems-in-the-western-balkans/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Miloš Pavković]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 12:24:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=19491</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Despite a shared commitment to EU integration, public [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/lex-specialis-as-modus-operandi-analysing-public-procurement-systems-in-the-western-balkans/">Lex Specialis as Modus Operandi: Analysing Public Procurement Systems in the Western Balkans</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img decoding="async" width="255" height="82" src="https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Screenshot-2025-10-13-155155.png" alt="" class="wp-image-19297"/></figure>



<p><em>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.</em></p>



<p>Despite a shared commitment to EU integration, public procurement reform across the Western Balkans remains uneven and complex. At first glance, the region appears to be moving in the right direction – formally aligning legal frameworks, introducing e-procurement systems, and harmonising with EU standards and practice. But beneath the surface lies a troubling workaround that undermines this progress: the recurring use of the <em>lex specialis </em>approach, or special laws, to circumvent established procurement rules. A typical case involves governments launching multi-million-euro infrastructure projects without competitive bidding, justified by a “special national interest” law passed overnight – effectively sidestepping standard procedures and weakening the integrity of the procurement system. This paper argues that the use of special laws not only hinders EU integration by breaching core EU principles of transparency and competition but it also opens the door to unchecked public spending and erodes public trust. To grasp whether this practice is an exception or rather becoming modus operandi across the Western Balkans, the paper explores this grey zone, examining how legal exceptions are increasingly becoming the rule, and what that means for the future of democratic governance and EU accession in the region. Against this regional backdrop, the paper dedicates particular attention to Serbia, where the reliance on special legislation is most entrenched and offers a revealing case of how systemic this practice has become.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/lex-specialis-as-modus-operandi-analysing-public-procurement-systems-in-the-western-balkans/">Lex Specialis as Modus Operandi: Analysing Public Procurement Systems in the Western Balkans</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">19491</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Labour Migration and EU Enlargement: Reconciling Dutch and Western Balkan Priorities</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/labour-migration-and-eu-enlargement-reconciling-dutch-and-western-balkan-priorities/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Camille van Hees]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Apr 2025 15:08:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18794</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This research paper intends to analyse the future of freedom of movement for workers within the EU, particularly in the context of further enlargement and potential reforms. It seeks to provide a detailed, evidence-based assessment of how the Dutch proposal to extend limitations on worker freedom for new member states is perceived by key Western [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/labour-migration-and-eu-enlargement-reconciling-dutch-and-western-balkan-priorities/">Labour Migration and EU Enlargement: Reconciling Dutch and Western Balkan Priorities</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>This research paper intends to analyse the future of freedom of movement for workers within the EU, particularly in the context of further enlargement and potential reforms. It seeks to provide a detailed, evidence-based assessment of how the Dutch proposal to extend limitations on worker freedom for new member states is perceived by key Western Balkan (WB) countries (considering their significant emigration challenges), while assessing the impact of the restrictions on the future EU member states.</p>



<p>The Republic of Serbia was selected as the primary case study due to its size, significance, and the potential impact of its labor mobility on the EU. Additionally, a comparative approach by examining Montenegro, the closest to EU membership, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, known for its high labor mobility, was taken. By conducting research efforts, in-depth, context-specific data was collected through interviews with key stakeholders in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro.</p>



<p><em>Supported in part by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs). Responsibility for the contents and views expressed in this publication therein lies entirely with the European Policy Centre &#8211; CEP and the Clingendael and in no way can be construed as reflecting the official position of OSIS, OSFs or any affiliated entities.</em></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-medium"><img decoding="async" width="300" height="117" src="https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/TFEP-Logos_Logo-03-600-x-600-px_snipped-1-300x117.png" alt="" class="wp-image-18795" srcset="https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/TFEP-Logos_Logo-03-600-x-600-px_snipped-1-300x117.png 300w, https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/TFEP-Logos_Logo-03-600-x-600-px_snipped-1-1024x400.png 1024w, https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/TFEP-Logos_Logo-03-600-x-600-px_snipped-1-768x300.png 768w, https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/TFEP-Logos_Logo-03-600-x-600-px_snipped-1-1536x600.png 1536w, https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/TFEP-Logos_Logo-03-600-x-600-px_snipped-1-2048x800.png 2048w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></figure>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/labour-migration-and-eu-enlargement-reconciling-dutch-and-western-balkan-priorities/">Labour Migration and EU Enlargement: Reconciling Dutch and Western Balkan Priorities</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18794</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>EU Trio Presidency Rewind: From Spain, over Belgium, to Hungary</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/eu-trio-presidency-rewind-from-spain-over-belgium-to-hungary/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sava Mitrović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Apr 2025 08:16:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=19108</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>CEP is participating in the implementation of the project &#8220;Central Europe and the Future EU Enlargement,&#8221; which aims to support the integration of EU candidate countries by working with research centers from across the region to build an active network capable of sharing expertise, fostering mutual understanding, and developing joint solutions. As part of this [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/eu-trio-presidency-rewind-from-spain-over-belgium-to-hungary/">EU Trio Presidency Rewind: From Spain, over Belgium, to Hungary</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>CEP is participating in the implementation of the project <em>&#8220;Central Europe and the Future EU Enlargement,&#8221;</em> which aims to support the integration of EU candidate countries by working with research centers from across the region to build an active network capable of sharing expertise, fostering mutual understanding, and developing joint solutions.</p>



<p>As part of this project, CEP has produced a paper titled <em>“EU Trio Presidency Rewind: From Spain, over Belgium, to Hungary.”</em></p>



<p>The project is co-financed by the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from the International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the Fund is to promote ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/eu-trio-presidency-rewind-from-spain-over-belgium-to-hungary/">EU Trio Presidency Rewind: From Spain, over Belgium, to Hungary</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">19108</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Behind the Curtain: Examining the Adoption and Content of Serbia’s Reform Agenda</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/behind-the-curtain-examining-the-adoption-and-content-of-serbias-reform-agenda/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marko Todorović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2025 13:57:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18751</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This paper will critically examine the development and adoption process of the Reform Agenda, focusing on its inclusiveness, analysing its content, and assessing the mechanisms designed for its implementation and monitoring. Particular attention will be given to the role of civil society in ensuring accountability and transparency. By addressing these aspects, the paper comprehensively analyses [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/behind-the-curtain-examining-the-adoption-and-content-of-serbias-reform-agenda/">Behind the Curtain: Examining the Adoption and Content of Serbia’s Reform Agenda</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>This paper will critically examine the development and adoption process of the Reform Agenda, focusing on its inclusiveness, analysing its content, and assessing the mechanisms designed for its implementation and monitoring. Particular attention will be given to the role of civil society in ensuring accountability and transparency. By addressing these aspects, the paper comprehensively analyses the Reform Agenda’s significance within Serbia’s EU integration efforts. Ultimately, it concludes that while the Reform Agenda represents a notable milestone in Serbia’s path to EU membership, its development and adoption were characterised by insufficient inclusiveness and transparency. The success of its implementation will depend on the government’s capacity to address these shortcomings and foster meaningful engagement with all stakeholders.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/behind-the-curtain-examining-the-adoption-and-content-of-serbias-reform-agenda/">Behind the Curtain: Examining the Adoption and Content of Serbia’s Reform Agenda</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18751</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>A Place to Call Home? Addressing foreign nationals’ challenges to entering, residing and working in Serbia</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/a-place-to-call-home-addressing-foreign-nationals-challenges-to-entering-residing-and-working-in-serbia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ludovica Daffini]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jan 2025 14:13:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18594</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Living in a foreign country means gaining exposure to diverse cultural perspectives, as well as sharing personal and professional contributions across the world. Although the prospects of embarking in international adventures are appealing to many, there are several practical obstacles that may prevent a foreigner from travelling internationally and settling abroad. More specifically, foreign citizens&#8217; [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/a-place-to-call-home-addressing-foreign-nationals-challenges-to-entering-residing-and-working-in-serbia/">A Place to Call Home? Addressing foreign nationals’ challenges to entering, residing and working in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Living in a foreign country means gaining exposure to diverse cultural perspectives, as well as sharing personal and professional contributions across the world. Although the prospects of embarking in international adventures are appealing to many, there are several practical obstacles that may prevent a foreigner from travelling internationally and settling abroad. More specifically, foreign citizens&#8217; journey to entering, residing and working in Serbia can be disrupted by different obstacles, mainly concerning the availability of clear and accessible information on travelling and living in Serbia on institutional websites. While responsible authorities acknowledge these issues and claim to be making significant efforts to improve services, remaining obstacles can still negatively influence foreign nationals’ decision to move to Serbia. These challenges in attracting foreign workers could also have negative effects on Serbia&#8217;s growing economy, an awareness that urges policymakers not only to continue improving successful reforms, but also to address remaining weaknesses.</p>



<p>The need to attract foreigners is deemed as a priority given that Serbia is traversing an economic growth phase, with GDP projected to increase between 3% and 4% in the next years, and at the same time dealing with a rapidly ageing population. This evidence seems to motivate the Government as well, with high officials highlighting the need to import as much labour as possible from other regions of the world in the coming years. Welcoming foreigners, however, can go far beyond economic progress, and initiate a process of mutual exchange of resources, good practices, skills and diverse cultural perspectives between Serbia and the rest of the globe. Ultimately, in a world faced by unprecedented environmental, geopolitical and economic crises, building international connections is one of the ways forward.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/a-place-to-call-home-addressing-foreign-nationals-challenges-to-entering-residing-and-working-in-serbia/">A Place to Call Home? Addressing foreign nationals’ challenges to entering, residing and working in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18594</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>PAR Monitoring and Coordination: What space for civil society to influence?</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/par-monitoring-and-coordination-what-space-for-civil-society-to-influence/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Milica Divljak]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 13:21:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18552</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Public Administration Reform Strategy in the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter PAR Strategy/ Strategy) was adopted in April 2021, covering the period from 2021 to 2030. During the three years of its implementation, a steady course of reform was set, although with varying results in the different reform areas. The Strategy introduced a three-tier coordination [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/par-monitoring-and-coordination-what-space-for-civil-society-to-influence/">PAR Monitoring and Coordination: What space for civil society to influence?</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>The Public Administration Reform Strategy in the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter PAR Strategy/ Strategy) was adopted in April 2021, covering the period from 2021 to 2030. During the three years of its implementation, a steady course of reform was set, although with varying results in the different reform areas. The Strategy introduced a three-tier coordination and management structure to improve efficiency, distinguishing between administrative and political levels. The first level, focused on expert and operational tasks, falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government (MPALSG). The Inter-Ministerial Project Group (IMPG) represents the second level. It is chaired by the Secretary of the MPALSG, and it includes coordinators of thematic areas of the Strategy. Other members of the IMPG include relevant representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs). The third, political level is the PAR Council, formed by the Government as the central strategic body for PAR. The Council represents the common political level of coordination of PAR and public finance reform. It is chaired by the Minister of Public Administration and Local Self-Government, with the deputy being the Minister of Finance. Members are appointed among line ministers and representatives of other state authorities, representatives of the Government of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina) and the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities (SCTM).</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/par-monitoring-and-coordination-what-space-for-civil-society-to-influence/">PAR Monitoring and Coordination: What space for civil society to influence?</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18552</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/echoes-of-moscow-russian-telegramnetwork-in-serbia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Sep 2024 09:11:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18200</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russia has launched an extensive information warfare campaign, wielding the power of misinformation to sway global sentiment, fracture European unity, and rally support for its actions. As the European Union swiftly moved to ban Russian media broadcasts, the battleground shifted to social media platforms, with Telegram emerging as [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/echoes-of-moscow-russian-telegramnetwork-in-serbia/">Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russia has launched an extensive information warfare campaign, wielding the power of misinformation to sway global sentiment, fracture European unity, and rally support for its actions. As the European Union swiftly moved to ban Russian media broadcasts, the battleground shifted to social media platforms, with Telegram emerging as a centre stage for the dissemination of Kremlin propaganda on a global scale. In particular, European nations such as Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, which are among the top supporters of Ukraine, have found themselves on the frontline of this information competition. Meanwhile, in the Western Balkans, which are far from the conflict zone but not immune to its reverberations, the influence of Russian media has only grown stronger.</p>



<p>Yet, alongside this official presence, the social media landscape has also undergone profound transformations, becoming both a battlefield and a breeding ground for pro-Russian narratives. Considering the importance of this topic, this study investigates the dynamics and impact of the Kremlin&#8217;s narratives on <em>Telegram</em> in Serbia, focusing on the interplay between local Serbian discourse and propagandist&#8217; content. Primarily, it seeks to determine whether Russian or pro-Russian propaganda dominates the region. The research uncovers a network affiliated with Russia&#8217;s Telegram channels operating in Serbia and the Western Balkans, analysing how the Serbian political and social context influences these narratives and their perception. Furthermore, it identifies patterns in the distribution of pro-Russian content across the region, offering insights into the strategies used to disseminate these messages and their broader implications for regional stability and political dynamics. The analysis reveals that despite Russia&#8217;s efforts to establish a propaganda broadcasting network in the Balkans, the region does not hold a strategic priority for the Kremlin. Instead, the primary disseminators of pro-Russian messages are local actors leveraging these narratives to serve their interests.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/echoes-of-moscow-russian-telegramnetwork-in-serbia/">Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18200</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Quantifying the Functioning of Democratic Institutions: Developing a Reliable Model for the Western Balkans</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/quantifying-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutionsdeveloping-a-reliable-model-for-the-western-balkans/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Miloš Pavković]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2023 14:34:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=16658</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Functioning of democratic institutions (FoDI) is an inseparable [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/quantifying-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutionsdeveloping-a-reliable-model-for-the-western-balkans/">Quantifying the Functioning of Democratic Institutions: Developing a Reliable Model for the Western Balkans</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img decoding="async" width="255" height="82" src="https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Screenshot-2025-10-13-155155.png" alt="" class="wp-image-19297"/></figure>



<p><em>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.</em></p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Functioning of democratic institutions (FoDI) is an inseparable part of country reports produced by the European Commission (EC, Commission) each year. At the same time, this is the sole part of the report that does not have an assessment of the level of preparedness and progress. Since 33 negotiating chapters and two sub-areas within the Fundamentals cluster, namely Economic Criteria and the Public Administration Reform (PAR), are regularly assessed by the Commission for all (potential) candidate countries, FoDI deserved the same treatment. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>Moreover, having in mind the revised enlargement methodology with enhanced focus on the Fundamentals, the necessity for providing a clear assessment of the state of play in this area appears as a logical step forward if the aim is to elevate the overall impact of the mentioned reports on the reform processes in the Western Balkan region. Hence, this paper offers thorough guidance for the EC to apply quantification to the FoDI area, using a reliable approach (referred to as &#8216;mixed approach’ throughout the paper). &nbsp;</p>



<p>The paper is organised in five distinct chapters. In the first part, it argues why quantification is important and necessary for the EU accession process. In the second chapter, a methodology for quantifying FoDI is developed with detailed step-by-step explanations. Afterwards, in the third section, the quantification methodology is applied to six Western Balkan countries and ratings for four categories (‘Elections’, ‘Parliament’, ‘Governance’, and ‘Civil society’) are calculated and presented. The Mixed approach model for quantifying FoDI is developed in the same chapter by calculating an overall score for FoDI across six countries. The same chapter also presents and discusses the final FoDI results based on the applied methodology. Lastly, quantification is observed in the context of the Model of staged accession as part of its merit-based approach towards enlargement.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p></p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/quantifying-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutionsdeveloping-a-reliable-model-for-the-western-balkans/">Quantifying the Functioning of Democratic Institutions: Developing a Reliable Model for the Western Balkans</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">16658</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Uncharted Waters: The BRICS Expansion and Implications</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/uncharted-waters-the-brics-expansion-and-implications/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ana Maria Skaricic]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Nov 2023 11:11:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=16532</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At the 15th BRICS summit in August 2023, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced plans to expand their membership by inviting six nations to join as official members. This move means that when Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, join the bloc with full membership [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/uncharted-waters-the-brics-expansion-and-implications/">Uncharted Waters: The BRICS Expansion and Implications</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>At the 15th <strong>BRICS summit</strong> in August 2023, the <strong>BRICS nations </strong>(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) announced plans to expand their membership by inviting six nations to join as official members. This move means that when Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, join the bloc with full membership in January 2024, BRICS will represent about 46.5% of the global population and about a third of the global GDP. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>The expansion will likely aid BRICS’ legitimacy as a representative and inclusive institution. However, it also makes an organisation that has already been criticised for being a varied, miscellaneous collection of member-states, even more heterogeneous, adding new regional dynamics, political governance structures, development stages, and economic specialisations to the mix. The expansion thus has considerable implications for the governance, efficacy, and character of BRICS as an international institution.</p>



<p>Meanwhile, scholars and analysts have situated the existence of BRICS in the context of a global political power contest between Russia, China, and the US. This struggle takes place within a Western-led world order that many developing countries also perceive as institutionally excluding the voices and interests of the global South, particularly in the sphere of economic development. The expansion of BRICS, and the subsequent effects it has on the organisation’s competence, is, therefore, a significant development in international politics, even if it is not the watershed for a multipolar world order that some have been hoping for. </p>



<p>This paper aims to track the international context behind the BRICS challenge to Western organisations, discuss the potential geopolitical consequences of a BRICS expansion in the context of a Russian power play, and consider the implications for Serbia’s global positioning.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/uncharted-waters-the-brics-expansion-and-implications/">Uncharted Waters: The BRICS Expansion and Implications</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">16532</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Circular Migration: Does Serbia Have a Solution?</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/circular-migration-does-serbia-have-a-solution/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ana Milinković]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Oct 2023 12:25:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=16363</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Circular migration represents an innovative response to the challenges of demographic decline and population outflow in Serbia. This migration model allows the country to harness the benefits of migration, transfer knowledge and capital from abroad, thus contributing to its economic development. However, circular migrants face specific challenges due to frequent changes in their place of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/circular-migration-does-serbia-have-a-solution/">Circular Migration: Does Serbia Have a Solution?</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>Circular migration represents an innovative response to the challenges of demographic decline and population outflow in Serbia. This migration model allows the country to harness the benefits of migration, transfer knowledge and capital from abroad, thus contributing to its economic development. </p>
</blockquote>



<p>However, circular migrants face specific challenges due to frequent changes in their place of residence, requiring tailored services and support. Managing circular migration requires careful consideration to meet their needs and create favourable conditions for their return with new skills and experiences, thus strengthening Serbia’s competitive advantages in the global market. Based on these assumptions, this policy brief provides recommendations for enhancing support for circular migrants, thereby contributing to Serbia’s economic and social development. The brief analyses the significance and effectiveness of two key platforms – the eGovernment portal and <a href="https://tackapovratka.rs/en/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">the Returning Point</a> – in supporting circular migrants and returnees to Serbia. Through a detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis, challenges and potential solutions related to the use of these portals are explored. Additionally, user satisfaction is considered, their specific needs are examined, and potential improvements are proposed</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/circular-migration-does-serbia-have-a-solution/">Circular Migration: Does Serbia Have a Solution?</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">16363</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Deepening and Expanding the Scope of the Commission’s Reporting of Developments in the “Functioning of Democratic Institutions” in WB6</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/deepening-and-expanding-the-scope-of-the-commission-s-reporting-of-developments-in-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutions-in-wb6/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Strahinja Subotić]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Sep 2023 14:27:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=15818</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. This paper is an integral component of a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/deepening-and-expanding-the-scope-of-the-commission-s-reporting-of-developments-in-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutions-in-wb6/">Deepening and Expanding the Scope of the Commission’s Reporting of Developments in the “Functioning of Democratic Institutions” in WB6</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img decoding="async" width="255" height="82" src="https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Screenshot-2025-10-13-155155.png" alt="" class="wp-image-19299"/></figure>



<p><em>This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.</em></p>



<p>This paper is an integral component of a broader initiative aimed at enhancing the Commission’s assessments within the &#8220;Functioning of Democratic Institutions&#8221; (FoDI) subarea. It builds upon prior work <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/identifying-deficiencies-in-the-2022-european-commission-s-annual-reports-for-wb6/">identifying the inconsistencies</a> present in the Commission’s reporting on the Western Balkans (WB6) while also proposing methods to quantify the findings by cross-analysing the most renowned international democracy indexes. This paper goes further, as its primary objective is to identify and advocate for the introduction and integration of additional essential policy elements into the Commission’s reporting within the FoDI domain. Doing so would result in the deepening and expansion of the Commission’s reporting and assessment scope, thus providing a platform for a more detailed, precise, and realistic evaluation of the state of affairs on the ground. Such a comprehensive and in-depth examination is essential for fostering a deeper understanding of the challenges, strengths, and dynamics of democratic institutions within the assessed region, but also as a contribution towards increasing the overall credibility of the Commission’s reports.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/deepening-and-expanding-the-scope-of-the-commission-s-reporting-of-developments-in-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutions-in-wb6/">Deepening and Expanding the Scope of the Commission’s Reporting of Developments in the “Functioning of Democratic Institutions” in WB6</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">15818</post-id>	</item>
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