




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MONITORING REFORMS IN THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS A WESTERN BALKAN CIVIL SOCIETY CONTRIBUTION

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INTRODUCTION: THE REVISED ENLARGEMENT METHODOLOGY AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE PREDICTABILITY OF THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS

In the context of the EU's enlargement policy, the European Commission is the institution which should be in the driver's seat, leading the development of the policy and proposing changes and improvements of the approach. Its [annual reports](#) analyse the state of play and progress across the fundamental reform areas as well as individual negotiating chapters for all candidates and potential candidates. As such, they are the primary source for evaluating these countries' progress in the EU integration process. Moreover, they should serve as a reliable basis for the decisions by the EU Council to make or withhold advancement of individual aspirants towards membership, including opening of negotiation clusters and closing of individual negotiation chapters.

Yet, it is doubtful whether the Commission's monitoring and assessment mechanisms are effective enough to allow it to act in the expected capacity. In practice, the Council has frequently disregarded or decided not to follow up on the Commission's recommendations based on these reports. This is largely due to the fact that member states continue to demonstrate a notable level of mistrust when it comes to the Commission's approach to reform monitoring and assessment. Such an inter-institutional rift in the EU sends inconsistent and even conflicting messages to (potential) candidates, thus undermining the credibility of the enlargement policy and discouraging domestic reform processes.

The 2020 [Revised enlargement methodology](#) (REM) was announced as a game-changer in terms of how assessment and monitoring are conducted, as the Commission took upon itself to increase the use of third-party indicators. Three years later, however, the Commission's approach has remained largely unchanged. While clusterisation of chapters was introduced to simplify and streamline the negotiating process, most other elements of the REM have remained only ideas on paper, without proper operationalisation. As a result, countries in the region continue to stall with reforms on their path to the EU, prompting civil society organisations to actively and repeatedly [call](#) for more consistent and evidence-based monitoring and assessment, in order to render the annual reports more objective, accurate, impartial, verifiable, and comparable. It is, therefore, crucial to improve the Commission's approach to tracking reforms and ensure greater credibility of its reports, especially in face of geopolitical turbulence in and surrounding Europe. This paper explores how the Commission's approach can be improved, reviews several civil-society-led reform monitoring initiatives, and proposes a way forward with greater utilisation of their results as objective third party indicators in line with the REM.

FROM DIAGNOSIS OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH...

Persistent deficiencies in the Commission's reporting approach

Despite the introduction of the REM in 2020 with the aim of increasing transparency, among other things, in the Commission's assessment and monitoring process, endemic problems persist in practice. In fact, a comparative analysis of the reports before and after the adoption of the REM shows that direct quotes and citations of third-party indicators are still missing, leading to concerns that the Commission may, for example, prioritise diplomatic language over precision when presenting findings. Such intentional omission goes against the REM's "Predictability" pillar, which emphasises the importance of raising transparency when it comes to facilitating more effective monitoring and ensuring sustainability of reforms. Moreover, the Commission's unwillingness to reference its sources is also in contrast with common practice of renowned international watchdogs' reports – such as [V-DEM](#), [International IDEA](#), [UN Development Programme](#) and [Freedom House: Nations in Transit](#) – which directly, extensively and transparently rely upon civil society organisations' (CSOs) findings as third-party indicators. Addressing this issue warrants attention, as overlooking the importance of the "Predictability" pillar may further compromise the integrity of the EU's assessment and monitoring mechanisms.

The shortcomings of the Commission's approach to assessing and monitoring are most visibly reflected in the *Functioning of democratic institutions* (FoDI) sub-area within the Fundamentals cluster. FoDI is the only part of the report which does not include a membership preparedness assessment, which is based on a scale starting from 'early stage' up to 'very advanced' level of preparedness. Such a treatment of one of the most fundamental segments of EU membership conditionality runs contrary to REM's efforts to prioritise democratic reforms. Additionally, there is a notable level of inconsistency in how the Commission assesses different policy aspects from one country's report to another, which makes individual reports less comparable. For example, some reports cover "women's political participation at the local level" in the *Governance* sub-chapter, others do it in the introduction of the FoDI section, and some do not mention it at all. The quality of the Commission's work is most disputable in the sub-chapter of FoDI's Civilian oversight of security forces. Some reports do not cover it at all, whereas, in others, minimal attention is dedicated to it, particularly when compared to other sub-chapters. Given the ongoing struggles of the Western Balkans in establishing robust democratic institutions, the low level of priority given to the FoDI sub-area in the EC's reports prevents setting clear benchmarks for measuring progress. Moreover, it sends a disincentivising signal to governments to engage in crucial reforms and prompts member states to turn to other sources of evidence when making decisions concerning progress in Cluster 1, which in turn decides on the candidates' progress in all other negotiation clusters.

Use of Civil Society Contributions in the Current Commission's Approach

As the EU is the largest donor to the enlargement region, civil society has greatly benefitted from its support in designing and developing research and analytical projects focused on the reforms in the accession process. Numerous policy and reform monitoring initiatives have over the years been financed by the EU, with management of those projects performed either by EU delegations in respective countries or by DG NEAR officials directly.

Oftentimes though, the officials managing those projects in the EU delegations or DG NEAR are generalist task managers whose main objective is to see the projects implemented efficiently and in line with the EU rules and regulations, rather than to help ensure maximum effectiveness and impact of those projects. Despite notable exceptions, civil society projects rarely directly interact with the EC's policy officials in charge of the sectoral policies and reforms that they monitor or work to improve. This leads to a rather inefficient system, as the Commission often fails to make use of the results created by the very initiatives it helps fund and implement.

On the positive side, however, the venues for civil society's contributions to the Commission's work has been growing. Over the past few years, the Commission and the EU delegations have established a regular practice of consulting civil society in the development of country reports. In addition to organising consultation meetings at the national level, they have been regularly inviting the responsible CSOs to provide their written inputs for the enlargement package – an opportunity which the region's civil society has welcomed and enthusiastically participated in. DG NEAR has also organised regional meetings in which it invited regional initiatives to provide contributions for the country reports. These practices have become institutionalised and have led to a great improvement in the inclusiveness of the Commission's reporting practices.

Yet, the country reports have not explicitly referenced the inputs of the civil society organisations, usually leaving the sources of the assessments in the reports unclear. Despite some rare exceptions,¹ the reports normally do not use citations or refer directly to the evidence for the assessments they make. At the same time, the consulted CSOs lack information about how their contributions were used by the Commission. Moreover, when CSOs' inputs find their way into the reports, they are usually not cited, which undermines the credibility of those findings. The evidence-based findings and results of the various monitoring exercises are not integrated into the reports, which results in less effective and credible reports.

...TO A REMEDY RELYING ON THE WORKS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

There are numerous examples of civil society initiatives for monitoring reforms in various areas which are assessed by the Commission. They range from large regional initiatives that perform monitoring in all Western Balkan countries using methodologies that allow for regional comparisons, to individual country-specific initiatives, with immense potential for up-scaling and regional dissemination and replication. Most of these monitoring methodologies concern the fundamental reform areas, which are otherwise quite difficult for the Commission to measure. This is because in these areas there is very little *EU acquis*, which means that EU membership requirements comprise mainly international principles and good practices of member states. As a result, use of third-party indicators based on regional and international monitoring methodologies is particularly valuable to provide evidence basis and credibility to the Commission's annual assessments.

Examples of regional reform monitoring initiatives by civil society

The WeBER PAR Monitor

The first example of such a monitoring approach is the WeBER *PAR monitor methodology*, which focuses on public administration reform (PAR) – one of the fundamental reform areas assessed under Cluster 1 in accession negotiations. The methodology was developed by civil society organisations (CSOs) in an inclusive and consultative process, fully relying on the EU framework of principles in the PAR area, which makes it highly usable in the context of EU accession monitoring. Building upon the experience of *SIGMA*, a joint initiative of the OECD and the EU, which is already assisting the EU in measuring PAR developments, the WeBER's entire design of sets of compound indicators is based on the combination of quantitative and qualitative research that assigns numerical values to the findings for each sub-indicator. Moreover, the principles of public administration that lie in the foundation of the entire monitoring methodology represent a selection of those EU principles that bear the greatest interest for the public and civil society. Accordingly, the WeBER PAR Monitor reports provide an in-depth assessment of the most citizen-facing aspects of the functioning of the region's administrations, though always in keeping with the EU conditionality framework in the PAR area. As such, they represent a valuable source of data that the Commission can use to highlight the strengths and weaknesses in the PAR area, to which the REM gives a particularly prominent status by requiring the development of roadmaps covering both FoDI and PAR.


The WeBER's Regional PAR Scoreboard offers an interactive display of monitoring results across countries and monitoring cycles, with a possibility of tracking reform progress or backsliding (see Example 1 below).

¹ One such example is a reference to the corruption perception index in the Serbia report, 2022. - Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. (2022, October 12). Serbia Report 2022. European Commission, p. 71 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2022_en

Policy Development and Coordination

Indicator: Public availability of information on Government performance

Principle: Regular monitoring of government's performance enables public scrutiny and supports the government in achieving its objectives



Example 1: WeBER's Indicator on public availability of information on Government performance, regional results for three monitoring cycles

The Monitoring Matrix on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development


The [Monitoring Matrix](#) on Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development (MM) is a detailed theoretical framework based on international human rights and freedoms and regulatory practices of European countries and the EU. The framework is built around three core areas: 1. Basic Legal Guarantees of Freedoms; 2. Framework for CSOs' Financial Viability and Sustainability; 3. Government – CSO Relationship, each divided in sub-areas. The areas are elaborated by standards, which are further specified through legal and practice indicators. The monitoring is performed in the six Western Balkan countries and Turkey.

The MM underscores the fact that enabling environment is a complex concept, which includes various areas and depends on several factors and phases of development of the society and the civil society sector. The development of the principles, standards and indicators (explained in detail in the so-called MM Toolkit) was performed relying on the internationally guaranteed freedoms and rights and best regulatory practices at the EU level and in EU member states.

As a research tool for measuring the health of the legal, regulatory, and financial environment in which CSO in the Western Balkans and Turkey operate, the MM aims to respond to the need of CSOs to have evidence-based research products and capacities to advocate for policy changes towards a more enabling civil society environment. The research conducted under the MM aims to provide for shadow reporting on the enabling environment for civil society development, as well as influence the EU enlargement policy and funding support towards sustainable and strategic development of the sector. Considering that the area of civil society development forms part of the political criteria for EU accession and is assessed under Cluster 1 – Fundamentals, the MM is a highly appropriate source of third party indicators for monitoring this salient area as part of the enlargement process.

Sub-area 3.1: Framework and practices for cooperation

State policies and strategies for development of cooperation with civil society



Example 2: Country results for the sub-area “Framework and practices for cooperation” within the Monitoring Matrix Regional Report 2019

Examples of national reform monitoring initiatives with potential for regional dissemination and upscaling

Monitoring Reports on the State of Judiciary in Serbia

The Commission’s framework for monitoring and assessment can also be further strengthened by taking stock of nationally specific monitoring initiatives of the civil society, which carry regional dissemination potential. One such example is the *Open Doors of Judiciary* project in Serbia. Recognising the lack of detailed EU acquis in the area of rule of law, often resulting in general Commission benchmarks, this project defines key compound indicators and sub-indicators in the area of access to justice, taking a fully citizen-centric perspective. These are then broken down into standards or prerequisites that must be met so that the indicator values are at a satisfactory level. This allows multi-layered assessments, focusing not only on institutionalisation and legal alignment but on applying the set standards in practice, including analysis of citizens’ satisfaction levels. By comparing the baseline standards across time, the methodology tracks improvements and warns of potential stagnation and backsliding.

The methodology for monitoring judicial reform in Serbia is organised around seven key areas: 1. legal aid, 2. access to data and/or transparency of courts, 3. accessibility of courts, 4. efficiency of the procedure, 5. ethics in the judiciary, 6. access to criminal justice, 7. access to justice services (notaries and public enforcement officers). There are several dimensions and approaches to data collection. Firstly, the sub-indicators look at the fulfilment of specific legal standards in regulations, based on the analysis of the quality of the existing legal framework. Next, they analyse the application of the regulations in force, using analyses of information collected based on freedom of information (FOI) requests, court statistics and other relevant sources. Finally, they rely on the data on the satisfaction of system users (citizens) with the quality of services provided by judicial institutions, for which the methodology uses surveys of system users’ views, focus groups as well as feedback collected through “Open Doors of the Judiciary” – tailor-made consultative events that involve citizens, experts and judges.

SUB-INDICATOR 1.4

EFFICIENCY OF THE SYSTEM OF LEGAL AID

SUB-INDICATOR STANDARDS	POINTS
1. Share of the approved requests for provision of free legal aid in the total number of requests	1/1
2. Share of the rejected requests for provision of free legal aid due to expiration of the deadline for a response to the request in the total number of requests	1/1
3. Share of the approved requests for provision of free legal aid in litigation proceeding in the total number of requests in the litigation proceeding	1/1
4. Share of the initiated disciplinary proceedings against the attorneys in the total number of applications against the attorneys due to breach of the standards for provision of free legal aid	0/0.5
5. Share of the disciplinary decisions on the breach of the attorneys' standards due to breach of the standards for provision of free legal aid in the total number of requests	0/0.5
6. Average number of the employees working on the activities of free legal aid in the units of local self-government in Serbia	0/0.5
TOTAL NUMBER OF POINTS	3/4.5

Example 3: Contents and point allocation for a sub-indicator within the indicator "Accessibility of legal aid" within the Monitoring Report on the State of Judiciary in Serbia, 2020

Monitoring PAR at the local level – PratiMJA initiative

Another example of an evidence-based methodology that is fully complementary with the EU accession framework and can serve as a valuable source of information for the Commission's reports was developed as part of the "Public Administration Monitoring for Better Local Governance (PratiMJA)" initiative.² It aims to increase capacities, credibility, and effectiveness of Serbian civil society to perform evidence-based monitoring, advocacy and consultations, towards greater transparency, openness and accountability of local administration (LA) in line with EU accession requirements.

The comprehensive methodology for local PAR monitoring was developed based on credible sources and long-term experts' experiences, followed by a thorough consultation process with experts, stakeholders and CSOs before finalisation. Like the WeBER PAR monitoring methodology, it is based on the EU principles of public administration, but in this case adapted for use at local level of governance. It includes a set of compound indicators focusing on the most citizen-centric aspects of the LAs' work, i.e. inclusiveness of decision-making processes, provision of information to citizens, etc. Data collection is performed through exhaustive desk research of LAs' documents (mostly obtained through freedom of information requests), interviews with civil servants, as well as focus groups with CSOs and citizens.

So far, this initiative has produced monitoring reports for 17 local administrations in Serbia, as well as one comparative summary report. Considering its focus on EU requirements in PAR which to date have not been assessed at the local level by either SIGMA/OECD or any other actor, use of the results of this monitoring exercise can be very informative for the Commission's assessments of governance at local level. The methodology thus has a great potential for further application in Serbia and across the region.

² The pilot project, funded by the EU through the Civil Society Facility, was implemented between December 2020 and December 2022. At the time of writing of this paper, the second phase is under development.

Element no.	Name of the Element	Maximum number of points	Average number of points achieved
E.1	Public consultations are conducted during the development of local public policies and regulations	4	1,53 (38,24%)
E.2	Proactivity of the municipal administration in informing interested parties about public consultations	4	0,82 (20,59%)
E.3	Uniformity and predictability of publication of information on public consultations	2	0,59 (29,41%)
E.4	Consultations are held in the early stages of drafting local regulations and policies	2	0,24 (11,76%)
E.5	Availability of reports on public consultations conducted during the development of local regulations and policies	4	0,82 (20,59%)
E.6Q	Quality of reporting on conducted public consultations	2	0,47 (23,53%)
TOTAL1		8	4,47 (24,84%)
AVERAGE RATING (scale 0–5)		1	
RATING (scale 0–5)		1	

Example 4: A table showing results of one monitored LA on Indicator 3: Inclusiveness and openness of policymaking in the local administration, Report on the monitoring of public administration reform at the local government level – Local PAR

SOME CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING POTENTIAL USE OF CIVIL SOCIETY DATA

Despite its abundance and overall value in providing independent information about the state of play in various reform areas, it is understandable that not all monitoring information produced by civil society is fit for use by the Commission in its assessments. There are several factors which might affect the usability and reliability of such information over a longer period of time.

To begin with, civil society monitoring initiatives sometimes lack continuity and regularity. Monitoring cycles sometimes get disrupted due to lack of financing, which is caused by the prevailing project financing of CSOs in the enlargement countries. Even if a project is highly successful and demonstrates added value and impact, there is no guarantee that it will be continued once its implementation is over. Donors often change priorities and strategies and few of them intentionally support continuity of successful civil society initiatives.³ This results in fragmentation and a scattered approach of CSOs to the design and delivery of projects. Moreover, it prevents specialisation and concentration of expertise for specific policies among CSOs, which are instead forced to adopt general approaches and prioritise breadth over depth of expertise. For that reason, it might be difficult for the Commission to rely on civil society data in one reporting cycle, knowing that in the next one this data might not be available. Therefore, in order to be useful for the Commission's purposes, monitoring cycles would have to be regular and have an established dynamics over a longer period of time.

Moreover, data quality is a decisive factor for the credibility and usability of any third-party indicator or monitoring information. This can be particularly problematic if the monitoring methodologies and details of the assessments are not publicly or readily available on request. Clarity about the data sources, analytical processes which form basis for the assessments and the methods for determining indicator values is paramount in order for the Commission to make a decision on using any external information in its reports. Furthermore, allowing the monitored administrations to fact-check and comment on the findings is an important step which affects data quality, but might not always form part of the monitoring processes. Finally, in case of monitoring methodologies which span across the Western Balkan region, or which are otherwise comparative in nature (for example, monitoring of local administrations), data comparability gains

³ The European Commission's approach to funding public administration reform monitoring through the WeBER initiative is a notable exception to such lack of continuity, as DG NEAR has through the Multi-country Civil Society Facility ensured continued support to the PAR Monitor since 2015.

particular significance and requires dedicated procedures for checking that such methodologies have been applied consistently in all monitored administrations. Only if the resulting data is transparent, evidence-based and verified should it qualify for application in the Commission's salient reporting on progress and preparedness of (potential) candidates for EU membership.

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

From the onset of the Western Balkan countries' journey towards the EU, CSOs have played an indispensable role in holding their governments accountable and pushing for EU-compliant reform agendas. As the region continues to demonstrate "clear elements of state capture",⁴ the role of civil society is no less important in 2023. The examples of CSO's methodologies analysed in the paper indicate that a more active role of CSOs could allow for the Commission's existing monitoring and assessment mechanisms to be improved, especially in the fundamental reform areas, and carried out transparently and inclusively, with key stakeholders' involvement. This is the only way to give true meaning to the REM's request for the enlargement process to become more predictable and credible, based on objective criteria and rigorous positive and negative conditionality, and reversibility. Doing so would also contribute to repairing the inter-institutional trust in the EU and thus reduce the risk of future dissonant views between the Commission and (some) member states. The following recommendations, therefore, offer a roadmap for enhancing the EU's mechanisms for monitoring and assessment based on several key principles for engaging civil society contributions.

- **Two-way transparency:** To improve the Commission's overall credibility and precision in reporting, it is essential to acknowledge the need for transparency, both in the Commission's reporting and in the civil society monitoring work.
 - For the EC, directly and explicitly referencing all sources used to make the assessments in the annual reports is a precondition for alignment with the proclaimed REM's principles, emphasising the importance of using third-party indicators as a critical basis for assessment. Increasing the transparency of indicator selection and findings can also reduce doubts about the accuracy of the Commission's reporting and build trust with stakeholders. Moreover, CSOs should have access to reliable and up-to-date information on EU policy developments and the Commission's engagement in their countries' reform efforts, as well as open channels of communication for engaging with relevant EU stakeholders and decision-makers.
 - CSOs' monitoring initiatives must also be open and transparent, allowing external stakeholders to gain insight into the details of the monitoring methodologies, including data collection methods, data sources, as well as procedures put in place for fact-checking as well as cross-checking (in case of comparative monitoring methodologies).
 - Increased transparency about data sources on both sides would go a long way in preventing potential undue pressure on CSOs, often targeted by governments with false accusations of providing misleading information for the Commission's reports. Solving this issue would give genuine meaning to evidence-based reporting. Moreover, it would help distinguish high-quality and reliable monitoring initiatives from those that fail to fulfil the basic quality standards discussed above.
- **Precision:** The examples of monitoring exercises provided in this paper demonstrate that even the highly complex policy areas that lack EU *acquis* can be effectively measured and quantified through carefully designed and precise indicators. The Commission should seek to extend evidence-based monitoring and assessing to all policy areas, particularly those related to the Fundamentals, where it cannot rely on the precise *acquis* requirements. This would enable the Commission to identify areas for improvement and develop benchmarks with more precision, ultimately better informing the Council's decision-making process. As a result, room for (un)intentional misinterpretation of benchmarks by national authorities would be signifi-

4 European Commission. (2018, August 31). A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Strasbourg, 6.2.2018 COM(2018) 65 final. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/western_balkans_strategy_brochure.pdf

cantly reduced, and accountability for reform results would be increased. Moreover, such an approach would increase the member states' trust in the Commission's assessments.

- **Consistency:** Given the existing flaws in reporting on the FoDI, it is crucial that the Commission prioritises raising the level of consistency in this sub-area of the Fundamentals. To achieve intra-report consistency, in this case, the Commission should introduce a methodology that would allow it to start providing preparedness assessments for the FoDI area. Thus, this area would no longer represent an outlier in comparison with the other parts of the annual reports. In addition, inter-report consistency can be increased by making sure that the different country reports address the same key topics within each of the assessed sub-areas and chapters. As the REM prioritises FoDI as a fundamental sub-area of major importance, the Commission should take swift action to improve the way it is assessed and reported. By making sure the overall consistency within and between the reports is high, the Commission's efforts can result in clearer and more consistent benchmarking between candidates, particularly in the rather abstract fundamental reform areas.
- **Partnership:** CSOs have immense experience and expertise as watchdogs and drivers of new ideas. As they have been active contributors to the EU accession process as the EU institutions' partners, the Commission should start providing regular and concrete feedback to their policy proposals and contributions to its reports. Moreover, it should adopt a participatory approach in devising and implementing innovative methodologies for assessment and monitoring of reforms. Giving a more systematic role to CSOs as partners in reform monitoring would thus help leverage the expertise of CSOs to make the enlargement process more evidence-based and more credible. The Commission should particularly partner up with the civil society reform monitoring initiatives that it funds through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). It should strive to identify (for example, using independent expert evaluations) those that meet the basic criteria for informing its reports, and design more systematic and transparent ways in using their results, indicators and recommendations in its work.
- **Continuity of support:** CSOs often operate in challenging working conditions in their home countries, where they may face political pressures, smear campaigns and obscure national funding schemes. Providing consistent and continuous financial support is a critical precondition to assist CSOs in monitoring fundamental reform areas regularly and comprehensively. This would help ensure that CSOs can operate effectively and independently and contribute to the EU accession process with data and evidence, making them act as constructive and accountable contributors rather than general information providers. In addition, it is important to ensure that they have access to the necessary resources and skills. This can include providing training and capacity-building opportunities to help them develop the skills and knowledge needed to effectively monitor and advocate for reforms. Continued support to the key reform monitoring initiatives of high quality is paramount, to ensure regular supply of results that can be tracked over time.

In short, by more systematically and transparently relying on the CSO's attempts to measure reform levels, the Commission can improve its monitoring and assessment methodologies and set more concrete and precise benchmarks which can serve as critical guiding points for the expected democratic and EU-compliant reforms in the Western Balkan countries.

This paper was presented at the 11th regional meeting of the WeBER Platform on 12 April 2023, which was organised in a hybrid format with participants joining from Sarajevo and via Zoom. The meeting featured several noteworthy monitoring initiatives, including the Monitoring Anticorruption Policy Implementation (MACPI) tool and CSO Sustainability Index. While the final version of this paper takes into account the comments and contributions made by meeting participants, it does not present the examples of these two initiatives. For the MACPI tool, the reason for not including it is the fact that its implementation is limited to individual institutions where the tool is implemented, making it difficult to use for assessment of wider reforms at a national level. The CSO Sustainability Index was not included because the methodology was developed and is driven by a donor (USAID), rather than by civil society.

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