The US congressional elections, commonly known as the midterms, held on November 3 2026, marked a significant political turning point. Midterm elections take place halfway through a president’s term, when voters elect a new House of Representatives and approximately one-third of the Senate, making them something of a referendum on the incumbent president’s performance. The Democratic Party succeeded in taking control of both chambers of Congress, depriving the Republican Party of one of the key institutional advantages it enjoyed during the first two years of Donald Trump’s second term. The result represents a major setback for a president who, just two years ago, made his return to the White House promising to make America great again. This time, however, voters sent a different message: the political support Trump secured in 2024 was not unconditional, and his policies no longer commanded the same level of public confidence. Opinion polls conducted ahead of the elections had already pointed in this direction. According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll, just 32% of Americans approved of his job performance, putting his approval rating close to the lowest level recorded during his two presidential terms. Trump therefore entered the midterm election campaign with particularly low levels of public support, which proved to be a significant liability for Republican candidates.

Such an outcome is hardly surprising, given that voters often use midterm elections to express their level of satisfaction with the policies of the incumbent administration. The scale of the Republican defeat, however, points to something beyond the usual voter dissatisfaction with the party in power. Democrats secured victories even in states that had until recently been considered safe Republican strongholds. In the Senate, Democrats flipped seven seats previously held by Republicans, winning in Kansas, Iowa, Texas, Ohio, Maine, North Carolina and South Carolina. The victory in Kansas is particularly noteworthy, as the state had not elected a Democratic senator in nearly a century. The result in South Carolina is equally significant, given that Trump carried the state by a margin of almost 18 percentage points in 2024. The elections also produced several historic firsts. Abdul El-Sayed became the first Muslim ever elected to the US Senate, while his Republican opponent, Mike Rogers, fell short of securing a Senate seat for the second time. Meanwhile, Peggy Flanagan of Minnesota became the first woman of Native American heritage elected to the Senate, while Chris Pappas of New Hampshire became the first openly gay man to win a seat in the chamber. Taken together with the historic victories of women and members of minority communities in gubernatorial races, these results also point to broader changes in the composition of political representation in the United States.

A similar trend emerged in the House of Representatives, where Democrats gained more than twenty additional seats. Among the most notable upsets were Iowa, where they won three of the state’s four congressional districts; Indiana, where an incumbent Republican representative lost in a district Trump had carried by nearly 17 percentage points; as well as Texas and New Hampshire.

It is worth noting that House elections are not contests for entire states, but rather for individual congressional districts. Nevertheless, Democratic victories in traditionally conservative areas suggest that dissatisfaction with the Republican administration has spread well beyond the party’s usual electoral strongholds. According to the Associated Press (AP), as of November 5, winners had been declared in 384 of the 435 congressional districts, with Democrats securing 238 seats and Republicans 146. Vote counting is still underway in the remaining 51 districts, meaning that the final balance of power has yet to be established. The question of which party will control the House, however, has already been settled, as Democrats have surpassed the 218 seats required for a majority. The only remaining question is how large that majority will ultimately be and whether the final results will confirm the scale of their electoral success.

What Explains This Outcome?

One of the most important factors was undoubtedly the state of the economy. Despite Trump’s promises of an economic recovery and a lower cost of living, many Americans remain dissatisfied with the prices of everyday goods and the prevailing economic uncertainty. His protectionist trade policy, centered on the introduction of tariffs, has further fueled concerns about rising prices. These grievances were compounded by dissatisfaction with the war with Iran, which placed an additional strain on the US economy and heightened the sense of uncertainty. The Democratic campaign succeeded in bringing these issues to the forefront, while Republicans devoted much of their attention to cultural and identity-based divisions, including questions of gender identity and social values.

Trump’s own involvement in the campaign also played an important role. In the final weeks before the election, the president actively campaigned on behalf of Republican candidates, urging voters to act as though he himself were on the ballot. However, several of his endorsements proved unsuccessful. The defeats of candidates he had personally backed in Texas and South Carolina, along with the loss of long-serving Republican Senator Susan Collins in Maine, suggest that presidential endorsement was not necessarily an electoral asset. In other words, Trump’s political persona, which had been one of the key factors behind the Republican victory in 2024, may this time have become one of the reasons for the party’s electoral defeat.

What Will Change?

Democratic control of Congress will significantly alter the political landscape in Washington during the remaining two years of Trump’s term. A Democratic majority in the House of Representatives will be able to launch congressional investigations and step up oversight of the administration, while control of the Senate will allow Democrats to block certain presidential nominations and influence future judicial appointments. At the same time, passing legislation and implementing parts of Trump’s political agenda will become considerably more difficult. Nevertheless, the Democratic majority will not have unlimited power. Trump retains the right to veto legislation passed by Congress, and Democrats lack the two-thirds majority in either chamber required to override a presidential veto. The president has already indicated that he is prepared to use this power, describing himself as a kind of “Mr. Veto”, which points to the possibility of frequent clashes between the White House and Congress. Instead of operating in a relatively favorable institutional environment, the president will face a Congress capable of providing a serious check on his power, while he himself will retain significant means of blocking Democratic initiatives.

Still, the Democratic victory should not automatically be viewed as proof that the party has found an answer to the Trump movement. Some voters may have been voting less in favor of the Democratic party, but more so in opposition of the Republican administration. How well Democrats live up to the trust they have been given, put forward a convincing platform, and overcome their own internal divisions will be among the key factors heading into the 2028 presidential election.

At the same time, the election results raise questions about the future of the Republican Party in the post-Trump era. Trump’s Vice President, JD Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who have long stood out as the two most serious potential contenders for the Republican presidential nomination in 2028 and have both performed well in polls of Republican voters, will find it difficult to distance themselves from the record and policies of the current administration. If voter dissatisfaction persists, it could weaken their starting positions in the race for the Republican nomination and fuel an internal debate over whether the party should continue along its current political path or seek a different candidate.

For Trump, the result is a warning that the political capital gained through his return to the White House can be depleted relatively quickly. His “America First” agenda and promise to transform American society along conservative lines have not disappeared, but from now on they will face considerably stronger institutional resistance. The elections have shown that control of the White House does not guarantee lasting support from American voters. The next two years will reveal not only how far Trump is willing or able to adapt his policies to the new political circumstances, but also what political direction the Republican Party will choose as it looks beyond his presidency.

Članak US Midterm Elections 2026: The End of the Trump Era? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

1. Turnout was the key

We identified turnout as the key factor in deciding the outcome. While turnout in 2023 was almost 59%, in our analysis all scenarios assumed that it would fall between 65% and 70%. It came in at 68.8%, the highest in more than three decades, and it worked in the Student List’s favour. Our reasoning was that the further turnout rose above 65%, the less likely the regime would be able to secure its political survival.

2. The SNS ceiling was within our range

We argued that the SNS has a relatively stable voter base, made up of committed supporters and so-called “capillary” votes, mobilised through party and clientelist networks, and that it could realistically reach up to 1.7 million votes. The outcome stayed at about that level: the SNS received about 1.68 million votes (39.15%). We also added that, because the party was facing its most serious challenge to date, its inability to attract new voters could cost it power.

3. The SPS and the smaller lists missed the threshold

A key assumption under Scenario 4 was that the SPS would end up below 3%. In that case, the SNS, in every one of our modelled cases, would have had no chance of forming a government even with the support of all minority parties. While the SPS only achieved around 2%, we were right to assume that European Serbia and Authentic Right would also fall below the threshold. Votes cast for lists below the threshold are lost, and the seats are redistributed proportionally among the lists that pass it, which favours the largest list, in this case the SL.

4. The Student List governs alone

The scenario most favourable to the students materialised. Under Scenario 4, in five of the six cases we modelled, the SL won a majority on its own. Only in one case (65% turnout and the SNS at the top of its range) would the SL have needed the support of just three seats from minority parties. In the cases where it could govern alone, we estimated that the SL would win between 129 and 144 seats. With 97.5% of polling stations counted, the SL is at the upper end of this range: it received about 2.27 million votes (52.73%), which translates into around 140 seats, a comfortable majority 14 seats above the 126 required.

Looking ahead

The “winning” scenario implied a National Assembly dominated by two lists, with only a handful of minority representatives. The other scenarios assumed that the SPS would clear the threshold and that post-election bargaining, possibly involving minority parties, might decide the outcome. With the results of 25 October, this uncertainty has disappeared: a single list holds a majority and does not depend on any coalition partner. Turnout rose by about ten percentage points compared with 2023, to its highest level in more than three decades, and, as our scenarios anticipated, high participation reshaped the outcome.

The lesson of this election reaches beyond the seat count. For analysts, this is a reminder that transparent, assumption-based modelling can help citizens, experts and international audiences understand what is at stake before the votes are cast. More importantly, the next tests are institutional rather than arithmetic. A clear mandate and a mobilised electorate offer a rare opportunity to turn civic energy into lasting trust in elections and institutions, and how that opportunity is used will matter as much as the result itself.

Članak Serbia’s Election Scenarios: Four Things We Got Right se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The Ruling Parties’ Arithmetic

Ever since 2014, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has maintained stable support. To be precise, support has varied between 1.63 million and 1.95 million voters. This is roughly double the 940 thousand voters it had when it first came to power in 2012. The trend suggests that, regardless of ongoing protests and domestic turmoil, SNS can count on at least one and a half million voters. These are the so-called “locked-in” voters. One part of this group is made up of eager supporters of the government. The other part is the “capillary votes”, i.e. votes obtained in exchange for a job, a service or some other benefit, including intimidation. This time around, however, the challenge the regime is facing is the most severe one, and the experts we have engaged with agree that it would be very difficult for SNS to secure more than 1.7 million voters.

With that assumption in mind, to illustrate what higher turnout would mean for SNS, we modelled four scenarios. Scenario 1 shows SNS governing alone at 65% and 70% turnout. Scenarios 2 to 4 add its coalition partner, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which either repeats its 2023 result of about 250,000 votes (Scenario 2), just clears the 3% threshold (Scenario 3) or falls just below it (Scenario 4). All scenarios assume 6.5 million registered voters and 97.3% valid ballots, and that the lists below the 3% threshold waste about 7.4% of valid votes at 65% turnout and about 7.0% at 70%. Among these, based on our engagement with different experts, Authentic Right and European Serbia are assumed to fall below the threshold, and we add 2.5% for the remaining small lists. In Scenario 4, the votes of SPS are wasted as well, which raises the total to about 10%. The 3% threshold is calculated on all voters who voted, so it equals about 127,000 votes at 65% turnout and about 137,000 at 70%. Seats are estimated from a proportional allocation, not an exact d’Hondt calculation.

Scenario 1: Single-party SNS government at 65% and 70% turnout (~4.11 and ~4.43 million valid votes)

With 65% turnout, SNS would need about 1.92 million votes to govern alone, a level it last exceeded in 2020, an election marked by an opposition boycott and the lowest turnout of the 2012–2023 period. With 1.5 to 1.7 million votes, it would be 14 to 28 seats short. With 70% turnout, SNS would need about 2.07 million votes to govern alone. With 1.5 to 1.7 million votes, it would be 23 to 35 seats short. This puts SNS in an uncomfortable position. In the past, it could usually govern on its own, yet it still brought in partners such as SPS as insurance to secure their loyalty.

Our estimate is that how well SNS performs matters less than how SPS does and whether it passes the threshold at all. Accounting for this, we present three additional scenarios. In the highly unlikelyscenario that SPS repeats its 2023 result of about 250,000 votes (Scenario 2), it would bring roughly 16 seats at 65% turnout and 15 seats at 70%. In share terms, 250,000 votes is about 6.1% of valid votes at 65% turnout and about 5.6% at 70%, compared with about 6.7% in 2023. The majority is then reached only if that figure is combined with 1.7 million SNS votes at 65% turnout (about 128 seats). However, with a weaker performance by SNS, the role of the minorities would become the most critical factor for the ruling coalition to stay in power.

Scenario 2: Coalition with SPS added (assuming SPS keeps its 2023 result of ~250,000 votes)

At exactly the 3% threshold, which is within the realm of possibility, SPS would receive about 127,000 votes at 65% turnout and about 137,000 at 70% (about 3.1% of valid votes), which would bring it roughly 8 seats (Scenario 3). That is about half of its 2023 vote count (about 250,000) and about half of the seats it would bring in Scenario 2. The combined list would need about 1.92 million votes at 65% turnout and about 2.07 million at 70%, i.e. about 1.79 and 1.94 million from SNS alone, which is unlikely. Therefore, with 1.5 to 1.7 million SNS votes, the combined list would reach about 107 to 120 seats at 65% turnout and about 99 to 111 at 70%, so no case produces a majority. Taken together, the ruling parties could stay in power only if several conditions hold at once: turnout does not rise above about 65%, SNS holds its upper range of about 1.7 million votes, SPS clears the threshold, and the minorities side with the coalition. If any one of these fails, the regime loses power.

Scenario 3: Coalition with SPS added (assuming SPS gets 3%)

In the quite possible situation in which SPS finishes just under the threshold (about 2.9% of the turnout), it would get about 123,000 votes at 65% turnout and about 132,000 at 70% (Scenario 4). These votes are wasted, so SPS wins no seats and total waste rises to about 10% (accounting for other parties as well). This lowers the number of votes needed for a majority: SNS alone would need about 1.86 million votes at 65% turnout and about 2.01 million at 70%. With 1.5 to 1.7 million votes, SNS would reach about 102 to 115 seats at 65% turnout and about 94 to 107 at 70%, i.e. 11 to 32 seats short, so no case produces a majority. If SPS does not pass, SNS has almost no chance of forming a government, even with the support of all the minority parties.

Scenario 4: SPS does not make it across the threshold

Can the Student List win?

In this part, we estimate how the Student List (SL) would do under the same assumptions. We treat SL as a residual: it gets whatever remains of the valid votes once everyone else has been accounted for. A similar approach has already been soundly applied in another analysis, albeit under different scenarios. Here, we take away the votes for SNS (1.5 to 1.7 million, as above) and for SPS (exactly at the 3% threshold in Scenario 3, and none in Scenario 4, where its votes are wasted). We also take away the wasted votes, counted list by list as above, which come to about 7% in Scenario 3 and about 10% in Scenario 4. Finally, we assume that the minorities win 12 seats in total, as in 2023 (about 175,000 to 200,000 votes), and everything that remains goes to SL.

With SPS exactly at the threshold (Scenario 3) and 1.5 to 1.7 million SNS votes, SL would receive between 1.80 and 2.00 million votes at 65% turnout and between 2.08 and 2.28 million at 70%. This would translate into about 118 to 131 seats for SL at 65% turnout and about 127 to 139 at 70%, giving it a majority on its own in four of the six cases, including all three at 70% turnout. In the other two, the minorities would be decisive: with 1.6 million SNS votes, SL would be only one seat short (125 seats), and with 1.7 million, SNS and SPS together would narrowly lead (120 seats to 118), so neither side could govern alone. This is to say that even if SL ends up as the top performer in the elections, this will not automatically translate into an absolute majority, reaffirming the necessity of negotiations with the minorities.

Scenario 3 – SL majority with SPS at exactly 3%

However, if SPS falls below the threshold, SL would be in a commanding position. In this case, the votes of SPS are wasted (Scenario 4), and total waste rises to about 10%. As a result, SL would need only about 1.86 million votes at 65% turnout and about 2.01 million at 70% to form a government on its own. With 1.5 to 1.7 million SNS votes, SL would receive between 1.81 and 2.01 million votes at 65% turnout and between 2.09 and 2.29 million at 70%. This would translate into about 123 to 136 seats for SL at 65% turnout and about 131 to 144 at 70%, making it the single largest list in all six cases and giving it a majority on its own in five of them. The only exception is 1.7 million SNS votes at 65% turnout, where SL would have about 123 seats against 115 for SNS, and would need the minorities’ support to govern.

Scenario 4 – SL majority (alone) with SPS below 3%

After the Count

The scenarios show that Serbia’s election will be decided less by who finishes first than by who can assemble 126 seats. Although the SL would be the largest list in nearly every case we modelled, at 65% turnout, with 1.7 million SNS votes and the SPS passing the threshold, it would still fall short of the majority needed to form a government on its own. In that situation, minority parties would essentially become the kingmakers. While not accounted for in the scenarios, the possibility that European Serbia and Authentic Right, either both or at least one of them, clear the threshold could further tilt the arithmetic. The count on election night may therefore be only the beginning, with the real contest potentially being fought in the negotiations that follow – assuming, of course, that everything proceeds peacefully.

Članak Serbia’s Election Scenarios: The Road to a 126-Seat Majority se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

A race against deadlines

When the European Commission presented the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans in November 2023, it announced a historic shift in the Union’s relationship with the region. One of its key components is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans introduced in May 2024, which replaces the previous logic of pre-accession funding with the principle of “performance-based financing” under which every euro is disbursed only once beneficiaries have actually implemented the previously agreed reform steps. By adopting the Reform Agenda in October 2024, Serbia fulfilled the first requirement for gaining access to its envelope worth €1.58 billion (out of a total available amount of €5.6 billion in grants and loans for the entire region).[1] That funding, however, is conditional upon the fulfilment of 98 concrete, measurable and pre-defined reform steps within clearly established deadlines. Under this framework, delayed reforms carry an immediate and measurable cost.

To grasp the scale of Serbia’s opportunity cost up to January 2026 – when the Commission gave the green light for the release of funds for the first and, so far, only time, in response to the fulfilment of both the preconditions and certain reform steps – one has to consider how much funding was available for that period. After deducting the pre-financing from the total pre-defined amount per semester,[2] the figures come to €104.1 million for the second semester of 2024, €151.5 million for the first semester of 2025, and €246.3 million for the second semester of 2025. This means that, had Belgrade done everything it originally committed to within the given deadlines, it would now have had €501.9 million at its disposal. Instead, the Commission responded positively only to Serbia’s first request, establishing that merely three out of seven steps had been fulfilled, thereby releasing only €56.5 million net (after the deduction of pre-financing). This indicates that as much as 89% of the funds envisaged for the given period remained undrawn, amounting to a serious opportunity cost of €445.4 million.

What is at stake this summer

All eyes are now on the Commission, which has yet to assess whether Serbia meets the democratic preconditions.[3] It has already sent a clear message that Serbia is falling behind, given that Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia were granted new funds back in May 2026, while Belgrade has received no additional funding since January. This gap emerged amid a substantial deterioration following the adoption of the so-called Mrdić laws, which called into question whether Serbia continued to meet the democratic preconditions for drawing down the funds. This is also why there has been no response so far to Serbia’s second, third and fourth requests for the release of funds. Although the Commission has in the meantime found that a degree of progress has been made – both in undoing the damage done to judicial reform and through certain formal steps forward regarding the media regulatory body (the REM Council) and the electoral legal framework – it has yet to issue its official assessment which would offer clear insight into how it evaluates the “situation on the ground” from the perspective of the Facility. Until that happens, the funds remain de facto frozen.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Commission’s suddenly intensified support for the opening of Cluster 3 reflects its readiness to soon officially confirm that Serbia once again meets the preconditions. This raises the question of how much funding Serbia could count on in that case. In fact, by cross-referencing the number of reform steps planned per semester in the Reform Agenda with the percentage of reform steps Serbia has fulfilled – recently revealed by the Director-General for Enlargement, Gert Jan Koopman – it is possible to draw conclusions about what lies ahead. While Montenegro and Albania are implementing around 80% of their reform commitments, and North Macedonia half of them, Serbia stands at a mere 35% – only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, both blocked by internal political crises, rank lower. As for the concrete steps, out of a total of 98 steps envisaged by the end of 2027, Serbia committed to seven for the second semester of 2024, 10 for the first semester of 2025 and 20 for the second semester of 2025.[4] Cross-referencing Koopman’s assessment with the total of 37 steps for the period in question suggests that Serbia has fulfilled 13 reform steps – at least from the Commission’s point of view.[5] This means that even in the event of a positive assessment of the preconditions, Belgrade could not count on the automatic release of a significant share of the frozen funds for the given period.

The opportunity cost grows considerably once one takes into account that fulfilment of the reform steps planned for the first semester of 2026 will also be assessed in the period ahead. There are ten of them in total. Adding the €183.1 million allocated for the first semester of this year (likewise calculated after deducting the pre-financing share) to the previously mentioned €501.9 million for the first three semesters (July 2024 – December 2025) brings the amount at stake to €685 million. With only €56.5 million drawn down, Serbia has so far made use of just 8% of that potentially available amount. The risk that this percentage will not increase significantly is underscored by the fact that, by January 2026, Serbia had failed to fulfil nearly two-thirds of the envisaged reform steps on time, making it difficult to expect dramatically better performance in the first half of this year. Without clear political prioritisation of the timely implementation of reform steps and, in essence, a credible commitment to European integration, there is a serious risk that the largest part of the total available amount will remain undrawn, further deepening the gap between the promises contained in the Reform Agenda and Serbia’s actual reform performance.

The potential damage keeps growing

Even if the Commission were to release new funds on account of the fulfilment of a further ten reform steps – assuming that it once again decides to confirm that Serbia meets the democratic preconditions – Serbia risks irreversibly losing a significant portion of the money. Namely, the Facility included so-called “grace periods” for the fulfilment of reforms from the outset as it was correctly anticipated that countries across the region would miss some deadlines. For reforms scheduled for the second semester of 2024, the rules granted a two-year grace period, i.e. the possibility of completing them by the end of 2026. For all other semesters, the grace period is one year. In this context, it is therefore particularly relevant that the end of June 2026 marked the first turning point, as that was when the first grace period expired – the one for reforms originally planned for completion by the end of June 2025. The exact amount Serbia stands to lose will become clear once the Commission publishes how much of the total €151.5 million it is entitled to on the basis of the reform steps fulfilled. Should the Commission adhere strictly to the rules, the unallocated funds would amount to Serbia’s first irreversible financial loss and would then be redistributed to other countries in the region.

Although there have been warnings that Serbia is on the brink of losing between €109 million and €136 million, the potential damage grows further if we look towards the end of 2026. That will be the second turning point, as no fewer than two grace periods will expire: one for the reforms planned for the end of 2024 and the other for the reforms envisaged for the end of 2025. For the former, the net amount is €104.1 million, and for the latter, €246.3 million. Adding these two amounts to the one whose grace period expired at the end of June this year – and subtracting the €56.5 million already unlocked – yields a figure of up to €445.4 million that Serbia could irreversibly lose by the end of the year, with the final figure depending on the number of reform steps Serbia manages to fulfil before the relevant grace periods expire. Given the anticipated elections in Serbia – and the Commission’s warnings in its annual reports that electoral periods are times when reform progress tends to stall – the possibility that Serbia will make only minimal use of the Growth Plan should be taken seriously. Citizens would ultimately bear the greatest cost, particularly given that the Growth Plan was designed to help accelerate the accession process, strengthen domestic economic opportunities and, consequently, reduce the socio-economic gap with EU countries.

[1] The €5.6 billion figure represents what is genuinely available to the beneficiaries, as it excludes administrative and technical costs, as well as around €360 million set aside as insurance against loan default, from the total of €6 billion.

[2] In the summer of 2025, Serbia received pre-financing of €111 million, which was expected to serve as an initial impetus for the remaining reforms. That amount forms part of Serbia’s total allocation, and the calculations throughout the text deduct it proportionally to arrive at net figures.

[3] The Scoreboard under the Facility shows that Serbia has fulfilled 8% of the reform steps in its Reform Agenda for the period up to December 2025. That percentage has not been updated, even though Serbia has in the meantime fulfilled certain steps, because the preconditions had been called into question. Article 5 of the Facility stipulates that, alongside the dialogue on normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina, the preconditions require beneficiaries of the funds to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, free and fair elections, pluralistic media, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and to guarantee respect for all human rights obligations, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

[4]Although ten steps are envisaged for the first semester of 2026, it is unlikely that Koopman had that semester in mind as well, since the implementation deadline had only recently expired, meaning that the Commission will assess their fulfilment only in the period ahead.

[5] That is four steps more than civil society identified in its first independent monitoring report. The difference does not necessarily point to leniency on the Commission’s part, but rather to the fact that it has access to documentation that state institutions have not made available to civil society, as well as to the stricter criterion applied by the working group, according to which a step must not only be implemented but also be publicly verifiable.

Originally posted by Belgrade open school.

Članak The Growth Plan and Serbia: On the Brink of Significant and Permanent Losses se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Key Priorities under the Spotlight

Like other member states, Ireland will promote security; however, what makes it stand out is that it will do so as a militarily neutral country. As one of the rare non-NATO countries in the EU, its neutrality has defined its state identity, forged in the early days of the state as a means of asserting independence from Britain. What is more, it is even legally codified, insofar as the Irish Constitution prevents Ireland from joining a European army or mutual defence pact. On the EU level, its neutrality is further protected by legally binding guarantees in a Protocol attached to the Lisbon Treaty. This position allows Dublin to frame deeper cooperation not as abandonment of neutrality, but as a pragmatic response to cyber threats, hybrid warfare, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the wider geopolitical pressures created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and transatlantic uncertainty. While setting clear boundaries, the Presidency motto – “Strength with unity” – suggests that Ireland will seek to balance its distinctive position of military neutrality with security priorities, including the unification of the EU’s voice and accelerated defence integration of the Union. 

Besides continuing its support for Ukraine and maintaining punitive measures against Russia, the programme sets out a dense agenda for advancing the EU’s security and defence policy. First, Ireland will advance work on the new European Security Strategy by seeking to consolidate member-state positions on key security challenges ahead of its expected launch in the third quarter of 2026, ten years after the adoption of the EU Global Strategy. Second, it will seek to operationalise the measures contained in the White Paper on the Future of European Defence and the associated Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, including by promoting agreement on priority capability gaps and European Defence Projects of Common Interest. Third, it will focus on expanding joint defence procurement through and the revision of the Defence Procurement Directive, with the aim of making procurement more efficient, competitive and collaborative. Taken together, these points reflect Ireland’s stated ambition to promote the “evolution of the CSDP”.

Besides security – but nonetheless linked to it – from the first days of the Presidency, it is expected that competitiveness will be treated as a core priority across every Council formation. Concerning job creation, innovation and business growth, it is, as Irish Ambassador to Serbia Kevin Colgan framed it, a priority that most directly affects citizens. The centrepiece that will underpin the Presidency action in this area is the One Europe, One Market Roadmap, agreed by the EU Council, European Commission and the European Parliament in April 2026.  Shaped by the Draghi report and the shock of transatlantic trade tensions, the Roadmap rests on five building blocks: 1) reducing administrative burdens through “omnibus” simplification packages; 2) deepening the Single Market and lowering internal barriers; 3) securing economic and trade resilience by diversifying supply chains; 4) strengthening energy security alongside the green transition; and 5) boosting Europe’s digital and Artificial Intelligence capacity. The Presidency will also seek to advance flagship initiatives such as the EU Inc, among others. As the Roadmap contains half of the measures slated for the end of the year, the ability of the Irish Presidency to effectively coordinate this ambitious workload will determine the fate of the EU’s drive to make itself competitive again.

It is here that the MFF for 2028-2034 – a proposal worth close to €2 trillion – becomes the Presidency’s most delicate task, because the budget crystallises the deeper security and competitiveness dilemma dividing member states. For instance, Taoiseach Micheál Martin has pointed to “enormous pressure” from several capitals to spend more on defence and less on agriculture, while others defend or seek to increase Common Agricultural Policy funding. At the same time, the European Parliament will aim to maximise the MFF’s size, whereas multiple member states have already made it clear that the proposal, as it stands, already overextends realistic possibilities. Moreover, the time-pressure is high, particularly as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa want to secure a political agreement on the MFF before the end of 2026. In such a context, while drawing on its experience in successfully brokering an MFF in 2013, it will be up to Ireland, together with its Trio partners, to seize a narrowing window: with French elections approaching, President Macron is expected to grow more reluctant to take risky decisions, adding pressure to close a deal by the end of 2026.

What about Enlargement?

Crucially, enlargement is strongly embedded into Ireland’s priorities. Ireland held the Presidency of the Council in 2004, when the “Big Bang” enlargement took place. Now, Ireland explicitly states that it will work with all candidates and potential candidates to support them on their path to membership. It then differentiates by explicitly pointing out in its Programme that it will work towards “the completion of accession negotiations with Montenegro, and seek to make substantial progress in negotiations with Albania, Moldova and Ukraine”. Martin visited Montenegro in June and called completing everything in six months “challenging”, but confirmed it as Dublin’s goal to “break the back of this process” via intergovernmental conferences expected in the autumn. According to the Irish Ambassador to Serbia, that would be “the clearest signal that the system works”. Moreover, Dublin hopes to open the remaining clusters for Ukraine and Moldova, with Martin stating an ambition to open “as many as we possibly can” while insisting on a strictly merit-based approach. This explains why Marta Kos suggested the Irish Presidency could become “the most successful presidency after the 2004 big bang”.

While Serbia is not on the list of explicitly named countries in the Programme, it may be expected that Ireland will insist on the necessity to keep Belgrade close – where it has recently opened up an embassy as a token of recognition of its value – while insisting on the essential rule-of-law reforms to be conducted in a proper manner. As Serbia’s attempt to open Cluster 3 – with abruptly increased support by the European Commission and push by several member states – failed to materialise in the summer of 2026, this topic will surely resurface during the Irish presidency. While there is political goodwill in Dublin, it will not necessarily translate into automatic acceleration of Serbia’s path, as the outstanding issues still remain. Whatever might happen with Serbia – including other non-frontrunner countries of the region – Ireland is unusually well placed to carry the enlargement policy forward: it has never misused its veto right, has no bilateral disputes with any candidate, and is widely regarded in Brussels as a natural honest broker.

Finally, it will be up to Ireland to balance out the plans and ideas of member states on whether and to what extent to maximise the gradual integration and introduce new, specific post-accession arrangements for new member states. The ground was set for this, with several nonpapers being introduced during the summer, with Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Czechia, and Slovenia pushing for sectoral integration, Germany and France advocating for gradual institutional integration, and France and Germany coupled with the Benelux countries pushing for more robust post-accession safeguard clauses, while calling, among other things, for discussion on temporary veto limitations for newcomers. With consensus on any of these issues being far from reached, Ireland will have to account for a tight schedule for action, particularly as discussions on these matters are expected at the October European Council and possible decisions in December. This coincides with the acceleration of work on Montenegro’s Act of Accession, which is expected to be a suitable testing ground for new ideas, to be applicable to all the countries waiting in the queue.

Članak Ireland Now Heads the EU Council – What Does it Mean for the EU and the Western Balkans? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

On the 7^th of July 2026, the verdict fell. Until that day, Le Pen’s candidacy had seemed compromised. While the Paris Court of Appeal had upheld her conviction for embezzlement of public funds in the case of the “European parliamentary assistants” of the Front National (renamed Rassemblement National in 2018), the court shortened her electoral ban, making her eligible to stand. But what happens now?

Marine Le Pen’s conviction hasn’t ended her campaign; it has merely reshaped it. The woman who, in 2013, argued for implementing “lifetime ineligibility for anyone convicted of crimes committed while in office” now appears to be backtracking. Marine Le Pen is already envisioning herself at the Élysée Palace, where she speaks of a “winning ticket” with Jordan Bardella, whom she would appoint as prime minister in the event of a victory in the next presidential election.

Convicted yet still in the presidential race, Marine Le Pen has thrown French politics into uncharted territory, with ripples reaching far beyond France’s borders. This article sketches out how consequential this development might be.

A whirlwind legal saga

Le Pen’s case has been unfolding for years. Between 2004 and 2016, Marine Le Pen and several party officials were accused of paying Front National employees in France with funds intended to pay European Parliament assistants. The alleged damages are estimated at 4.1 million euros. In March 2025, the Paris Criminal Court found her guilty of misuse of public funds, with a severe sentence: four years in prison, two of which were suspended sentences (meaning imposed by the court but not enforced as long as no further offence is committed within a specified period) and the remaining two to be served under electronic monitoring, a €100,000 fine, and five years of ineligibility for office, with immediate enforcement. While she immediately appealed the ruling, the last point had been the most politically explosive, since it effectively excluded her from the 2027 presidential race even before her appeal was heard.

One year later, on 7 July 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld her conviction, ruling out the acquittal some RN officials had hoped for. However, the sentence was less severe: three years’ imprisonment, two of them suspended, with the remaining year to be served at home under electronic monitoring. Her ineligibility for office, meanwhile, was reduced to 3 years and 9 months, of which 2 years and 6 months were suspended – amounting to only 1 year and 3 months that had to be served effectively. Since this period has already been served as of 2025, she would be eligible to run immediately.

The ruling nevertheless presented Le Pen with a political dilemma. Although it cleared her path to the election, it also left her facing the prospect of campaigning under electronic monitoring – something she had previously ruled out. On the afternoon of 7 July, some were therefore already envisioning Jordan Bardella, the president of the RN, taking up the mantle. That evening, however, Le Pen announced on French television that she would appeal to the Court of Cassation. Because the Court of Appeal did not order the immediate enforcement of her new sentence, the appeal suspends the electronic-monitoring requirement while the case is pending. She can therefore begin her campaign without an ankle monitor – although she could be required to wear one if the High Court upholds her sentence a few weeks before the first round of the election, scheduled for 18 April 2027. “It’s double or nothing,” in the words of a French political historian. Given the stakes, the RN will likely have every incentive to see the Court of Cassation’s ruling delayed for as long as possible, ideally past the election itself.

An explosive announcement igniting the political spectrum

These statements are not without consequences and are already provoking strong reactions across the French political class. On the right, the Secretary-General of Les Républicains accuses the RN leader of “holding democracy hostage.” On the left, the leader of the Ecologists spoke out, saying that “in a normal world where the National Rally had even the slightest shred of morality, Marine Le Pen would voluntarily withdraw her candidacy.” “She no longer has any credibility to guarantee the authority of the state,” said the Socialist Party leader. In the centre, presidential candidate Gabriel Attal emphasised the “moral dimension” of a candidate “convicted twice” of misusing public funds. Édouard Philippe, also a candidate in 2027, refrained from directly criticising what he called “a choice that belongs to her,” while stressing that she will have to “explain it to the French people.” Across the spectrum, the reactions reveal a shared unease, even among rivals reluctant to attack her directly, about the precedent her candidacy sets for the norms governing French political life.

On the European side, this ruling has brought relief to the Rassemblement National’s European allies. For Hungary’s former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, it was nothing short of “justice for Marine, a victory for France, and a beacon of hope for the freedom-loving nations of Europe.” At the same time, Dutch PVV (Party for Freedom) leader Geert Wilders went further still, hailing her outright as “the new president of France.” Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini framed the moment as one for the people rather than the judges, urging her to let the “word pass from the judges to the citizens,” and Vox leader Santiago Abascal saw in her “fight and courage” the makings of “a great president of the Republic.” Others read the verdict less as vindication than as a near-miss: Krzysztof Bosak, Deputy Speaker of Poland’s Sejm and leader of the National Movement, welcomed it for averting an “extremely dangerous precedent” that would have seen the opposition’s frontrunner judicially shut out of the race, while Vlaams Belang leader Tom Van Grieken struck a warier note, insisting the electronic monitor that remains shows “what the system wants: the opposition in chains, democracy on a leash, the people gagged.” Across these otherwise divergent reactions runs the same thread: for a populist right that casts itself as under siege by an unelected judiciary, Le Pen’s continued candidacy reads not as one party’s legal drama but as validation of their own fight.

Indeed, there is another issue at stake at the European Union level. In its ruling, the appeals court explicitly justified the reduction of the period of ineligibility by citing “the voter’s freedom of choice, a prerequisite for the exercise of democratic suffrage.” This legal reasoning risks fuelling a narrative promoted by the European far right, already echoed in 2025 by figures such as Orbán, that legal proceedings against populist leaders amount to political persecution rather than a simple application of the law. The trial of Marine Le Pen is allowing for “a faint chorus of dissent against the democratic institutional framework” to grow, confides a French political historian. “The RN has revived an old political argument: every time […] there has been […] political and financial misconduct […] it was a conspiracy by the judges or even a conspiracy by political opponents.” This debate extends beyond France: it echoes similar controversies in Romania, Slovakia, and elsewhere in Central Europe, where populist movements have denounced legal proceedings targeting them.

2027 on probation

The appeal to the Court of Cassation also creates an unprecedented situation: a candidate leading the French polls would campaign under a judicial sword of Damocles, with a ruling not expected until late 2026 or early 2027, a tight window given how close that is to the election itself. Two scenarios follow. If the high court rules before the first round on 18 April 2027, Le Pen could be forced to resume wearing the electronic ankle monitor just weeks before the vote, a major logistical and political handicap for the RN candidate. If, instead, the ruling comes after the election and she has already won, the question of presidential immunity would arise for the first time under the Fifth Republic: according to Franceinfo, she could invoke the mechanism that shields a sitting head of state from certain legal proceedings during their term. Either path would directly test the balance between the judicial and executive branches, an issue likely to reignite debate well beyond France. Le Pen’s legal case, in other words, is far from closed. By appealing to the Court of Cassation, she buys time, but the move changes the timeline, not the substance of the case. Either way, the Court of Cassation’s decision, expected in April, will mark a turning point in the coming presidential race, even before the French people have their say at the ballot box.

Članak Convicted but still running: What Marine Le Pen’s political gamble means for France and the rest of Europe se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Among the earliest attempts to translate this diagnosis into a concrete, detailed, and structured proposal was the Staged Accession Model. Co-developed by the European Policy Centre (CEP-Belgrade) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 2021, the Model has set the stage for subsequent discussions on how to reanimate the enlargement policy. As 2026 marks five years since its inception, the following article situates the Model within the ongoing enlargement debate, examines which of its ideas have gained policy traction, and highlights those that are yet to be taken up.

Mapping out the Debates: Where does the Model stand?

The ongoing wave of discussions on how to reimagine enlargement policy has produced two categories of concepts. The first includes proposals that insist on the need for EU enlargement to become more gradual, credible, and politically rewarding before accession itself, so as to incentivise long-delayed reforms. On this front, the European Council adopted “gradual integration” in 2022 as the new official approach to enlargement. While often used interchangeably with terms such as “phasing-in” or “accelerated integration”, it was intentionally framed in broad terms, leaving enough space for more specific ideas to emerge as to how closer integration could be operationalised.

The second category includes ideas designed to address concerns that the Union might become dysfunctional as it acquires new members, assuming that the current institutional and decision-making system remains in place. Here, proxy models for full membership, such as “single market membership”, “associated membership”, and “reversed membership” come to mind as temporary solutions, offering interim steps for candidates while buying the Union more time to reform itself internally so that it can adequately absorb newcomers.

The reader might wonder where the Staged Accession Model fits within these debates. Its unique value lies in the fact that it bridges the two previously described categories of enlargement-related concepts, while having full membership as the final goal.

On the one hand, it envisaged linking access to increased institutional and financial benefits to the level of reforms achieved during the pre-accession period. By doing so in a gradual, merit-based, and reversible manner, the proposal was intended to increase the predictability and credibility of the entire process, thereby unlocking the political will of candidate countries to undertake essential reforms.

On the other hand, it addressed concerns about the difficulties of decision-making in an enlarged but unreformed Union by introducing temporary veto limitations and enhanced post-accession safeguards for new member states. This was intended to ensure that enlargement could proceed even if the EU’s internal reforms remained unfinished by the time a candidate country fulfilled the accession requirements.

Taken together, through these pre- and post-accession arrangements, the Model offered a unique and balanced response to the concerns of existing member states and the needs of candidate countries.

Tracking the Policy Uptake: How does the Model stand?

The Model’s ideas have made their mark on the EU’s approach to enlargement across four key policy areas, to varying degrees.

First, the Model’s proposal for more substantial but conditional financial incentives was brought to life in the form of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (NGP). When the Model originally came out with this approach, it highlighted that such a step would help reduce the socio-economic convergence gap, strengthen domestic absorption capacities, and reduce the space for the involvement of malign external actors.

Today, the Reform and Growth Facility for 2024–2027 links financial support to reform agendas, with payments conditional on concrete quantitative and qualitative steps. In the words of the head of DG ENEST, the NGP represents “a form of staged accession”, as it provides increased financial incentives to candidate countries in a gradual, merit-based, and reversible manner. Importantly, the NGP not only incorporates the Model’s underlying logic but also broadly reflects its approach to the scale of additional funding made available to candidate countries.

The Model is set to regain relevance as the EU prepares a new Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF 2028–2034), particularly in debates on increasing pre-accession funding and making it fully conditional on reforms.

Second, the Model’s proposal for gradual institutional participation has recently been taken up by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In a letter to the heads of EU institutions, he called for the exploration of “innovative solutions”, including gradually opening the doors of EU institutions to candidate countries.

When the Model advanced this proposal, the intended benefits were threefold: it would provide a strong incentive for reforms by linking access to institutions with the level of progress, thereby complementing financial incentives; facilitate the socialisation of candidate countries’ representatives with their EU counterparts while giving them a voice in policy discussions; and encourage candidates to gradually build up their administrative capacities, enabling them to effectively assume membership obligations once negotiations are completed.

The Model’s focus was on the EU Council, while also advocating for inclusion of candidates in other EU institutions such as the European Parliament and Comitology, including different agencies. As Chancellor Merz has called for the establishment of a special Task Force on the matter, the Model’s blueprint for gradual institutional participation is well-placed to move from concept to concrete policy.

Third, the Model’s emphasis on post-accession safeguard clauses has now become a reality, with the Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos spearheading this approach. Recognising the dangers of keeping enlargement on hold pending the Union’s internal reform, the Model proposed enhanced safeguards to ensure that conditionality does not end on the day of accession, especially in areas such as the rule of law.

These can be understood as legal provisions set out in Acts of Accession that allow the EU to take corrective measures if a new member state fails to uphold its commitments during a predetermined period following accession. Building upon existing precedents, the Model made the case that longer, wider, and more precise safeguards should emerge not as a mere technical add-on to Acts of Accession, as was largely the case in the past. Instead, these are to be relied upon as important means of ensuring that newcomers are welcomed without undue delay, yet effectively kept in check even when the pre-accession conditionality is gone.

With Montenegro’s Act of Accession currently being drafted, it provides a good testing ground for a new generation of safeguard clauses, so that such an approach can be applied in future rounds of enlargement.

Fourth, the Model’s proposal to temporarily limit post-accession veto powers remains its most politically sensitive element, albeit one that is increasingly being contemplated. Accounting for member states’ credible fears that newcomers could unilaterally misuse their vetoes in areas such as foreign or enlargement policy, the Model presented veto limitations as a measure of last resort to ensure that candidate countries do not face closed doors despite having completed the required reforms.

The proposal may prove necessary to avoid such a damaging scenario, particularly as timely internal reform of the Union cannot be taken for granted. In that case, any limitation would be temporary, limited in scope, and subject to automatic expiry – all codified in an Act of Accession – thus avoiding the creation of a second-class membership.

In practice, given that it touches upon equality of member states, no institution or member state has overtly championed it. Nevertheless, the proposal has entered political discussions, as illustrated by the Albanian Prime Minister’s continued public support for the idea. Naturally, this issue will be of prime importance for the Union in considering Ukraine’s accession.

What is the Model’s legacy?

Five years on, the Model’s greatest legacy lies in the fact that it has succeeded in completely rehauling the enlargement conversation: no one now defends the old binary, all-or-nothing enlargement model. While it is far from being adopted as a coherent architecture, parts of the proposal have entered the EU’s core vocabulary and policy thinking.

Indeed, the language of gradual integration, intermediate benefits, conditional funding, and post-accession safeguards – all presented as innovative solutions to the challenges facing enlargement – has become part of the EU’s everyday discourse. Importantly, even with such a track record, the Model’s potential is far from being fully exploited.

Views expressed in the Opinion section belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of European Western Balkans.

Originally published on European Western Balkans.

Članak From Concept to Realization: The Staged Accession Model, five years on se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

“It’s the first time in years, I actually feel that my vote can make a change,” the woman sitting across from me on the train said as we pulled into Budapest Nyugati. She hadn’t voted in the previous elections because she felt there were no real alternatives, “but now,” she added, with a meaningful look, “there is a real opportunity.”

When I entered a polling station (PS) in central Pécs at 5:30 in the morning with a colleague and our interpreter, our three-person delegation almost went unnoticed in the buzz of election-day preparations. The energy inside contrasted starkly with the still-sleepy city outside. Identifying ourselves as international observers with the Agora Election Observation Mission, we received some inquisitive looks from the PS members, before they were forced to temporarily suppress their curiosity and return to their duties. After all, the PS had to open their doors for the first voters at 6:00.

The city of Pécs, located in Baranya county in southern Hungary, is a student city of about 140,000 people. Its economy is historically centered on mining, while more recently the city has shifted its focus to developing the tourism sector, and is one of only two Hungarian cities to have received the title of ‘European Capital of Culture’^[1]. Moreover, Pécs ranks as one of Hungary’s most multicultural cities, particularly for German and Croatian minorities. Perhaps for those reasons, it has been somewhat of a laboratory for opposition success. Both in 2018 and 2022, Pécs District 1 was one of the rural districts where no Fidesz-KDNP candidate won an individual victory, largely due to opposition withdrawals and unification behind a single candidate^[2] – a pattern repeated in the 2026 elections.

“Free but not Fair”

As a short-term observer (STO) with Agora, a youth-focused international election observation organisation, the historic 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections, which featured a record turnout of nearly 80%^[3], made for an exceptionally exciting first deployment. Essentially a contest between 16-year incumbent Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, the latter’s two-thirds supermajority victory was not a given in an electoral environment that the OSCE has repeatedly described as “free but not fair” since 2014^[4]. In the days prior to the elections, I was briefed together with the other Agora observers on the institutional-electoral architecture, media environment, and political situation of marginalized communities in the country.

It is important to underline that Orbán built and consolidated the system in his favor for 16 years, using his two-thirds supermajority, Fidesz amended Hungary’s constitution a staggering fifteen times, packed the Constitutional Court, and redesigned the electoral framework. Constituency boundaries were gerrymandered, and a ‘winner’s compensation’ mechanism ensured that Orbán could count on a supermajority. Hungary’s minority list system creates what the European Court of Human Rights ruled to be structural disenfranchisement^[5], as minority voters lose their standard party list vote when participating in minority representation.

Orbán’s so-called “system of national sovereignty” systematically marginalized vulnerable communities, proving remarkably effective at limiting the sovereignty of its own citizens. The repressive “Transparency in Public Life” foreign agents bill would allow the government to blacklist NGOs receiving foreign funding, including EU grants, requiring prior authorization for any support. Constitutional amendments banned LGBTQ+ public events, including last year’s Budapest pride, which in an ironic turn subsequently saw its biggest turnout to date.

Election Day: Continued

I felt an energetic atmosphere from the first polling station we observed onwards. As we continued throughout the day along the randomly selected route we had planned the day before, this tangible charge in the air did not change. This was not just a feeling: every time I asked the question “what is the turnout so far?” – a standard question on our observer form – the data confirmed the high turnout. The high international interest was also manifestly visible as we ran into no less than four other international observation missions during the day. Aside from the well-established international missions like the OSCE’s ODIHR, the 2026 election also attracted partisan observer groups like the Polish Liberty Coalition, seeking to legitimize predetermined narratives and operating without an internationally recognized methodology.

The organization of the polling station itself was a reflection of the mutual distrust between the two main opposing parties: both Fidesz and Tisza had announced that they would have party representatives in each polling station as part of the core team. In my experience, this resulted in a high engagement within the democratic process itself and did not lead to any observable tension within the PS. Interestingly, political parties organized warm lunch deliveries for their own PS members. The result was that parties with more financial means, read: Fidesz, could offer their PS members a nicer lunch, producing a nutritional hierarchy of sorts.

Dietary stratification aside, the day passed in orderly fashion. The main irregularities I observed personally were limited to multiple instances of family voting, where multiple people, often family members, go into the voting booth together, thereby foregoing the secrecy of the vote. However, our parallel observation team, whose route covered more villages on the outskirts of the district, had some interesting stories to tell, including a fake bomb threat and second-hand stories of vote-buying – stories that seemed to echo the craziness of the days leading up to the election^[6].

Uneasy Undertones

At 19:00 the PS closed and counting began. The mood of certain PS members visibly turned celebratory as results streamed in via live news coverage, prompting one Fidesz member to sharply warn a jubilant Tisza colleague against ‘being provocative.’

We ended our night at the tabulation center located in the town hall, the place where the results of all PS were gathered. We could hear the festivities in the adjacent main square getting increasingly louder. When Orbán – much to everyone’s surprise – conceded early in the evening, a civil servant in the office had to close the window so the (still audible) celebration outside would not disturb the final procedures. The reason for this excitement was clear: a landslide Tisza victory with a two-thirds constitutional majority – a requirement for properly changing the Fidesz system.

The lady on the train had been right: her vote could make a change. For sixteen years, Orbán’s model of ‘illiberal democracy’ had become a template studied from Warsaw to Washington and beyond. From Pécs to every capital where leaders have learned to hollow out democracy from within, April 12th proved that even carefully skewed systems can still surprise their architects – something that must make many an authoritarian leader uncomfortable.

Read the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions here:

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Agora EOM

^[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Capital_of_Culture

^[2]https://telex.hu/valasztasi-foldrajz/2024/05/25/onkormanyzati-valasztas-baranya-megye-Pécs-szigetvar-mohacs

^[3]https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-election-2026-live-viktor-Orbáns-fidesz-faces-challenge-opposition-peter-2026-04-12/

^[4] https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/121098

^[5] https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-220672%22]}

^[6] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj60x206dx1o

Članak Free but not Fair: Observing the Hungarian Elections in Pécs se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Autonomy in the first place.

Although Cyprus points out that Europe has faced complex and existential crises before – managing to respond to the demands of the times through evolution and strengthening of its capacities – this time it is recognised that the challenge is far greater. Cyprus warns that what is new is “intensity, plurality and complexity of the challenges”. For this reason, strengthening European autonomy is “the necessary next step of our evolving European integration project”. That is why the Cypriots have chosen “An Autonomous Union” as their slogan. However, the second part of the slogan refers to it being “Open to the World”. This is in direct contrast to US attempts to defend its national interests in the first place, at the expense of all the international achievements to date – such as the United Nations and the building of free trade regimes – to which it has contributed the most. In this way, the message is sent that a more autonomous EU – more self-sufficient and capable – will not contradict its current vision of the global order.

Achieving these objectives will primarily require strengthening the Union’s capacity to act as an autonomous security actor, with capacities capable of responding to growing challenges. As Cypriot President Christodoulidis pointed out, an autonomous Union is first and foremost a secure Union. As he further emphasizes, Cyprus has “first-hand knowledge of the importance of defending a state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence”. Building on the achievements of the Danish Presidency, Cyprus aims to accelerate the implementation of the so-called White Paper for European Defence, which entails the strengthening of all the Union’s capabilities by 2030, as well as all accompanying defence initiatives, such as the Common Defence Fund (SAFE) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) Essentially, Cyprus will continue to do what its Trio partners have been doing, which is to support a multidimensional security agenda.

At the same time, Cyprus can be expected to strive for a stronger EU engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Cyprus unreservedly supports its support for Ukraine, emphasis will also be placed on the immediate security environment of this member state. On the one hand, for Cyprus, nuanced relations with Turkey are of importance. Since Turkey invaded the northern part of Cyprus, Nicosia has no effective control over that part of the territory. This is an aggravating circumstance, given that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus either – and prevents its ships from sailing into Turkish ports or planes flying over Turkish territory – while at the same time Turkey is a member of the EU’s Customs Union and a necessary partner for managing numerous crises, from migration to Ukraine. On the other hand, geographically close to the Middle East, Cyprus will insist on  a New Pact for the Mediterranean as a way to strengthen the Union’s strategic interests in the region, including humanitarian efforts and assistance to Gaza. It is therefore not surprising that developments in the Mediterranean represent the alpha and omega, i.e. a key landmark for understanding Cypriot foreign policy, and that Cyprus will insist on placing an increased focus on this geographical area as well.

Competitiveness as an indispensable necessity

As has been seen in the first weeks since Cyprus  took over the presidency, the word competitiveness has dominated key European political and expert discussions. Cyprus is among the member states that undoubtedly recognise the fact that strengthening the EU’s autonomy at all levels is intrinsically linked to improving its global competitiveness. Since Mario Draghi published his report in 2024 – which pointed out that without changing the over-dependence on mainstream players, the Union cannot survive as a relevant and sustainable actor – Europeans’ eyes have been opened. In line with the newly acquired insights, the steps to be taken during the Cypriot presidency will relate to further work on simplifying procedures, cutting red tape and strengthening the single market. At the beginning of February, the members discussed the possibility, which Cyprus also spoke about at the very beginning of its mandate, to implement all these steps in 2026, without further delay.

These discussions are gaining importance because the Cypriot presidency is expected to intensify negotiations in the Council on the Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2028-2034. The key message of the proponents of its increase is that without significant budgetary breakthroughs, there can be no strengthening of competitiveness. The Commission has previously come up with an ambitious proposal to almost double the budget, reaching €2 trillion. While Cyprus will undoubtedly be – as a country that is a net recipient of funds from the EU budget – in favour of increasing overall financial allocations in the future, it will have the demanding task of reconciling the positions of its members, given that many net-recipients have stood by the Commission, while more frugal ones, such as Germany, have immediately expressed their scepticism and belief that the budget will have to be significantly revised and reduced. As in the case of competitiveness, Cyprus’ ambition is to reach a common position on the future financial framework this year. Practice, however, shows that this is an ambitious goal, especially if we take into account that negotiations on this “hot potato” are being conducted almost until the last day of the deadline.

Enlargement and the Sculpture Programme

There are several reasons why the Cypriot presidency comes at a turning point for many candidate countries.

• Ukraine has begun publicly demanding membership in the Union in 2027, and the events during the Cypriot presidency will certainly determine its further European path. Although it is widely known that it is impossible for it to meet all the conditions for membership by then, that is, to fully harmonize with the EU acquis and demonstrate its effective implementation, Ukrainian President Zelensky insists that by the end of the year, much-needed steps will be taken in the most important areas. The possibility of including a year of membership in an agreement that should end Russian aggression, and which should provide guarantees to Ukraine that it will be able to count on European partners in the future, is currently being scrutinised. Currently, the EU has informally opened three clusters with Ukraine through the so-called frontloading procedure proposed by Denmark. If the goal is to help Ukraine on its European path in a timely manner, the talks on the opening of the remaining clusters can be expected in the coming months.

• From the Western Balkans, this year is the most important for Montenegro. This is a country that has managed to close a large number of chapters with exceptional speed, and whose leadership insisted on completing all its reforms by the end of this year. This implied that the Union would also be proportionately responsive, i.e. that it would continue to close the negotiating chapters. With the support of Cyprus, the closure of up to ten chapters is being considered. The fact that, at the beginning of the Cypriot mandate, Chapter 32 was closed – which covers financial control (an area within the Fundamentals cluster) – is a step in the right direction. In addition, in line with the conclusions of the end of 2025, Cyprus intends to launch an ad hoc working group for the drafting of an accession treaty with Montenegro. As the Cypriot Ambassador to Serbia stated, the formation of this group would be a “point of no return”. If the described intentions of Cyprus are really realized, it will really send a message that Montenegro’s ambition to become the 28^th member in 2028 is within realistic possibilities.

• In addition to Montenegro, Albania has so far managed to break records, opening all six clusters in a very short time. During the Cypriot Presidency, the most significant step forward would be the adoption of a positive decision and the adoption of the interim benchmark assessment report (IBAR), in order to start closing the chapters. This would be a turning point for Tirana, given that Montenegro entered its final phase just after resolving the IBAR hurdle in 2024. With the support of Cyprus, the goal is to close several chapters. It is too early to know whether this ambition will be achieved, especially considering that the most difficult part of the job for Albania is just beginning. A breakthrough in this field would send a message that Albania can make progress towards becoming a member of the Union in the foreseeable future, right next to Montenegro.

• As for the other candidates, although they are less in focus, Cyprus will try to keep them on the Union’s agenda. For example, Moldova, like Ukraine, managed to informally open three clusters with the help of the frontloading procedure. Now the goal is to open the remaining clusters as well. Although there is no mention of a target year for its membership, there is a possibility of separating the Moldova and Ukraine processes, especially if they work with Ukraine to define the year of membership as part of the peace negotiations. When  it comes to Serbia, Cyprus will insist that Belgrade has met the  technical criteria for the opening of Cluster 3. Although it is too early to say whether Cyprus will be able to convince other member states to open the cluster, the fact is that the chances of doing so will increase only if Serbia further shows readiness to fulfil the key rule of law reforms it has committed to and to align its foreign policy with the vision of the Union. For these countries, therefore, the political benevolence of Cyprus will not mean an automatic acceleration of the process.

Taking all factors into account, Cyprus will face the delicate task of balancing geopolitical imperatives with the need to preserve the Union’s legal and functional integrity. Although the ultimate outcome of these processes cannot be known, it can be expected that Cyprus, as a traditional supporter of enlargement, will certainly seek to secure support for the candidate countries in order to send the message that membership is within reach for those willing to extend their hand. At the same time, given expectations that the Commission will present its pre-enlargement policy reviews, Cyprus is likely to promoting enlargement policy as an integral component of the Union’s broader, internal reforms.

Originally published on EUpravozato.

Članak Cyprus Now Heads the EU Council – What Does it Mean for the EU and the Western Balkans? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Against this backdrop, meaningful reform of enlargement policy, and its ultimate success, will depend on a forward-looking joint commitment between the EU and candidate countries. Rather than waiting for reluctant member states or candidates to ‘give in’ to peer pressure – whether to streamline enlargement or to accept post-accession specificities – this article outlines the following quid pro quo arrangement: the EU delivers simplification and predictability during the pre-accession period, while candidate countries accept transitional post-accession measures to safeguard the Union’s functionality.

The EU’s side of the commitment: marking enlargement work

The current enlargement policy still struggles to accommodate today’s geopolitical realities and the growing number of aspirants. To maintain both credibility and efficiency, the EU needs practical adjustments that can boost the accession process without requiring a treaty change. The following proposals outline how the Union could restore enlargement as a functional and credible policy for candidates.

1. Closing clusters instead of chapters

A practical way to streamline the accession process would be to start closing six thematic clusters rather than 35 individual chapters. When the revised enlargement methodology was introduced in 2020, it established that negotiations on each cluster would open as a whole rather than on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Such an approach has significantly simplified the decision-making process by reducing the number of Council decisions at the early stage of accession talks by about 80%. There is no reason why the same logic could not be applied at later stages as well. Although this would increase the political weight of each decision, the upside is that member states would need to agree only six times instead of 35.^[3] Revising the approach would not be a silver bullet, as vetoes would remain in place;^[4] it would nonetheless signal that the EU is serious about increasing the predictability of the process.^[5]

2. Reinforcing qualified majority voting

Although the debate on qualified majority voting (QMV) has resurfaced, a clear pathway toward its application in the enlargement process has been missing. Perhaps the EU needs to look beyond classical QMV; instead, a more balanced solution could be found in the lesser-known option of reinforced QMV. Unlike QMV, which requires 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the EU’s population, the reinforced one would require 65% of member states representing 72% of the EU population – raising the bar from roughly 15 to 21 states for a decision to be adopted. Opting for this approach would preserve member states’ sense of control to an extent, while preventing paralysis caused by a single veto.

3. Linking institutional participation to progress

Gradual integration, endorsed by the European Council in 2022, allows candidates to enjoy some membership benefits before accession. Thus far, however, the focus has been mostly on financial aspects such as grants or loans, as well as partial single market access. Yet the potential of gradual institutional participation remains largely unused. Linking progress on clusters and chapters to increased access to EU bodies would bridge the gap that currently exists between candidates and member states. The more a candidate advances, the more it should have opportunities to engage with EU institutions – and vice versa – allowing future members to ‘practice’ membership and strengthen preparedness before accession.^[6]

4. Establishing an accession calendar

Predictability is essential for credibility. The EU should formalise what it already does informally – support candidates’ internal timelines – by publishing an official Accession Calendar. Jointly prepared by the Commission and the Council, it would set indicative target dates for each candidate, regularly updated in the annual Enlargement Package and Council Conclusions. This would not guarantee membership for a fixed year but would create a shared roadmap, fostering accountability and coherence across institutions.

Candidates’ side of the commitment: safeguarding an enlarged Union

As the EU undertakes internal adjustments to make the process more workable, candidates would be expected to demonstrate their commitment by accepting post-accession transitional measures – designed to preserve the Union’s functionality and safeguard the application of accepted obligations and shared values. The logic behind these measures would be to increase the likelihood of successful enlargement even if the EU does not complete its own internal reforms in time, such as abandoning, or at least reducing, the use of the veto in the Council.

1. Introducing post-accession veto limitations

To ensure that the Union’s decision-making capacity is not hindered by enlargement, candidate countries could agree to temporary restrictions on their use of veto powers after accession.^[7] Depending on the outcome of political negotiations, these could cover all areas currently subject to unanimity or be limited to key fields such as foreign policy or further enlargements. Importantly, such limitations would not create second-tier membership as they would only apply for a predefined period (e.g. up to 10 years), while expiring automatically after it elapses. At the same time, a proposal of this kind would be accompanied by the so-called “emergency brake mechanism”, allowing candidates to protect their vital national interests. Such an arrangement would go a long way toward winning over those member states whose populations still hold a predominantly enlargement-sceptic view.

2. Embedding safeguard clauses

Building on existing precedents, safeguard clauses should be strengthened and systematically applied in all future accession treaties. Drawing on the Internal Market Safeguard Clause and the Justice and Home Affairs Safeguard Clause used in Croatia’s Accession Treaty, such provisions largely cover essential areas. Besides already being linked to justice, freedom and security (Chapter 24), public procurement (Chapter 5), economic criteria (a subarea of the Fundamental cluster), and four freedoms (Chapters 1-4), the clauses should be extended to cover rule-of-law and governance failures. If a new member were to undermine fair competition, judicial independence, or anti-corruption standards, these clauses should allow the Union to temporarily suspend access to funds, programmes, or specific cooperation mechanisms until compliance is restored. Moreover, extending the activation period from three (as referred to in prior Accession Acts) to ten years after accession would further enhance the EU’s capacity to respond to delayed backsliding.^[8]

3. Establishing a monitoring mechanism during the ratification period

Ending the accession talks should not mark the end of reform efforts but the beginning of their consolidation. The Monitoring Clause – introduced for the first time in Croatia’s Accession Treaty – enabled the Commission to closely monitor all commitments undertaken during the final phase of negotiations. Its strength lay in the fact that it fully covered the rule-of-law domain. Moreover, if issues of concern are identified, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, would have the power to “take all appropriate measures”. The exact measures are never listed, which is something future accession treaties should correct.

4. Introducing a postponement clause

Recognising the risks of premature accession, the Postponement Clause – first appearing in the Accession Act of Bulgaria and Romania – allowed the EU to delay entry if there was a serious risk that an acceding country would be “manifestly unprepared” to meet membership criteria by the scheduled accession date. The mechanism placed the European Commission at the centre of monitoring, assessing compliance with judicial, anti-corruption, and governance reforms. If compliance fell short, the Council could, on a Commission recommendation, postpone accession “by one year”: acting unanimously as a general rule, or even by qualified majority in certain cases specified for Romania. Applied in future enlargements, such a clause would give the EU additional leverage to secure final reform commitments before accession.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the success of both pre-accession and post-accession reform debates will depend on whether the EU and candidate countries can meet halfway. By accepting transitional post-accession measures as a gesture of solidarity, candidates can help address legitimate concerns among current member states about decision-making paralysis or governance backsliding in an enlarged Union. In turn, such political reassurance would make it easier for the EU to simplify procedures, reduce veto points, and increase predictability for candidates. Such an approach would render the enlargement policy fit to deliver and ensure that the Union can function effectively even as its membership grows.

[1] In just a few months, several new ideas have surfaced in the debate on reforming the EU’s enlargement policy. In September, the media reported that Austria, Italy, Germany, and Slovenia jointly called for proposals to simplify and streamline the accession methodology, reflecting growing recognition that the current framework is too cumbersome. Soon after, European Council President António Costa revived the discussion on introducing Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for the technical stages of enlargement, echoing the 2024 German-Slovenian non-paper. Together, these initiatives signal a renewed political appetite to modernise the process and reduce the role of unilateral vetoes in shaping the EU’s enlargement agenda.

[2] The debate, however, has not been limited to the pre-accession phase. What makes this period particularly notable is the concentration of proposals focused on the post-accession stage. It began with a POLITICO article suggesting that new members could face temporary limits on their veto rights upon joining the Union. Soon after, the Enlargement Commissioner confirmed that discussions were underway on a potential “probation period” with unprecedented restrictions, accompanied by robust rule of law safeguard clauses to deter and reduce the danger of post-accession backsliding. As one Commission official put it, the EU is entering an era of “new-generation accession treaties”.

[3] Such a shift would require that reforms and plans for closing individual chapters reflect the cluster structure, which may in turn mean either accepting later closure of certain chapters or accelerating work on others to ensure simultaneous closure.

[4] A potential criticism of this proposal is that it could risk de-dynamising the process, as a single member state’s veto might jeopardise the closure of chapters that are otherwise ready. This is a reasonable concern. However, the assumption here is that, by the time a cluster closure is feasible, the political cost of blocking an entire cluster would be substantially higher than that of objecting to an individual chapter. Accordingly, an act of cluster blockage would be an act of significant political escalation, one that member states would be far less likely to undertake except in cases of genuinely fundamental concern.

[5] Alternatively, moving toward closure at the cluster level could be understood as a political objective rather than a rigid rule. This would still allow the EU to navigate the final stages of accession talks with a candidate from a more structured, cluster-based perspective. It would also preserve the flexibility to withhold agreement on a specific chapter when a member state raises substantive concerns, without jeopardising the closure of other chapters within the same cluster.

[6] The proposal’s application entailed granting candidate countries the right to be invited to the Council’s working parties – once the Fundamentals Cluster is opened – in areas corresponding to the opened clusters. Participation would then evolve by inviting the candidates to COREPER and ministerial-level meetings – after receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) for the Fundamentals Cluster – in areas covered by closed chapters. In this way, participation would be both gradual and merit-based, while also giving greater political weight to the act of opening a cluster or closing a chapter.

[7] The optimal outcome, of course, would be for the Union’s internal reforms to be implemented in a timely manner, rendering any form of veto limitation for the newcomers unnecessary. However, experience demonstrates that this is not a realistic expectation at present. It all comes down to avoiding a scenario in which a candidate has fulfilled all membership criteria, yet its Act of accession cannot be successfully ratified in all member states. Consider France, where ratification requires either a three-fifths majority in the French Parliament or approval through a referendum. This proposal, therefore, offers a mechanism designed to ease the concerns of those member states that fear the Union could become more dysfunctional as it admits new members. It would allow the EU to preserve its capacity to advance internal reforms without the risk of newly admitted states misusing their veto power. The proposal, therefore, represents a measure of last, but potentially necessary, resort.

[8] The 2025 Enlargement Package shows that the Commission is on the right track when it comes to the development of safeguard clauses. It explicitly states: “To ensure that new Member States continue to safeguard and maintain their track-record on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, the Commission considers that future Accession Treaties should contain stronger safeguards against backsliding on commitments made during the accession negotiations”.

Originally posted to Friends of Europe.

Članak A Quid Pro Quo Approach to Enlargement Reform: Streamlining Accession while Safeguarding the Union se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.