Since the last expansion of the European Union in 2013, the enlargement policy ceased to be a priority for the Union. This happened despite the civil society organisations’ (CSOs) warnings of the perils such a stance might bring. The inability of CSOs to impact the EU’s policymaking agenda was a result of the EU’s traditional struggles with the inclusivity of non-state actors concerning policy development. With the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, however, the tides have changed. In the midst of geopolitical challenges, EU officials started emphasising that the enlargement policy was back on the agenda. The paper argues that this shift has created a strategic opportunity for CSOs to carve out a more distinctive position within the EU’s policymaking process. This was achieved through their robust advocacy for innovative ideas concerning enlargement, thereby positioning CSOs as influential contributors to the evolution of EU policies.As a case study, the paper uses the Model for Staged Accession to the EU, published in October 2021 and revised in August 2023 by the European Policy Centre (CEP – Belgrade) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS – Brussels). With CSOs across Europe functioning as multipliers of the original proposal, a critical mass significant enough was generated to compel decision-makers in the EU institutions and EU member states to incorporate the Model’s key features into subsequent official proposals of their own. These features are best visible in proposals that refer to the necessity to render the enlargement policy more gradual, structured, dynamic, effective, predictable, and credible. Therefore, by effectively navigating the shift from a lack of prioritisation to enhanced reprioritisation of the enlargement policy, this paper demonstrates that CSOs have played a pivotal role in reshaping the enlargement policy and making the EU’s policymaking more inclusive.

To showcase how the CSOs managed to carve out a more distinctive position within the EU’s policymaking process, the paper examines the issue across several sections. After this introductory chapter, in section 2, the paper examines how CSOs have shaped EU enlargement policy by advocating for reforms and addressing democratic deficits. In section 3, the paper provides a description of what the Model of Staged Accession to the EU is, how and under what circumstances has developed in the past years. This will set the stage for a basic understanding of the Model’s premise, tools to overcome challenges, and overall purpose. In section 4, the paper engages in mapping out the Model’s “life” after its inception, that is, identifying a rough estimate of CSOs that have so far picked it up, discussed it and endorsed it as a way forward. By having circulated, brainstormed, and even promoted the Model across Europe (and beyond), the paper will show that they have contributed to the process of reshaping the EU’s top agenda. In section 5, the paper identifies key EU documents that have been actually influenced by the idea of Staged accession, including the work of EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Council, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, as well as the work of individual member states. The documents include official conclusions, communications, declarations, and non-papers that have so far had a full or partial mention or adjusted interpretation of the ideas originating from the Model, such as the staged/gradual/phased integration of candidate countries into the EU. Although these terms are not conceptually identical, their purpose aligns – to alter the status quo and invigorate enlargement. Finally, section 6 will provide conclusory remarks, interpreting the findings and reaffirming the thesis of the paper.

Članak The Role of Civil Society in Re-shaping EU Enlargement Policy in the Context of Geopolitical Changes: The Model for Staged Accession to the EU as a Case Study se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This publication has received funding from Progres Institute and Kalevi Sorsa Foundation’s Think Tank Grant Program. The Grant Program is supported by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Progres Institute, the Kalevi Sorsa foundation, or the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Democracy and functioning democratic institutions are some of the key criteria and necessary prerequisites for a country to join the European Union (EU). First established at the Copenhagen European Council summit, as part of the so-called political criteria, it was additionally strengthened in 2020 with the Revised Enlargement Methodology (REM) by placing the sub-area ‘Functioning of democratic institutions’ (FoDI) in the Fundamentals cluster (Cluster 1). In that sense, the role of the European Commission (EC) and its annual country report for candidates serve as the most relevant source of information for the state of play in this area on which important decisions within the accession process are made, by EC and other EU competent bodies. The importance of credible reporting in the FoDI area has been once again confirmed by the decision of the European Council (EUCO) to start accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, highlighting the necessity in their respective negotiating frameworks for preparing a roadmap for the functioning of democratic institutions. Finally, the newly adopted Growth Plan for the Western Balkans emphasises the Fundamentals as a condition for EU financial support.

The FoDI is the sole area in the EC’s reports that does not provide an assessment of the progress and preparation levels of candidate countries. Moreover, this is the only segment of the Fundamentals without a proper qualitative assessment – standing in contrast to areas on the Economic Criteria and Public Administration Reform (PAR). The research focused on the Commission 2022 Enlargement Package for the Western Balkan countries and found inconsistencies in the EC’s approach to reporting FoDI, especially for the Governance and Civilian oversight of the security and intelligence sector sections. The European Policy Centre (CEP) has, based on the findings of its three analyses on the Commission’s reporting on FoDI, provided certain recommendations to this EU body on how to improve its reporting. Key recommendations suggest improving consistency, providing assessment, and deepening and expanding the scope and quantification of reports in this segment. Finally, CEP developed a model for quantification of the FoDI area based on a mixed approach using publicly available renowned democracy indexes.

However, preliminary estimations indicated that many of the last year’s recommendations were not adopted, warranting another detailed overview of the subsequent annual reports. Thus, this paper aims to replicate last year’s analysis using the methodology developed for scrutinising the 2023 Enlargement Package – EC’s annual country reports for six Western Balkan countries. In order to see whether and to what extent the EC continued making the same mistakes and to track the developments over time, a replication study is warranted. In the first section, the paper will test for consistency of reporting in the FoDI area, providing a statistical calculation of how coherent and consistent the 2023 Enlargement Package among the WB countries was. The second section will discuss key findings regarding consistency and engage in the debate of standardised reporting against technical and national context-adjusted reporting. The third section will utilise the Mixed Approach Model to calculate and quantify the whole area of Functioning of democratic institutions for all six WB countries. That will allow for tracking reforms in this area over time and paint a clearer picture of the state of affairs of the whole Western Balkan region. Finally, this paper will offer a comparative analysis of the 2022 and 2023 Enlargement Packages in the FoDI area, both in terms of consistency of reporting and quantification of the state of play in six countries. Comparative analysis will provide a regional as well as in-country assessment on a year-by-year basis.  

Članak Towards Better Monitoring of Democracy in the Western Balkans se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The reluctance of the Council to take decisive action on including candidates in its work is counterintuitive, given the widespread acclaim that the idea of institutional incentives has received across the EU member states. To understand the underlying reasons behind this paradox and find a way to resolve it, CEP has engaged with the Council of the EU and has visited 23 of the 27 member states to date. Building upon the collected insights, this paper outlines the encountered challenges and proposes a new, feasible strategy moving forward. The basic idea is that opening the doors of the EU Council is not only legally feasible but also practically achievable. Transitioning from the original proposal presented in Template 2.0 for Staged Accession in August 2023, this paper offers a revised but more realistic pathway for involving the candidate countries in the work of the EU Council while accounting for the identified practical needs and concerns of member states. The ideas presented in this paper are primarily directed at the upcoming Council Trio–Poland, Denmark, and Cyprus–who would be in a unique position to set a positive example for subsequent Trios to follow by agreeing to apply the proposed framework for gradual institutional participation already in the first half of 2025.

Članak From Bystanders to Contributors: A Realistic Way Towards Candidates’ Participation in the EU Council se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The inception of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (NGP) represented a pivotal moment in the ongoing discussions of how to breathe life into gradual integration within the EU’s approach to enlargement. Gradual integration can be broadly defined as the strategy to incrementally extend membership-like benefits to non-member states, thereby smoothing their transition toward full EU membership. Since 2021, the Model for Staged Accession has pioneered a horizontal approach to this concept, linking the access to increased benefits to the level of accomplished reforms in all clusters. This model seeks to move beyond the traditional binary approach to enlargement while prioritising the Fundamentals. Given that both the Model and the NGP represent attempts of operationalising gradual integration, it is warranted to analyse to what extent they overlap. The paper posits that while the NGP effectively integrates the Model’s principle of conditional financial incentives to promote reforms, it overlooks the critical role of institutional participation as a complementary driver for accelerated accession progress. Uncovering the similarities and nuances of the NGP and the Model, the aim of the paper is to provide clarity on the analysed topic to EU policymakers and guide them on how to continue exploring further possibilities of gradual integration in the next institutional cycle.

Članak Setting the Stage for Enlargement se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The New Growth Plan (NGP) for the Western Balkans marks a significant departure from the existing Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). While the latter lacks reform-related conditionalities, the NGP’s funding will hinge upon the successful implementation of fundamental and socioeconomic reforms. By gradually providing increased financial benefits ahead of accession (amounting to roughly €6 billion, comprising €2 billion in grants and €4 billion in favourable loans), the initiative seeks to unlock the political will for reforms to take place and to facilitate socioeconomic convergence.

According to the European Commission, the region’s convergence stands at approximately 35% of the EU average. Given the magnitude of this disparity, the pertinent question arises: Will the NGP prove sufficient to address the pressing socioeconomic gap and contribute to catching up with the EU average?

Answering this question entails examining multiple facets. Thus, this analysis first identifies key socioeconomic trends and gaps to be addressed and then tests the two claims made by the Commission regarding the effects of the NGP. The first claim is that the financial assistance through NGP and IPA III combined will provide the WB with “roughly the same aid intensity per inhabitant as cohesion policy does on average in the EU.” The second claim is that the NGP “has the potential to double the size of the WB economies within the next 10 years.”

Based on the analysed socioeconomic indicators and the evaluation of the Commission’s claims, the analysis concludes that the NGP can serve as a solid foundation for stimulating economic growth and expediting EU integration. However, its effect on reducing the socioeconomic gap will remain limited.

Članak The Great Gap se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The Western Balkan countries (WB6) have long been entangled in a protracted stalemate in their quest for European Union membership. However, recent geopolitical shifts caused by Russia’s attack on Ukraine have thrust the enlargement process back on the EU’s agenda as one of the Union’s highest priorities, injecting new vigour into the process.

In the Spring of 2024, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans. This milestone also marked the official acceptance of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (Growth Plan), a strategic initiative presented in the fall of 2023 aimed at revitalising the enlargement process and reducing the economic disparity between the WB6 and the EU. Among other things, it proposed incentives in the form of early integration into the single market by providing access to various EU initiatives such as programmes, agencies, joint alliances, and more. It was done with the aim to facilitate more opportunities for closer association with the EU’s single market already during the pre-accession period.

Building upon the Model for Staged Accession to the EU, which underscores the need to provide increased incentives linked to the level of accomplished reforms, this paper aims to assess whether and to what extent the Growth Plan’s initiatives can serve as viable incentives for the WB6 governments to implement necessary reforms. The underlying thesis posits that while the proposed incentives add value to the accession journey, they fall short of serving as compelling motivators for the WB6 to enact reforms, particularly considering their accessibility prior to the formulation of the Growth Plan.

Therefore, their effectiveness depends on the successful implementation of other Growth Plan components, particularly increased and conditional funding, and the introduction of institutional participation as an additional incentive.

Članak The New Growth Plan se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The low rates of natural population growth combined with emigration surpassing immigration pose challenges for the domestic labour market and the overall economy. While Serbia has been grappling with economic emigrations since the 1960s, recent times have witnessed new patterns in line with global trends: among the more educated population, there are so-called circular migrations, involving repeated legal migrations of the same individual between two or more countries. Simultaneously, thanks to new technologies, it is possible to work from Serbia for a foreign employer, which has a positive impact on the return of Serbian citizens to their country of origin.

The Economic Migration Strategy of the Republic of Serbia for the period 2021–2027 was adopted in 2020, along with its accompanying Action Plan. This is the first public document that addresses this area and attempts to provide state measures aimed at slowing down emigration and attracting returnees. The adoption of this strategy inspired our project, and one of our initial goals was to assess the Action Plan of the Strategy. The Assessment of the Action Plan was published at the midpoint of its implementation cycle so that its findings could be utilized in the preparation of a new plan. Its aim was to systematically analyze the Action Plan for the implementation of the Economic Migration Strategy and, based on that analysis, objectively assess, and inform policymakers and decision-makers about the results achieved in the ongoing implementation of the Strategy. Additionally, it aimed to provide recommendations for potential corrective measures going
forward.

The second goal of the project was to familiarize ourselves with the comparative experiences of European countries regarding economic migrations. Specifically, this involved examining the legislative framework regulating this area, assessing whether it is more advanced compared to the domestic one, and exploring how roles in addressing these issues are distributed among the state, civil sector, and other stakeholders (private sector, academic community, media), and investigating the measures implemented by the state to encourage the return of emigrants to their country of origin.

Comparative experiences demonstrate that the existence of organizations dedicated to supporting returnees, considering aspects such as their return, economic activity in their home country, as well as scientific and professional careers, significantly influences migration decisions. Therefore, a segment of our project was focused on assessing the support available to circular migrants through programs on the Returning Point and eGovernment portals. Additionally, our aim was to provide recommendations suggesting directions for enhancing existing services or establishing new ones for circular migrants. This aspect of the project addressed the question of to what extent these two portals encourage and facilitate the process of circular migrations through the various forms of support they offer.

One of the project’s objectives was also to engage the local level in the discourse on circular migrations. By enhancing the capabilities of several civil society organizations chosen for their ability to represent diverse regions in our country, we empowered local stakeholders to address the issue of economic migration more actively. The ultimate goal is for the selected civil society organizations to evolve into Regional Centers of Excellence for economic migrations in the future. This transformation would enable them to actively participate in constructive dialogues on migration-related public policies and contribute to the development of optimal solutions for the regions they represent.

Članak Recommendations for improving the circular migration management process se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The Template on Staged Accession to the EU proposed in 2021 that funding for reforms and socio-economic development should substantially grow as (potential) candidate states improve their preparedness for membership, assessed annually by the European Commission. This proposal aims at incentivising politically sensitive reforms in the accession process while helping to gradually prepare beneficiaries for assuming membership obligations and opportunities in a gradual way.

The setting of the current third edition of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) appears to be neither financially sufficient nor designed for such a purpose. The recent announcement of a four-pil-lar growth plan for the Western Balkans by the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which includes a decision to increase pre-accession assistance, provides a timely opportunity to reflect on the effectiveness of IPA III and design appropriate measures to improve it. The rationale behind the funding proposal in the Template is threefold.

Firstly, if the candidates are to catch up with the EU proper in terms of socio-economic development, they need much higher levels of funding as early as possible in the accession process. Secondly, the countries need to start preparing for the absorption of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) once they become members, to avoid a scenario in which they absorb small portions of available funds in the first years of membership due to lack of capacity. Thirdly, more substantial financial support for socio-economic development can create more public awareness and support for EU accession, as well as a stronger incentive for governments in the region to press on with the ambitious reform agenda.

As the original Template did not include details regarding the funding instruments and conditions for access to increased funding, this paper probes deeper into these issues and proposes different policy options for the funding facet of the staged accession model. The paper starts with an analysis of the present IPA III, from the perspective of preparation of its beneficiaries for EU membership and especially the use of ESIF, providing an analytical basis for the Staged accession funding model. In section III, it proceeds to a discussion of several policy options for introducing additional funding as interim incentives and benefits during the accession process. It also lays out in significant detail the preferred option, which includes a proposal for a fully reformed IPA IV, and assesses its advantages and disadvantages. In sections IV and V, the paper discusses proposals for conditioning and reversibility mechanisms as well as for the development of absorption capacities among candidates. It concludes by drawing attention to the major prerequisites that will decide if a new, staged approach to the provision of pre-accession assistance will make it or break it.

Članak Reforming the EU’s pre-accession funding instrument se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The Template for Staged Accession to the EU was first published in the autumn of 2021, following the European Commission’s publication of the revised enlargement methodology and the persistently stagnating accession process of the Western Balkan countries. The necessity to adapt EU enlargement policy has become ever more pronounced since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The geopolitical imperative for EU enlargement has prompted numerous proposals but ‘Staged Accession’ remains the only model which provides a predictable way forward for all present and future membership candidates in parallel with internal reforms aimed at smooth functioning of an enlarged EU.

Emerging from wide-ranging consultations and a series of issue papers that delved into the specific elements of the Model, this revised Template 2.0 presents a comprehensive proposal on how to amend the EU’s current accession policy. It presents the overall structure of the Staged Accession Model, with new specifications on the EU’s ‘fundamentals first’ approach. It lays out the ‘essential elements’ of the proposal, which the authors consider the bare minimum a new enlargement policy revision would need to entail to achieve the Model’s objectives. It unpacks the two pre-accession stages and the benefits of gradual institutional participation as well as increased funding proposed to (potential) candidates as incentives to press on with the most difficult fundamental reforms. The EU needs to use the momentum carefully to ensure that candidates go through a merit-based and predictable process, which will guarantee more reforms are rewarded with more benefits, while stagnation and backsliding are met with appropriate measures and reversibility in the integration process. The special arrangements of the Stage 3 ‘New Member State’ regime are detailed as well as the transition into the fourth and final stage envisaging conventional EU membership. Ideas on advanced sectoral integration (i.e. vertical ‘phasing-in’) and their possible relationship with the horizontal approach of the Staged Accession Model are also analysed.

Finally, the paper reviews the proposals for innovating the overall governance of the EU’s enlargement policy. Template 2.0 concludes by making important recommendations to the EU institutions, Member States and candidates that ought to be considered if the EU is to avoid missing another chance to restore the credibility and effectiveness of its once most successful foreign policy. Such proposals should be advanced in October 2023, at the latest, as part of the Commission’s next ‘Enlargement Package,’ with a view to agreement at the European Council’s December 2023 meeting.

Članak Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The EU is the main trading partner of the Western Balkans (WB). According to the estimates from 2021, 81% of total WB exports went to the EU while 58% of the WB imports came from the EU, peaking at €28.2 and €36.9 billion, respectively. The manufactured goods dominate the EU trade with the WB, making up 75% of the EU exports and 76% of the EU imports from the WB.  Trade with the region has grown by almost 130% over the past 10 years.

Indeed, the EU-WB trade increase in volume owes to the implementation of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) providing for a zero-tariff trade between the EU and the region.

However, the trade between the SAAs parties is inhibited by numerous non-tariff barriers to trade (NBTs). NTBs come from various sources – technical regulations, licensing requirements, customs procedures, and other regulatory obstacles – that can distort the flow of goods between the parties. These barriers result in increased costs, delays, and administrative burdens for businesses engaged in cross-border trade. As a matter of illustration, the waiting time only at crossing points in CEFTA states generates up to 300 M€ annually.

Arguably, given the scale of trade, the detrimental effect of the NBTs applied between the WB and the EU could be much higher. Indeed, failure to eliminate NBTs between SAA parties is reflected in the costs of doing business, lost opportunities and a slower pace of market integration. This is all the more surprising given that the SAAs parties have agreed to abolish all the quantitative restrictions and measures with an equivalent effect to the free cross-border movement of goods. The revised enlargement methodology (REM) envisages potential for “closer integration of the country with the EU”, including the “work for accelerated integration and ‘phasing-in’ to […] the EU market” based on the countries’ sufficient progress in reform priorities agreed in the accession negotiations.

To that end, the REM foresees the SAA institutional structures as a venue for monitoring “the progress in […] [implementation of] specific measures of accelerated alignment” with the relevant Union acquis. In particular, the SAA sub-committees would be used for “identification of opportunities for accelerated alignment and integration in all EU policy areas, with clear benefits for European Union and candidate countries”, which, arguably, includes the abolition of remaining obstacles to the free movement of goods, in accordance with the SAA provisions.

Članak Sectoral integration opportunities in the SAA regime se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This paper examines the impact of the Staged Accession model on the EU’s budget, with a focus on the Western Balkan (WB) countries. It reveals that the total cost of enlargement to the Western Balkans would amount to €35 billion over a single Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) or €5 billion annually. Although this would represent a 7.5-fold increase in expenditures on the EU’s side compared to IPA III, the annual burden on the member states’ GNI would amount to only 0.014% and 0.026%, or, depending on the member state, between €1.6 and €10.8 per capita.

The burden of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans would be even lower in practice if mandatory contributions of new member states are taken into account. After subtracting the full contributions of the WB6, the post-accession costs would amount to around €26 bn, or €3.76 bn on an annual level. Put into the perspective of the €1.8 trillion of combined funds of the MFF and the Next Generation EU, these amounts appear relatively negligible. The gradual accession process also softens the budget impact, as the countries are unlikely to progress from one stage to another or join the EU all at once, allowing the EU more time to prepare its budget for the newcomers. In that context, the original logic of the Staged accession model of gradual financial assistance and incentives is both needed and feasible.

To ensure effective operationalisation, the Template’s original funding progression was adjusted as it did not account for the dynamics of introducing compulsory contributions to the EU budget. The paper, therefore, cross-analyses three different financial variants for distributing funds and determining contributions from the Western Balkan countries at each stage of the accession process. The original Template suggested candidates receive 50% of conventional membership funding in Stage 1, followed by 75% in Stage 2, ending with 100% in Stage 3 when membership is achieved. The revised scheme stipulates that candidates would be able to receive up to 40% of conventional membership funding in Stage 1, followed by funds up to 60% in Stage 2, with standard full funding upon acquiring membership. Considering this adjustment, the paper suggests that the simplest, most straightforward option in terms of implementation would be to pursue Variant A, which prescribes full contributions to the EU budget upon acquiring the membership, as has always been the case.

The more advanced one, and most advantageous for candidates, would be Variant B, which stipulates a gradual increase of required contributions even after attaining membership, leading to full contributions in Stage 4. It effectively balances the urgency of boosting reforms and economic convergence with the need to compensate the candidates for the Stage 3 limitations.

Finally, introducing gradual contributions already during the pre-accession stages, as per Variant C, would be the least favourable one from the Western Balkans’ perspective but could nevertheless be a compromise to convince enlargement sceptics to support the rationale behind the Staged Accession model. Opting in favour of any of these variants would represent a breakthrough in how the EU prioritises enlargement.

Članak On financial and economic implications of the Staged accession model on the EU budget, and on acceding countries’ budgets se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The paper explores the potential for institutional participation of candidate countries in EU bodies during the pre-accession period, aiming to create a more gradual and merit-based approach to enlargement in line with the Staged accession model. The premise is that opening the doors would contribute to the effectiveness of the accession process by incentivising reforms and facilitating early socialisation.

Accordingly, the paper explores the operating procedures of EU institutions, including the Council of the EU, European Council, European Parliament, Comitology, European Commission’s Expert Groups, and EU consultative bodies and agencies. The paper draws a conclusion that the EU can facilitate greater institutional access for candidate countries without treaty changes, provided there is political will from EU institutions and member states. In doing so, however, the “principle of autonomy in decision-making” must be upheld, as the Council’s Legal Service has repeatedly reaffirmed that this principle is fundamental to fulfilling policy-making and decision-making responsibilities. To enable candidate countries’ presence in meetings while preserving autonomy, temporary removal of professional secrecy obligations would be necessary, with invitees leaving the room once the subject has been discussed.

Moreover, prior presence on a particular subject does not create a right to be invited on that subject in the future, thus reaffirming the possibility of reversing the acquired institutional benefits in case the necessary accession reforms are missing. This logic particularly applies to the Council of the EU, European Council, European Parliament, and Comitology, whereas a more flexible approach would apply to European Commission’s Expert Groups, EU consultative bodies and EU agencies, as they have been more welcoming to third-state participation thus far. Meanwhile, to capitalise on the expected benefits, any attempt to introduce a regime of graduation through stages of institutional participation would need to be based on preparedness for membership in a fully merit-based process, following the principle “more-for-more, less-for-less”.

This approach could also be applicable to other candidate countries, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and potentially Georgia. By leveraging past experiences and lessons learned, the EU can effectively navigate the candidates’ path to membership, ensuring that the enlargement policy remains a transformative tool for change at times of changing geopolitical realities.

Članak Enabling gradual access to EU institutions with the Staged accession model se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.