Autonomy in the first place.

Although Cyprus points out that Europe has faced complex and existential crises before – managing to respond to the demands of the times through evolution and strengthening of its capacities – this time it is recognised that the challenge is far greater. Cyprus warns that what is new is “intensity, plurality and complexity of the challenges”. For this reason, strengthening European autonomy is “the necessary next step of our evolving European integration project”. That is why the Cypriots have chosen “An Autonomous Union” as their slogan. However, the second part of the slogan refers to it being “Open to the World”. This is in direct contrast to US attempts to defend its national interests in the first place, at the expense of all the international achievements to date – such as the United Nations and the building of free trade regimes – to which it has contributed the most. In this way, the message is sent that a more autonomous EU – more self-sufficient and capable – will not contradict its current vision of the global order.

Achieving these objectives will primarily require strengthening the Union’s capacity to act as an autonomous security actor, with capacities capable of responding to growing challenges. As Cypriot President Christodoulidis pointed out, an autonomous Union is first and foremost a secure Union. As he further emphasizes, Cyprus has “first-hand knowledge of the importance of defending a state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence”. Building on the achievements of the Danish Presidency, Cyprus aims to accelerate the implementation of the so-called White Paper for European Defence, which entails the strengthening of all the Union’s capabilities by 2030, as well as all accompanying defence initiatives, such as the Common Defence Fund (SAFE) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) Essentially, Cyprus will continue to do what its Trio partners have been doing, which is to support a multidimensional security agenda.

At the same time, Cyprus can be expected to strive for a stronger EU engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Cyprus unreservedly supports its support for Ukraine, emphasis will also be placed on the immediate security environment of this member state. On the one hand, for Cyprus, nuanced relations with Turkey are of importance. Since Turkey invaded the northern part of Cyprus, Nicosia has no effective control over that part of the territory. This is an aggravating circumstance, given that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus either – and prevents its ships from sailing into Turkish ports or planes flying over Turkish territory – while at the same time Turkey is a member of the EU’s Customs Union and a necessary partner for managing numerous crises, from migration to Ukraine. On the other hand, geographically close to the Middle East, Cyprus will insist on  a New Pact for the Mediterranean as a way to strengthen the Union’s strategic interests in the region, including humanitarian efforts and assistance to Gaza. It is therefore not surprising that developments in the Mediterranean represent the alpha and omega, i.e. a key landmark for understanding Cypriot foreign policy, and that Cyprus will insist on placing an increased focus on this geographical area as well.

Competitiveness as an indispensable necessity

As has been seen in the first weeks since Cyprus  took over the presidency, the word competitiveness has dominated key European political and expert discussions. Cyprus is among the member states that undoubtedly recognise the fact that strengthening the EU’s autonomy at all levels is intrinsically linked to improving its global competitiveness. Since Mario Draghi published his report in 2024 – which pointed out that without changing the over-dependence on mainstream players, the Union cannot survive as a relevant and sustainable actor – Europeans’ eyes have been opened. In line with the newly acquired insights, the steps to be taken during the Cypriot presidency will relate to further work on simplifying procedures, cutting red tape and strengthening the single market. At the beginning of February, the members discussed the possibility, which Cyprus also spoke about at the very beginning of its mandate, to implement all these steps in 2026, without further delay.

These discussions are gaining importance because the Cypriot presidency is expected to intensify negotiations in the Council on the Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2028-2034. The key message of the proponents of its increase is that without significant budgetary breakthroughs, there can be no strengthening of competitiveness. The Commission has previously come up with an ambitious proposal to almost double the budget, reaching €2 trillion. While Cyprus will undoubtedly be – as a country that is a net recipient of funds from the EU budget – in favour of increasing overall financial allocations in the future, it will have the demanding task of reconciling the positions of its members, given that many net-recipients have stood by the Commission, while more frugal ones, such as Germany, have immediately expressed their scepticism and belief that the budget will have to be significantly revised and reduced. As in the case of competitiveness, Cyprus’ ambition is to reach a common position on the future financial framework this year. Practice, however, shows that this is an ambitious goal, especially if we take into account that negotiations on this “hot potato” are being conducted almost until the last day of the deadline.

Enlargement and the Sculpture Programme

There are several reasons why the Cypriot presidency comes at a turning point for many candidate countries.

• Ukraine has begun publicly demanding membership in the Union in 2027, and the events during the Cypriot presidency will certainly determine its further European path. Although it is widely known that it is impossible for it to meet all the conditions for membership by then, that is, to fully harmonize with the EU acquis and demonstrate its effective implementation, Ukrainian President Zelensky insists that by the end of the year, much-needed steps will be taken in the most important areas. The possibility of including a year of membership in an agreement that should end Russian aggression, and which should provide guarantees to Ukraine that it will be able to count on European partners in the future, is currently being scrutinised. Currently, the EU has informally opened three clusters with Ukraine through the so-called frontloading procedure proposed by Denmark. If the goal is to help Ukraine on its European path in a timely manner, the talks on the opening of the remaining clusters can be expected in the coming months.

• From the Western Balkans, this year is the most important for Montenegro. This is a country that has managed to close a large number of chapters with exceptional speed, and whose leadership insisted on completing all its reforms by the end of this year. This implied that the Union would also be proportionately responsive, i.e. that it would continue to close the negotiating chapters. With the support of Cyprus, the closure of up to ten chapters is being considered. The fact that, at the beginning of the Cypriot mandate, Chapter 32 was closed – which covers financial control (an area within the Fundamentals cluster) – is a step in the right direction. In addition, in line with the conclusions of the end of 2025, Cyprus intends to launch an ad hoc working group for the drafting of an accession treaty with Montenegro. As the Cypriot Ambassador to Serbia stated, the formation of this group would be a “point of no return”. If the described intentions of Cyprus are really realized, it will really send a message that Montenegro’s ambition to become the 28^th member in 2028 is within realistic possibilities.

• In addition to Montenegro, Albania has so far managed to break records, opening all six clusters in a very short time. During the Cypriot Presidency, the most significant step forward would be the adoption of a positive decision and the adoption of the interim benchmark assessment report (IBAR), in order to start closing the chapters. This would be a turning point for Tirana, given that Montenegro entered its final phase just after resolving the IBAR hurdle in 2024. With the support of Cyprus, the goal is to close several chapters. It is too early to know whether this ambition will be achieved, especially considering that the most difficult part of the job for Albania is just beginning. A breakthrough in this field would send a message that Albania can make progress towards becoming a member of the Union in the foreseeable future, right next to Montenegro.

• As for the other candidates, although they are less in focus, Cyprus will try to keep them on the Union’s agenda. For example, Moldova, like Ukraine, managed to informally open three clusters with the help of the frontloading procedure. Now the goal is to open the remaining clusters as well. Although there is no mention of a target year for its membership, there is a possibility of separating the Moldova and Ukraine processes, especially if they work with Ukraine to define the year of membership as part of the peace negotiations. When  it comes to Serbia, Cyprus will insist that Belgrade has met the  technical criteria for the opening of Cluster 3. Although it is too early to say whether Cyprus will be able to convince other member states to open the cluster, the fact is that the chances of doing so will increase only if Serbia further shows readiness to fulfil the key rule of law reforms it has committed to and to align its foreign policy with the vision of the Union. For these countries, therefore, the political benevolence of Cyprus will not mean an automatic acceleration of the process.

Taking all factors into account, Cyprus will face the delicate task of balancing geopolitical imperatives with the need to preserve the Union’s legal and functional integrity. Although the ultimate outcome of these processes cannot be known, it can be expected that Cyprus, as a traditional supporter of enlargement, will certainly seek to secure support for the candidate countries in order to send the message that membership is within reach for those willing to extend their hand. At the same time, given expectations that the Commission will present its pre-enlargement policy reviews, Cyprus is likely to promoting enlargement policy as an integral component of the Union’s broader, internal reforms.

Originally published on EUpravozato.

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Against this backdrop, meaningful reform of enlargement policy, and its ultimate success, will depend on a forward-looking joint commitment between the EU and candidate countries. Rather than waiting for reluctant member states or candidates to ‘give in’ to peer pressure – whether to streamline enlargement or to accept post-accession specificities – this article outlines the following quid pro quo arrangement: the EU delivers simplification and predictability during the pre-accession period, while candidate countries accept transitional post-accession measures to safeguard the Union’s functionality.

The EU’s side of the commitment: marking enlargement work

The current enlargement policy still struggles to accommodate today’s geopolitical realities and the growing number of aspirants. To maintain both credibility and efficiency, the EU needs practical adjustments that can boost the accession process without requiring a treaty change. The following proposals outline how the Union could restore enlargement as a functional and credible policy for candidates.

1. Closing clusters instead of chapters

A practical way to streamline the accession process would be to start closing six thematic clusters rather than 35 individual chapters. When the revised enlargement methodology was introduced in 2020, it established that negotiations on each cluster would open as a whole rather than on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Such an approach has significantly simplified the decision-making process by reducing the number of Council decisions at the early stage of accession talks by about 80%. There is no reason why the same logic could not be applied at later stages as well. Although this would increase the political weight of each decision, the upside is that member states would need to agree only six times instead of 35.^[3] Revising the approach would not be a silver bullet, as vetoes would remain in place;^[4] it would nonetheless signal that the EU is serious about increasing the predictability of the process.^[5]

2. Reinforcing qualified majority voting

Although the debate on qualified majority voting (QMV) has resurfaced, a clear pathway toward its application in the enlargement process has been missing. Perhaps the EU needs to look beyond classical QMV; instead, a more balanced solution could be found in the lesser-known option of reinforced QMV. Unlike QMV, which requires 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the EU’s population, the reinforced one would require 65% of member states representing 72% of the EU population – raising the bar from roughly 15 to 21 states for a decision to be adopted. Opting for this approach would preserve member states’ sense of control to an extent, while preventing paralysis caused by a single veto.

3. Linking institutional participation to progress

Gradual integration, endorsed by the European Council in 2022, allows candidates to enjoy some membership benefits before accession. Thus far, however, the focus has been mostly on financial aspects such as grants or loans, as well as partial single market access. Yet the potential of gradual institutional participation remains largely unused. Linking progress on clusters and chapters to increased access to EU bodies would bridge the gap that currently exists between candidates and member states. The more a candidate advances, the more it should have opportunities to engage with EU institutions – and vice versa – allowing future members to ‘practice’ membership and strengthen preparedness before accession.^[6]

4. Establishing an accession calendar

Predictability is essential for credibility. The EU should formalise what it already does informally – support candidates’ internal timelines – by publishing an official Accession Calendar. Jointly prepared by the Commission and the Council, it would set indicative target dates for each candidate, regularly updated in the annual Enlargement Package and Council Conclusions. This would not guarantee membership for a fixed year but would create a shared roadmap, fostering accountability and coherence across institutions.

Candidates’ side of the commitment: safeguarding an enlarged Union

As the EU undertakes internal adjustments to make the process more workable, candidates would be expected to demonstrate their commitment by accepting post-accession transitional measures – designed to preserve the Union’s functionality and safeguard the application of accepted obligations and shared values. The logic behind these measures would be to increase the likelihood of successful enlargement even if the EU does not complete its own internal reforms in time, such as abandoning, or at least reducing, the use of the veto in the Council.

1. Introducing post-accession veto limitations

To ensure that the Union’s decision-making capacity is not hindered by enlargement, candidate countries could agree to temporary restrictions on their use of veto powers after accession.^[7] Depending on the outcome of political negotiations, these could cover all areas currently subject to unanimity or be limited to key fields such as foreign policy or further enlargements. Importantly, such limitations would not create second-tier membership as they would only apply for a predefined period (e.g. up to 10 years), while expiring automatically after it elapses. At the same time, a proposal of this kind would be accompanied by the so-called “emergency brake mechanism”, allowing candidates to protect their vital national interests. Such an arrangement would go a long way toward winning over those member states whose populations still hold a predominantly enlargement-sceptic view.

2. Embedding safeguard clauses

Building on existing precedents, safeguard clauses should be strengthened and systematically applied in all future accession treaties. Drawing on the Internal Market Safeguard Clause and the Justice and Home Affairs Safeguard Clause used in Croatia’s Accession Treaty, such provisions largely cover essential areas. Besides already being linked to justice, freedom and security (Chapter 24), public procurement (Chapter 5), economic criteria (a subarea of the Fundamental cluster), and four freedoms (Chapters 1-4), the clauses should be extended to cover rule-of-law and governance failures. If a new member were to undermine fair competition, judicial independence, or anti-corruption standards, these clauses should allow the Union to temporarily suspend access to funds, programmes, or specific cooperation mechanisms until compliance is restored. Moreover, extending the activation period from three (as referred to in prior Accession Acts) to ten years after accession would further enhance the EU’s capacity to respond to delayed backsliding.^[8]

3. Establishing a monitoring mechanism during the ratification period

Ending the accession talks should not mark the end of reform efforts but the beginning of their consolidation. The Monitoring Clause – introduced for the first time in Croatia’s Accession Treaty – enabled the Commission to closely monitor all commitments undertaken during the final phase of negotiations. Its strength lay in the fact that it fully covered the rule-of-law domain. Moreover, if issues of concern are identified, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, would have the power to “take all appropriate measures”. The exact measures are never listed, which is something future accession treaties should correct.

4. Introducing a postponement clause

Recognising the risks of premature accession, the Postponement Clause – first appearing in the Accession Act of Bulgaria and Romania – allowed the EU to delay entry if there was a serious risk that an acceding country would be “manifestly unprepared” to meet membership criteria by the scheduled accession date. The mechanism placed the European Commission at the centre of monitoring, assessing compliance with judicial, anti-corruption, and governance reforms. If compliance fell short, the Council could, on a Commission recommendation, postpone accession “by one year”: acting unanimously as a general rule, or even by qualified majority in certain cases specified for Romania. Applied in future enlargements, such a clause would give the EU additional leverage to secure final reform commitments before accession.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the success of both pre-accession and post-accession reform debates will depend on whether the EU and candidate countries can meet halfway. By accepting transitional post-accession measures as a gesture of solidarity, candidates can help address legitimate concerns among current member states about decision-making paralysis or governance backsliding in an enlarged Union. In turn, such political reassurance would make it easier for the EU to simplify procedures, reduce veto points, and increase predictability for candidates. Such an approach would render the enlargement policy fit to deliver and ensure that the Union can function effectively even as its membership grows.

[1] In just a few months, several new ideas have surfaced in the debate on reforming the EU’s enlargement policy. In September, the media reported that Austria, Italy, Germany, and Slovenia jointly called for proposals to simplify and streamline the accession methodology, reflecting growing recognition that the current framework is too cumbersome. Soon after, European Council President António Costa revived the discussion on introducing Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for the technical stages of enlargement, echoing the 2024 German-Slovenian non-paper. Together, these initiatives signal a renewed political appetite to modernise the process and reduce the role of unilateral vetoes in shaping the EU’s enlargement agenda.

[2] The debate, however, has not been limited to the pre-accession phase. What makes this period particularly notable is the concentration of proposals focused on the post-accession stage. It began with a POLITICO article suggesting that new members could face temporary limits on their veto rights upon joining the Union. Soon after, the Enlargement Commissioner confirmed that discussions were underway on a potential “probation period” with unprecedented restrictions, accompanied by robust rule of law safeguard clauses to deter and reduce the danger of post-accession backsliding. As one Commission official put it, the EU is entering an era of “new-generation accession treaties”.

[3] Such a shift would require that reforms and plans for closing individual chapters reflect the cluster structure, which may in turn mean either accepting later closure of certain chapters or accelerating work on others to ensure simultaneous closure.

[4] A potential criticism of this proposal is that it could risk de-dynamising the process, as a single member state’s veto might jeopardise the closure of chapters that are otherwise ready. This is a reasonable concern. However, the assumption here is that, by the time a cluster closure is feasible, the political cost of blocking an entire cluster would be substantially higher than that of objecting to an individual chapter. Accordingly, an act of cluster blockage would be an act of significant political escalation, one that member states would be far less likely to undertake except in cases of genuinely fundamental concern.

[5] Alternatively, moving toward closure at the cluster level could be understood as a political objective rather than a rigid rule. This would still allow the EU to navigate the final stages of accession talks with a candidate from a more structured, cluster-based perspective. It would also preserve the flexibility to withhold agreement on a specific chapter when a member state raises substantive concerns, without jeopardising the closure of other chapters within the same cluster.

[6] The proposal’s application entailed granting candidate countries the right to be invited to the Council’s working parties – once the Fundamentals Cluster is opened – in areas corresponding to the opened clusters. Participation would then evolve by inviting the candidates to COREPER and ministerial-level meetings – after receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) for the Fundamentals Cluster – in areas covered by closed chapters. In this way, participation would be both gradual and merit-based, while also giving greater political weight to the act of opening a cluster or closing a chapter.

[7] The optimal outcome, of course, would be for the Union’s internal reforms to be implemented in a timely manner, rendering any form of veto limitation for the newcomers unnecessary. However, experience demonstrates that this is not a realistic expectation at present. It all comes down to avoiding a scenario in which a candidate has fulfilled all membership criteria, yet its Act of accession cannot be successfully ratified in all member states. Consider France, where ratification requires either a three-fifths majority in the French Parliament or approval through a referendum. This proposal, therefore, offers a mechanism designed to ease the concerns of those member states that fear the Union could become more dysfunctional as it admits new members. It would allow the EU to preserve its capacity to advance internal reforms without the risk of newly admitted states misusing their veto power. The proposal, therefore, represents a measure of last, but potentially necessary, resort.

[8] The 2025 Enlargement Package shows that the Commission is on the right track when it comes to the development of safeguard clauses. It explicitly states: “To ensure that new Member States continue to safeguard and maintain their track-record on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, the Commission considers that future Accession Treaties should contain stronger safeguards against backsliding on commitments made during the accession negotiations”.

Originally posted to Friends of Europe.

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Ukraine (and Moldova) in focus

Although this approach had been in development for months, its “revelation” took place on 11 December 2025 at an informal meeting of EU Ministers for European Affairs in Lviv, Ukraine. The Council meeting was held there, given that, during that period, member states’ decisions were largely focused on providing strong political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support to Ukraine. While there is broad unity regarding this type of support, one of the EU’s key challenges has been the prolonged inability of member states to reach unanimity on opening negotiating clusters for Ukraine. Although Ukraine holds candidate status and has formally opened accession negotiations, Hungary has remained the sole member state strongly opposing further progress in Ukraine’s accession process. This has also posed a significant obstacle for Moldova, which has been blocked “as part of the package”. Despite repeated efforts by Member States to win Hungary over, these attempts have proven unsuccessful. It is at this point that Denmark stepped in with a creative solution.

Namely, having assumed the helm of the EU Council for the eighth time, Denmark committed to drawing on its extensive experience and strong credibility to break the deadlock. By emphasising, at the very outset of its mandate, that enlargement would be among its core priorities, Denmark clearly set the tone for its presidency. This was particularly noteworthy given that enlargement had not traditionally featured among Denmark’s principal political priorities. However, since the onset of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Denmark has adopted a markedly firmer position in favour of deeper EU integration, increased joint spending, and the expansion of the Union’s borders. Against this backdrop, Denmark was determined to identify a solution to the Ukrainian case. In practical terms, this meant that if Hungary could not be persuaded, alternative ways of circumventing its veto would need to be explored. Naturally, any immediate solution would have to be regarded as a temporary measure, as many Member States are awaiting political developments in Hungary, with parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2026.

Unlocking the negotiations

Denmark’s efforts built on the European Commission’s successful undertaking to respond, at maximum speed, to the requirements related to the screening of the degree of alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis. According to the Commission’s assessment, all six negotiating clusters are ready to be opened for Ukraine. However, it is not the Commission that decides on the opening of clusters, but the Council, where decisions are taken unanimously. Aware of how problematic it can be when a single member state abuses its veto power, especially at a time when Ukraine is striving to resist Russian aggression, Denmark, in agreement with all other Member States except Hungary, introduced an approach that allows technical negotiations in certain clusters to begin without a formal political decision on their opening. This arrangement was implemented informally, with the presiding country creatively using its procedural powers.

Specifically, instead of waiting for unanimity for the EU to adopt common positions on clusters – which specify what the Union expects candidate countries to fulfil in order to make further progress in the negotiations – the document was, on this occasion, issued by the presiding country itself, in its own name. In other words, it was a draft common position formally issued by the presidency alone, but whose content had been agreed by all Member States except one. Until now, the EU had strictly prohibited the transmission of such documents to candidate countries before negotiations on the relevant clusters had formally begun – a constraint that has now been effectively overcome. The aim was to enable Ukraine and Moldova to begin implementing all necessary reforms without waiting for Hungary to give the green light. In practice, the process has officially remained at the same stage as before, while unofficially – but substantively – these candidate countries now have a clear roadmap outlining everything that needs to be done on the path to EU membership.

De facto opening of clusters

With this kind of creative solution, Ukraine has been de facto enabled to open as many as three negotiating clusters, and the same applies to Moldova. Among them is Cluster 1 (Fundamentals), which covers the most demanding and most significant reforms. As with candidates from the Western Balkans, this cluster is opened first in order to place core reforms at the forefront, and progress achieved in this area determines whether, and to what extent, other clusters will be opened or individual chapters closed. In line with the revised enlargement methodology, in order for this cluster to be opened at all, Ukraine and Moldova had to meet the opening benchmarks, which included the adoption of roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration and democratic institutions, as well as an action plan on national minorities – documents that were positively assessed by the European Commission. In addition to this cluster, Cluster 2 (Internal Market) and Cluster 6 (External Relations) were also included. Ukraine and Moldova can already work on these clusters, and may even complete them in full, meaning that once Hungary lifts its blockade, their formal opening and closing could take place almost simultaneously.

With these advances, Ukraine and Moldova have surpassed the entire Western Balkans, except Montenegro and Albania, in terms of the number of (technically) opened clusters. Serbia, which until recently stood shoulder to shoulder with Montenegro, has thus been pushed, for example, to fifth place in terms of progress towards EU membership. This gap could widen further given that, as Cyprus takes over the Presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an informal agreement to open the remaining three clusters with Ukraine, and potentially Moldova, by mid-2026. Should Orban suffer an electoral defeat, it can be expected that technical negotiations will soon receive their political endorsement as well, meaning that unanimity among member states for the formal opening of negotiations would be achieved. All of this illustrates the extent to which geopolitical pressures can act as a powerful incentive for the Union to resort to creative solutions in order to overcome unilateral blockages in the accession process of candidate countries. For now, the only open question remains whether, and to what extent, this innovative approach can also be applied to the Western Balkans. The coming year, 2026, may soon provide an answer to that question.

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Origin of the idea

When we first conceived the idea of limiting veto powers for new members, the context was radically different. It was a period when few within the EU itself showed genuine interest in the enlargement policy, while domestic political elites were not particularly engaged either. The status quo – that is, a stagnant accession process – appeared to be the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future. In such difficult circumstances, we sought to “woo” the more sceptical member states by highlighting the strong potential of a credible enlargement policy to drive reforms, while also emphasising the geostrategic importance of the region – something that, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, became more than evident. We therefore tried to stress that, no matter how many other priorities the Union may have, it must not allow itself to neglect the region. However, even when our position was met with understanding, the response was usually that the Union itself was not yet ready to begin seriously considering enlargement, as it faced strong resistance to the necessary internal reforms. It was at that very moment that we experienced our “eureka moment”.

In rethinking our approach, we identified three fundamental pillars on which the solution needed to rest. First, we started from the premise that the EU’s capacity to absorb new members is one of the officially recognised criteria that must be seriously accounted for. This is why, for example, the EU implemented a series of internal reforms that enabled it to successfully integrate as many as 13 new members between 2004 and 2013. Second, we recognised that the current context is fundamentally different – it has become increasingly difficult to reach consensus on key issues, including constitutional changes – and there is a genuine risk that any internal reforms may ultimately fail to materialise. Finally, a scenario in which candidate countries meet all the membership criteria while the Union itself remains insufficiently reformed to admit them would have a devastating impact on both the Union’s credibility and the democratic processes within the candidate states. This is precisely where the idea of limiting the right of veto comes into play.

It is, therefore, a mechanism designed to ease the concerns of those member states that fear the Union could become more dysfunctional as it admits new members. Through this proposal, the EU would preserve its capacity to advance internal reforms without the risk of new members misusing their veto power. Moreover, newly admitted countries would not be able to use their voting rights to unilaterally block the accession of states still engaged in the negotiation process. In this sense, it represents a measure of last, but potentially necessary, resorts in a suboptimal scenario such as the one we are currently facing. The optimal scenario, of course, would be for the Union’s internal reforms to be implemented in a timely manner; however, experience shows that this is not very realistic at present. Today, for instance, at least ten member states have expressed reservations about moving towards qualified majority voting in the field of foreign policy – and this is only one of several areas in need of reform. That is why limiting the right of veto is increasingly being discussed as a solution that could unlock progress in the enlargement process – particularly given the growing number of candidate countries awaiting membership.

Realisation of the idea

When we first presented this idea, we encountered some resistance. On the one hand, the question was whether there was a legal basis for such a solution at all, and on the other, whether it would lead to the creation of the so-called “second-class membership”. Faced with such questions, some members instinctively raised their guard, which was in line with the “enlargement fatigue” that was present at the time. Others, on the other hand, were more open and enthusiastic – because they saw in the proposal an effective way to solve the problem of the absorption criterion – but nevertheless remained reluctant to publicly support an idea that was still in its infancy. All these kinds of concerns actually helped us further sharpen our arguments and find answers to questions that were fundamentally legitimate. This “ping-pong” process lasted for some time, with no clear indication that it would lead to a situation in which the idea could really be taken seriously. Still, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 changed everything – almost overnight, most member states became more willing to consider this approach.

This new openness has also created space for us to explain more clearly that the reasons for the initial scepticism were unfounded, especially when it comes to legal concerns. As we argued, within the framework of this proposal, candidates would still be expected to fully meet all the criteria for membership. In other words, no “shortcut” to membership has ever been advocated, because the reform path has remained the basic assumption and essence of the accession process itself. What is essential here is that, once the reforms have been completed, it is envisaged that the Act of Accession would serve as the legal basis for the introduction of the proposed measure. It is an act with the same legal force as the EU’s founding treaties – with the possibility of amending them in the context of enlargement. If all member states, including a candidate country, were to ratify an accession act containing a veto-limitation clause, there would be no obstacle to its implementation. The key element here is the mutual acceptance of the proposal, which clearly shows that it would be the result of a political compromise.

What is equally important, as we went to argue, is that this proposal avoids the creation of a “second-class membership”. Recognising that the principle of equality among member states is one of the fundamental pillars of the EU’s functioning – which, as such, cannot tolerate permanent deviations – our proposal included temporary restrictions only. In practice, these would automatically expire after a predetermined period – for example, up to ten years. Therefore, there would be no possibility of keeping new members permanently in a status without the right of veto. This idea builds on the fact that every previous enlargement of the EU has entailed certain temporary restrictions (so-called derogations) for new members – such as restrictions on the free movement of workers. Of course, limiting the right of veto is a step further but, as such, it is in line with current circumstances and the need to preserve the functionality of the Union. At the same time, the new members would have the right to vote in qualified majority decision-making – which encompasses the vast majority of policies – while even in areas requiring unanimity, the goal would still be to reach consensus, and overvoting would only be used as a last resort.

At the same time, a proposal of this kind is accompanied by additional safeguards for candidates – the so-called “emergency brake mechanism”. It ensures that a new member, despite the temporary restriction, always has the opportunity to protect its vital national interests. This mechanism would be explicitly mentioned in the Act of Accession, and our proposal read: ‘If a [new member state] declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by [unanimity], a vote shall not be taken. The [President of the Council] will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If [s/he] does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity”. The purpose of this mechanism is to prevent any possibility of outvoting on matters that explicitly relate to a new member. In this way, we aimed to demonstrate that it was possible to find a solution that simultaneously safeguards the functionality of the Union and guarantees the protection of new members’ interests.

Acceptance of the idea

While the POLITICO article was encouraging for us, we should not lose sight of the fact that this is still a proposal in progress. In order for it to be adopted, it would require the unanimity of the member states, as well as the consent of the candidate countries. The fact that this idea has now entered the public domain indicates that the goal is to feel the pulse of those to whom it would apply. In Serbia, the reaction was cautious but not dismissive, noting that “any initiative that can accelerate Serbia’s accession deserves attention” and that there is openness “to all pragmatic solutions”, provided they do not create a permanent situation. In Montenegro, reservations were somewhat more pronounced, but even there it was said that, if there is to be any renunciation by the new members, “some kind of control, that is, a control mechanism” should be introduced. In contrast, Albania has openly embraced such a proposal, recognising that it could address “very clearly expressed frustration among EU Member States” about the increasing difficulty of reaching consensus. Taking into account all these comments from decision-makers in the region, it can be concluded that there is room for further discussion and for shaping a compromise solution that would satisfy both the aspirations of the candidates and the caution of the member states.

As the region gets closer to fully meeting the membership criteria, the discussed topic will gain increasing importance. It is possible, in fact, that Montenegro might become the first concrete case in which this idea could be tested – not necessarily to impose a limitation specific to Montenegro, but rather to establish a precedent that could apply to other candidates. This is particularly relevant given that the EU could have more than 30 member states within the next decade. That is why it is important that the countries of the region – and especially Montenegro, which is at the forefront of the accession process – show willingness to consider ideas of this kind. If we take into account that each of them would have equal weight in the Council of the EU as, for example, France – whose citizens, incidentally, are among the most sceptical about enlargement, even in the context of the current momentum – the perspective changes significantly. In this sense, it would be of utmost importance for the countries of the Western Balkans to act together and send a clear message that they support those steps that make the Union more functional and better prepared to accept new members. Such a concerted and constructive attitude would demonstrate not only their commitment to membership, but also their political maturity and capacity to act in a spirit of much-needed solidarity.

Originally posted to EUpravozato.

*Disclaimer: The original title has been modified to better suit the blog format.

Članak As POLITICO Reports: Our Veto-limitation Proposal Gains Traction se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

During the past weekend, local elections were held throughout Kosovo*[1] in all cities and local self-government units. The elections were organized amid a political and constitutional crisis resulting from the inability to constitute the assembly and form a government following the parliamentary elections held in February. In this context, parties entered the campaign with significant uncertainty regarding the results. These local elections are particularly important because they will almost certainly influence the resolution of the political crisis and the formation of the government. The party or parties that achieve the best results will be able to influence the government-formation process from a position of power.

On the other hand, the context in which elections are being held in the north, where Serbs constitute the majority ethnic community, is significantly different from the rest of Kosovo. Namely, in 2023, Albanian mayors took over four predominantly Serbian municipalities: North (Kosovska) Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavić, due to the withdrawal from institutions and the boycott of local elections by Serbian political representatives. Although illegitimate, the Albanian mayors in these majority-Serb areas assumed office and managed local self-governments until the end of their terms. Thus, these elections represent an opportunity for Serbian political representatives to return to institutions after nearly three years and to ease the pressures and challenging position in which the Serbian community has found itself in recent years.

Election Results in Serbian-Majority Areas

            Local elections in Kosovo are largely different from those in Serbia. Specifically, mayors are elected directly, while at the same time members of local assemblies are elected through open electoral lists. This means that citizens vote preferentially, by name and surname. When it comes to mayoral elections, if no candidate receives over 50% of the votes in the first round, the two candidates with the highest number of votes proceed to a second round. Additionally, elections are held every four years simultaneously in all local self-government units. If changes or extraordinary elections occur in the period between regular elections, the mandate of councilors or mayors is valid only until the next regular local elections.

               The Serbian List (SL), after nearly three years, returned to power in all four municipalities, achieving decisive victories already in the first round. Despite strong political competition from various parties and citizen movements, such as the Serbian Democracy led by Aleksandar Arsenijević or the Civic Initiative “North for All” led by Marko Jakšić, the Serbian List managed to secure victories in all four municipalities. This outcome will certainly provide some relief to the Serbian community, which in previous years had been exposed to institutional pressures without adequate protection. The presence of special police forces, checkpoints in the north, illegal expropriation of property, construction of military posts, and street name changes are just some of the challenges Serbs have faced in the northern municipalities. Although one should not expect that a change in local authorities will immediately resolve all these problems, which it will not, the Serbian community will now at least have some form of institutional protection, even if minimal. However, the presence of special police forces and the previous practice of exceeding authority remain under the control of the central government in Pristina, so it is uncertain how much influence mayors or municipal presidents will have over the deployment of these forces. Where mayors will certainly have influence and authority is in the appointment of commanders of the Kosovo Police (KP) for the northern region. In the long term, this could help ease the situation, but the effects are still distant.        

In the enclaves south of the Ibar, the Serbian List also secured victories. It was particularly challenging in Gračanica, where several Albanian parties united on a joint list, posing a serious threat to outweigh the divided Serbian political representatives. Therefore, maintaining power in this Serbian area near Pristina represents a great relief for the remaining Serbs living there. In addition to Gračanica, the Serbian List also achieved good results in the following municipalities: Štrpce, Parteš, Ranilug, and Novo Brdo. The Central Election Commission (CEC) stated that the Serbian List won in nine out of ten municipalities with a majority Serbian population, while a second round will be held in Klokot. After participating in the parliamentary elections in February, the process of returning to the institutions of Kosovo is now gaining full momentum following the local elections. However, the return of political representatives marks only the beginning of this process.

When it comes to full reintegration, this process will almost certainly be long and arduous. Although political representatives are now fully returning to the system, this is not the case for administrative staff in the north, judges and prosecutors, or the police. Serbian representatives in the judiciary and police voluntarily left their positions in November 2022, while Serbs employed in local administration were dismissed in 2023 after Albanian mayors took over the municipalities. For now, all of them remain outside Kosovo’s institutions. Regarding the administration, the positions vacated by dismissed Serbs have, in the meantime, mostly been filled by Albanians. It will now be very difficult to dismiss the existing administration due to a lack of legal grounds. Secondly, employment in the police falls under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is controlled by Vetëvendosje (Self-determination Movement), so one should not expect willingness to open new positions in the north, and it is particularly unrealistic to expect that police officers who returned their uniforms and weapons would be reissued them. Thirdly, a similar situation can be expected in the judiciary. Albanian judges and prosecutors have filled the vacuum and taken over the cases of their Serbian colleagues. The Ministry of Justice has no incentive to reinstate Serbian legal professionals. For a mass return of Serbs to institutions, primarily in the police and judiciary, it is essential that this be part of a broader political agreement in dialogue with Belgrade and with insistence from the EU and the Quint countries. Without this, one should not be under the illusion that the government in Pristina will proactively promote reintegration.

The Community of Serbian Municipalities – One Step Closer or Not?

               Now that the return of political representatives to local institutions has been finalised, the basic condition for the creation of the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (CSMM) has been met – local governments with the political will to implement this process. However, the formation of the CSMM does not depend solely on local self-governments; it largely depends on the central authorities, which must formally initiate the process by issuing a special decree. The adoption of this decision will largely depend on who forms the government in the upcoming period. Since the constitutional crisis has ended and the assembly has been constituted, the chances of Vetëvendosje forming the government are increasing. Vetëvendosje has always been a staunch opponent of the CSMM, and if a Kurti III government is formed, the prospects for creating the CSMM remain slim. Only strong pressure from the EU and the international community could change this, but such pressures have not been successful so far.

The second scenario involves a change of government in Pristina, which would mean that the new prime minister is more receptive to the Serbian community and, more broadly, to the process of normalising relations. Opposition parties in Kosovo, primarily the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), could, in theory, form a parliamentary majority necessary to establish a government and potentially include the Serbian List in it. The Serbian List has experience cooperating with both the PDK and now the LDK, as well as with the AAK over the past ten years, which is not the case with Albin Kurti’s Vetëvendosje. This would likely result in a less stable government, dependent on the support of the Serbian List and more inclined to heed advice from Brussels. In such a scenario, progress could be made regarding the adoption of the CSMM statute proposed by the EU in 2023. This outcome would likely also help in lifting the restrictive measures that the EU imposed on Kosovo in June of the same year.

The third scenario, which also carries a significant likelihood, is new parliamentary elections. Considering that Vetëvendosje does not have a parliamentary majority to form a government, and the opposition parties are unable to create a united bloc against Vetëvendosje, the political deadlock will likely be resolved through extraordinary parliamentary elections after the constitutional deadlines expire. In such a situation, any issues regarding the CSMM and the autonomy of Serbs in Kosovo would inevitably be postponed until 2026, with the formation of a new government, or possibly even later.

Instead of a Conclusion: General Overview of the Results in the Rest of Kosovo

               Regarding the results of the local elections in the rest of Kosovo, according to the results published on the CEC website, mayors were elected in the first round in 21 municipalities, while in 17 municipalities the decision will be made in the second round on November 9. Notably, voter turnout was very low, averaging 39%. Vetëvendosje, previously the strongest political option in the parliamentary elections in February, suffered a significant defeat in the local elections. The only first-round victories for this movement were in smaller municipalities such as Podujeve, Kamenice, and Shtime. Major cities like Pristina (heading to a second round), Prizren, Peje, and South Mitrovica ended up in the hands of the opposition. The PDK declared victory in the local elections, having won the most municipalities in the first round and participating in the majority of municipalities heading to the second round. With this outcome, Vetëvendosje continued its negative trend, undermining its position and complicating its prospects for forming a government.

[1] This designation is without prejudice to final status of Kosovo and is in line with Resolution 1244 (1999) UNSC and advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on unilateral declaration of independence.

Članak Local Elections in Kosovo: The Return of the Serbian List and the Future of the Serbian Community se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Arrival of the First Problems

Even before I set off for Moldova, I knew there was about a 30% risk that I would not even be allowed through passport control. The reason was that, as recently publicly revealed by Moldovan President Maia Sandu, pro-Russian and militant-minded foreign nationals were being trained in paramilitary camps in Serbia, with the goal of destabilising Moldova during the elections. This was not the first time such claims had appeared – something similar happened in 2024, when suspects were arrested near Banja Luka for organising such camps. This time, just a few days before my trip, two individuals of Serbian nationality were arrested in Šabac, in direct response to the Moldovan president’s appeal; they were suspected of participating in the organisation and financing of training. To make matters worse, it was reported that the camps had been active from July to September, raising the question of why domestic institutions had not reacted in a timely manner.

With that in mind, I approached passport control and noticed that the officer suddenly became serious when he saw my Serbian passport. It was obvious that he had instructions to carefully scrutinise passengers from Serbia, especially on election day. He called two of his colleagues, and after a thorough examination of my passport, a barrage of questions followed: “Why are you travelling to Moldova? How long will you stay? Where are you staying? Who invited you? What is your profession? What is the name of the organisation you work for? What is the focus of your work?”. Despite the number of questions, while other passengers were passing freely beside me, the officers were not rude – just very cautious. Once it became clear that I would not be staying in Moldova long and that I was coming for a conference organised by civil society, they let me through. This episode, however, clearly illustrated that Moldova perceives Serbia as a risk factor.

Politics from the Perspective of an Ordinary Moldovan

There is no better way to understand how the “ordinary” Moldovan sees the elections than through a conversation with a taxi driver. After an unsuccessful attempt to find someone who spoke English, I decided to address him in Serbian – and the communication worked, since for many, the Russian language is a mother tongue. Relying on the closeness of Russian and Serbian languages, and with some help from ChatGPT, I asked the driver how he viewed the elections. At first, he shook his head and gave a thumbs down – a short and clear answer. However, after a few moments of silence, he opened up and became more talkative. Although at no point did he openly say which bloc he supported, his comments revealed a sense of overall resignation and distrust in the direction the country was heading.

His key criticism of President Maia Sandu was that, in his opinion, she does not recognise the Moldovan identity. He believed that her alleged insistence that Moldovans are actually Romanians represented an act that was contrary to reality. Although he did not deny that they speak the same language, he emphasised that they are “brotherly but different nations.” That was the moment when I realised that the narrative of “de-Moldovanisation” among sceptics is directly tied to the process of the country’s Europeanization, with the fear that rapprochement with the Union would also mean forcing the integration of Moldovan and Romanian identity, which would further polarise society. Shortly after, upon the end of this interesting ride, I learned that the basis for this narrative is the fact that President Sandu holds dual citizenship – Moldovan and Romanian – and that this is precisely the theme on which the pro-Russian opposition strongly insists and spreads.

Election Day and Results

Election day in Chișinău passed peacefully. When I arrived, I did not notice any signs of tension: no crowds, incidents, protests, or police presence. Instead, classical music was playing in the central park, and passersby who happened to be there stopped to listen. All of this was taking place right next to the Government building, from which the flags of Moldova and the European Union were hanging, stretching from the roof to the ground. I had never before seen such a large EU flag, not even in member states. The atmosphere, therefore, in no way resembled an election day – a moment when the strategic orientation of an until-recently neglected Eastern European country was supposed to be decided.

Before midnight, the official results were announced. The ruling pro-European party could breathe a sigh of relief – not only had it maintained the leading position, but it had also secured enough mandates to form a government on its own. The message from voters was unambiguous: they clearly favour accession to the EU and believe that European integration can be a lever for strengthening democracy and empowering the economy. For a country where pro-Russian forces had until recently held dominant influence, and which is still considered the poorest state in Europe, such a result represents a clear signal that Moldovans want to turn a new page – both domestically and in foreign policy.

The experts I spoke with the next day were more than relieved. While we had been arranging meetings earlier, it was easy to notice that they were under pressure and that their schedules were tight. Now, however, they spoke about European integration with visible relief. Their main impression was that Moldova’s European perspective is “irreversible.” According to them, the key advantage of this outcome is that the ruling party will not have to rely on coalition partners – as the polls had initially suggested.

Moldova is Ready for Negotiations – But is the EU?

Moldovans voted for the European path, but what remains now is for the Union itself to do its part. To begin with, the continuation of the implementation of the New Growth Plan for Moldova is expected, which provides a significant financial instrument of 1.9 billion euros. This plan is valid until the end of 2027 (modelled on the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans) and represents a combination of grants and loans, with opportunities for sectoral integration even before membership is achieved. Then, it is emphasised that it is important for Moldova (together with Ukraine) to open Cluster 1 as soon as possible. As experts point out, the screening process has been successfully completed, and Moldova would be ready to open that cluster, as well as clusters 2 and 3. They are certainly looking to Albania, which managed to open almost all clusters in a short period of time. Finally, the goal of the pro-European government is to complete negotiations by 2028, so that the accession act can be ratified by 2030. It is an ambitious goal, but also a mandate that the new government must now justify.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Moldova’s path to membership will also depend on the EU’s ability to unlock Ukraine’s accession process, which until now has been mostly blocked by Hungary. Just as Albania and North Macedonia were “coupled” for years – which meant that one had to wait for the other despite its own readiness – so too are Moldova and Ukraine now linked. For the time being, Moldova does not insist on “decoupling”, bearing in mind that the EU probably would not have even considered its case if it were not for Ukraine and its struggle against Russia. As experts point out, the Union’s goal will be to appease Hungary and prevent the emergence of new “veto players”. This would send a message not only to voters in Moldova, but also to candidate countries in the Western Balkans – especially those still balancing between East and West – that the policy of sitting on two chairs does not pay off, and that with clear commitment, even the most ambitious goals can be achieved.

A shorter, but original, version of this text can be found at: EUpravozato.

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Regulation of limited-risk systems

In one of previous analysis, it was noted that the Union has chosen a nuanced approach to regulating artificial intelligence by classifying AI systems according to their level of risk. These are divided into categories of “unacceptable risk”, “high risk”, “limited risk”, and “minimal risk”. For ChatGPT users, the reassuring news is that this tool falls into the “limited risk” category. Unlike systems of unacceptable risk, which are prohibited, and high-risk systems, which face significant restrictions, providers of GPAI systems deemed limited risk must primarily comply with stricter transparency requirements. In practice, this means ensuring that users are clearly informed they are interacting with AI, while AI-generated content – such as audio, images, or video – must be appropriately labelled. In an era dominated by disinformation, such precautionary measures gain increasing importance.

Nevertheless, the obligations for providers of GPAI systems extend well beyond content labelling. OpenAI, as the provider of ChatGPT, will be required to: 1) prepare and maintain up-to-date technical documentation; 2) publish a summary of the data used to train the model, following a predefined template; 3) establish and publicly release a copyright policy that ensures respect for content owners; and 4) cooperate with the newly established AI Office of the European Commission, which is tasked with implementing the Act and supporting providers. These obligations are closely linked to the AI Code of Practice. Although not legally binding, the Code serves as a guide to acceptable AI conduct. OpenAI, along with Google and IBM, is already among its signatories . In practice, adherence to the Code may serve as evidence of compliance with the rules and act as a mitigating factor in cases of (unintentional) breaches.

Since ChatGPT has been available on the EU market since 2022 – that is, before the AI Act entered into force on 1 August 2024 – a special transitional regime applies to it. On the one hand, for all GPAI models placed on the market after 2 August 2025, the obligations take effect immediately, while from 2 August 2026 the Commission will also gain powers of supervision and the authority to impose fines. On the other hand, OpenAI has until 2 August 2027 to bring ChatGPT fully into compliance with the new rules. This approach gives providers of existing models additional time to introduce the necessary mechanisms for transparency, copyright protection, safety and other standards set out in the Act, while at the same time ensuring that no system remains beyond regulatory reach in the long term.

Stricter rules around the corner

Although it seems that OpenAI will not have to worry too much about regulatory obstacles, it is important to note that the rules can become stricter in exceptional circumstances. This may happen if ChatGPT is deemed to pose a “systemic risk.” Such a designation may arise in two ways: either automatically – if the model in training exceeds the threshold of 10²⁵ FLOPS (floating point operations) – or by decision of the European Commission, which can, on its own initiative or on the recommendation of a scientific panel, determine an equivalent impact even without the threshold being crossed. The risk associated with such models stems from the assessment that they could significantly affect the EU market or cause serious harm to health, safety, fundamental rights, or society as a whole. The most serious of these risks involves the potential misuse of AI in developing chemical or biological weapons.

In such cases, the duties of providers multiply. First, once the threshold is crossed, OpenAI must report it to the Commission without delay, even during the training process, after which the Commission will consider measures to address the risks involved. Second, providers are required to actively assess and mitigate systemic risks through continuous model evaluation, monitoring, documentation and reporting of serious incidents, and by ensuring robust cybersecurity for both the model and its physical infrastructure. In the most serious scenario, the model may be withdrawn from the market, and fines of up to 3% of global annual turnover or €15 million – whichever is higher – may be imposed. Consequently, if future models such as GPT-6 exceed the 10²⁵ FLOPS threshold during training, they will automatically be classified as systemically risky. Conversely, if AI development follows a regulated path, ChatGPT will remain free to operate in the European market, including in candidate countries. In the meantime, all providers will remain under the close supervision of the AI Office.

Originally published on EUpravozato.

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French Political Scene Further Polarised

Although Macron struggles to gain support on almost any issue domestically, the question of Palestine is a notable exception. Left-leaning parties – including La France Insoumise (LFI), the Communists, the Greens, and the Socialists – openly back his move, seeing it as a necessary step toward peace in the Middle East. While LFI criticises the fact that the decision will be officially take place only in September, they still call the recognition a “moral victory” and stress the urgency to “end the genocide”. The Socialists highlight that this is a prerequisite for a “sustainable political solution”, the Communists describe it as a “correction of historical injustice”, and the Greens view it as a reaffirmation of an “undeniable reality”. What unites these groups is their call for France to impose an arms embargo and sanctions on Israel by September, as well as for the EU to suspend its trade agreement with Israel. This sends a clear message that recognising Palestine “obliges” and must be followed by concrete steps if it is to have genuine meaning..

While Macron has indeed gained some support from the left-wing bloc, it is clear that the right will seize the opportunity to intensify their ongoing attacks against the French president. Conservative and right-wing parties – including the National Rally (RN), the Right for the Republic (UDR), and the far-right Reconquête – view this move as a foreign policy failure. As the largest opposition party, RN stated that “recognising a Palestinian state today means recognising a Hamas state, and therefore a terrorist state.” Reconquête called it a “gift to Hamas”, while UDR claimed the decision was made purely for “electoral reasons”. Unlike the left, the right firmly rejects any talk of sanctions against Israel, an arms embargo, or suspending the EU-Israel trade agreement. These positions suggest that the recognition of Palestine will become a tool for further polarisation of the French political landscape.

The Palestinian Issue Within the EU

When it comes to EU institutions, the official EU policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has historically focused on maintaining neutrality. The EU has consistently supported the two-state solution, presenting it as the only viable path to ensure peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. However, this hasn’t stopped significant disagreements among top EU leaders over how to approach the issue. For example, the previous EU leadership, which lasted until 2024, saw open clashes between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen –  whose statements were often seen as pro-Israel – and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell – who openly sided with the Palestinian cause. Although these differences are less pronounced in the current leadership setup, the requirement for unanimous decisions in EU foreign policy has contributed to slow and cautious action by EU institutions in this matter. Against this backdrop, the positions of individual member states – and any shifts in their stances regarding the recognition of Palestine – are expected to become increasingly important moving forward.

Before the war in Gaza began in 2023, efforts to recognise Palestinian statehood received limited support among EU member states. Until 2004, no EU country had officially recognised Palestine. When the EU expanded, it effectively “imported” the recognition of Palestine, as many new members – Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary – had already recognised it in 1988. Looking at changes made during EU membership, Sweden was the first – and for a long time the only – country to recognise Palestine, doing so in 2013. Despite its move, Palestine has not been a high priority on the EU agenda over the following decade. That changed in 2024, when Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia took a stand, arguing that a two-state solution would promote peace while condemning Israel’s actions that caused heavy casualties and violated international law. Shortly afterwards, Malta also announced plans to recognise Palestine. Now, with Macron’s recent announcement – followed by plans of recognition by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia – it is expected that an increasing number of EU member states will take a clearer position and seriously consider recognising the Palestinian state. As the UN summit in September is fast approaching, it promises to be consequential.

Originally posted on EUpravozato.

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The Hague Raises Suspension Debate

One of the EU’s most powerful foreign policy instruments is the AA itself. When Serbia signed such an agreement with the EU – along with the other Western Balkan states – it marked a new stage in their mutual relations, enabling the deepening of economic and political ties. The EU and Israel, however, had signed such an agreement long before this region, back in 1995, with it entering into force five years later. This document provides the legal framework governing political, economic and trade relations, with particular emphasis on reducing most tariffs, opening markets, and including Israel in various EU programmes. A key provision is Article 2, which states: “Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the AA itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement.” It is precisely this wording that is most frequently cited today in the context of debates on a possible suspension of the Agreement.

It is no surprise that the initiative to suspend the AA originated in the Netherlands – a country that has built a European, and indeed global, reputation not only for its impeccable record on the rule of law, but also for placing particular emphasis on criminal accountability for war crimes. This region knows the Netherlands well as the seat of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Court of Justice, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. With such a national “résumé”, the issue of preventing further war crimes in Gaza reached the EU agenda after the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter on 6 May 2025 to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas. In it, he called for a review of the AA under Article 2, as it obliges the parties to respect human rights and democratic principles. In the meantime, the Netherlands has stated that, until the investigation is concluded, it will not support the renewal of the EU–Israel three-year Action Plan – a move that will block any further deepening of relations. Such actions compel all Member States to take a clear and unequivocal stance on an issue that will, in the long term, shape the credibility and direction of European foreign policy.

Caught between Dialogue and Sanctions

The fact that the Netherlands – a country that has traditionally maintained good relations with Israel – raised the question of suspending the AA triggered a wave of reactions across Europe. It therefore comes as no surprise that High Representative Kallas, two weeks after the Dutch request, formally launched a review procedure to assess Israel’s compliance with human rights and democratic principles – the first step in a process that could ultimately lead to the suspension of the AA. Countries such as France, Belgium and Ireland joined the call for a review, arguing that Israel’s plans for the long-term occupation of Gaza threaten the prospects of a peace process. In total, 17 Member States openly supported the Dutch request. On the other hand, Member States such as Hungary and Austria categorically reject any possibility of suspending the AA, insisting on the continuation of dialogue and cooperation. These countries warn that sanctions would be counterproductive and would further distance the parties from a peace settlement. Such divisions make decision-making even more difficult, given that the suspension of the AA requires unanimous approval from EU Member States.

A full suspension of the AA remains the ultimate, “nuclear” option, and the EU Council could instead decide to halt cooperation in certain areas. On 17 July 2025, High Representative Kallas presented no fewer than nine options – with the suspension of the AA as the tenth – among them the suspension of political dialogue and the termination of visa-free travel. While member states deliberate, on 28 July 2025, the Commission proposed the partial suspension of Israel’s participation in the “Horizon Europe” programme, targeting start-ups and small enterprises with disruptive innovations and new technologies with potential dual-use applications, such as those in the fields of cyber security, drones and artificial intelligence. The proposed suspension is a targeted measure intended to discourage further attacks on Gaza and would thus not affect the participation of Israeli universities and researchers in collaborative projects and research activities under the programme. For the Commission’s proposal to be adopted, it must secure the support of a qualified majority in the Council. As the conflict continues to escalate, the coming months will bring an even more intense debate within the EU, pitting those calling for a more decisive response against those advocating a gradual, dialogue-based approach.

Originally posted on EUpravozato.

Članak Reviewing the EU–Israel Association Agreement: A New Chapter in Europe’s Debate on the Gaza Conflict? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Drawing the Red Lines

Unlike the member states, which mostly argued that the plan is overly ambitious and fiscally irresponsible, the EP sends a diametrically opposite message – the proposal lacks ambition, and the total financial resources need to be increased. According to the calculations of the Parliament’s “co-rapporteurs”, the Commission’s proposal does not represent any real progress compared to the current MFF. Although the amount may appear to have “doubled” nominally, they caution that this increase is solely due to inflation adjustments and the fact that a significant portion of the funds is allocated to repaying loans from the NextGenerationEU (a joint loan taken during the pandemic). Taking this into account, there is a warning that the EU risks entering the next decade with its’ hands tied- or rather its’ pockets tied – lacking the real capacity to strengthen competitiveness, or sufficient resources to address the challenges it faces: climate transition, security threats, technological competition, and economic inequalities among member states. Therefore, in the coming period, the co-rapporteurs are expected to present their own proposal for the total budget amount they consider desirable.

The amount itself aside, a key concern relates to the so-called “renationalisation” of the process. In an attempt to streamline and reduce bureaucracy, the Commission proposed consolidating all planned expenditures into a single document per Member State. However, rather than achieving the intended simplification, this has raised fears among members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that the proposal actually aims to strengthen the power of individual national capitals, thereby bypassing the EP and neglecting supranational issues. There is also fear of excessive centralisation, further limiting the influence of regional and local authorities on shaping the financial framework. According to the EP’s view, such a strategy would only deepen the divide between different parts of the EU, increase mistrust toward central governments, and reduce the effectiveness of planned projects and programs – many of which primarily address local needs.

Given that the Commission’s proposal would simplify the MFF, the EP emphasises the need to preserve the cohesion and agricultural funds as separate and distinct entities – funds traditionally regarded as pillars of the Union’s budget. The EP insists that these funds continue to be programmed separately and that their current allocations be maintained. It warns that integrating these funds into broader budget categories would undermine their visibility and long-term predictability of financing. This would also send the wrong signal to various social groups that have long depended on these funds- particularly farmers, who were among the first to take to the streets of Brussels to express their dissatisfaction. For now, this stance, along with the previously mentioned challenges, represents a set of red lines that will shape the future course of negotiations in which the EP will be engaged.

Priorities of the European Parliament

The stance of MEPs had been formed even before the Commission officially presented its proposal. In fact, back in May of this year, the European Parliament adopted its priorities for the EU’s long-term budget beyond 2027. These priorities laid the foundation for the red lines described above. At that time, 317 MEPs voted in favour, 206 opposed, and 123 abstained. The majority support came from the European People’s Party, Socialdemocrats, and the Liberals. Among the other political groups, the most vocal opponents on the right were the Patriots and Sovereigntists, while the Conservatives were split – with half voting against and half abstaining. Although almost diametrically opposed on nearly all issues, in this case, the right-wing groups overlapped with the Left, which also voted against, while the Greens abstained. The message from the majority of MEPs was twofold: on the one hand, the future budget must align with new geopolitical, economic, and social challenges; on the other, “you cannot do more with less,” meaning that increased ambitions must be matched by an increased budget.

The May vote proved to be a rehearsal for what would follow – virtually the same coalitions and opinion clashes re-emerged around the Commission’s proposal. Despite numerous differences, traditional political groups (the European People’s Party, the Socialdemocrats, and the Liberals) demonstrated their ability to speak with one voice regarding the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF. Their (highly critical) position amounted to a call for a larger budget, a rejection of the so-called renationalisation of budget programming, and a refusal of any attempts to reduce the agricultural and cohesion funds. As negotiations continue, the European People’s Party has gone so far as to warn sharply that “without partnership with the Parliament, there will be no budget”, while the Socialdemocrats remind that the EP must remain a central actor in budget negotiations. The Liberals, similarly, have called the proposed model “the end of the European project,” as it would lead to 27 different budgetary logics and abolish cross-border cooperation. Accordingly, the main message has been that the EP will do everything in its power to be a truly equal partner to the member states when deciding on the future of the Union’s budget.

The political groups that voted against the EP’s list of priorities in May and rejected the Commission’s proposal did so for a variety of reasons. For example, the Conservatives primarily cited fiscal concerns, rejecting the possibility of further joint borrowing as well as the introduction of new own resources for the Union’s financing. They argued that such revenues would place additional pressure on consumers and businesses, and could undermine the fiscal autonomy of member states. Sovereigntists and Patriots employed a populist narrative, claiming that the new proposal hands more power to the supranational level and that, through strengthening the conditionality mechanism for access to funds, it amounts to unacceptable political blackmail by Brussels bureaucrats. The Left, meanwhile, lamented what they see as excessive “securitisation” of the proposal, while the Greens pointed out a lack of emphasis on environmental protection. Given the entrenched positions of these groups, no change in their stance is expected moving forward – except perhaps among the Greens, who often engage in strategic voting as a way to reach compromise and limit the power of the right-wing spectrum.

Points of Overlap

Despite numerous criticisms, there are some silver linings for the Commission’s proposal. In fact, the analysis of existing assessments reveals several key points of overlap between this proposal and the positions of the traditional political groups in the EP. First, these groups support the Commission’s initiative to increase the number of own resources to collect additional common funds for repaying pandemic-era debts as well as for the Union’s increased spending needs. Second, they welcome the introduction of so-called “smart conditionality” of the budget, meaning that access to funds would be conditioned on implementing democratic reforms. Special emphasis is placed on strengthening the link between respect for the rule of law and access to EU budgetary funds. Third, they back continued support for Ukraine, including separate funds for its accession process as well as those aimed at macroeconomic stability and post-war reconstruction. This suggests that the EP will adopt the role of a constructive critic during negotiations with the member states and the Commission.

Among the points of overlap, it is especially significant that all three groups support the enlargement policy in the context of budget negotiations. In the priorities voted on in May 2025, it was emphasised that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is “of crucial importance” for preparing the Union for this process. Calling for strategic investments through grants as well as loans, it is stressed that financial support must be conditioned on implementing reforms aligned with EU legal frameworks and policies, as well as respect for its values. Finally, it is highlighted that the existing mandatory clause for reviewing the MFF in case of enlargement should remain part of the next financial framework, and that national budgetary frameworks must not be affected. Since it is currently known that enlargement will be part of the budget line “Global Europe,” which is expected to amount to around 42 billion euros, there is no doubt that the majority in the EP will strive to ensure that the accession process of candidate countries is accompanied by a credible “carrot.”

Previously published on EUpravozato.

Članak The “Mother of All Battles” at the Parliament: Political Groups react to the New MFF se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.