Članak Unpacking the 2024 Enlargement Package – A New Momentum or Business as Usual? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak PAR Monitoring and Coordination: What space for civil society to influence? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Since the last expansion of the European Union in 2013, the enlargement policy ceased to be a priority for the Union. This happened despite the civil society organisations’ (CSOs) warnings of the perils such a stance might bring. The inability of CSOs to impact the EU’s policymaking agenda was a result of the EU’s traditional struggles with the inclusivity of non-state actors concerning policy development. With the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, however, the tides have changed. In the midst of geopolitical challenges, EU officials started emphasising that the enlargement policy was back on the agenda. The paper argues that this shift has created a strategic opportunity for CSOs to carve out a more distinctive position within the EU’s policymaking process. This was achieved through their robust advocacy for innovative ideas concerning enlargement, thereby positioning CSOs as influential contributors to the evolution of EU policies.As a case study, the paper uses the Model for Staged Accession to the EU, published in October 2021 and revised in August 2023 by the European Policy Centre (CEP – Belgrade) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS – Brussels). With CSOs across Europe functioning as multipliers of the original proposal, a critical mass significant enough was generated to compel decision-makers in the EU institutions and EU member states to incorporate the Model’s key features into subsequent official proposals of their own. These features are best visible in proposals that refer to the necessity to render the enlargement policy more gradual, structured, dynamic, effective, predictable, and credible. Therefore, by effectively navigating the shift from a lack of prioritisation to enhanced reprioritisation of the enlargement policy, this paper demonstrates that CSOs have played a pivotal role in reshaping the enlargement policy and making the EU’s policymaking more inclusive.

To showcase how the CSOs managed to carve out a more distinctive position within the EU’s policymaking process, the paper examines the issue across several sections. After this introductory chapter, in section 2, the paper examines how CSOs have shaped EU enlargement policy by advocating for reforms and addressing democratic deficits. In section 3, the paper provides a description of what the Model of Staged Accession to the EU is, how and under what circumstances has developed in the past years. This will set the stage for a basic understanding of the Model’s premise, tools to overcome challenges, and overall purpose. In section 4, the paper engages in mapping out the Model’s “life” after its inception, that is, identifying a rough estimate of CSOs that have so far picked it up, discussed it and endorsed it as a way forward. By having circulated, brainstormed, and even promoted the Model across Europe (and beyond), the paper will show that they have contributed to the process of reshaping the EU’s top agenda. In section 5, the paper identifies key EU documents that have been actually influenced by the idea of Staged accession, including the work of EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, as well as the work of individual member states. The documents include official conclusions, communications, declarations, and non-papers that have so far had a full or partial mention or adjusted interpretation of the ideas originating from the Model, such as the staged/gradual/phased integration of candidate countries into the EU. Although these terms are not conceptually identical, their purpose aligns – to alter the status quo and invigorate enlargement. Finally, section 6 will provide conclusory remarks, interpreting the findings and reaffirming the thesis of the paper.

Članak The Role of Civil Society in Re-shaping EU Enlargement Policy in the Context of Geopolitical Changes: The Model for Staged Accession to the EU as a Case Study se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Amidst these challenges, the European Policy Centre (CEP – Belgrade) and Le Grand Continent organised a closed discussion titled “Political Priorities of Serbia and the Balkans between Trans-Atlantic, Sino-American, and EU-China Relations in Times of Global Changes.” The event was held under the Chatham House rule and gathered over 20 experts from civil society, academia and the private sector who shared their insights, perspectives, and opinions on the pressing issues facing Serbia. The discussion was divided into two panels, with the first one focusing on offering an outlook on Serbia’s internal situation in the context of its EU accession process, while the second focused on the country’s foreign policy amidst shifting global dynamics. This paper presents a summary of the discussions and offers important insights publicly while respecting the Chatham House rule and protecting participants’ names and affiliations.

Članak Political Priorities of Serbia: Between Trans-Atlantic, Sino-American, and EU-China Relations se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This publication has received funding from Progres Institute and Kalevi Sorsa Foundation’s Think Tank Grant Program. The Grant Program is supported by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Progres Institute, the Kalevi Sorsa foundation, or the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Democracy and functioning democratic institutions are some of the key criteria and necessary prerequisites for a country to join the European Union (EU). First established at the Copenhagen European Council summit, as part of the so-called political criteria, it was additionally strengthened in 2020 with the Revised Enlargement Methodology (REM) by placing the sub-area ‘Functioning of democratic institutions’ (FoDI) in the Fundamentals cluster (Cluster 1). In that sense, the role of the European Commission (EC) and its annual country report for candidates serve as the most relevant source of information for the state of play in this area on which important decisions within the accession process are made, by EC and other EU competent bodies. The importance of credible reporting in the FoDI area has been once again confirmed by the decision of the European Council (EUCO) to start accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, highlighting the necessity in their respective negotiating frameworks for preparing a roadmap for the functioning of democratic institutions. Finally, the newly adopted Growth Plan for the Western Balkans emphasises the Fundamentals as a condition for EU financial support.

The FoDI is the sole area in the EC’s reports that does not provide an assessment of the progress and preparation levels of candidate countries. Moreover, this is the only segment of the Fundamentals without a proper qualitative assessment – standing in contrast to areas on the Economic Criteria and Public Administration Reform (PAR). The research focused on the Commission 2022 Enlargement Package for the Western Balkan countries and found inconsistencies in the EC’s approach to reporting FoDI, especially for the Governance and Civilian oversight of the security and intelligence sector sections. The European Policy Centre (CEP) has, based on the findings of its three analyses on the Commission’s reporting on FoDI, provided certain recommendations to this EU body on how to improve its reporting. Key recommendations suggest improving consistency, providing assessment, and deepening and expanding the scope and quantification of reports in this segment. Finally, CEP developed a model for quantification of the FoDI area based on a mixed approach using publicly available renowned democracy indexes.

However, preliminary estimations indicated that many of the last year’s recommendations were not adopted, warranting another detailed overview of the subsequent annual reports. Thus, this paper aims to replicate last year’s analysis using the methodology developed for scrutinising the 2023 Enlargement Package – EC’s annual country reports for six Western Balkan countries. In order to see whether and to what extent the EC continued making the same mistakes and to track the developments over time, a replication study is warranted. In the first section, the paper will test for consistency of reporting in the FoDI area, providing a statistical calculation of how coherent and consistent the 2023 Enlargement Package among the WB countries was. The second section will discuss key findings regarding consistency and engage in the debate of standardised reporting against technical and national context-adjusted reporting. The third section will utilise the Mixed Approach Model to calculate and quantify the whole area of Functioning of democratic institutions for all six WB countries. That will allow for tracking reforms in this area over time and paint a clearer picture of the state of affairs of the whole Western Balkan region. Finally, this paper will offer a comparative analysis of the 2022 and 2023 Enlargement Packages in the FoDI area, both in terms of consistency of reporting and quantification of the state of play in six countries. Comparative analysis will provide a regional as well as in-country assessment on a year-by-year basis.  

Članak Towards Better Monitoring of Democracy in the Western Balkans se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This insight aims to shed light on conscription as part of a broader remilitarisation trend among EU member states and analyse how it fits within the EU’s framework of resilience and strategic autonomy. In the second part, the paper compares Serbia’s intention to reintroduce conscription with the intentions of its EU counterparts, investigating whether Serbia’s move is part of the same remilitarisation trend or driven by purely national motives. Given the country’s thorny path towards EU membership due to insufficient rule of law standards, foreign policy alignment, and unresolved issues with Kosovo, the paper particularly examines whether the reintroduction of conscription might have any detrimental effect on regional dynamics and Serbia’s EU aspirations.

Članak From Peace to Preparedness: Conscription as a Once-Again Fashionable Idea in the EU and Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The reluctance of the Council to take decisive action on including candidates in its work is counterintuitive, given the widespread acclaim that the idea of institutional incentives has received across the EU member states. To understand the underlying reasons behind this paradox and find a way to resolve it, CEP has engaged with the Council of the EU and has visited 23 of the 27 member states to date. Building upon the collected insights, this paper outlines the encountered challenges and proposes a new, feasible strategy moving forward. The basic idea is that opening the doors of the EU Council is not only legally feasible but also practically achievable. Transitioning from the original proposal presented in Template 2.0 for Staged Accession in August 2023, this paper offers a revised but more realistic pathway for involving the candidate countries in the work of the EU Council while accounting for the identified practical needs and concerns of member states. The ideas presented in this paper are primarily directed at the upcoming Council Trio–Poland, Denmark, and Cyprus–who would be in a unique position to set a positive example for subsequent Trios to follow by agreeing to apply the proposed framework for gradual institutional participation already in the first half of 2025.

Članak From Bystanders to Contributors: A Realistic Way Towards Candidates’ Participation in the EU Council se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Yet, alongside this official presence, the social media landscape has also undergone profound transformations, becoming both a battlefield and a breeding ground for pro-Russian narratives. Considering the importance of this topic, this study investigates the dynamics and impact of the Kremlin’s narratives on Telegram in Serbia, focusing on the interplay between local Serbian discourse and propagandist’ content. Primarily, it seeks to determine whether Russian or pro-Russian propaganda dominates the region. The research uncovers a network affiliated with Russia’s Telegram channels operating in Serbia and the Western Balkans, analysing how the Serbian political and social context influences these narratives and their perception. Furthermore, it identifies patterns in the distribution of pro-Russian content across the region, offering insights into the strategies used to disseminate these messages and their broader implications for regional stability and political dynamics. The analysis reveals that despite Russia’s efforts to establish a propaganda broadcasting network in the Balkans, the region does not hold a strategic priority for the Kremlin. Instead, the primary disseminators of pro-Russian messages are local actors leveraging these narratives to serve their interests.

Članak Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In the last decade, the exploration of Russian interests in the Western Balkans (WB), particularly in Serbia, has surged in scholarly circles, rivalling the longstanding issue of Kosovo’s status. The eruption of war in Ukraine has thrust the question of Russian influence in Serbia into sharper focus, presenting Serbia with an existential dilemma in its foreign policy trajectory.

Amidst a geopolitical landscape evoking echoes of a new Cold War, the urgency of Serbia’s decision-making has intensified. On one hand, as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership, Serbia faces pressure to align with EU political interests. On the other hand, historical ties and ongoing cooperation with Russia present a complex dynamic that challenges the stated commitment to European integration. As a result, despite Western discontent, Serbia has steadfastly pursued its multi-vector foreign policy for the past two years. This approach involves maintaining active partnerships not only with the EU and the United States (US) but also with China and Russia. Notably, Serbia stands out as the sole European nation to have avoided the imposition of sanctions against Russia, sustaining robust business and political ties with Moscow amidst international tensions.

The deep-rooted influence of Russia in Serbia, coupled with pro-Russian sentiments among the population, often serves as the backdrop for understanding this phenomenon. However, while such assertions hold sway, recent studies and analyses shed light on a contrasting reality: Russia’s actual presence in Serbia is less substantial than commonly perceived. It becomes especially apparent considering the scale of economic and financial partnerships between Serbia and the EU.

Indeed, Russia’s primary leverage lies within its soft power arsenal, intricately woven into the broader context of its hybrid war strategy in the WB. Extensive research has been dedicated to unravelling the mechanisms of Russian propaganda in Serbia, dissecting the role of pro-Kremlin media in shaping anti-European sentiments and grappling with the issue of information warfare orchestrated by Russian entities in the region. However, numerous studies fall short of going beyond identifying Russian actors in Serbia and uncovering the grounds guiding their actions.

This study delves deeper into the intricate web of Russian propaganda in Serbia, aiming to connect its core narratives and images within the country’s political landscape. This study aims to explore Serbia’s role in the geopolitical framework of Russian foreign policy. Specifically, it seeks to answer two key research questions: First, does Kremlin propaganda follow a clearly articulated strategic plan in its operations? Second, to what extent does this propaganda permeate Serbian political and social spheres?

These inquiries are not merely academic exercises; they hold significant implications for Serbia’s future trajectory. The country’s notable democratic backsliding hinders its progress towards EU accession, casting a shadow of uncertainty over its prospects. The rising autocratic tendencies within Serbia are often linked to the alliances formed by the ruling elite with authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, and Turkey. Therefore, this study aims to gauge the extent of Russian interference and assess Russia’s role as a potential impediment to Serbia’s European integration. By shedding light on these complexities, it endeavours to provide insights that could inform decisions crucial for Serbia’s future development.

An intriguing facet setting this study apart is its examination of the proliferation of Kremlin propaganda on the relatively new digital platform, Telegram, which has attempted to make substantial inroads into the region. Telegram, renowned for its robust data security measures and refusal to collaborate with autocratic regimes like Russia, Belarus, or Iran, has garnered global acclaim. However, despite its initial reputation, the Kremlin has adapted to the platform’s dynamics, establishing a formidable information presence on social media.

This trend became particularly pronounced during the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, as numerous Telegram channels fervently disseminated pro-Russian propaganda both domestically and internationally. This surge extended its reach into Serbia and the broader WB, leveraging the platform’s anonymity and minimal censorship to orchestrate information offensives and sway public opinion.

As of October 2023, this study revealed a staggering 143 pro-Russian Telegram channels operating in Serbia alone, underscoring the pressing nature of Russia’s incursion into the Balkans’ information sphere and the imperative for deeper contemplation on this issue.

Članak From Russia with Love se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In the context of such challenges, the Hungarian Presidency sets strong ambitions, seeking to defy its critics and demonstrate its capacity for effective and decisive leadership. Besides the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and other security risks confronting Europe, the Presidency will engage in addressing the acute economic problems reflected in EU companies lagging behind their global counterparts, particularly those in the US and China. Judging by Hungary’s Presidency programme and Victor Orbán’s messages, Budapest recognises both security and economic issues faced by Europe, making the enhancement of the EU’s competitiveness and its defence capabilities the top two priorities of its Presidency. In addition, as a country which shares the border with both the Western Balkans (WB) and Ukraine, Hungary is now in a position to potentially accelerate the EU enlargement process by prioritising this policy and putting it high on the EU agenda. Therefore, this paper aims to critically examine the declaratively proclaimed goals of the Hungarian Presidency, answering the question of how realistically achievable they are and what are prerequisites for their fulfilment.

Članak The Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU: Navigating the EU in Times of Change se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The inception of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (NGP) represented a pivotal moment in the ongoing discussions of how to breathe life into gradual integration within the EU’s approach to enlargement. Gradual integration can be broadly defined as the strategy to incrementally extend membership-like benefits to non-member states, thereby smoothing their transition toward full EU membership. Since 2021, the Model for Staged Accession has pioneered a horizontal approach to this concept, linking the access to increased benefits to the level of accomplished reforms in all clusters. This model seeks to move beyond the traditional binary approach to enlargement while prioritising the Fundamentals. Given that both the Model and the NGP represent attempts of operationalising gradual integration, it is warranted to analyse to what extent they overlap. The paper posits that while the NGP effectively integrates the Model’s principle of conditional financial incentives to promote reforms, it overlooks the critical role of institutional participation as a complementary driver for accelerated accession progress. Uncovering the similarities and nuances of the NGP and the Model, the aim of the paper is to provide clarity on the analysed topic to EU policymakers and guide them on how to continue exploring further possibilities of gradual integration in the next institutional cycle.

Članak Setting the Stage for Enlargement se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The New Growth Plan (NGP) for the Western Balkans marks a significant departure from the existing Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). While the latter lacks reform-related conditionalities, the NGP’s funding will hinge upon the successful implementation of fundamental and socioeconomic reforms. By gradually providing increased financial benefits ahead of accession (amounting to roughly €6 billion, comprising €2 billion in grants and €4 billion in favourable loans), the initiative seeks to unlock the political will for reforms to take place and to facilitate socioeconomic convergence.

According to the European Commission, the region’s convergence stands at approximately 35% of the EU average. Given the magnitude of this disparity, the pertinent question arises: Will the NGP prove sufficient to address the pressing socioeconomic gap and contribute to catching up with the EU average?

Answering this question entails examining multiple facets. Thus, this analysis first identifies key socioeconomic trends and gaps to be addressed and then tests the two claims made by the Commission regarding the effects of the NGP. The first claim is that the financial assistance through NGP and IPA III combined will provide the WB with “roughly the same aid intensity per inhabitant as cohesion policy does on average in the EU.” The second claim is that the NGP “has the potential to double the size of the WB economies within the next 10 years.”

Based on the analysed socioeconomic indicators and the evaluation of the Commission’s claims, the analysis concludes that the NGP can serve as a solid foundation for stimulating economic growth and expediting EU integration. However, its effect on reducing the socioeconomic gap will remain limited.

Članak The Great Gap se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.