Članak What does the Western Balkans cost me? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Drawing on the InvigoratEU External Influence Index – an empirically grounded tool for systematically measuring and comparing the political, economic, and societal dimensions of external influence – the report tracks the evolution of China’s presence between 2013 and 2023. The findings show that China’s approach is flexible, pragmatic, and highly con-text-specific, rather than driven by a unified regional strategy. It leverages bilateralism, exploiting institutional fragmentation and offering alternatives to the EU’s liberal-demo-cratic model through infrastructure investments, soft power, and diplomatic engagement, often in ways that align with the interests of local elites.

Serbia emerges as China’s most deeply embedded partner, showing significant political alignment, high levels of economic engagement – including strategic FDI and a free trade agreement – and a growing societal footprint. In contrast, countries like Kosovo and Moldova exhibit minimal Chinese presence, largely due to non-recognition in the case of Kosovo and a sharp political and institutional reorientation toward the EU in Moldova. Georgia and Ukraine present complex cases: both show increasing political and economic influence by China, but with varying degrees of political openness and strategic caution. Among the Western Balkans, Albania and North Macedonia maintain limited but pragmatic relations with China, focusing primarily on trade and infrastructure, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have shown higher levels of economic engagement, often accompanied by governance and debt-related concerns.

On the economic front, Chinese engagement increased after the 2008 financial crisis and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. However, one of the report’s main findings is that China’s actual economic influence in the two regions remains limited and highly uneven. Meaningful economic presence is largely concentrated in a few countries such as Serbia (and Georgia and Ukraine to a lesser extent), while in most other countries it is marginal or symbolic. Despite high-profile announcements and investment promises, economic cooperation remains limited. This weak economic footprint undermines China’s ability to leverage economic engagement into long-term strategic influence. At the same time, concerns persist regarding issues such as debt sustainability, corruption risks, and the involvement of Chinese actors in sensitive sectors, including telecommunications.
In societal terms, China’s approach has been primarily top-down, driven by Confucius Insti-tutes, educational exchanges, and symbolic partnerships rather than bottom-up societal engagement. In terms of public perception, though, attitudes towards China are generally tepid to positive in most countries, especially where economic cooperation has been more visible. However, trust in China has significantly deteriorated in Ukraine, largely due to its perceived ambiguity regarding Russia’s invasion.

Overall, Chinese influence in the region is growing but remains fragmented. It tends to concentrate in environments where governance is weak, institutions are fragile, and EU prospects are either uncertain or distant. China acts less as a direct challenger to Brussels or Washington and more as a strategic opportunist – offering investment and diplomatic support without requiring democratic reform. This approach allows Beijing to reinforce the power of domestic elites in hybrid regimes while promoting its own development model.
To effectively respond to these challenges, the report recommends that the EU adopts a more strategic, targeted, and country-specific approach. The EU should strengthen political engagement beyond enlargement rhetoric through concrete diplomatic, institutional, and financial commitments tailored to the individual needs and contexts of partner coun-tries. Enhancing internal coherence and strategic coordination among EU member states and institutions is crucial to align policies on China-related issues and integrate them into broader enlargement strategies. Moreover, the EU should strengthen its support for transparency and resilience in partner countries by promoting anti-corruption measures, independent media, and the vibrant civil society, thereby reducing the attractiveness of opaque and conditional Chinese offers. 

Članak Chinese Influence in the Eastern Trio and the Western Balkans: Strategic Fragmentation in the EU’s Enlargement Countries se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This study presents the findings from 24 in-depth interviews conducted in Kosovo and Serbia with key stakeholders involved in the normalisation process. Interviewees included government representatives from both Kosovo and Serbia, members of academia and civil society, ruling and opposition party figures, journalists, experts, representatives of international organisations, and members of the Serb community in northern Kosovo.

The core focus of the study is the mapping of four key narratives surrounding the normalisation process. The research identifies four distinct perspectives on the dialogue and the expectations for its final outcome:

• In Kosovo, the majority of stakeholders view the dialogue as an essential step in state-building, with mutual recognition seen as the ultimate goal of the normalisation process.
• In Serbia, most stakeholders, particularly government representatives, do not share this view. For them, the dialogue is framed within the context of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and maintains Serbia’s sovereignty, excluding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

These opposing narratives have entrenched tensions within the dialogue, a dynamic further complicated by the EU’s strategy of constructive ambiguity. The 2023 Ohrid Agreement introduced new dimensions to the dialogue, giving rise to a third narrative centred around functional recognition. This view, predominantly supported by stakeholders from (Kosovska) Mitrovica, has also gained notable traction in both Belgrade and Pristina. A fourth narrative emerged advocating for de facto recognition of Kosovo, while opposing Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. This position finds its strongest support in Belgrade.

In addition to mapping these narratives, the study also explores:

• The current state of the EU-facilitated dialogue,
• The debate surrounding the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities,
• The (lack of) implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (2023), and
• The potential for escalation on the ground following the Banjska and Ibar-Lepenac canal incidents.

This research aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the evolving dynamics in the Kosovo-Serbia normalisation process, highlighting both convergences and deep-rooted divergences among key actors.

Članak FROM BRUSSELS TO OHRID, BELGRADE AND PRISTINA ON A CROSSROAD se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

By showing how the non-paper’s proposal would specifically affect different groups of candidate countries (the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio), the paper helps readers better comprehend to what extent it benefits these countries and whether it calls into question member states’ ability to safeguard their core interests. Drawing on concrete findings, the paper advances two key arguments. First, the German-Slovenian non-paper introduces only modest immediate benefits, accelerating candidates’ accession progress to varying degrees depending on each country’s specific context. While it does not fundamentally transform the enlargement process, it nonetheless represents a meaningful step toward greater predictability for candidates – at least through the point of cluster opening. Second, even if member states were to implement the proposal as suggested by the non-paper, they would still retain the majority of their existing veto opportunities. Yet, since the unconvinced member states will likely require even stronger safeguards to support dropping the unanimity for some steps, the paper recommends adopting reinforced QMV – requiring 65% of member states representing 72% of the EU population – as a more workable compromise.

Članak Reining in the Enlargement Vetoes: The German-Slovenian Non-Paper Under Review se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This study analyses Russia’s inluence in the Eastern Trio (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)
and the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North
Macedonia, and Serbia) over the past decade, focusing on its political, economic, and societal dimensions. Using the InvigoratEU External Inluence Index, a comprehensive empirical tool specifically designed for this study, it systematically measures and compares Russian leverage across nine EU candidate countries. The index captures shifts in inluence from 2013 to 2023, highlighting how political-security dynamics, economic dependencies, and societal developments have shaped Moscow’s leverage in the region and the strategic responses of affected states. The indings reveal a general decline in Russian inluence, particularly in the political and economic spheres, while societal inluence remains more resilient. Political leverage has weakened as countries distance themselves from Moscow, though informal networks and disinformation campaigns persist. Economic inluence has been reduced through energy diversi ication and trade realignment, limiting Russia’s capacity for coercion. How ever, societal inluence remains a key vector, with Russian media, religious networks, and ideological narratives continuing to shape public opinion and foster Euroscepticism. These trends highlight the need for a proactive EU response that reinforces the credibility of enlargement, strengthens energy independence, and counters Russian disinformation. Further gradual integration of candidate countries into the EU could maintain reform momentum and systematically diminish Moscow’s leverage, while targeted investments in energy infrastructure and diversi ied supply routes would enhance regional resilience and limit Russia’s capacity for economic coercion. Additionally, enhanced support for independent media, fact-checking initiatives, and strategic communication in local languages is essential to mitigating Russian inluence. The study underscores that while Russia’s ability to exert direct control is diminishing, its capacity to shape societal narratives remains a challenge, requiring a forward-looking EU strategy that integrates political, economic, and societal dimensions to reinforce resilience and strategic influence in the region.

This study was previously published on InvigoratEU.
Download the PDF study here.

Članak Long Policy Report on Russia´s ambitionsand leverage se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Regional Cooperation Initiatives in the Western Balkans se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In the last decade, the exploration of Russian interests in the Western Balkans (WB), particularly in Serbia, has surged in scholarly circles, rivalling the longstanding issue of Kosovo’s status. The eruption of war in Ukraine has thrust the question of Russian influence in Serbia into sharper focus, presenting Serbia with an existential dilemma in its foreign policy trajectory.

Amidst a geopolitical landscape evoking echoes of a new Cold War, the urgency of Serbia’s decision-making has intensified. On one hand, as a candidate for European Union (EU) membership, Serbia faces pressure to align with EU political interests. On the other hand, historical ties and ongoing cooperation with Russia present a complex dynamic that challenges the stated commitment to European integration. As a result, despite Western discontent, Serbia has steadfastly pursued its multi-vector foreign policy for the past two years. This approach involves maintaining active partnerships not only with the EU and the United States (US) but also with China and Russia. Notably, Serbia stands out as the sole European nation to have avoided the imposition of sanctions against Russia, sustaining robust business and political ties with Moscow amidst international tensions.

The deep-rooted influence of Russia in Serbia, coupled with pro-Russian sentiments among the population, often serves as the backdrop for understanding this phenomenon. However, while such assertions hold sway, recent studies and analyses shed light on a contrasting reality: Russia’s actual presence in Serbia is less substantial than commonly perceived. It becomes especially apparent considering the scale of economic and financial partnerships between Serbia and the EU.

Indeed, Russia’s primary leverage lies within its soft power arsenal, intricately woven into the broader context of its hybrid war strategy in the WB. Extensive research has been dedicated to unravelling the mechanisms of Russian propaganda in Serbia, dissecting the role of pro-Kremlin media in shaping anti-European sentiments and grappling with the issue of information warfare orchestrated by Russian entities in the region. However, numerous studies fall short of going beyond identifying Russian actors in Serbia and uncovering the grounds guiding their actions.

This study delves deeper into the intricate web of Russian propaganda in Serbia, aiming to connect its core narratives and images within the country’s political landscape. This study aims to explore Serbia’s role in the geopolitical framework of Russian foreign policy. Specifically, it seeks to answer two key research questions: First, does Kremlin propaganda follow a clearly articulated strategic plan in its operations? Second, to what extent does this propaganda permeate Serbian political and social spheres?

These inquiries are not merely academic exercises; they hold significant implications for Serbia’s future trajectory. The country’s notable democratic backsliding hinders its progress towards EU accession, casting a shadow of uncertainty over its prospects. The rising autocratic tendencies within Serbia are often linked to the alliances formed by the ruling elite with authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, and Turkey. Therefore, this study aims to gauge the extent of Russian interference and assess Russia’s role as a potential impediment to Serbia’s European integration. By shedding light on these complexities, it endeavours to provide insights that could inform decisions crucial for Serbia’s future development.

An intriguing facet setting this study apart is its examination of the proliferation of Kremlin propaganda on the relatively new digital platform, Telegram, which has attempted to make substantial inroads into the region. Telegram, renowned for its robust data security measures and refusal to collaborate with autocratic regimes like Russia, Belarus, or Iran, has garnered global acclaim. However, despite its initial reputation, the Kremlin has adapted to the platform’s dynamics, establishing a formidable information presence on social media.

This trend became particularly pronounced during the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, as numerous Telegram channels fervently disseminated pro-Russian propaganda both domestically and internationally. This surge extended its reach into Serbia and the broader WB, leveraging the platform’s anonymity and minimal censorship to orchestrate information offensives and sway public opinion.

As of October 2023, this study revealed a staggering 143 pro-Russian Telegram channels operating in Serbia alone, underscoring the pressing nature of Russia’s incursion into the Balkans’ information sphere and the imperative for deeper contemplation on this issue.

Članak From Russia with Love se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Public administration reform (PAR), as an integral part of the first cluster, is one of the fundamental conditions on the way to the EU membership. In the Western Balkans region, this reform has been assessed for years through the lenses of the SIGMA Principles of Public Administration, developed by OECD/SIGMA and endorsed by the EU.

These Principles define what makes a well-functioning administration in terms of its ability to deliver transparent, efficient and effective services to citizens and to support socio-economic development. In the context of high external pressure for tangible developments in PAR, homegrown demand for better administration becomes even more important to keep pressuring the government to pursue reforms once the external conditionality dissipates as a result of a completed EU accession process. Civil society actors, with local knowledge of the administration’s functioning, can lead such domestic advocacy efforts aimed at better administration. Independent PAR monitoring and evidence-based dialogue with the government represent a good approach to achieving this goal.

Based on such a rationale, the WeBER project has completed the third PAR monitoring cycle for 2021/2022. The structured, evidence-based approach, as in the previous two monitoring cycles, particularly focuses on PAR aspects with the highest relevance to civil society and to the public. WeBER PAR monitoring strongly relies on the strengths, skills, and local knowledge of the civil society in the Western Balkans. It builds on SIGMA’s Principles of Public Administration as a cornerstone of PAR, while assessing them from the standpoint of an independently produced PAR Monitor methodology. Overall, the methodology, slightly revised using the lessons learned in the first monitoring cycle, is based on the selection of 22 SIGMA principles within six key PAR areas, monitored and reported through 23 compound indicators.

The third monitoring cycle also represents the last edition of the PAR Monitor in accordance with the existing framework of the SIGMA Principles from 2014, modified in 2017, since the process of revision of the Principles is ongoing. Therefore, the next, fourth monitoring cycle will be based on the modified PAR Monitor methodology, aligned with the new SIGMA framework, given that it represents the basis of the WeBER approach to PAR monitoring in the Western Balkans region. The design of all WeBER indicators enables comparisons between the administrations in the Western Balkans and allows for regional comparability of results.

In addition to the methodology, the PAR Monitor package comprises a comparative monitoring report for the entire WB region as well as six reports which elaborate on detailed findings for each administration. This report provides the results of the third monitoring cycle for Serbia, including a set of actionable recommendations.

Članak National PAR Monitor 2021/2022 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The assessment of the public administration and the capacity of the administration, which is regularly carried out by SIGMA and which the European Commission uses in its assessments of Serbia’s progress to EU, is limited to state administration. The methodology for monitoring public administration carried out by think tank organizations in the countries of the Western Balkans within the framework of WeBER projects also focuses on the work of central institutions. On the other hand, the fact that over 70% of EU legislation is implemented by local self-government units indicates the need to shift the focus, if not completely from the central to the local level, then at least extend it to improving the work and strengthening the capacity of local governments. Through the application of methodological tools, therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of local civil society organizations to deal with the monitoring of public administration reform at the local level, and to influence the improvement of local regulations, policies, procedures and services through cooperation with local authorities.

Insufficient engagement with the local level of government in the context of public administration reform was recognized, so the project Public administration Monitoring for better local Governance – Pratim JA was initiated in 2020, which focuses on the assessment of administration and administrative procedures at the local level of government. One of the tasks of this project was to develop a methodology for monitoring and evaluating the public administration reform at the local level of government, which would be complementary to previously developed methodologies, used by SIGMA and WeBER, and enable a true picture of the state and capacities of the entire public administration to implement EU legislation. Identifying the shortcomings and then overcoming them would enable Serbia to become a credible and capable EU member state with a professional and efficient administration. A pilot research on the monitoring and assessment of the public administration reform in local administration was conducted within the Pratim JA project in 17 local self-government units (hereinafter: LGUs) in the period from December 2021 to August 2022. The monitoring covered six areas and 14 principles of public administration, and the situation was assessed through 12 indicators that monitor those areas and principles. The research was conducted in seven cities (Niš, Subotica, Prokuplje, Vršac, Užice, Novi Pazar and Valjevo), nine municipalities (Aleksinac, Vlasotince, Bečej, Odžaci, Arandjelovac, Despotovac, Ivanjica, Tutin and Koceljeva) and one urban municipality (Zvezdara).

Članak Local PAR monitor se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Within the framework of two projects dedicated to the public administration reforms (PAR) at the local and state level, European Policy Centre (CEP) initiated the campaigns through which the experiences of citizens and their impressions of functioning of public administration are collected.

During 2021, as part of the project Public administration Monitoring for better local Governance – Pratim JA, a campaign carried out focused on issues of PAR at the local level. The campaign consisted of 85 street actions carried out in 17 cities and municipalities where citizens directly participated in a survey. Additionally, the campaign was carried out online, through the Pratim JA portal, so as to give the opportunity to all citizens in Serbia to share their experiences.

Moreover, within in the frame of the project Western Balkan Civil Society Empowerment for a Reformed Public Administration, the WeBER 2.0, CEP has been collecting citizens’ experiences since 2020 through an online platform2, but also in direct communication with citizens in the field. While the Pratim JA project collected the experiences of citizens who were in contact with municipal / city administrations, WeBER 2.0 gave them the opportunity to share their experiences about different types of services provided to them by public authorities.

Convinced that it is not essential for the citizens whether the service was provided by a local self-government unit, state administration or public service, and that it is the most important for citizens that public services are accessible to them and provided in an efficient and professional manner, researchers of the European Policy Centre created a Book of Citizens’ Impressions in order to inform decision-makers about the problems that citizens experience often, but also offered concrete recommendations for improving the functioning of public administration in Serbia.

Članak Book of citizens’ impressions se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The issue of migration in Serbia has been approached fatalistically in the last few years, by often presenting information that is not completely accurate in order to create the image that especially the most talented are leaving Serbia. The reality is different: the educational structure of people leaving the country is similar to the level of education of the resident population.

Nevertheless, the pressure coming from the public was transferred to the decision-makers, which motivated the adoption of the first migration strategy in 2019, which focused almost entirely on ways to prevent population outflow. A little later adopted Economic Migration Strategy of the Republic of Serbia for the period 2021-2027 softened the tone of the first version of the document, but the measures adopted due to concerns about the so-called “brain drain” phenomenon sought to encourage the return of highly educated individuals to Serbia.

A number of measures with generous tax incentives aimed at attracting highly qualified individuals were adopted even before the adoption of the Strategy. Concern about the “brain drain” also motivated the proposal to exempt qualified individuals from paying the annual income tax, which is normally paid by an insignificant number of 1% of the Serbian population.

Research that was recently published suggests that individuals with lower education leave Serbia more than highly qualified ones, and that the story of the „brain drain“ is exaggerated. In the example of the countries of the Western Balkans, which Leitner (2021) observed in the period 2010-2019, showed that all countries recorded net emigration – the number of emigrants was greater than the number of immigrants. However, there are differences in results based on people’s age and level of education. Her results show that evidence of a “brain drain” exists only for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*. On the other hand, there is no outflow in Serbia, but an influx of those with higher education, that is, more of them come to Serbia than leave it. The key drivers of this trend are students, who return to the country after completing their tertiary education abroad. Serbia attracts a significant number of foreign students, of which a large share is from the region, mostly Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the level of education, net emigration exists only among those with secondary education and it is most pronounced among individuals with a diploma of secondary medical school.

Arandarenko (2022) explains the reasons for these flows by the tax and social system in Serbia which, for the last twenty years, has been mainly discriminatory against low-skilled and medium-skilled labor, poor workers, large families, people in rural areas and other vulnerable and underprivileged groups.

In the following, we analyze migration flows in three EU member states: Estonia, Bulgaria and Ireland. The reasons for choosing these three countries, whose experiences in attracting returnees we want to examine, stem from the idea of focusing on countries that are closer to Serbia in terms of income, so it was natural to look for candidates among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We wanted a country that is similar to Serbia in terms of socio-economic indicators, and that is why the choice fell on Bulgaria, and Estonia was chosen because it is marked as a successful in several areas – digitization of public administration, which could introduce us to some useful solutions in attracting returnees, but also the enviable economic recovery after the 2008 crisis. We chose Ireland because it is a traditionally emigrant country, and we wanted to see if the reasons for return and the state’s measures to attract returnees differ in the case of richer and more developed countries.

Within each country, we discuss migration trends with reference to the last few decades. Next, we consider the current institutional structure that deals with migratory movements, as well as measures to support returnees.

Članak Circular and return migrations: experiences of Estonia, Bulgaria and Ireland se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

But shifting priorities in the past decades have eroded French presence in the region. To regain a foothold in this important part of Europe, France has taken a series of initiatives aimed at boosting its engagement.

In 2016, it hosted the Berlin Process summit; in 2017, it launched with Germany an initiative to coordinate the drive against firearms trafficking in the Western Balkans; in 2018, it expanded the intervention mandate of the French Development Agency (AFD) to all Western Balkans countries and adopted a national Strategy for the Western Balkans; in 2020, after a two-year stalemate, it withdrew its reservations against the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, while drawing the contours of the revised enlargement methodology.

Drawing from a series of consultations in the region and structured cooperation with partner think-tanks, this policy paper is conceived as an independent, expert contribution to French efforts at re-engaging with the Western Balkans. It explores perceptions of French re-engagement in the region and reflects the potential of the 2019 Strategy for the Western Balkans in light of the forthcoming French Presidency of the European Council and in the context of the grands débats on the future of Europe.

This study is written as a part of project France and the Western Balkans – a Strategic Engagement. Authors from CEP are Strahinja Subotić, programme manager and senior researcher, Miloš Pavković, junior researcher, and Kristina Nikolić, former project assistant in CEP.

This study is also available in French:  “L’engagement de la France dans les Balkans occidentaux. Pour un renforcement de la coopération stratégique, politique, économique et sociétale”.

Članak French Engagement in the Western Balkans se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.