The “Reform Agenda Updates” assessment focuses on the implementation progress of country-specific obligations under the RGF. Monitoring is conducted through a set of procedural, reform implementation, and financial indicators. The core of the monitoring exercise tracks reform steps with defined deadlines, assessing their implementation status based on publicly available evidence and official documentation obtained by national authorities, and, where relevant, complemented by information from independent institutions and civil society sources. Cross-cutting attention is given to stakeholder participation and transparency.

The monitoring exercise covers selected reforms organised into so-called “policy domains,” created by coding the sub-areas of the harmonised policy areas in the Reform Agendas. The selected policy domains, which enable regional-level analyses, benchmarking, and comparability, are supported by the available human resources and the thematic expertise of the TEN network.  

For methodological notes and the reform steps selection process, see the draft methodology note at the link. 

The Reform Agenda Update is structured as follows. The Key findings and recommendations provide a high-level summary. The Legal and Institutional Arrangements and Requests and Release of Funds sections monitor overall progress in the procedural and financial aspects of implementing the Reform Agenda. The last section, Reforms in Focus: Reform Monitor policy domains, provides independent monitoring findings on selected reforms. Here, each section provides a narrative snapshot of progress and obstacles in implementing Serbia’s Reform Agenda.

The cut-off date for data collection and assessment for this update is 31.12.2025. Further policy developments may shift the status of currently pending reforms and will be reflected in subsequent updates.

These monitoring updates are not a substitute for the European Commission’s formal assessment role.

Članak Serbia – Reform Agenda Update – 2nd Semester 2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Serbia and the European Union: Geopolitics and EU Values – in Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This policy paper examines how Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio may evolve by 2035, combining the InvigoratEU External Influence Index with a structured strategic foresight approach. The Index documents a sharp decline and high volatility in Russian influence since 2013, driven by war dynamics, sanctions, and geopolitical rupture, alongside a more incremental expansion of Chinese and Turkish influence through economic engagement, connectivity initiatives, and socially embedded networks.

Building on these empirical patterns, the paper identifies key drivers of external influence, drawing on political, economic, and societal dimensions, and reorganising them into higher-order strategic clusters that underpin a two-axis scenario framework. The first axis captures the strength of EU anchoring in candidate countries, understood as the interaction between EU credibility and domestic alignment, while the second concerns the nature of the international system, ranging from a rules-based order to coercive, “might-makes-right” dynamics. Crossing these axes yields three plausible scenarios for 2035: Great-Power Chessboard, characterised by intensified external leverage and weakened EU anchoring; Resilient Europe, where credible EU engagement, gradual integration, and domestic governance reforms reduce vulnerabilities; and Strategic Tug-of-War, a baseline trajectory marked by sustained hybrid competition and partial EU anchoring.

Across all scenarios, the analysis shows that external influence is not predetermined but contingent on governance capacity, societal resilience, and the credibility and delivery of EU engagement. While Russia’s trajectory remains uniquely volatile and shaped by critical uncertainties linked to the war in Ukraine, China’s and Turkey’s influence evolves more predictably within structural constraints set by EU policy choices and domestic conditions. The paper concludes that strengthening EU anchoring – through credible enlargement, gradual integration, and sustained support for governance and societal resilience – remains the most effective strategy to limit destabilising external influence and reinforce long-term stability in the EU’s enlargement countries.

Članak InvigoratEU Foreign Interference of China, Russia and Turkey in the EU Enlargement Countries until 2035: Three Scenarios and Policy Implications (D6.4) se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This report examines Turkey’s influence in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) over the past decade, focusing on political, economic, and societal dimensions. Using the InvigoratEU External Influence Index—an empirical tool specifically designed for this study—it systematically measures and compares Turkish leverage across nine EU candidate and partner countries. The Index captures shifts from 2013 to 2023, offering a cross-country and longitudinal analysis of how Ankara has engaged with the region and how these countries have responded. The findings show that Turkey’s influence is neither uniformly benign nor overtly antagonistic, but shaped by local receptivity, institutional interest, and historical or cultural proximity. Unlike coercive actors, Turkey typically avoids direct confrontation with the EU, opting instead for relational diplomacy, targeted investments, and long-term societal engagement. Political influence has grown modestly, driven by high-level visits, security cooperation, and elite alignment—especially in Kosovo, Ukraine, and North Macedonia. Economic influence has expanded more steadily, fuelled by concessional loans, preferential trade agreements, and infrastructure projects. However, macroeconomic instability in Turkey casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of this outreach. Societal influence emerges as the most persistent and embedded dimension. Through cultural diplomacy, religious networks, educational initiatives, and media presence—including popular Turkish TV series—Turkey has cultivated durable societal linkages, particularly in Muslim-majority areas of the Western Balkans. While this influence is less pronounced in the Eastern Trio, it plays a growing role in public perceptions. These trends suggest that Turkey’s influence is best understood as adaptive and opportunistic rather than expansionist or ideological. It advances where EU presence is weak, particularly at the local level, and where Turkey can act quickly and visibly.

Importantly, Turkish influence should not be seen as inherently malign. As a NATO member, Ankara has often supported Euro-Atlantic security priorities—from contributing troops to regional missions to backing collective defence measures in the Black Sea—and in some cases has complemented rather than competed with EU objectives. Yet the line between constructive engagement and problematic interference can be thin, especially when Turkey externalises its domestic political agenda through pressure on partner governments.

For the EU, this calls for a strategic response that reinforces its credibility, reclaims societal space, and avoids unnecessary antagonism with Ankara – while remaining alert to cases where Turkish influence can undermine democratic resilience in EU candidate countries. The Union’s response should therefore be less about constraining Turkey and more about investing in its own appeal and effectiveness. This means ensuring timely delivery of promised financial and infrastructure projects, making EU engagement more visible on the ground, and working directly with municipalities, universities, and civil society to generate bottom-up legitimacy. It also requires pragmatic coordination with Ankara in areas of shared concern, such as migration management or infrastructure security, while safeguarding conditionality whenever Turkish pressure risks undermining rule-of-law or human rights commitments in partner states. Preventing asymmetric dependencies will be equally important: the EU must support investment screening and provide credible alternatives through instruments like the EIB and EBRD. Finally, reclaiming the soft-power edge will demand more robust cultural and educational programmes, investment in regional media, and clear communication of the EU’s core values – secularism, inclusivity, and democratic governance –as the non-negotiable foundations of the European project. Taken together, these measures would allow the EU to channel Turkey’s presence into a more complementary direction, while ensuring that European norms and institutions remain the decisive reference point for countries on the path to accession.

Članak InvigoratEU Long Policy Report on Turkey’s Ambitions and Leverage se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This study analyses Russia’s inluence in the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)
and the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North
Macedonia, and Serbia) over the past decade, focusing on its political, economic, and societal dimensions. Using the InvigoratEU External Inluence Index, a comprehensive empirical tool specifically designed for this study, it systematically measures and compares Russian leverage across nine EU candidate countries. The index captures shifts in inluence from 2013 to 2023, highlighting how political-security dynamics, economic dependencies, and societal developments have shaped Moscow’s leverage in the region and the strategic responses of affected states. The indings reveal a general decline in Russian inluence, particularly in the political and economic spheres, while societal inluence remains more resilient. Political leverage has weakened as countries distance themselves from Moscow, though informal networks and disinformation campaigns persist. Economic inluence has been reduced through energy diversi ication and trade realignment, limiting Russia’s capacity for coercion. How ever, societal inluence remains a key vector, with Russian media, religious networks, and ideological narratives continuing to shape public opinion and foster Euroscepticism. These trends highlight the need for a proactive EU response that reinforces the credibility of enlargement, strengthens energy independence, and counters Russian disinformation. Further gradual integration of candidate countries into the EU could maintain reform momentum and systematically diminish Moscow’s leverage, while targeted investments in energy infrastructure and diversi ied supply routes would enhance regional resilience and limit Russia’s capacity for economic coercion. Additionally, enhanced support for independent media, fact-checking initiatives, and strategic communication in local languages is essential to mitigating Russian inluence. The study underscores that while Russia’s ability to exert direct control is diminishing, its capacity to shape societal narratives remains a challenge, requiring a forward-looking EU strategy that integrates political, economic, and societal dimensions to reinforce resilience and strategic influence in the region.

This study was previously published on InvigoratEU.
Download the PDF study here.

Članak Long Policy Report on Russia´s ambitionsand leverage se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Behind the Curtain: Examining the Adoption and Content of Serbia’s Reform Agenda se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This insight aims to shed light on conscription as part of a broader remilitarisation trend among EU member states and analyse how it fits within the EU’s framework of resilience and strategic autonomy. In the second part, the paper compares Serbia’s intention to reintroduce conscription with the intentions of its EU counterparts, investigating whether Serbia’s move is part of the same remilitarisation trend or driven by purely national motives. Given the country’s thorny path towards EU membership due to insufficient rule of law standards, foreign policy alignment, and unresolved issues with Kosovo, the paper particularly examines whether the reintroduction of conscription might have any detrimental effect on regional dynamics and Serbia’s EU aspirations.

Članak From Peace to Preparedness: Conscription as a Once-Again Fashionable Idea in the EU and Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The New Growth Plan (NGP) for the Western Balkans marks a significant departure from the existing Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). While the latter lacks reform-related conditionalities, the NGP’s funding will hinge upon the successful implementation of fundamental and socioeconomic reforms. By gradually providing increased financial benefits ahead of accession (amounting to roughly €6 billion, comprising €2 billion in grants and €4 billion in favourable loans), the initiative seeks to unlock the political will for reforms to take place and to facilitate socioeconomic convergence.

According to the European Commission, the region’s convergence stands at approximately 35% of the EU average. Given the magnitude of this disparity, the pertinent question arises: Will the NGP prove sufficient to address the pressing socioeconomic gap and contribute to catching up with the EU average?

Answering this question entails examining multiple facets. Thus, this analysis first identifies key socioeconomic trends and gaps to be addressed and then tests the two claims made by the Commission regarding the effects of the NGP. The first claim is that the financial assistance through NGP and IPA III combined will provide the WB with “roughly the same aid intensity per inhabitant as cohesion policy does on average in the EU.” The second claim is that the NGP “has the potential to double the size of the WB economies within the next 10 years.”

Based on the analysed socioeconomic indicators and the evaluation of the Commission’s claims, the analysis concludes that the NGP can serve as a solid foundation for stimulating economic growth and expediting EU integration. However, its effect on reducing the socioeconomic gap will remain limited.

Članak The Great Gap se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

As the EU’s Israel-Palestine policy is dissected, the questions also arise: What is Serbia’s stance on this issue and is its position on this matter also a part of its both East and West geopolitical equation? Answering these questions is warranted, as Serbia continues to find itself in a delicate balancing act of nurturing its partnerships with the East, despite its official strategic priority being EU membership. Through rigorous analysis, the paper evaluates the extent of Serbia’s alignment with EU policies on the mentioned conflict and uncovers the multifaceted factors influencing its position. As the role of the Israel-Palestine conflict is examined as a litmus test for unity and diversity of opinions within the EU, Serbia’s standpoint is scrutinised, and broader questions regarding its policy alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are addressed.

Članak In the Shadow of the Middle East: EU and Serbia’s Israeli-Palestinian Policies Compared se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Does the new Law on Public Information and Media enable the improvement of the labour law status of journalists? What awaits us in terms of the transparency of spending public funds? How will the new Law on Electronic Media affect the future composition and functioning of REM? How does the new law limit official campaigns? What remains controversial, and what parts of civil society objected to the new laws?

Find out in the new CEP infographic.

You can download the infographic here.

Članak New media laws 2023: The new rules of the game se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In the wake of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intricate game of geopolitical considerations has prompted the EU to recalibrate its approach to enlargement. This recalibration has not gone unnoticed in the Western Balkans and former Eastern Partnership countries, where anticipation hangs in the air. Expectations are large, yet the undeniable truth lingers: the EU must reform its institutional groundwork for enlargement to materialise.

Against this backdrop, Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, has cast a hopeful gaze towards 2030 as a target date when the EU should complete its internal reforms to become enlargement-ready. Simultaneously, candidate and potential candidate countries are urged to amplify their reform efforts. Brussels remains resolute – any progression towards membership will be merit-based, with an unwavering commitment to the rule of law. As the anticipation builds, all eyes turn to the 2023 Enlargement Package so as to see what the Commission has to say about the progress of respective countries, while also accounting for the Commission’s new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.

In that context, CEP organised a webinar titled ‘Discussing the 2023 Enlargement Package and the Functioning of Democratic Institutions in the Western Balkans,’ inviting its regional partners from the Think for Europe Network (TEN) to participate. The event featured the participation of the Ambassador of Italy to Serbia, H.E. Luca Gori, as well as Mr Ger Jan Koopman, the Director-General for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. The event had two primary objectives. Firstly, it served as a platform to delve into the EU’s 2023 Enlargement Package and the current state of the accession process in the Western Balkans. Esteemed experts from each WB country shared their insights and perspectives, contributing to a comprehensive understanding of the region’s path forward. Secondly, the webinar presented the results of CEP’s research, which scrutinised the Commission’s methodology for evaluating the Functioning of Democratic Institutions (FoDI) across the region. This research and webinar were made possible with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy.

Članak Unpacking the 2023 Enlargement Package: A Wake-up Call for the Western Balkans se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Preparation and progress of Serbia towards EU membership 2023 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.