If the EU does not count the Balkan countries among the stakeholders who should participate, in some form, in the upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), then one has to wonder whether the Union is still serious about the European perspective of the region.

The EU should allow political leaders and citizens from the Balkan countries to join the activities and discussions held in the context of the CoFoE on a consultative basis, along the representative and citizens’ dimensions of the process, respectively. In doing so, the EU would build on the precedent of the European Convention of the early 2000s.

The EU has nothing to lose and everything to win by deepening and refining its relationship with the Balkan countries, by allowing the region to feel included in its plans for the future of the EU. The Union would use the interdependence with the Balkans to good advantage, strengthening natural alliances with its neighbours and consolidating its political vicinity. Deliberating over joint responses to specific common challenges addressed by the Conference would help the Balkan countries continue to build experience and know-how in preparation for their eventual EU membership. Allowing the Balkans to witness and contribute to this initiative would also foster a sense of togetherness and partnership that has been lacking from the long, drawn-out formal accession process. More, rather than less, EU-Balkans cooperation and coordination will build trust and loyalty.

In the end, even without a formal invitation to accompany the CoFoE process, the Balkan countries should organise themselves at the political and societal levels to follow the Conference and mirror its activities with similar initiatives. The Regional Cooperation Council could help organise and coordinate a network of Balkan politicians tasked by their governments to follow and participate in the Conference. In parallel, civil society networks in the region should build on their already existing cooperation and look for funds to organise ‘Balkan Citizens’ Consultations’, which can accompany the CoFoE process as it unfolds. Such a broad mobilisation would prove the Balkan countries’ strong will to approach the EU and a certain dose of political maturity.

But the Union should know better than to just wait to be impressed by the Balkans. The EU is one CoFoE invitation away from leaping forward into the future, together with its strong partners and closest neighbours, as Commission President von der Leyen referred to the Balkans in her State of the Union address.

This discussion paper is developed in cooperation with the Brussels-based think tank European Policy Centre (EPC), and is thus also published at epc.eu.

Članak The Conference on the Future of Europe: Is the EU still serious about the Balkans? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Dear President Macron,

You are right! A renewed approach to the European Union (EU)’s enlargement towards the Balkans is necessary to help the countries of the region break with their troubled histories and break through the gates of accession. Full membership is indeed the final objective of the EU’s engagement in the region – thank you for stressing this! And to be able to transform the Balkan countries into future ‘good members’ – that is, committed to European integration – the Union must certainly lead by example and first demonstrate its own capacity for renewal.

To be sure, under the stewardship of the European Commission, the EU’s tools and methods for carrying out enlargement have been undergoing reforms since at least 2011, both in response to the ‘indigestion’ problems following the 2004/2007 waves of expansion and to the particularities of the region (especially legacies of war and state weakness). In time, the process has changed, and it is now more rigorous and complex than in any of the previous enlargement rounds.

Yet, as you correctly point out, the policy still struggles to reap successes. Moreover, the member states’ strong commitment to the region – on which you justly lay emphasis – has gradually given way to increasingly more assertive or ambiguous national positions on the prospective entry of new countries. The result is that the Balkans’ European perspective, at present, seems far more aspirational than actual.

The idea that a sovereign EU can disengage from its Balkan inner courtyard is fantasy. The interdependence between the Union and the region goes beyond geographic proximity, as underscored by all recent crises. The two sides share the same problems and interests – so your plea for closer ties between the EU and its Balkan allies is welcome. As the Union starts a new politico-institutional cycle and prepares a Conference on the Future of Europe, it makes sense to thrust enlargement into the spotlight – broken promises (to Skopje and Tirana) notwithstanding.

Your initiative could give this policy a much-needed jolt of energy. But the devil is in the details – which, for now, are lacking in your ‘non-paper’.

To mark a clear departure from past revisions, this vital conversation about enlargement should go far beyond restating the EU’s hard line on the dossier. The fundamental areas of reform, including a minefield of issues – like the rule of law, state capture, borders/statehood definition, or reconciliation – have become an undisputed part of the conditionality for the Balkans. ‘What’ is expected from the Balkan countries is already well-known; it is the ‘how’ that still trips us up.

Your idea of linking groups of stringent conditions to tangible rewards would pepper the strenuous reform path that the region must travel with more frequent incentives for the Balkan leaders to make steady progress. More generous EU support would also allow politicians in the region to show their citizens the concrete benefits of undertaking reforms. And deeper interaction between the Balkans and the EU would breed familiarity, increase mutual understanding, and make accession less intimidating on both sides.

But for all that to happen, the benefits provided at various stages should, in fact, be new and substantial. They should include much more than just access to EU programmes – already granted in most cases. The EU should empower the Balkan countries through smart, inclusive, and probably expensive policies. Gradually opening the European Structural and Investment Funds to the Balkan countries (such as to support infrastructural projects), extending the use of the EU’s financial stability mechanisms to the region or enabling circular migration, for example, warrant serious consideration. The EU should also invite Balkan leaders and citizens to participate in the Conference on the Future of Europe and contribute to the debates on the current reform agenda.

Yet, incentives alone will not suffice to guarantee that the Balkan countries fulfil the conditions set and converge with the EU in political, economic, and social terms. The current method for applying the enhanced conditionality, although more exacting, is still too vague and ineffective. Yes, the EU should use objectively verifiable indicators for measuring progress. But, when it comes to solving the thorniest problems, such as state capture, reconciliation, or statehood, a proper strategy still escapes us. The EU should help the Balkan countries develop more precise ways of tackling sensitive areas of reform, drawing on best practices and involving local actors in the region.

Finally, to rejig the old approach, the division of labour between the European Commission and the member states on enlargement should also be better specified, and the possibility to introduce QMV revisited. The member states’ review of the Commission’s evaluations of progress in the Balkans, which you encourage, risks perpetuating the Council’s recent tendency to diverge from agreed standards and procedures, ignore the Commission’s avis, and derail or block the process for reasons that have more to do with member states’ domestic politics than the situation in the region. Perceptions, as well as rules, count for something in international relations. If EU capitals appear distrustful of the Commission and ready to focus on specific issues or countries rather than the process that has been laid out, the credibility and transformative power of the policy are weakened.

Thank you for making enlargement a topic of conversation. Your input offers a good start to this discussion, which has to be inclusive and sensitive to detail in order to make a difference.

Yours sincerely,

Corina Stratulat (Head of European Politics and Institutions programme, European Policy Centre) and Milena Lazarevic (co-founder, CEP Belgrade)

PS: Conditionality before accession is all very well, but don’t forget about post-accession safeguards against backsliding!

This letter was originally published on EPC’s website.

Članak Letter to Macron: Details matter for enlargement reform se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

One of the lessons learnt from previous enlargement waves is the need to complement the politics of conditionality – that is, Brussel’s traditional ‘carrot and stick approach’ – with the politics of civic pressure – whereby the governments in the Balkan countries are ‘squeezed’ between civil society demands and an uncompromising European Commission.

In this Policy Brief, Milena Lazarevic and Corina Stratulat review the origins of civil society involvement in the public sector reforms leading to a country’s accession to the European Union. The search for civil society allies represents a promising break with the legacy of previous accessions in which governments were the Commission’s only trusted interlocutors. To avoid (or at least mitigate) the possibility of backsliding on reforms as it occurred in a number of Central Eastern European countries after their EU entry, the Commission is wisely investing now into the politics of bottom-up pressure for the Balkan aspirants.
The authors also draw lessons from recent steps taken to ensure a more transparent, formal and structured dialogue with civil society in all the countries of the region, and to boost the skills, knowledge and know-how of civil society organisations in the PAR area.
To that end, they recommend that, for each Balkan aspirant, the European Commission should:

• Agree with the lead PAR authority on a uniform practice of publishing the agenda and minutes of each PAR Special Groups (PAR SG) meeting.
• Decide on a common, structured approach to the organisation of preparatory consultations with civil society ahead of each PAR SG meeting.
• Recommend that the government make all reports produced during the PAR process publicly available (both those produced by the EU’s missions/experts and those prepared by national institutions) to increase accountability and stimulate domestic policy debates.

This policy brief was originally published by European Policy Centre – EPC, as part of collaboration with the Think for Europe Network, under the framework of the WeBER project.

Članak Balkan Enlargement and the politics of civic pressure se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.