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	<title>European Policy Centre</title>
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		<title>Polish Presidency of the EU Council</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/polish-presidency-of-the-eu-council/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anesa Omeragic]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Jun 2025 09:10:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=19047</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Shaping the New Institutional Cycle</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/polish-presidency-of-the-eu-council/">Polish Presidency of the EU Council</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On 1 January 2025, Poland assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time, following its first tenure in 2011. This presidency marks the beginning of a new presidency trio and coincides with a fresh institutional cycle, setting the stage for renewed priorities and challenges. Poland takes on this role at a particularly complex moment, inheriting numerous unresolved issues while facing political instability in key EU member states and the upcoming presidential election at home. Moreover, the return of Donald Trump to the White House introduces fresh uncertainties in transatlantic relations, potentially reshaping Europe’s strategic policies. Against this backdrop, Poland has adopted the slogan “Secure Europe” as the guiding theme of its presidency. This insight tends to analyse how Warsaw will navigate the challenges ahead and whether it can effectively advance its vision of secure and stabile Europe amid a shifting geopolitical landscape, by analysing Poland’s key priorities that will shape its presidency.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/polish-presidency-of-the-eu-council/">Polish Presidency of the EU Council</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">19047</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>From Peace to Preparedness: Conscription as a Once-Again Fashionable Idea in the EU and Serbia</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/from-peace-to-preparedness-conscription-as-a-once-again-fashionable-idea-in-the-eu-and-serbia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marko Todorović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 10:30:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18222</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a significant trigger for the resurgence of mandatory military service in Europe. As a result of the invasion, the EU has found itself in a position of heightened concern for its own security. Beyond considering how to best support Ukraine, the Union has also been preparing for the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/from-peace-to-preparedness-conscription-as-a-once-again-fashionable-idea-in-the-eu-and-serbia/">From Peace to Preparedness: Conscription as a Once-Again Fashionable Idea in the EU and Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a significant trigger for the resurgence of mandatory military service in Europe. As a result of the invasion, the EU has found itself in a position of heightened concern for its own security. Beyond considering how to best support Ukraine, the Union has also been preparing for the worst-case scenario of aggression progressing and extending beyond Ukraine to an EU member state. This overarching strategic thinking has led to a rise in military capacities among member states, sparking a new wave of militarisation in Europe. Consequently, the idea of conscription—mandatory military service for all eligible male citizens—is resurfacing, despite its abandonment in the early 2000s, based on the belief that future wars would not require extensive ground forces. Renewed proposals for conscription <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/07/21/europe/europe-conscription-war-russia-intl/index.html">sprung up</a> in several EU member states and, perhaps unexpectedly, in <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2024/01/30/serbia-considers-reintroducing-conscription-as-regional-tensions-grow">Serbia</a>, an EU candidate country.</p>



<p>This insight aims to shed light on conscription as part of a broader remilitarisation trend among EU member states and analyse how it fits within the EU’s framework of resilience and strategic autonomy. In the second part, the paper compares Serbia’s intention to reintroduce conscription with the intentions of its EU counterparts, investigating whether Serbia’s move is part of the same remilitarisation trend or driven by purely national motives. Given the country’s thorny path towards EU membership due to insufficient rule of law standards, foreign policy alignment, and unresolved issues with Kosovo, the paper particularly examines whether the reintroduction of conscription might have any detrimental effect on regional dynamics and Serbia’s EU aspirations.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/from-peace-to-preparedness-conscription-as-a-once-again-fashionable-idea-in-the-eu-and-serbia/">From Peace to Preparedness: Conscription as a Once-Again Fashionable Idea in the EU and Serbia</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18222</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU: Navigating the EU in Times of Change</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-hungarian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sava Mitrović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Jul 2024 10:41:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=18513</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Following Spain and Belgium, the Presidency of the Council of the EU moves to Central Europe to close the Trio launched on 1 July 2023. Hungary, a nation of moderate size and economic strength but with above-average political ambitions, is set to assume the Presidency. For the next six months, the EU Council will be [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-hungarian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">The Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU: Navigating the EU in Times of Change</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Following Spain and Belgium, the Presidency of the Council of the EU moves to Central Europe to close the Trio launched on 1 July 2023. Hungary, a nation of moderate size and economic strength but with above-average political ambitions, is set to assume the Presidency. For the next six months, the EU Council will be chaired by a country that has often been viewed as <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180906IPR12104/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-calls-on-the-eu-to-act">challenging</a> the EU’s founding values and <a href="https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2022/DP_Hungary_s_illiberal_turn.pdf">complicating</a> its decision-making processes. Namely, the European Parliament officially <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0053_EN.html">questioned</a> the credibility of the Hungarian Government in driving forward the Council’s legislative work, while others <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/18adafee-1d89-4b83-b7af-d9ee8c877b7b">warned</a> of the potentially harmful effects Hungarian agenda-setting could have on various policy areas. To further complicate matters, the Hungarian Presidency coincides with the beginning of a new institutional cycle when the recently established European Parliament still needs to take a vote on the new College of European Commissioners. For added complexity, all this happens in the context of the increased power of right-wing parties in the European Parliament. All these factors generated a range of concerns about Hungary’s approach to leading the Council, especially amid prolonged periods of uncertainty shaped by the EU’s ongoing geopolitical and economic challenges.</p>



<p>In the context of such challenges, the Hungarian Presidency sets strong ambitions, seeking to defy its critics and demonstrate its capacity for effective and decisive leadership. Besides the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine and other security risks confronting Europe, the Presidency will engage in addressing the acute economic problems reflected in EU companies <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf">lagging</a> behind their global counterparts, particularly those in the US and China. Judging by Hungary’s <a href="https://hungarian-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/media/32nhoe0p/programme-and-priorities-of-the-hungarian-presidency.pdf">Presidency programme</a> and Victor Orbán’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f87a5005-6713-4da4-ba9a-8d1c161d642b">messages</a>, Budapest recognises both security and economic issues faced by Europe, making the enhancement of the EU’s competitiveness and its defence capabilities the top two priorities of its Presidency. In addition, as a country which shares the border with both the Western Balkans (WB) and Ukraine, Hungary is now in a position to potentially accelerate the EU enlargement process by prioritising this policy and putting it high on the EU agenda. Therefore, this paper aims to critically examine the declaratively proclaimed goals of the Hungarian Presidency, answering the question of how realistically achievable they are and what are prerequisites for their fulfilment.</p>



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<p></p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-hungarian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">The Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU: Navigating the EU in Times of Change</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">18513</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Europe’s farmers taking to the streets: What will come of the recent disruptions?</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/europes-farmers-taking-to-the-streets-what-will-come-of-the-recent-disruptions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anesa Omeragic]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2024 10:21:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=17757</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Farmers have truly taken Europe by storm in the opening weeks of 2024, with protests erupting in most EU member states and causing ever-growing disruptions. German farmers blocked Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck from disembarking a ferry and blockaded roads and motorways throughout the country with their tractors. French farmers are targeting government buildings to express [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/europes-farmers-taking-to-the-streets-what-will-come-of-the-recent-disruptions/">Europe’s farmers taking to the streets: What will come of the recent disruptions?</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Farmers have truly taken Europe by storm in the opening weeks of 2024, with protests erupting in most EU member states and causing ever-growing disruptions. German farmers blocked Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck from disembarking a ferry and blockaded roads and motorways throughout the country with their tractors. French farmers are targeting government buildings to express their anger in protests that are gaining in violence in some cases. Meanwhile, farmers in Poland are partaking in a lengthy general strike and the blockading of the border to neighbouring Ukraine. Even Brussels has seen its fair share of violent clashes between farmers and police officers, with officers being sprayed with liquid manure and tyres being lit on fire in some cases. With the important role agriculture plays in the accession process of new EU member states, these European developments, as well as any protests of this kind in the Western Balkans (WB), are hard to ignore. One is left to wonder whether the protests are justified and where the reasons for such extensive measures lie. </p>



<p>With farmers dealing with a wide range of challenges, from rising costs and impacts felt from the war in Ukraine, it is clear that European policymakers are struggling to address farmer’s needs. This brings into question the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – traditionally known as one of the earliest and most significant aspects of European integration. Launched in 1962, the CAP sought to support farmers, improve agricultural productivity, and safeguard Europe’s food supply. Currently, the CAP has a budget of over €380 billion, which still represents almost a quarter of the total EU budget. It is fair to say that the CAP has transformed Europe and its agricultural sector. Having said this, the recent protests pose questions about whether the measures the EU takes within the context of this central policy area, from income support and market interventions to rural development measures, are enough. It is also important to explore how WB countries navigate the challenges presented by their agricultural sectors, particularly in relation to the CAP, and what role the EU plays in assisting these countries in aligning their agricultural policies with EU standards. As this new crisis will put Europe’s problem-solving capabilities to the test, it will be of paramount importance to see how the EU manages to juggle extensive internal protests with a new push for further enlargement.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/europes-farmers-taking-to-the-streets-what-will-come-of-the-recent-disruptions/">Europe’s farmers taking to the streets: What will come of the recent disruptions?</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">17757</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Belgian Presidency of The Council of the EU</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/belgian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Strahinja Subotić]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Jan 2024 11:29:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=17715</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Presidency Returns to the Heart of Europe </p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/belgian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">Belgian Presidency of The Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On 1 January 2024, Belgium, one of the European Union’s founding members, will assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union. This will be Belgium’s 13th presidency overall and its second since the Lisbon Treaty. The country finds itself at a critical juncture in the twilight of the current European institutional cycle and ahead of the European Parliament (EP) election, highlighting the utmost urgency to finish some pertinent pending issues. Moreover, the Belgian federal election will take place along with the EP election, thus further burdening the Presidency. Under the guiding principles of “protect our people,” “strengthen our economy,” and “prepare for our shared future,” the Belgian presidency is poised to grapple with the multifaceted challenges confronting the EU. This insight seeks to unravel the strategies, policies, and diplomatic endeavours that Belgium will employ in leading Europe in the upcoming six months.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/belgian-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">Belgian Presidency of The Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">17715</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>In the Shadow of the Middle East: EU and Serbia’s Israeli-Palestinian Policies Compared</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/in-the-shadow-of-the-middle-east-eu-and-serbias-israeli-palestinian-policies-compared/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marko Todorović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Jan 2024 13:27:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=17456</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict once again escalated on 7 October 2023, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties and a further exacerbation of the already delicate regional circumstances. Such an unexpected crisis underscores the persistent nature of this conflict, with each outbreak carrying implications felt far beyond the Middle East. This paper embarks on a nuanced [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/in-the-shadow-of-the-middle-east-eu-and-serbias-israeli-palestinian-policies-compared/">In the Shadow of the Middle East: EU and Serbia’s Israeli-Palestinian Policies Compared</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict once again <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">escalated</a> on 7 October 2023, resulting in tens of thousands of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/20/gaza-death-toll-surpasses-20000-as-un-security-council-delays-vote-on-aid" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">casualties</a> and a further exacerbation of the already delicate regional circumstances. Such an unexpected crisis underscores the persistent nature of this conflict, with each outbreak carrying implications felt far beyond the Middle East. This paper embarks on a nuanced exploration of the EU’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, with a particular focus on the recent developments. Going beyond the official statements and commonplace narratives of EU foreign policy, it delves into the intricate internal dynamics of the EU and its member states, aiming to understand their various positions, motivations, and contradictions.</p>



<p>As the EU’s Israel-Palestine policy is dissected, the questions also arise: What is Serbia’s stance on this issue and is its position on this matter also a part of its <em>both East and West</em> geopolitical equation? Answering these questions is warranted, as Serbia continues to find itself in a delicate balancing act of nurturing its partnerships with the East, despite its official strategic priority being EU membership. Through rigorous analysis, the paper evaluates the extent of Serbia’s alignment with EU policies on the mentioned conflict and uncovers the multifaceted factors influencing its position. As the role of the Israel-Palestine conflict is examined as a litmus test for unity and diversity of opinions within the EU, Serbia’s standpoint is scrutinised, and broader questions regarding its policy alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are addressed.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/in-the-shadow-of-the-middle-east-eu-and-serbias-israeli-palestinian-policies-compared/">In the Shadow of the Middle East: EU and Serbia’s Israeli-Palestinian Policies Compared</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">17456</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Spanish Presidency of the Council</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/spanish-presidency-of-the-council/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anesa Omeragic]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Sep 2023 12:25:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=15566</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Making the “Golden Presidency” Count</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/spanish-presidency-of-the-council/">Spanish Presidency of the Council</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p>In July 2023, Spain will assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union, being the first in the new trio together with Belgium and Hungary. This will be Spain’s second presidency since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and fifth overall.</p>
</blockquote>



<p> However, it remains unknown who will be leading Madrid, as the snap general elections are scheduled for 23 July, thus causing fears that a long government formation could draw Madrid’s attention away from Brussels. This will be yet another challenging presidency, with the war in Ukraine still looming at large, an ongoing economic crisis with high inflation, unprecedently high interest rates and competition with China, as well as the need to combat climate change. Adding to the weight of responsibility, Spain will hold the so-called “golden presidency”, meaning that this will be the last presidency in which the incumbent institutional cycle will work in full capacity before the European Parliament elections in June 2024. </p>



<p>Thus, Spain will have the responsibility to make progress and finalise many pending dossiers before the work of the EU institutions pauses for almost a year. Having in mind the presidency’s motto, “Europe-closer”, the aim of this insight is to analyse how Spain will navigate Europe in the next six months.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/spanish-presidency-of-the-council/">Spanish Presidency of the Council</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">15566</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/swedish-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anesa Omeragic]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Mar 2023 15:03:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=15716</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On 1 January 2023, Sweden will assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union, as the last in the line of the current presidency trio. This will be Sweden’s first EU presidency since the Lisbon Treaty came into force and third overall. The Presidency takes place in time of severe turbulence caused by [&#8230;]</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/swedish-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On 1 January 2023, Sweden will assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union, as the last in the line of the current presidency trio. This will be Sweden’s first EU presidency since the Lisbon Treaty came into force and third overall. The Presidency takes place in time of severe turbulence caused by the prolonged war in Ukraine and economic turmoil characterised by record-high inflation and looming recession. Thus, there is no doubt that Sweden will continue the crisis management work of France and the Czech Republic. The presidency’s slogan ‘Greener, Safer and More Free Europe’ indicates that security and green transition will dominate the Presidency’s agenda. In addition, although the enlargement policy has been widened and now includes Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, it is unlikely that the Western Balkans will strongly feature on Sweden’s agenda. The aim of this insight is to examine how Sweden will manoeuvre through Europe in the midst of an increasingly complex context.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/swedish-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">15716</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/czech-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Strahinja Subotić]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Sep 2022 14:52:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dev.cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=9308</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A Herculean task or presidency as usual?</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/czech-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-palette-color-6-background-color has-background">Presiding over the Council of the EU is a complex task that requires significant leadership and political skills. After another round of rotation, the turn has come for the Czech Republic to head the Council for a six-month period. This will be the second Czech presidency since this country acceded to the EU in 2004. This time, however, presiding over the EU will be much more challenging.</p>



<p>Having in mind the war in Ukraine and its consequences in the form of constrained economic recovery previously caused by the pandemic, the refugee crisis and energy crisis can be expected to dominate the Presidency’s agenda. The aim of this paper is to examine to what degree the Czech Programme will be occupied by the consequences of war development on the EU’s eastern borders, and what kind of policy solutions and attempts to set them in motion will Czechia offer.</p>



<p>Judging by the Presidency&nbsp;<a href="https://czech-presidency.consilium.europa.eu/media/ddjjq0zh/programme-cz-pres-english.pdf">slogan</a>, which is&nbsp;<em>Europe as a Task: Rethink, rebuild, repower,</em>&nbsp;it can be anticipated that rethinking European geopolitical position, rebuilding Ukraine after the bloody war, and repowering the European defence structures will be the focus of the Council’s work in the upcoming six months and longer. While some Council presidencies aim to finalise long-running legislative priorities, Prague largely sees its job over the next six months as a crisis responder. Czechia will have its hands full forging common positions on financial and political support for Ukraine, and reducing the bloc’s continued reliance on Russian energy. Having in mind the presidency programme and volatile geopolitical developments, this paper also aims to uncover whether the Council will have enough time and energy to dedicate to the enlargement policy and the Western Balkans region under the Czech baton.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/czech-presidency-of-the-council-of-the-eu/">Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">9308</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-green-agenda-for-the-western-balkans/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sava Mitrović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Apr 2022 20:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dev.cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=9899</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A dead letter or a genuine opportunity?</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-green-agenda-for-the-western-balkans/">The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-palette-color-6-background-color has-background">By signing the Sofia Declaration on the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans in October 2020, leaders from the region recognised the importance of the European Green Deal (EGD), which is the EU’s new growth strategy towards a modern, climate neutral, resource-efficient and competitive economy.</p>



<p>In order for this acknowledgement to materialise in practice, the leaders of the Western Balkans (WB) also agreed to incorporate elements of the EGD into all interrelated sectors and policies, based on the European Commission’s Guidelines, with the common goal of developing carbon-neutral and sustainable economies in the region. Given that it has been a year and a half since the Sofia Summit, it is warranted to break down the complex notion of the Green Agenda and analyse whether and to what extent it has the potential to truly induce changes in the Western Balkans. Therefore, the paper presents key issues identified in the five pillars of the Green Agenda, examines certain cross-cutting aspects of the green transition that could be essential for achieving a climate-neutral Western Balkans, and provides concrete measures and proposals for effective Green Agenda implementation.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-green-agenda-for-the-western-balkans/">The Green Agenda for the Western Balkans</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">9899</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>The French Presidency of Council of the EU</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-french-presidency-of-council-of-the-eu/</link>
					<comments>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-french-presidency-of-council-of-the-eu/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Miloš Pavković]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Feb 2022 21:56:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dev.cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=9940</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Turning Europe Sovereign</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-french-presidency-of-council-of-the-eu/">The French Presidency of Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="has-palette-color-6-background-color has-background">In January 2022, France – one of the founding member states of the EU – embarked on 6-months long journey for the second time since the Lisbon Treaty adoption, and the 13th time in total. French Presidency comes at a time of a power vacuum in the EU, particularly after the UK had left the EU and in the aftermath of the retirement of the long-serving German Chancellor Angela Merkel.</p>



<p>Moreover, the Ukrainian-Russian border is facing increasing tensions, while the Conference on the Future of Europe (CotFoE) is expected to end with concrete results. As Europe is faced with times of change, expectations are high from France that it will take the lead and steer the Union in the right direction in the upcoming six months. Having in mind the Presidency slogan – Recovery (reliance), Power (puissance), and Belonging (appurtenance) – this Insight analyses how France will navigate Europe in this increasingly complex context.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-french-presidency-of-council-of-the-eu/">The French Presidency of Council of the EU</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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					<wfw:commentRss>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/the-french-presidency-of-council-of-the-eu/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">9940</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Serbia and Civilian CSDP Missions</title>
		<link>https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/serbia-and-civilian-csdp-missions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kristina Velimirović]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jan 2022 14:24:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cep.org.rs/?post_type=publikacije&#038;p=10879</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In fact, EU’s civilian missions are twice as common when compared to those of military character. Despite their growing importance, Serbia, as a candidate country, is yet to take part in civilian CSDP missions and therefore must work on strengthening its capacities together with developing its institutional framework, to constructively engage with the Union on this matter.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/serbia-and-civilian-csdp-missions/">Serbia and Civilian CSDP Missions</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p>Bearing such context in mind, the aim of the Insight is to examine the prospects for closer cooperation between third countries and the EU when it comes to civilian CSDP missions, while shining a spotlight on the untapped potential within Serbia’s accession negotiations and Chapter 31. At the same time, this Insight provides a critical review of the existing legislative framework in Serbia and in this regard, analyses the latest initiative on drafting a law that should regulate the given topic in the future. Finally, this Insight lays out further recommendations for the improvement of the Draft Law on the participation of civilians in peacekeeping missions and argues Serbia finally needs to break the deadlock and take part in the EU civilian missions.</p>
<p>Članak <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/serbia-and-civilian-csdp-missions/">Serbia and Civilian CSDP Missions</a> se pojavljuje prvo na <a href="https://cep.org.rs/en/homepage/">European Policy Centre</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">10879</post-id>	</item>
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