Članak Serbia and the European Union: Geopolitics and EU Values – in Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

At its core, REACH tested a simple premise: when citizens are given space, structure, and access to information, they can develop meaningful policy recommendations. The project focused on three interlinked themes – rule of law, environmental sustainability, and EU integration/enlargement – examined through a three-tiered process of local, national, and
transnational consultations. This structure enabled the comparison and integration of citizen perspectives across diverse political and cultural contexts.

Altogether, REACH conducted 16 local consultations, seven national consultations, and a transnational deliberative event held in Belgrade in September 2025. Each stage deepened engagement: local discussions identified challenges; national events translated them into actionable proposals; and the transnational meeting brought participants from all seven countries together to refine and align their recommendations. These deliberations produced 71 citizen-driven policy proposals addressing governance, environmental, and institutional reforms.

Methodologically, REACH is notable for its standardised and comparative design, developed by Corina Stratulat of the European Policy Centre. The shared deliberation protocol ensured consistency while allowing national flexibility. Consultations were inclusive and demographically balanced, with at least 30% youth participation. Through expert facilitation and evidence-based discussion, participants generated realistic, policy-oriented solutions on issues ranging from judicial reform and anti-corruption to renewable energy and civic education. A central insight from REACH is the mutual dependence between the rule of law, environmental policy, and EU integration. Citizens recognised that without rule of law, neither sustainability nor credible EU accession is possible, while EU integration itself drives institutional reform and civic empowerment. The transnational event marked a milestone in participatory democracy, transforming national proposals into a coherent European framework and demonstrating the value of cross-border deliberation in fostering democratic renewal.

Ultimately, REACH shows that democracy thrives beyond elections – through continuous participation, learning, and cocreation. It proves that citizens are capable partners policymaking and that Europe’s democratic renewal depends on listening to its people and turning their collective insight into tangible change

Članak Reaching Out: Citizens as Drivers of Change for Rule of Law, Environment, and EU Integration se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

Over the years of a stalled enlargement process and very slow and limited effect of reforms, the EU has become aware of inherent challenges. This led to the introduction of the Reform and Growth Facility (RFG) in 2024 – a new instrument of gradual integration aimed at revitalising the Western Balkans’ (WB) reforms and membership perspective.[1] By allocating EUR 6 billion and explicitly linking access to funding to the fulfilment of reform commitments, the essential goal of the Facility was to incentivise fundamental reforms.[2] As the rule of law reforms lie at the very heart of its RGF, it becomes particularly important to analyse whether Western Balkan governments’ formal commitments under the Reform Agendas translate into practice. Rather than assessing the rule of law agenda in its entirety, this paper singles out anti-corruption, as progress in this area serves as a critical proxy for overall governance and adherence to EU values. By comparatively examining this component of Reform Agendas, the analysis aims to identify emerging trends, existing gaps, and examples of promising practice.[3] The central argument is that variation in early implementation of anti-corruption reforms primarily reflects differences in political will, suggesting that the Facility’s capacity to induce transformative change, while meaningful, may remain inherently constrained.

[1] Official Journal of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, 2024/1449

[2] Reform and Growth Facility is referred to as “the Facility” or “RGF” throughout the paper.

[3] Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only WB country that has not to date adopted the Reform Agenda in 2024. The document was adopted in October 2025, but it is still awaiting EC verification during writing of this paper. Thus, five other countries are analysed: Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo* (This designation is without prejudice to status and is in line with UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) and ICJ advisory opinion on unilateral declaration of independence.

Članak Comparing Reform Agendas: Overview of Anti-Corruption Measures Among Western Balkan Countries se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Comparing Reform Agendas: Overview of Anti-Corruption Measures Among Western Balkan Countries se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Together with Luisa Chiodi of the Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa and Miloš Đorđević from Transparency International Serbia, the discussion examines the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, the risks of “box-ticking” reforms, public procurement transparency, and the state of anti-corruption efforts in Serbia and the wider region.

The episode reflects on political will, institutional independence, civil society pressure, and citizen movements as key drivers of sustainable rule-of-law reforms on the path toward EU membership.

Članak Fighting Corruption in the Western Balkans as part of the EU’s Enlargement Reprioritisation se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

For the full infographic, click here.

Članak Enlargement Package 2025 Quantification: SERBIA se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Western Balkans Overview in the Public Procurement Area: Is Lex Specialis Regional Modus Operandi? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

Despite a shared commitment to EU integration, public procurement reform across the Western Balkans remains uneven and complex. At first glance, the region appears to be moving in the right direction – formally aligning legal frameworks, introducing e-procurement systems, and harmonising with EU standards and practice. But beneath the surface lies a troubling workaround that undermines this progress: the recurring use of the lex specialis approach, or special laws, to circumvent established procurement rules. A typical case involves governments launching multi-million-euro infrastructure projects without competitive bidding, justified by a “special national interest” law passed overnight – effectively sidestepping standard procedures and weakening the integrity of the procurement system. This paper argues that the use of special laws not only hinders EU integration by breaching core EU principles of transparency and competition but it also opens the door to unchecked public spending and erodes public trust. To grasp whether this practice is an exception or rather becoming modus operandi across the Western Balkans, the paper explores this grey zone, examining how legal exceptions are increasingly becoming the rule, and what that means for the future of democratic governance and EU accession in the region. Against this regional backdrop, the paper dedicates particular attention to Serbia, where the reliance on special legislation is most entrenched and offers a revealing case of how systemic this practice has become.

Članak Lex Specialis as Modus Operandi: Analysing Public Procurement Systems in the Western Balkans se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

During the past weekend, local elections were held throughout Kosovo*[1] in all cities and local self-government units. The elections were organized amid a political and constitutional crisis resulting from the inability to constitute the assembly and form a government following the parliamentary elections held in February. In this context, parties entered the campaign with significant uncertainty regarding the results. These local elections are particularly important because they will almost certainly influence the resolution of the political crisis and the formation of the government. The party or parties that achieve the best results will be able to influence the government-formation process from a position of power.

On the other hand, the context in which elections are being held in the north, where Serbs constitute the majority ethnic community, is significantly different from the rest of Kosovo. Namely, in 2023, Albanian mayors took over four predominantly Serbian municipalities: North (Kosovska) Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavić, due to the withdrawal from institutions and the boycott of local elections by Serbian political representatives. Although illegitimate, the Albanian mayors in these majority-Serb areas assumed office and managed local self-governments until the end of their terms. Thus, these elections represent an opportunity for Serbian political representatives to return to institutions after nearly three years and to ease the pressures and challenging position in which the Serbian community has found itself in recent years.

Election Results in Serbian-Majority Areas

            Local elections in Kosovo are largely different from those in Serbia. Specifically, mayors are elected directly, while at the same time members of local assemblies are elected through open electoral lists. This means that citizens vote preferentially, by name and surname. When it comes to mayoral elections, if no candidate receives over 50% of the votes in the first round, the two candidates with the highest number of votes proceed to a second round. Additionally, elections are held every four years simultaneously in all local self-government units. If changes or extraordinary elections occur in the period between regular elections, the mandate of councilors or mayors is valid only until the next regular local elections.

               The Serbian List (SL), after nearly three years, returned to power in all four municipalities, achieving decisive victories already in the first round. Despite strong political competition from various parties and citizen movements, such as the Serbian Democracy led by Aleksandar Arsenijević or the Civic Initiative “North for All” led by Marko Jakšić, the Serbian List managed to secure victories in all four municipalities. This outcome will certainly provide some relief to the Serbian community, which in previous years had been exposed to institutional pressures without adequate protection. The presence of special police forces, checkpoints in the north, illegal expropriation of property, construction of military posts, and street name changes are just some of the challenges Serbs have faced in the northern municipalities. Although one should not expect that a change in local authorities will immediately resolve all these problems, which it will not, the Serbian community will now at least have some form of institutional protection, even if minimal. However, the presence of special police forces and the previous practice of exceeding authority remain under the control of the central government in Pristina, so it is uncertain how much influence mayors or municipal presidents will have over the deployment of these forces. Where mayors will certainly have influence and authority is in the appointment of commanders of the Kosovo Police (KP) for the northern region. In the long term, this could help ease the situation, but the effects are still distant.        

In the enclaves south of the Ibar, the Serbian List also secured victories. It was particularly challenging in Gračanica, where several Albanian parties united on a joint list, posing a serious threat to outweigh the divided Serbian political representatives. Therefore, maintaining power in this Serbian area near Pristina represents a great relief for the remaining Serbs living there. In addition to Gračanica, the Serbian List also achieved good results in the following municipalities: Štrpce, Parteš, Ranilug, and Novo Brdo. The Central Election Commission (CEC) stated that the Serbian List won in nine out of ten municipalities with a majority Serbian population, while a second round will be held in Klokot. After participating in the parliamentary elections in February, the process of returning to the institutions of Kosovo is now gaining full momentum following the local elections. However, the return of political representatives marks only the beginning of this process.

When it comes to full reintegration, this process will almost certainly be long and arduous. Although political representatives are now fully returning to the system, this is not the case for administrative staff in the north, judges and prosecutors, or the police. Serbian representatives in the judiciary and police voluntarily left their positions in November 2022, while Serbs employed in local administration were dismissed in 2023 after Albanian mayors took over the municipalities. For now, all of them remain outside Kosovo’s institutions. Regarding the administration, the positions vacated by dismissed Serbs have, in the meantime, mostly been filled by Albanians. It will now be very difficult to dismiss the existing administration due to a lack of legal grounds. Secondly, employment in the police falls under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is controlled by Vetëvendosje (Self-determination Movement), so one should not expect willingness to open new positions in the north, and it is particularly unrealistic to expect that police officers who returned their uniforms and weapons would be reissued them. Thirdly, a similar situation can be expected in the judiciary. Albanian judges and prosecutors have filled the vacuum and taken over the cases of their Serbian colleagues. The Ministry of Justice has no incentive to reinstate Serbian legal professionals. For a mass return of Serbs to institutions, primarily in the police and judiciary, it is essential that this be part of a broader political agreement in dialogue with Belgrade and with insistence from the EU and the Quint countries. Without this, one should not be under the illusion that the government in Pristina will proactively promote reintegration.

The Community of Serbian Municipalities – One Step Closer or Not?

               Now that the return of political representatives to local institutions has been finalised, the basic condition for the creation of the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (CSMM) has been met – local governments with the political will to implement this process. However, the formation of the CSMM does not depend solely on local self-governments; it largely depends on the central authorities, which must formally initiate the process by issuing a special decree. The adoption of this decision will largely depend on who forms the government in the upcoming period. Since the constitutional crisis has ended and the assembly has been constituted, the chances of Vetëvendosje forming the government are increasing. Vetëvendosje has always been a staunch opponent of the CSMM, and if a Kurti III government is formed, the prospects for creating the CSMM remain slim. Only strong pressure from the EU and the international community could change this, but such pressures have not been successful so far.

The second scenario involves a change of government in Pristina, which would mean that the new prime minister is more receptive to the Serbian community and, more broadly, to the process of normalising relations. Opposition parties in Kosovo, primarily the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), could, in theory, form a parliamentary majority necessary to establish a government and potentially include the Serbian List in it. The Serbian List has experience cooperating with both the PDK and now the LDK, as well as with the AAK over the past ten years, which is not the case with Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje. This would likely result in a less stable government, dependent on the support of the Serbian List and more inclined to heed advice from Brussels. In such a scenario, progress could be made regarding the adoption of the CSMM statute proposed by the EU in 2023. This outcome would likely also help in lifting the restrictive measures that the EU imposed on Kosovo in June of the same year.

The third scenario, which also carries a significant likelihood, is new parliamentary elections. Considering that Vetëvendosje does not have a parliamentary majority to form a government, and the opposition parties are unable to create a united bloc against Vetëvendosje, the political deadlock will likely be resolved through extraordinary parliamentary elections after the constitutional deadlines expire. In such a situation, any issues regarding the CSMM and the autonomy of Serbs in Kosovo would inevitably be postponed until 2026, with the formation of a new government, or possibly even later.

Instead of a Conclusion: General Overview of the Results in the Rest of Kosovo

               Regarding the results of the local elections in the rest of Kosovo, according to the results published on the CEC website, mayors were elected in the first round in 21 municipalities, while in 17 municipalities the decision will be made in the second round on November 9. Notably, voter turnout was very low, averaging 39%. Vetëvendosje, previously the strongest political option in the parliamentary elections in February, suffered a significant defeat in the local elections. The only first-round victories for this movement were in smaller municipalities such as Podujeve, Kamenice, and Shtime. Major cities like Pristina (heading to a second round), Prizren, Peje, and South Mitrovica ended up in the hands of the opposition. The PDK declared victory in the local elections, having won the most municipalities in the first round and participating in the majority of municipalities heading to the second round. With this outcome, Vetëvendosje continued its negative trend, undermining its position and complicating its prospects for forming a government.

[1] This designation is without prejudice to final status of Kosovo and is in line with Resolution 1244 (1999) UNSC and advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on unilateral declaration of independence.

Članak Local Elections in Kosovo: The Return of the Serbian List and the Future of the Serbian Community se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The debates organised by the European Policy Centre (CEP) help reveal key political trends, citizens’ concerns and recommendations for different stakeholders, including local self-government units, national government and even the EU. The consultations revealed a nuanced public understanding of the interdependence between these three domains: citizens repeatedly stressed that without the rule of law, neither environmental sustainability nor genuine progress towards EU accession can be achieved. Key problems that citizens identified include inadequate implementation of laws, political pressure on the judiciary, low public trust in institutions, unqualified political appointments, widespread corruption, and legal uncertainty, as part of the rule of law thematic area. When it comes to the EU integration, citizens questioned the political will for actual accession to the EU, adding concerns of a lack of reform process and unfair treatment of the Kosovo dispute as key stumbling blocks. Finally, on environmental issues, the debates highlighted concerns such as inadequate waste management infrastructure, polluted drinking water, and the absence of strong cultural practices supporting environmental protection.

As part of the REACH consultative process, citizens proposed more than 30 concrete policy proposals for different stakeholders, from municipalities and local self-government units in Serbia, to ministries, government and judicial bodies, to finally EU institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, European Council). Following the national consultations, citizen delegates, in collaboration with experts, have come up with the final list of 12 policy recommendations. These concrete and actionable proposals are ready for immediate implementation by decision-makers.

The REACH consultations in Serbia represent a powerful demonstration of the untapped potential of deliberative democracy. Over the course of consultations, ordinary citizens from diverse backgrounds showed that they are both capable of grappling with complex issues and of co-creating meaningful policy proposals. Far from being passive observers of political life, participants engaged with high levels of knowledge, interest, and critical thinking, proving that inclusive deliberation can produce recommendations of direct value to decision-makers at both the national and EU levels. A central lesson of this process is that citizens are not only well informed about the challenges facing Serbia in the areas of the rule of law, EU integration, and environmental governance, but are also adept at articulating practical, actionable solutions.

Članak Towards Trust and Reform: Citizen-Driven Policy Proposals for Strengthening Rule of Law, EU Integration and Environmental Governance in Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This study presents the findings from 24 in-depth interviews conducted in Kosovo and Serbia with key stakeholders involved in the normalisation process. Interviewees included government representatives from both Kosovo and Serbia, members of academia and civil society, ruling and opposition party figures, journalists, experts, representatives of international organisations, and members of the Serb community in northern Kosovo.

The core focus of the study is the mapping of four key narratives surrounding the normalisation process. The research identifies four distinct perspectives on the dialogue and the expectations for its final outcome:

• In Kosovo, the majority of stakeholders view the dialogue as an essential step in state-building, with mutual recognition seen as the ultimate goal of the normalisation process.
• In Serbia, most stakeholders, particularly government representatives, do not share this view. For them, the dialogue is framed within the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and maintains Serbia’s sovereignty, excluding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

These opposing narratives have entrenched tensions within the dialogue, a dynamic further complicated by the EU’s strategy of constructive ambiguity. The 2023 Ohrid Agreement introduced new dimensions to the dialogue, giving rise to a third narrative centred around functional recognition. This view, predominantly supported by stakeholders from (Kosovska) Mitrovica, has also gained notable traction in both Belgrade and Pristina. A fourth narrative emerged advocating for de facto recognition of Kosovo, while opposing Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. This position finds its strongest support in Belgrade.

In addition to mapping these narratives, the study also explores:

• The current state of the EU-facilitated dialogue,
• The debate surrounding the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities,
• The (lack of) implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (2023), and
• The potential for escalation on the ground following the Banjska and Ibar-Lepenac canal incidents.

This research aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the evolving dynamics in the Kosovo-Serbia normalisation process, highlighting both convergences and deep-rooted divergences among key actors.

Članak FROM BRUSSELS TO OHRID, BELGRADE AND PRISTINA ON A CROSSROAD se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

During these consultations, participants had the chance to share their views on important issues, including:

• Rule of Law;
• Environmental Protection;
• EU Integration.

The REACH initiative seeks to ensure that citizen voices are incorporated into decision-making processes, helping to better identify and address the needs and expectations of the community.

These kinds of consultations play an important role in strengthening democratic culture, enhancing transparency, and shaping policies that embrace a variety of societal perspectives and opinions.

Download the infographic here.

Članak Belgrade Citizens at the Centre: 2024 Citizen Consultations Overview se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.