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	<title>Anna Khan - European Policy Centre</title>
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	<title>Anna Khan - European Policy Centre</title>
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		<title>Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/echoes-of-moscow-russian-telegramnetwork-in-serbia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Sep 2024 09:11:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18200</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russia has launched an extensive information warfare campaign, wielding the power of misinformation to sway global sentiment, fracture European unity, and rally support for its actions. As the European Union swiftly moved to ban Russian media broadcasts, the battleground shifted to social media platforms, with Telegram emerging as [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/echoes-of-moscow-russian-telegramnetwork-in-serbia/">Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russia has launched an extensive information warfare campaign, wielding the power of misinformation to sway global sentiment, fracture European unity, and rally support for its actions. As the European Union swiftly moved to ban Russian media broadcasts, the battleground shifted to social media platforms, with Telegram emerging as a centre stage for the dissemination of Kremlin propaganda on a global scale. In particular, European nations such as Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, which are among the top supporters of Ukraine, have found themselves on the frontline of this information competition. Meanwhile, in the Western Balkans, which are far from the conflict zone but not immune to its reverberations, the influence of Russian media has only grown stronger.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet, alongside this official presence, the social media landscape has also undergone profound transformations, becoming both a battlefield and a breeding ground for pro-Russian narratives. Considering the importance of this topic, this study investigates the dynamics and impact of the Kremlin&#8217;s narratives on <em>Telegram</em> in Serbia, focusing on the interplay between local Serbian discourse and propagandist&#8217; content. Primarily, it seeks to determine whether Russian or pro-Russian propaganda dominates the region. The research uncovers a network affiliated with Russia&#8217;s Telegram channels operating in Serbia and the Western Balkans, analysing how the Serbian political and social context influences these narratives and their perception. Furthermore, it identifies patterns in the distribution of pro-Russian content across the region, offering insights into the strategies used to disseminate these messages and their broader implications for regional stability and political dynamics. The analysis reveals that despite Russia&#8217;s efforts to establish a propaganda broadcasting network in the Balkans, the region does not hold a strategic priority for the Kremlin. Instead, the primary disseminators of pro-Russian messages are local actors leveraging these narratives to serve their interests.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/echoes-of-moscow-russian-telegramnetwork-in-serbia/">Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18200</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>From Russia with Love</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/from-russia-with-love/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Aug 2024 08:56:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18187</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Telegram as a Tool of Russian Propaganda in Serbia and Beyond</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/from-russia-with-love/">From Russia with Love</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the last decade, the exploration of Russian interests in the Western Balkans (WB), particularly in Serbia, has surged in scholarly circles, rivalling the longstanding issue of Kosovo&#8217;s status. <strong>The eruption of war in Ukraine has thrust the question of Russian influence in Serbia into sharper focus, presenting Serbia with an existential dilemma in its foreign policy trajectory.</strong></p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"> Amidst a geopolitical landscape evoking echoes of a new Cold War, the urgency of Serbia&#8217;s decision-making has intensified. On one hand, as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership, Serbia faces pressure to align with EU political interests. On the other hand, historical ties and ongoing cooperation with Russia present a complex dynamic that challenges the stated commitment to European integration. As a result, despite Western discontent, Serbia has steadfastly pursued its multi-vector foreign policy for the past two years. This approach involves maintaining active partnerships not only with the EU and the United States (US) but also with China and Russia. Notably, <strong>Serbia stands out as the sole European nation to have avoided the imposition of sanctions against Russia, sustaining robust business and political ties with Moscow amidst international tensions</strong>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The deep-rooted influence of Russia in Serbia, coupled with pro-Russian sentiments among the population, often serves as the backdrop for understanding this phenomenon. However, while such assertions hold sway, recent studies and analyses shed light on a contrasting reality: <strong>Russia&#8217;s actual presence in Serbia is less substantial than commonly perceived.</strong> It becomes especially apparent considering the scale of economic and financial partnerships between Serbia and the EU. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indeed, Russia&#8217;s primary leverage lies within its soft power arsenal, intricately woven into the broader context of its hybrid war strategy in the WB. Extensive research has been dedicated to unravelling the mechanisms of Russian propaganda in Serbia, dissecting the role of pro-Kremlin media in shaping anti-European sentiments and grappling with the issue of information warfare orchestrated by Russian entities in the region. However, numerous studies fall short of going beyond identifying Russian actors in Serbia and uncovering the grounds guiding their actions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>This study delves deeper into the intricate web of Russian propaganda in Serbia, aiming to connect its core narratives and images within the country&#8217;s political landscape. This study aims to explore Serbia&#8217;s role in the geopolitical framework of Russian foreign policy. </strong>Specifically, it seeks to answer two key research questions: First, does Kremlin propaganda follow a clearly articulated strategic plan in its operations? Second, to what extent does this propaganda permeate Serbian political and social spheres? </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These inquiries are not merely academic exercises; they hold significant implications for Serbia&#8217;s future trajectory. The country&#8217;s notable democratic backsliding hinders its progress towards EU accession, casting a shadow of uncertainty over its prospects. The rising autocratic tendencies within Serbia are often linked to the alliances formed by the ruling elite with authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, and Turkey. <strong>Therefore, this study aims to gauge the extent of Russian interference and assess Russia&#8217;s role as a potential impediment to Serbia&#8217;s European integration.</strong> By shedding light on these complexities, it endeavours to provide insights that could inform decisions crucial for Serbia&#8217;s future development.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>An intriguing facet setting this study apart is its examination of the proliferation of Kremlin propaganda on the relatively new digital platform, Telegram, which has attempted to make substantial inroads into the region. </strong>Telegram, renowned for its robust data security measures and refusal to collaborate with autocratic regimes like Russia, Belarus, or Iran, has garnered global acclaim. However, despite its initial reputation, the Kremlin has adapted to the platform&#8217;s dynamics, establishing a formidable information presence on social media. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This trend became particularly pronounced during the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, as numerous Telegram channels fervently disseminated pro-Russian propaganda both domestically and internationally. This surge extended its reach into Serbia and the broader WB, leveraging the platform&#8217;s anonymity and minimal censorship to orchestrate information offensives and sway public opinion. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>As of October 2023</strong>, this study revealed a <strong>staggering 143 pro-Russian Telegram channels </strong>operating in Serbia alone, underscoring the pressing nature of Russia&#8217;s incursion into the Balkans&#8217; information sphere and the imperative for deeper contemplation on this issue.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/from-russia-with-love/">From Russia with Love</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18187</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>A Year in Review: LGBTQ+ Rights in Serbia from EuroPride 2022 to Pride March 2023</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/blog/a-year-in-review-lgbtq-rights-in-serbia-from-europride-2022-to-pride-march-2023/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Sep 2023 12:49:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=blog&#038;p=16022</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 9, Belgrade&#8217;s streets came to life with a dazzling display of diversity and support during the nineteenth annual Pride Parade. This year&#8217;s slogan, &#8220;We are Not Even Close,&#8221; served as a mighty rallying cry against the divisive rhetoric of opposing groups. Hundreds of activists gathered despite the odds, making it the biggest Pride [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/blog/a-year-in-review-lgbtq-rights-in-serbia-from-europride-2022-to-pride-march-2023/">A Year in Review: LGBTQ+ Rights in Serbia from EuroPride 2022 to Pride March 2023</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 9, Belgrade&#8217;s streets came to life with a dazzling display of diversity and support during the nineteenth annual Pride Parade. This year&#8217;s slogan, &#8220;<a href="https://prajd.rs/en/pride-2023/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">We are Not Even Close</a>,&#8221; served as a mighty rallying cry against the divisive rhetoric of opposing groups. Hundreds of activists gathered despite the odds, making it the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-belgrade-pride-march/32585626.html#:~:text=Hundreds%20of%20activists%20marched%20through,in%20conservative%20Christian%20Orthodox%20Serbia." target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">biggest</a> Pride March in Serbia&#8217;s history. With security measures <a href="https://n1info.rs/english/news/belgrade-pride-organizers-no-progress-security-issue-has-worsened/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">cranked up</a>, the city became a kaleidoscope of colours and a sense of unity. The jubilant scene of this year&#8217;s event sharply juxtaposed the tense and apprehensive atmosphere from the previous one. </p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, it is essential not to be deceived by the apparent calm of the 2023 Pride. Even though it unfolded peacefully, without incidents of violence, the LGBTQ+ community in Serbia continues to confront persistent <a href="https://crd.org/2023/08/17/belgrade-pride-is-growing-yet-their-demands-remain-unheard/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">challenges</a> and hurdles. These issues are directly linked to a broader network of challenges that have persisted between the EuroPride 2022 to Pride March 2023, stemming from continuous physical threats, over unfavourable education changes, to unrecognised legal status for same-sex couples.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Namely, in the aftermath of EuroPride 2022, authorities claimed no violence occurred during the event. However, a starkly different narrative unfolded as the Association<strong>&nbsp;<em>Da se zna!</em></strong>&nbsp;<a href="https://dasezna.lgbt/saopstenje-povodom-incidenata-tokom-europride-setnje/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">documented</a> 14 disturbing incidents of homophobia and transphobia on September 17, 2022. These incidents included eight physical attacks on individuals and groups, alongside harassment and property damage. As the year unfolded, the LGBTQ+ community endured further abuse based on their sexual and gender identities, with human rights organisations <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lgbtq-violence-protest-extremists-4beecb12c16bd2bacf3348e512cd86c9" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">reporting</a> a staggering 68 attacks from August 2022 to March 2023. The situation reached a distressing peak in February 2023, marked by targeted attacks, culminating in a stabbing incident. Responding to this alarming escalation, LGBTQ+ and human rights activists joined forces in March 2023, announcing a protest initiative named &#8220;Hate Kills.&#8221; The surge in hate crimes can be attributed, in part, to a barrage of inflammatory rhetoric from political and religious leaders. Billboards advertising EuroPride have been targeted by vandals, and the Belgrade Pride Information Centre has endured <a href="https://prajd.rs/en/pride-info-center-vandalized-again/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">three attacks</a> over the past year. Regrettably, accountability for the perpetrators of these acts of hooliganism remained elusive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In education, the LGBTQ+ community in Serbia encountered a notable setback in the past year. The turning point came in September 2022 when conservative groups, including the Serbian Orthodox Church and the right-wing parties, called for reevaluating the recently updated school curriculum since the textbooks purportedly promoted &#8220;<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-textbook-battle-lgbt/32051160.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">LGBT ideology</a>.&#8221; As a result, they demanded the removal of any references to gender and sexual identity, even within biology courses. A pivotal biology textbook, in particular, was scrutinised for its comprehensive coverage of the distinctions between sex and gender, along with explanations of concepts like sexual orientation and gender identity. For instance, the textbook boldly <a href="https://lens.civicus.org/serbia-lgbtqi-people-the-latest-target-of-repression/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">stated</a> that gender &#8220;can be independent of the sex assigned to [a person] at birth,&#8221; underscoring that &#8220;only an individual can determine its gender identity.&#8221; In response to these concerns, the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology convened a working group to delve into the matter. Following an official review, changes were indeed made to biology textbooks in Serbia, effectively expunging references to gender and sexual identity, which activists and a cadre of scientists view as a <a href="https://www.womenngo.org.rs/en/policy-activities/advocacy/1934-2022-women-s-organizations-request-that-the-institute-for-the-advancement-of-education-and-training-publish-the-explanations-of-the-decision-on-the-changes-to-the-biology-textbooks" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">setback</a> for school education in Serbia. Furthermore, the omission of mentioning these topics represents a concerning development, with potential implications for a deficiency in comprehension and education.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, one of the key demands of LGBTQ+ groups <strong>since 2014</strong> remains <a href="https://crd.org/2023/08/17/belgrade-pride-is-growing-yet-their-demands-remain-unheard/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">unaddressed</a>. Despite including the <em><strong>Law on Same-sex Unions</strong></em> in the action plan of Serbia&#8217;s Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue, there has been little to no substantial progress towards its adoption in the past year. Consequently, same-sex couples in Serbia continue to grapple with a lack of legal recognition. Adding to this dilemma, in August 2023, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić reaffirmed his stance <a href="https://euronews.al/en/serbian-president-says-he-will-not-sign-same-sex-marriage-law/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">against</a> approving legislation allowing same-sex marriage,  extending the waiting period for the LGBTQ+ community by at least three more years. However, Serbia is not immune to international legal obligations in this regard, as the European Court of Human Rights decision underscored in the 2015 case of &#8220;Oliari and Others v. Italy.&#8221; This landmark ruling established a clear imperative for Council of Europe member states, i.e., those that have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, to ensure legal recognition for same-sex couples, <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/guide_art_8_eng" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">grounded</a> in the acknowledgment that the relationship of a same-sex couples falls under the purview of &#8220;private life,&#8221; safeguarded by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, Serbia&#8217;s persistent refusal to recognise same-sex couples leaves them in an unequal and disadvantageous position, depriving them of the legal protections enjoyed by their heterosexual counterparts. As the battle for LGBTQ+ rights in Serbia continues, achieving this crucial milestone remains an ongoing struggle for equality and justice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To summarise, the journey toward recognising and securing the rights of the LGBTQ+ community is a multifaceted endeavour that hinges on the readiness of governmental institutions and societal acceptance. Although there has been some progress in this area in the past – such as legal protection against <a href="https://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/SerbiaSociological_E.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">discrimination</a> based on sexual orientation since 2009, or the fact that transgender individuals can change their legal gender without <a href="https://prajd.rs/en/transition-in-serbia/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">surgical intervention</a> – persistent prejudice against the LGBTQ+ community <a href="https://www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/SerbiaSociological_E.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">lingers</a> across various domains, including employment, education, media representation, and access to goods and services. Furthermore, many implementation woes surrounding the enacted legal measures and initiatives create substantial roadblocks and delays for LGBTQ+ community members. Therefore, although Pride March 2023 was a success, Serbia has yet to tear down those barriers that stand in the way of fostering an inclusive society where every individual, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity, can thrive and live free from discrimination.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Photo: Adobe Stock</em></p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/blog/a-year-in-review-lgbtq-rights-in-serbia-from-europride-2022-to-pride-march-2023/">A Year in Review: LGBTQ+ Rights in Serbia from EuroPride 2022 to Pride March 2023</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">16022</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Russian Migration Surge in Serbia</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/russian-migration-surge-in-serbia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Sep 2023 09:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=15750</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Balancing Economic Opportunities and EU Concerns</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/russian-migration-surge-in-serbia/">Russian Migration Surge in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered the most substantial migration surge across Europe since World War II. Amid the millions of Ukrainians seeking refuge within the European Union’s borders from the war, Serbia, as an EU candidate country, is grappling with a significant influx of Russian expatriates, who are escaping political oppression and the looming spectre of conscription in their homeland. </p>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Remarkably, as Turkey increasingly began to reject Russian residence permit applications, Serbia rose to prominence among the top three preferences for Russian migrants. Inspired by strong historical ties and memories of a past wave of White emigres seeking refuge after the Russian Empire’s downfall, Serbia has warmly embraced its new Russian emigrants, viewing this influx as an opportunity for a youthful, skilled workforce that can boost the economy and bridge demographic gaps. </p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet, beneath the surface of this generous front lies a compelling question: What rewards will Serbia reap in exchange for its hospitality beyond the prospect of escalated rent prices? In this analysis, the focus shifts to delving into the intricacies of Serbia’s recent arrival of Russian emigrants, scrutinising the potential challenges this dynamic presents for the nation’s future.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/russian-migration-surge-in-serbia/">Russian Migration Surge in Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">15750</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Russia&#8217;s Propaganda Tactics: Analyzing the Rhetoric and Numbers in the Black Sea Grain Initiative</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/blog/russias-propaganda-tactics-analyzing-the-rhetoric-and-numbers-in-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anna Khan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Aug 2023 08:22:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=blog&#038;p=15457</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Any views or opinions represented in this blog are personal and belong solely to the author and do not represent the organisation’s position on the analysed topic. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, a grain deal forged between Russia and Ukraine with the mediation of the UN and Türkiye, marked a significant diplomatic accomplishment in 2022. [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/blog/russias-propaganda-tactics-analyzing-the-rhetoric-and-numbers-in-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/">Russia&#8217;s Propaganda Tactics: Analyzing the Rhetoric and Numbers in the Black Sea Grain Initiative</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Any views or opinions represented in this blog are personal and belong solely to the author and do not represent the organisation’s position on the analysed topic.</em></p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="#1"><strong>Why did the Grain Deal end?</strong> </a></li>



<li><strong><a href="#2">What does Africa have to do with it? </a></strong></li>



<li><strong><a href="#3">The numbers Behind the Grain Export: Debunking the &#8220;Evil West&#8221; Narrative</a></strong></li>



<li><strong><a href="#4">EU Farmers and the Impact of Grain Narratives</a></strong></li>



<li><strong><a href="#5">Сonclusion</a></strong></li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/black_sea_grain_initiative_full_text.pdf">Black Sea Grain Initiative</a>, a grain deal forged between Russia and Ukraine with the mediation of the UN and Türkiye, marked a significant diplomatic accomplishment in 2022. The agreement had far-reaching implications, permitting Ukrainian food exports from Black Sea ports, which held immense importance for Ukraine&#8217;s economy and global food supplies. Commencing grain shipments helped mitigate world food prices, alleviating the looming threat of a worldwide food crisis and hunger in vulnerable regions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, on July 17, 2023, Russia <a href="https://www.state.gov/russias-suspension-of-participation-in-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">suspended</a> participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative because of the non-fulfillment of certain agreements related to the facilitated export of Russian fertilizers. The statements of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin about this withdrawal highlighted a familiar narrative of Russian propaganda. They <a href="https://twitter.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1682350664649719809" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">emphasized</a> the complete dishonesty and betrayal of Ukraine and the &#8216;collective West&#8217; <a href="https://archive.ph/ugTOb" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">accusing</a> them of violating the terms of the deal and obstructing Russia&#8217;s humanitarian efforts. The Russian Ambassador to Serbia, Alexander Botan-Kharchenko, has taken center stage as the purveyor of Russian narratives in the Western Balkans. In a recent interview, he <a href="https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/563529/Sporazum-o-zitu-je-obesmisljen" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">claimed</a> that &#8220;the grain deal for the West is nothing more than a means to line pockets and facilitate terrorist activities.&#8221; Thus, by publicly blaming Ukraine and the West, Russia employed its time-tested propaganda tactics to shape the narrative, pressure specific points of contention, and hide the complex web of political and economic interests behind its decision to withdraw from the Black Sea deal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The situation calls for careful observation, as the Black Sea Initiative is not merely a grain deal but an intricate web of international relations and regional dynamics. Russia&#8217;s withdrawal can reverberate throughout the global food market and affect regional diplomatic ties. As events unfold, it remains crucial to decipher Russian propaganda&#8217;s underlying motives and rhetoric to understand the situation and its potential consequences better. The following, therefore, explains why did the Grain Deal end and what does Africa have to do with it, while showcasing the numbers behind the grain export.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-left" id="1"><strong>Why did the Grain Deal end?</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In exploring the recent developments surrounding Russia&#8217;s decision <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/17/russia-decision-not-extend-black-sea-grain-deal-final" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">not to extend</a> the agreement, it becomes evident that several objective reasons are being hidden under Russian rhetoric about the betrayal of the &#8220;collective West.&#8221; These factors have ultimately rendered the extension of the agreement unviable for Russia. Throughout the past year, Russia has <a href="https://farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2023/04/moscow-threatens-withdrawal-from-black-sea-grain-deal-if-g7-proceeds-with-export-ban/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">conveyed</a> various threats to withdraw from the grain deal. However, at the beginning of summer 2023, tangible indications of a genuine intention to terminate the agreement emerged.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Notably, the Russian side has created obstacles in the delivery process by repeatedly <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/last-ship-leaves-ukraine-port-ahead-black-sea-grain-deal-deadline-2023-07-16/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">suspending</a> the registration process of Ukrainian ships, causing disruptions since June 27. Additionally, Russia&#8217;s withdrawal from the Black Sea Initiative could be linked to losing its interest in maintaining the seaport operation in Odesa. A crucial aspect of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/black-sea-grain-deal-could-hinge-ammonia-pipeline-2023-06-06/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">deal</a> for Russia was the allowance to export ammonia, a vital component of nitrate fertilizers, through a pipeline passing through Ukrainian territory. However, Uralchem, a prominent ammonia producer in Russia, recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russias-uralchem-readies-alternative-ukraine-route-ammonia-2023-05-23/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">announced</a> finding an alternative supply route, reducing the dependency on the previous arrangement. Given these developments, Olga Trofimtseva, Ambassador at Large with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/ukraine-999-certain-russia-will-quit-black-sea-grain-deal-july-envoy-2023-06-22/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">reported</a> that Ukrainian authorities are &#8220;99.9% sure&#8221; that Russia will withdraw from the Black Sea Initiative in July.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Furthermore, Russia&#8217;s withdrawal might have been influenced by various domestic and global political changes. Notably, the attempted military mutiny by the private military company &#8216;Wagner&#8217; on June 23-24, 2023, raised <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90275" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">concerns</a> about the loyalty of Russia&#8217;s military and security services to President Vladimir Putin&#8217;s regime, impacting the authorities&#8217; image within the nation. Additionally, Türkiye&#8217;s recent actions have also played a role in affecting Russia&#8217;s leadership authority. Turkish President Recep Erdogan&#8217;s support for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/07/07/world/russia-ukraine-news" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Ukraine&#8217;s</a> NATO membership prospects and the agreement to back <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-erdogan-agrees-sweden-nato-accession/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Sweden&#8217;s</a> bid to join the Alliance was anticipated by the Kremlin. However, the unexpected return of commanders from the Azov regiment to Ukraine from Türkiye, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-accused-turkey-and-ukraine-of-violating-prisoners-deal-war/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">contrary</a> to the terms of a prisoner exchange agreement, resulted in significant image losses and public outrage in Russia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These circumstances have created discontent and tension within Russian society, providing a moment for Russia to respond and seek retribution for what it perceives as betrayals from the Western world. The decision to withdraw from the grain deal was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-russia-considering-withdrawal-grain-deal-2023-06-13/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">portrayed</a> as a refusal to cooperate with cheating and a hostile Western community, as emphasized by Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, who <a href="https://rg.ru/2023/07/02/epoha-protivostoianiia.html?fbclid=IwAR0Vs7twSB1aTq5R64IkVx3cySkvQPDwbKCmZDwNDFDDK1YhCsKd_AILsQ0,%252520July%2525202,%2525202023" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">likened</a> Russia&#8217;s position to a plane-taking off against the wind. In other words, despite facing opposition from the world, Russia remains steadfast in asserting its independence and integrity. However, Russian propagandist rhetoric could have broader implications for global politics.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-left" id="2"><strong>What does Africa have to do with it?</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The recent termination of the grain deal and the escalating rhetoric regarding the &#8220;hostile&#8221; West have gained particular significance in anticipation of the Russia-Africa summit, set to take place on July 27-28, 2023, in St. Petersburg, Russia. Russia&#8217;s historical ties with Africa have given it a strategic foothold in the region, which it has been capitalizing on recently. Notably, Wagner&#8217;s actions have garnered attention, with their presence recorded in over <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">10 African countries</a>. Pro-Russian forces&#8217; involvement in military coups has been previously documented in Mali and Burkina Faso and, more recently, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/18/russian-mercenaries-are-pushing-france-out-of-central-africa/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">in Niger</a>, which <a href="https://tass.com/world/1652111">declined</a> participation in the Russian summit. In addition, Russia has established an expansive information ecosystem comprising thousands of websites and social media accounts to kindle anti-Western sentiments within African states. <a href="https://www.irsem.fr/media/5-publications/etude-irsem-83-audinet-le-lion-ok.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School</a> and the <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/">Center for Strategic Studies of Africa</a> have reported on this disinformation campaign. This propaganda machinery is crucial in shaping perceptions and cultivating a pool of pro-Russian African politicians. If successful, they could offer the Kremlin 54 out of 193 votes in the UN General Assembly, thereby influencing global decisions and policies in favor of Russia.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, the attitudes of African countries towards Russia, particularly regarding the conflict in Ukraine, have proven to be diverse and complex despite Russia&#8217;s efforts to influence perceptions. While some may interpret the voting pattern of African states against UN resolutions condemning Russia as support for its actions, the reality is more nuanced. Many African countries have opted for a neutral stance, influenced by their weaker and dependent positions, since the war in Ukraine has had significant consequences on Africa, including impacts on food and fuel prices and hindering the continent&#8217;s recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, tensions between Russia and African nations were further highlighted when Vladimir Putin <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/19/icc-putin-warrant-ramaphosa-brics-summit-south-africa-russia/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">couldn&#8217;t take part </a>in the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, due to South Africa&#8217;s inability to guarantee that Putin would not be arrested on the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant. This incident caused significant reputational costs for Putin, as earlier South African President Cyril Ramaphosa&#8217;s statements about the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66238766" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">impossibility</a> of capturing Putin and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-try-withdraw-icc-again-ramaphosa-2023-04-25/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">withdrawing</a> from ICC jurisdiction for this were widely covered in the Russian media.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thus, Russia is acutely aware of the region&#8217;s significance amidst the unfolding geopolitical landscape. Moreover, Ukraine is also making efforts to bolster its influence in Africa, as demonstrated by the recent <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/kulebas-africa-tour-to-ensure-support-for-ukraines-un-resolutions/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">launch</a> of the second diplomatic tour by Ukraine&#8217;s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmitry Kuleba, to African countries in May 2023 (the first tour took place in the fall of 2022). Therefore, rejecting the grain deal just ahead of the Russia-Africa summit could be perceived as a Russian strategic move to exert pressure on African countries. Before the conflict in Ukraine, 15 African states heavily relied on wheat imports from Ukraine or Russia, with six of them importing <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-2023/one-year-later-impact-russian-conflict-ukraine-africa" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">over 70%</a> of their wheat from the region. Consequently, the hesitation and refusal to fulfill the terms of the grain deal pose an existential threat to these nations, potentially creating an opportunity for Russia to seek closer cooperation and support from them.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-left" id="3"><strong>The Numbers Behind Grain Export: Debunking the &#8216;Evil West&#8217; Narrative</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A recurring argument in Russian rhetoric suggests that the West receives the majority of Ukrainian grain exports while Africa, suffering from hunger, gets only a meager share. This narrative plays on the historical colonial past of African countries, painting the West as insidious and cynical. But what does the official data reveal? According to UN statistics on the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Ukraine <a href="https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/data" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">exported</a> 32.9 million tons of grain during the agreement&#8217;s year. It is true that only 2.5% of this grain went to low-income countries, in particular, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, receiving a combined 822.1 tons. However, a significant portion of the grain, 17.15%, was sent to countries in the lower-middle and upper-middle income groups. These included Algeria, Djibouti, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Kenya, Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and China. Moreover, some of these grain supplies were further distributed to needy countries. For instance, certain wheat shipments were milled into flour in Türkiye and then sent to countries where the World Food Programme runs humanitarian operations. Thus, the actual supply rate for African countries stands at 13.34%, not the earlier claimed 2.5%.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This data clarifies why African countries overwhelmingly supported the resumption of the grain deal, despite President Putin&#8217;s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/27/putin-promises-free-grain-to-six-african-nations-after-collapse-of-black-sea-deal" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">offer</a> of free grain to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea. Moreover, Zimbabwe&#8217;s President Emmerson Mnangagwa expressed gratitude for the offer but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwean-president-says-country-has-food-grateful-putin-grain-offer-2023-07-27/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">declined</a>, stating that they do not require additional grain. Further, President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/29/7413333/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">emphasized</a> that African countries&#8217; main objective was not to seek &#8216;gifts&#8217; but to address broader concerns beyond grain deliveries. Thus, statistics shed light on the complexity of grain exports and debunk the notion of an &#8216;evil West&#8217; hoarding resources while Africa is left in need. The situation is far more nuanced, and African countries definitely have made informed decisions, recognizing the true nature of the grain supply.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-left" id="4"><strong>EU Farmers and the Impact of Grain Narratives</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russian narratives about rich Western countries monopolizing Ukrainian grain are not just a concern for deprived African nations. It also has significant implications for Eastern European farmers, particularly those in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland. In May 2022, before the Grain Deal took place, the European Union decided to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2671">eliminate</a> duties and quotas on exporting grain and other agricultural products from Ukraine through Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. However, this move had unintended consequences. It facilitated transit and led to a surge in the import of Ukrainian products into Eastern European markets. As a result, local agricultural producers faced a situation of de facto dumping<a id="_ednref1" href="#_edn1"><sup>[i]</sup></a>, causing a sharp drop in prices for their products.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The impact was especially strong in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/04/polish-farmers-threaten-to-ruin-zelenskiy-visit-amid-grain-dispute" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Poland</a>, where farmers&#8217; discontent escalated into spontaneous and organized protests. In response to the growing unrest, the European Commission made concessions. On May 3, EU <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/14/eu-blocks-ukraine-grain-imports-to-five-countries-including-poland" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">blocked</a> exporting agricultural products from Ukraine to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia until 5 June 2023. Additionally, the Commission <a href="https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/news/eu100-million-support-farmers-bulgaria-hungary-poland-romania-and-slovakia-2023-05-03_en" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">approved</a> financial support of 100 million euros for local farmers and pledged to explore measures to ease transit. Focusing on large-scale purchases of Ukrainian grain by wealthy Western nations and discussing alternative plans for overland imports of Ukrainian raw materials through EU countries neighboring Ukraine might reignite <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/07/25/eastern-european-countries-push-for-bans-on-ukrainian-grain-to-be-extended-until-end-of-ye" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">dissatisfaction</a> among Eastern European farmers. By capitalizing on the problems of Eastern European farmers, the Kremlin strive to stoke nationalist sentiments, portraying Ukraine as a competitor gaining favorable treatment at the expense of neighboring countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Furthermore, recent information &#8216;declassified&#8217; by Russian hackers, disseminated through Telegram channels, indicates this clear intention. It <a href="https://ura.news/news/1052671733" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">suggests</a> that Ukraine purportedly earned over a million dollars in July 2023 from alleged illegal exports of wheat and corn to EU countries such as Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. For example, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/grains-of-truth-polish-farmers-irate-over-ukrainian-imports/a-62629948" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">documented</a> upsurge in anti-EU sentiment within the Polish farming community raises concerns for the European Union and the Polish government. Given the pivotal role of the agricultural sector in the country&#8217;s economy and rural regions, the narratives of Russian propaganda pose significant concerns. In a recent speech by the Polish Secretary of State in the Presidential Office, Wojciech Kolarski <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/poland-admits-to-conflict-with-ukraine-over-grain-exports-leaking-into-its-markets/2959206" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">admitted</a> that the transit of Ukrainian grain through Poland and the discontent of farmers have the potential to destabilize the country&#8217;s political landscape on the background of upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2023. All things considered, this approach aligns with the broader pattern of Russia&#8217;s efforts to sow discord and division within the European Union and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-staging-protests-for-anti-ukraine-propaganda-report/a-65544741" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">weaken</a> its unity on Ukraine-related issues.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Dumping in the market refers to the practice of selling goods or products in a foreign market at prices significantly below their production cost or the prices charged in the home market. It is a form of unfair trade where foreign companies aim to gain a competitive advantage over domestic businesses by flooding the market with cheap products, potentially harming local industries and economies. Dumping is often subject to regulations and anti-dumping measures to protect domestic industries from unfair competition.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading has-text-align-left" id="5"><strong>Сonclusion</strong></h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia&#8217;s recent suspension of the grain deal has sparked a flurry of narratives skillfully crafted by the Kremlin&#8217;s propaganda machinery. The move appears to be a strategic attempt to divert blame onto its partners while reinforcing the image of a &#8216;collective West&#8217; that poses a threat. At the same time, Russia seeks to portray itself as a &#8216;noble and just world leader, defending oppressed nations and countries.&#8217;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Russia aims to shape its image domestically and abroad using half-truths and selective information coverage. Reports about Russia&#8217;s plans to supply free grain to Africa&#8217;s poorest nations were widely covered all around the globe, <a href="https://www.blic.rs/vesti/putin-je-upravo-obecao-da-ce-slati-besplatno-zito-u-ove-zemlje/22wtygf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">including Serbia</a>. It was definitely an effort to present Russia as a defender of the weak and downtrodden. However, when examining the numbers, a different picture emerges</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">During the year of the grain deal, the poorest countries received 2.5% of the total exported grain, amounting to 822.1 tons. In contrast, President Vladimir Putin&#8217;s gift of 150 to 300 tons, with no clear indication of delivery timing, is a drop in the bucket compared to their actual needs. These nations will likely end up buying grain at inflated costs, as prices have surged since the agreement&#8217;s termination. It raises questions about whether this gift truly compensates for the deal&#8217;s breakdown and the losses borne by at least the poorest countries. Thus, Russia&#8217;s creative use of statistics and cunningly intertwined narratives force the public to examine the facts closely and recognize the complexities of the propaganda efforts.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/blog/russias-propaganda-tactics-analyzing-the-rhetoric-and-numbers-in-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/">Russia&#8217;s Propaganda Tactics: Analyzing the Rhetoric and Numbers in the Black Sea Grain Initiative</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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