

Policy Brief

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Echoes of Moscow: Russian Telegram Network in Serbia

With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russia has launched an extensive information warfare campaign,¹ wielding the power of misinformation to sway global sentiment, fracture European unity, and rally support for its actions. As the European Union swiftly moved to ban Russian media broadcasts, the battleground shifted to social media platforms, with Telegram emerging as a centre stage for the dissemination of Kremlin propaganda on a global scale.² In particular, European nations such as Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic,³ which are among the top supporters of Ukraine, have found themselves on the frontline of this information competition. Meanwhile, in the Western Balkans, which are far from the conflict zone but not immune to its reverberations, the influence of Russian media has only grown stronger.

Yet, alongside this official presence, the social media landscape has also undergone profound transformations, becoming both a battlefield and a breeding ground for pro-Russian narratives. Considering the importance of this topic, this study investigates the dynamics and impact of the Kremlin's narratives on *Telegram* in Serbia, focusing on the interplay between local Serbian discourse and propagandist content. Primarily, it seeks to determine whether Russian or pro-Russian propaganda dominates the region. The research uncovers a network affiliated with Russia's Telegram channels operating in Serbia and the Western Balkans, analysing how the Serbian political and social context influences these narratives and their perception. Furthermore, it identifies patterns in the distribution of pro-Russian content across the region, offering insights into the strategies used to disseminate these messages and their broader implications for regional stability and political dynamics.

The analysis reveals that despite Russia's efforts to establish a propaganda broadcasting network in the Balkans, the region does not hold a strategic priority for the Kremlin. Instead, the primary disseminators of pro-Russian messages are local actors leveraging these narratives to serve their interests.

The Telegram's Journey in Serbia

Despite its global popularity, Telegram's presence in Serbia is notably fragile. This instability may stem from the platform's tumultuous introduction in the country, marred by controversies. A series of scandals involving sexual crimes⁴ and drug trafficking⁵ has significantly tarnished its reputation in the region. However, the tides began to turn post-February 2022, as Serbia witnessed a significant shift in the dynamics of its Telegram community. In a remarkable twist, concerted efforts emerged to elevate the platform's status, with influential Serbian media outlets stepping into the fray. For instance, 'B92' regaled readers with tales of the application's unique and unparalleled features, setting it apart from its competitors.⁶ Concurrently, the portal 'Novosti' took a more pragmatic approach by furnishing step-by-step guides on Telegram installation, touted as a "shortcut to accessing up-to-the-minute information."⁷ Subsequently, Kurir joined the chorus and delivered a trifecta of publications, informing readers about new premium subscriptions in Telegram and providing insights into its novel func-

4 Blic, *Policija: Izdat nalog UKP-u da istraži slučaj objave fotografija i snimaka na Telegramu, krivci će biti nađeni i kažnjeni*, 2021, available at: <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/policija-izdat-nalog-ukp-u-da-istrazi-slucaj-objave-fotografija-i-snimaka-na/65ecxyj>

5 Blic, *Skandal. Na aplikaciji za dopisivanje pojavile se grupe u kojima se nude kokain, spid i drugi narkotici: Reklamiraju se čak i na autobuskoj stanici*, 2021, available at: <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/skandal-na-aplikaciji-za-dopisivanje-pojavile-se-grupe-u-kojima-se-nude-kokain-spid-i/81s1dj9>

6 B92, *Ako koristite Telegram, morate znati ove trikove*, 2022, available at: <https://www.b92.net/tehnopolis/internet/ako-koristite-telegram-morate-znati-ove-trikove-2157147>

7 Новости, *Корак по корак: Како да је инсталирате и користите - Уз апликацију "Телеграм" брзо до актуелих информација*, 2022, available at: <https://www.novosti.rs/c/drustvo/vesti/1118369/korak-korak-kako-instalirate-koristite-aplikaciju-telegram-brzo-aktuelih-informacija>

1 Digital Forensic Research Lab, *Undermining Ukraine: How Russia widened its global information war in 2023*, 2024, available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/undermining-ukraine-how-russia-widened-its-global-information-war-in-2023/>

2 TIME, *How Telegram Became the Digital Battlefield in the Russia-Ukraine War*, 2022, available at: <https://time.com/6158437/telegram-russia-ukraine-information-war/>

3 Vox Ukraine, *Propaganda Diary 2022-2023: VoxCheck presents the database of Russian propaganda in the European mass media*, 2023, available at: <https://voxukraine.org/en/propaganda-diary-2022-2023-voxcheck-presents-the-database-of-russian-propaganda-in-the-european-mass-media>

tionalities.⁸ Also, Russian propaganda efforts have been laser-focused on enticing Serbian audiences onto Telegram. In March 2023, Sputnik Serbia launched advertisements promising Serbian readers an “uncensored news experience” underscored by a “commitment to privacy within the app.”⁹ This targeted approach has paid off, as Telegram has amassed a significant following, reflecting the platform’s rich tapestry of engagement.

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A vast network of pro-Russian channels disseminating Kremlin propaganda has firmly established its presence in Serbian Telegram. In autumn 2023, a study conducted by the European Policy Centre revealed 143 Telegram channels spreading pro-Russian propaganda throughout the Balkan region, engaging an audience of over 800,000 subscribers. This list is curated from diverse channels, ranging from groups boasting over 100 thousand to a mere eight followers. Of particular interest is the chronological sequence of channel establishment following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Except for February 26, 2022, when five channels commenced simultaneously, subsequent channel formations transpired gradually. From February to April 2022, a new channel espousing pro-Russian narratives emerged nearly daily, except for a few sporadic instances. However, the fervour seemed to wane as time progressed. The tempo slowed to a steady rhythm from mid-April to late July 2022, with one new channel surfacing each week. Eventually, from July 2022 to July 2023, the frequency dwindled further, with new registrations averaging just 1-3 per month. However, despite a slowdown in the creation of new channels, the recurring pattern of their emergence sug-

gests a deliberate strategy, akin to a set schedule, for developing pro-Russian narratives in Serbia. Furthermore, the close interconnection between these channels, evident through mutual reposts and cross-promotion, highlights a coordinated effort by the authors to establish a Kremlin agenda in Serbia and the wider Western Balkans region.

While geopolitics serves as a pivotal theme among Serbian channels, with 24 channels exclusively devoted to this topic, the war in Ukraine has prompted the emergence of specialised channels solely or predominantly focused on the conflict. Eleven such channels consistently publish materials related to the war, with one channel actively emulating Ukrainian intelligence leaks while promoting a pro-Russian agenda.

Mapping the Landscape: Serbian Telegram Channels and the Reach of Kremlin-aligned Narratives

The channels identified in the study highlight a broad spectrum of tools and methods used to propagate pro-Russian narratives. The dominant majority of them, comprising 109 channels (76.2% of the total sample), are Serbian-language channels. Specifically, 67 were established following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while 42 were founded before the war but no later than July 2017. These channels span a diverse array of categories, from humour to global politics. Notably, a significant category includes channels openly dedicated to fostering Russian-Serbian relations, often featuring both Russian and Serbian flags in their names and advocating for the ‘brotherhood and love’ between the nations. In total, there are 19 channels within this category, amassing slightly over 14 thousand followers, with all but two channels established post-Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, while geopolitics serves as a pivotal theme among Serbian channels, with 24 channels exclusively devoted to this topic, the war in Ukraine has prompted the emergence of specialised channels solely or predominantly focused on the conflict. Eleven such channels consistently publish materials related to the war, with one channel actively emulating Ukrainian intelligence leaks while promoting a pro-Russian agenda.

⁸ Blic, *Telegram uvodi pretplatu: Teret im finansiranje oglašivača, ovim potezom žele da ga izbegnu*, 2022, available at: <https://www.blic.rs/biznis/tehnologija/telegram-uvodi-pretplatu-teret-im-finansiranje-oglasivaca-ovim-potezom-zele-da-ga/f1c82b4>

⁹ Sputnik Србија, *На овој апликацији не могу да вас шпијунирају, а можете да читате нецензурисане вести*, 2023, available at: <https://sputnikportal.rs/20230325/na-ovoj-aplikaciji-ne-mogu-da-vas-spijuniraju-a-mozete-da-citate-necenzurisane-vesti-1152908572.html>

Moreover, in addition to prominent pro-Russian outlets like 'Sputnik Serbia' and 'RT Balkans,' several Serbian media entities maintain active official Telegram accounts, serving as essential distributors of Kremlin narratives. These entities include 'Novi Svet,'¹⁰ 'Borba.info,'¹¹ 'Novi Standard,'¹² 'IN4S - an information portal,'¹³ and 'Vostok News.'¹⁴ Thus, Russian propaganda strategically extends its reach throughout Serbia, targeting a broad and varied audience to captivate and influence a wide array of citizens. This deliberate approach seeks to embed pro-Russian narratives into the fabric of Serbian society, enhancing its impact and penetration across multiple social strata.

Similar to Russia, Telegram channels of war correspondents, known as 'voyenkory,' have emerged in Serbia. These correspondents either report directly from the combat zone in Ukraine or engage in analysis of the armed conflict, unlike channels limited to publishing information from official Russian sources. Among them, a Serbian volunteer sniper, Dejan Berić, who joined pro-Russian forces in Donbas in early 2014¹⁵ and officially became a trusted agent of Vladimir Putin for the 2024 presidential campaign,¹⁶ has emerged as a vital tool of Kremlin propaganda. 'Dejan Berić' Telegram channel actively disseminates pro-Russian narratives regarding the war in Ukraine for the Serbian audience. Established in 2020, his channel stands as the most popular channel in Serbia, not just within the 'war in Ukraine' category but boasting a subscriber count exceeding 100 thousand.¹⁷ Alongside him, Nikola Jović,¹⁸ who also appeared in Donbas on a humanitarian mission after the outbreak of the war in 2022, Igor Damjanović and others work in the field of military journalism. However, unlike Berić, who serves as a direct conduit for Russian propaganda, echoing only the official Russian narratives, these 'local' war correspondents integrate pro-Russian messages into the broader tapestry of Serbian nationalist movements and ideologies. This multifaceted approach not only disseminates the Kremlin's propaganda but also leverages it to

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fuel and exploit the rise of extreme right-wing and nationalist ideologies in the region, aligning well with Moscow's interests in the Western Balkans.

Yet, it would be misleading to assume that Russian propaganda in Serbia is solely the domain of anonymous channels and marginalised groups; the reality is far more complex. Pro-Russian sentiments have deeply permeated Serbia's political and socio-political arenas. Prominent among these Kremlin-aligned narratives are the 'Conservative movement 'Nashi','¹⁹ 'Saint Sava Association 'Obraz','²⁰ and Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski,²¹ leader of the 'Serbian Party Oathkeepers' and the recently appointed Minister of Family Affairs and Demography. Additionally, influential Telegram channels driven by notable public figures — from artists to renowned lawyers and professors at the University of Belgrade — actively promote pro-Russian propaganda. While many of these channels have a modest reach, others, like Serbian-Canadian filmmaker Boris Malagurski,²² command audiences of over 7,000 subscribers. Moreover, beyond mere support for the war in Ukraine or spreading Euroscepticism, about ten channels in the study actively critique local politics, offering pro-Russian and anti-Western analysis. Thus, Russian propaganda is not solely focused on boosting support for its actions in Ukraine. It is also keenly involved in shaping local political discourse, positioning itself as a significant player in Serbia's internal political dynamics.

All channels examined in the study exhibit a closely-knit network, engaging in active reposting and mutual dissemination of content, fostering reciprocal growth in subscribers and overall popularity. Among them, five channels stand out as primary sources (see Figure 1): 'Re-

10 Telegram, НОВИ СВЕТ, 2024, available at: https://t.me/novi_svet

11 Telegram, *Borba.info*, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/borbainf>

12 Telegram, Нови Стандард | *Novi Standard*, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/novistandard>

13 Telegram, ИН4С - информативни портал, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/in4sportal>

14 Telegram, ВОСТОК ВЕСТИ, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/vostokvesti>

15 Balkan Insight, *Serb Volunteers Answer Call to Fight in Ukraine*, 2022, available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/03/08/serb-volunteers-answer-call-to-fight-in-ukraine/>

16 The New Voice of Ukraine, *Russian commanders mock Serbian recruits, beat them with rifles – Serb recruiter*, 2024, available at: <https://english.nv.ua/nation/putin-s-serbian-confident-complains-of-russian-commanders-mistreating-his-recruited-fellow-citizens-50382554.html>

17 Telegram, *Dejan Beric*, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/SrbijaRusija>

18 TGStat, *XaZардер HoBocpбиja*, 2024, available at: <https://tgstat.com/channel/@haZardernoVoserbia/stat>

19 Telegram, Конзервативни покрет "Наши", 2024, available at: <https://t.me/konzervativnipokretnasi>

20 Telegram, Срби за Русе | Србы за русских, 2024, available <https://t.me/srbizaruse>

21 Telegram, Милица Ђурђевић - Телеграм канал, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/milicadjurdjevic>

22 Telegram, *Boris Malagurski*, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/malagurski>

The Serbian Telegram serves as the vanguard of Kremlin engagement in the Western Balkans, marking the initial phase of Russian influence in the region. With a shared history and linguistic proximity, its reach extends across the peninsula, resonating particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and among the Serbian population in North Macedonia, Croatia and Kosovo.*

Beyond the Numbers: the Reach of Kremlin-aligned Narratives

Despite the outward appearance of strong Russian influence, the reality for the Russian propagandists behind these high-profile figures is far from optimistic. Analysis of statistical metrics related to audience engagement reveals a less-than-rosy picture. Among the diverse array of channels scrutinised in the study, only 20 demonstrate robust audience engagement rates, with over 50% of subscribers regularly reading the channel's content. For 29 channels, this metric falls within the range of 50% to 25% of subscribers actively engaging with published materials. However, the outlook dims considerably for the remaining 60 channels, with 51 registering such negligible levels that quantification becomes daunting. A similarly subdued picture emerges when assessing audience interaction with published content, including actions such as commenting, reacting, and sharing posts. Remarkably, only two channels manage to surpass a meagre 10% of their overall audience in this regard. For half of the channels, this indicator hovers between 0.5% and 9%, while 38.5% grapple with levels so infinitesimal that measurement proves elusive. These findings underscore the considerable challenges Russian propagandists encounter in effectively engaging and mobilising their audiences.

While initial statistics may suggest a limited penetration of Russian propaganda into the Serbian Telegram sphere, it is crucial to recognise that the reach of Russian propaganda narratives extends far beyond just the direct subscribers of specific Telegram channels. A survey on Serbian youth²⁸ — the primary demographic using Telegram — offers profound insights. Among those surveyed, 34% actively search for information about the war in Ukraine on the platform, while 22.5% stumble upon such content unintentionally. Consequently, nearly one in six respondents have encountered channels dedicated to the Ukraine war, and one in ten has come across channels that were identified as conduits for pro-Russian propaganda. Notably, some users favour these channels as their principal news source. Moreover, 43% of respondents consider the information from these often anon-

ymous and unverified channels objective. Additionally, 52% view these channels as more relevant sources of news and information on national and global politics than traditional media such as television and newspapers. This evidence highlights Telegram channels' significant and expanding influence among Serbian youth.

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29 Telegram, Република Српска Крајина, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/republikasrpskakrajina>

30 Telegram, Република Српска, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/RepublikaSrpska22>

31 Telegram, Приштински корпус, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/pristinski-korpus>

32 Telegram, Српски Инат, 2024, available at: https://t.me/INAT_SRPSKI

33 Telegram, Црна Гора Српска Спарта, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/crnagorasrpskaspata>

34 Telegram, Черногория Прямая Линия Z, 2024, available at: <https://t.me/crnagoraline>

35 Telegram, iNFOMAX.mk, 2024, available at: https://t.me/iNFOMAX_MK

28 In October 2023, a survey was conducted involving 250 university students from Belgrade. This cohort represents the primary demographic of Telegram users: young urban residents.

Dissecting Kremlin Rhetoric: The Realities of Russian Propaganda in the Western Balkans

Delving deeper into the Kremlin rhetoric, it is essential to recognise that the strength of Russian narratives in Serbia and the Western Balkans might not be as formidable as often portrayed. Despite concerted efforts to establish a network of channels disseminating Russian propaganda, the actual content falls short of the grand image of the Kremlin's information war often depicted in media and research circles. While Russian propaganda in EU countries strategically aims to undermine unity and sow discord, Serbia presents a different terrain. Analysis of posts on channels dedicated to the war in Ukraine reveals a lack of sophistication and systematic approach of Russia's propaganda strategy in Serbia. An examination of 2,815 posts on the 'Dejan Berić' Telegram channel reveals a deliberate failure to adapt content to Serbian realities. Since April 2022, the channel has been managed by Russian-speaking authors without proficiency in Serbian. As a result, the content is riddled with grammatical errors, linguistic nuances, and cultural references that escape the understanding of the Serbian audience. Essentially, the channel's posts appear as mere replicas of Russian domestic propaganda messages. Despite inundating the audience with a multitude of pro-Russian perspectives on the conflict, these messages do little to foster support within Serbian society. Moreover, they deviate from primary narratives associated with Russian information warfare in Serbia and the Balkans, such as 'Slavic and Orthodox brotherhood,' 'anti-NATO,' and 'anti-Western' sentiments. Additionally, the channel's narrative fails to bridge the identities of Serbs and Russians, portraying the war as an 'external' and 'distant phenomenon' rather than a matter of shared concern.

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Simultaneously, original Serbian channels distributing Russian propaganda serve as more than just tools for implementing the Kremlin's plans. Within Serbia's right-wing radical groups, the narrative of the war in Ukraine, while rooted in a pro-Russian stance, aims to bolster nationalist rhetoric centred on the revival of 'Greater Serbia.' In-depth analysis of publications on popular far-right channels like 'Serbs for Russians' and 'HaZarder No-Vosrbija' show that Russia assumes a pragmatic role in their rhetoric, as a facilitator, positioned 'to liberate Kosovo from NATO-backed Albanian occupation' and thereby initiate the reunion of Serbs with their historical lands. As a result, these channels reject mainstream Russian narratives, such as justifying the invasion of Ukraine by its 'denazification' and presenting relatively poor coverage of war events. Instead, they emphasised "Serbia-Russian

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brotherhood and unity" to attract Serbs to Russia's cause, fostering a sense of shared triumph over past grievances and defeats. However, as the prospect of a swift and decisive Russian victory fades, these channels gradually shift away from openly pro-Russian rhetoric. It is imperative to underscore this aspect, as it suggests that the prevailing pro-Russian sentiments among a significant part of Serbian society do not solely stem from successful Russian propaganda efforts. Instead, they are rooted in deeply ingrained anti-Western and anti-NATO emotions cultivated since the 1990s, embraced not only by extreme right-wing groups but also by prominent politicians. The strength of these anti-Western sentiments fuels widespread participation in rallies supporting Russia. However, the underlying motivation behind such demonstrations is not necessarily to endorse the Kremlin. Instead, it primarily serves as a platform to express discontentment with the West.

During the December 2023 elections, heightened attention and importance were given to the electoral process. At that moment, the rhetoric transformed the elections into a pivotal moment in Serbia's path toward civilisation, framing them as a battle between 'good and evil', embodied in the images of the 'decaying West' and 'God-chosen Russia,' rather than a clash of local political coalitions.

A similar murky scenario arises when examining the coverage of the 2022 and 2023 Serbian elections by Telegram channels flagged as disseminators of pro-Russian propaganda. Delving into the posts of the 'Sputnik Serbia' channel, it becomes evident that Kremlin propaganda employs a sophisticated approach in shaping the narrative surrounding the Serbian political landscape. In April 2022, the channel strategically manipulated election coverage by downplaying its significance, diverting attention from candidates, platforms, or debates. Instead, it minimised the elections' importance, effectively blurring their value. However, during the December 2023 elections, heightened attention and importance were given to the electoral process. At that moment, the rhetoric transformed the elections into a pivotal moment in Serbia's path toward civilisation, framing them as a battle between 'good and evil', embodied in the images of the 'decaying West' and 'God-chosen Russia,' rather than a clash of local political coalitions. Amidst this charged atmosphere, the channel unabashedly backed Aleksandar Vučić's candidacy and the ruling coalition, openly endorsing them throughout the electoral cycle. Furthermore, the channel actively worked to discredit post-election protests, portraying them in a relentlessly negative light and stripping away any semblance of significance, branding them as violent acts of opposition. This brazen display of support and manipulation underscores a consistent pattern in the channel's approach to elections – a coordinated strategy to advance its political agenda and influence political dynamics in the Balkans.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In the geopolitical chessboard of the Western Balkans, Russia's presence in Serbia may appear as a mere pawn, overshadowed by the towering figures of Western influence. However, when it comes to information warfare, a more complex picture emerges, revealing Russia's calculated moves in spreading Kremlin propaganda throughout Serbia and the wider Western Balkan region. The conducted analysis unveils a systematic surge in pro-Russian Telegram channels, weaving a dense web of interconnected nodes. Nevertheless, despite these orchestrated efforts, Serbia cannot be classified as a focal point of the Kremlin's 'strategic interests.' Notably, Russia has refrained from deploying a *tailored* strategy to amplify pro-Russian narratives regarding the war in Ukraine. Even with access to the largest Serbian Telegram channel, Kremlin propagandists have neglected to customise content for the local audience. Essentially, the posts regarding the war in Ukraine seem to be exact replicas of Russian domestic propaganda messages, lacking appropriate translation. It highlights a crucial observation: while Russia harbours an interest in advancing its narratives within Serbia, the region does not occupy a central position in the Kremlin's geopolitical manoeuvres. A similar trend emerges in the coverage of Serbian political life by pro-Russian channels. Despite the apparent efforts to create a strategy for presenting elections in public discourse, this agenda occupies an insignificant place in the rhetoric of the channel and published materials.

The analysis also highlights the autonomy and distinctiveness of right-wing factions, often painted as mere 'Russian puppets.' Whether discussing the conflict in Ukraine or the Serbian elections, their rhetoric diverged from the strategies of Kremlin-affiliated propaganda agents. Instead of blindly echoing Russian narratives, these channels utilised pro-Russian themes to advance their agendas, seamlessly integrating them into their ideological framework. When these narratives clashed, they were set aside. These findings challenge the prevalent notion of Russia's cosy relationship with right-wing groups in the region. When developing policies to counter Russia's propaganda, it is recommended to consider the following three key points:

- Research findings do not deny Russia's interests in the Balkans but confidently challenge the notion of Russia's overwhelming information warfare in the region and its control over Serbia. Instead of seeing Russia as an omnipotent force, its presence in Serbia resembles more of an 'invited intervention.' Amidst the intricate tapestry of political elites and increasingly strained relations with the EU, Russia emerges as a trump card in Serbia's hand. The Serbian establishment strategically leverages the narrative surrounding Russian presence and perceived

'threats' to its advantage. In this complicated landscape, Russian propaganda transcends being merely a driving force; it serves as a reflection of the broader political struggle. It morphs from a mere subject into an object of influence, wielded as a tool in current political dynamics.

- In the Balkans, the notion of Russian propaganda's pervasive influence has become ensnared in the paradox of the 'illusion of truth': the lie, repeated a thousand times, becomes a reality. What many attribute to the consequences of Russia's propaganda in Serbia often finds its roots in locally brewed concoctions nurtured and bred within the nation. Serbia's tumultuous history, marked by the scars of the Yugoslav wars, life under sanctions, and the NATO bombing, became a fertile ground for fostering deep-seated anti-European and anti-NATO sentiments in society. Thus, Serbia's stance is not merely pro-Russian; it is equally anti-Western, a sentiment directed towards nations that recognised Kosovo's independence and partook in aggression against Yugoslavia. Crucially, the architects nourishing these sentiments today are not solely Russia's media but rather the Serbian political elites who craft anti-Western rhetoric in their discourse. Within this framework, Russian propaganda agents are merely one of many voices echoing these narratives.

- Recognising this shifts the approach to countering Russian propaganda and combating anti-Western sentiments, highlighting the need for a multifaceted strategy to address historical grievances by fostering a dialogue that promotes reconciliation. Additionally, it should enhance transparency and accountability in governance to strengthen democratic institutions and limit the influence of manipulative political actors.

About European Policy Centre - CEP

European Policy Centre - CEP - is a nongovernmental, non-profit, independent think-tank, based in Belgrade. It was founded by a group of professionals in the areas of EU law, EU affairs, economics and public administration reform, with a shared vision of changing the policy making environment in Serbia for the better – by rendering it more evidence based, more open and inclusive and more substantially EU accession driven. Profound understanding of EU policies and the accession process, the workings of the Serbian administration, as well as strong social capital combine to create a think-tank capable of not only producing high quality research products but also penetrating the decision making arena to create tangible impact. Today, CEP organises its work into four programme areas:

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