A race against deadlines

When the European Commission presented the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans in November 2023, it announced a historic shift in the Union’s relationship with the region. One of its key components is the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans introduced in May 2024, which replaces the previous logic of pre-accession funding with the principle of “performance-based financing” under which every euro is disbursed only once beneficiaries have actually implemented the previously agreed reform steps. By adopting the Reform Agenda in October 2024, Serbia fulfilled the first requirement for gaining access to its envelope worth €1.58 billion (out of a total available amount of €5.6 billion in grants and loans for the entire region).[1] That funding, however, is conditional upon the fulfilment of 98 concrete, measurable and pre-defined reform steps within clearly established deadlines. Under this framework, delayed reforms carry an immediate and measurable cost.

To grasp the scale of Serbia’s opportunity cost up to January 2026 – when the Commission gave the green light for the release of funds for the first and, so far, only time, in response to the fulfilment of both the preconditions and certain reform steps – one has to consider how much funding was available for that period. After deducting the pre-financing from the total pre-defined amount per semester,[2] the figures come to €104.1 million for the second semester of 2024, €151.5 million for the first semester of 2025, and €246.3 million for the second semester of 2025. This means that, had Belgrade done everything it originally committed to within the given deadlines, it would now have had €501.9 million at its disposal. Instead, the Commission responded positively only to Serbia’s first request, establishing that merely three out of seven steps had been fulfilled, thereby releasing only €56.5 million net (after the deduction of pre-financing). This indicates that as much as 89% of the funds envisaged for the given period remained undrawn, amounting to a serious opportunity cost of €445.4 million.

What is at stake this summer

All eyes are now on the Commission, which has yet to assess whether Serbia meets the democratic preconditions.[3] It has already sent a clear message that Serbia is falling behind, given that Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia were granted new funds back in May 2026, while Belgrade has received no additional funding since January. This gap emerged amid a substantial deterioration following the adoption of the so-called Mrdić laws, which called into question whether Serbia continued to meet the democratic preconditions for drawing down the funds. This is also why there has been no response so far to Serbia’s second, third and fourth requests for the release of funds. Although the Commission has in the meantime found that a degree of progress has been made – both in undoing the damage done to judicial reform and through certain formal steps forward regarding the media regulatory body (the REM Council) and the electoral legal framework – it has yet to issue its official assessment which would offer clear insight into how it evaluates the “situation on the ground” from the perspective of the Facility. Until that happens, the funds remain de facto frozen.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Commission’s suddenly intensified support for the opening of Cluster 3 reflects its readiness to soon officially confirm that Serbia once again meets the preconditions. This raises the question of how much funding Serbia could count on in that case. In fact, by cross-referencing the number of reform steps planned per semester in the Reform Agenda with the percentage of reform steps Serbia has fulfilled – recently revealed by the Director-General for Enlargement, Gert Jan Koopman – it is possible to draw conclusions about what lies ahead. While Montenegro and Albania are implementing around 80% of their reform commitments, and North Macedonia half of them, Serbia stands at a mere 35% – only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, both blocked by internal political crises, rank lower. As for the concrete steps, out of a total of 98 steps envisaged by the end of 2027, Serbia committed to seven for the second semester of 2024, 10 for the first semester of 2025 and 20 for the second semester of 2025.[4] Cross-referencing Koopman’s assessment with the total of 37 steps for the period in question suggests that Serbia has fulfilled 13 reform steps – at least from the Commission’s point of view.[5] This means that even in the event of a positive assessment of the preconditions, Belgrade could not count on the automatic release of a significant share of the frozen funds for the given period.

The opportunity cost grows considerably once one takes into account that fulfilment of the reform steps planned for the first semester of 2026 will also be assessed in the period ahead. There are ten of them in total. Adding the €183.1 million allocated for the first semester of this year (likewise calculated after deducting the pre-financing share) to the previously mentioned €501.9 million for the first three semesters (July 2024 – December 2025) brings the amount at stake to €685 million. With only €56.5 million drawn down, Serbia has so far made use of just 8% of that potentially available amount. The risk that this percentage will not increase significantly is underscored by the fact that, by January 2026, Serbia had failed to fulfil nearly two-thirds of the envisaged reform steps on time, making it difficult to expect dramatically better performance in the first half of this year. Without clear political prioritisation of the timely implementation of reform steps and, in essence, a credible commitment to European integration, there is a serious risk that the largest part of the total available amount will remain undrawn, further deepening the gap between the promises contained in the Reform Agenda and Serbia’s actual reform performance.

The potential damage keeps growing

Even if the Commission were to release new funds on account of the fulfilment of a further ten reform steps – assuming that it once again decides to confirm that Serbia meets the democratic preconditions – Serbia risks irreversibly losing a significant portion of the money. Namely, the Facility included so-called “grace periods” for the fulfilment of reforms from the outset as it was correctly anticipated that countries across the region would miss some deadlines. For reforms scheduled for the second semester of 2024, the rules granted a two-year grace period, i.e. the possibility of completing them by the end of 2026. For all other semesters, the grace period is one year. In this context, it is therefore particularly relevant that the end of June 2026 marked the first turning point, as that was when the first grace period expired – the one for reforms originally planned for completion by the end of June 2025. The exact amount Serbia stands to lose will become clear once the Commission publishes how much of the total €151.5 million it is entitled to on the basis of the reform steps fulfilled. Should the Commission adhere strictly to the rules, the unallocated funds would amount to Serbia’s first irreversible financial loss and would then be redistributed to other countries in the region.

Although there have been warnings that Serbia is on the brink of losing between €109 million and €136 million, the potential damage grows further if we look towards the end of 2026. That will be the second turning point, as no fewer than two grace periods will expire: one for the reforms planned for the end of 2024 and the other for the reforms envisaged for the end of 2025. For the former, the net amount is €104.1 million, and for the latter, €246.3 million. Adding these two amounts to the one whose grace period expired at the end of June this year – and subtracting the €56.5 million already unlocked – yields a figure of up to €445.4 million that Serbia could irreversibly lose by the end of the year, with the final figure depending on the number of reform steps Serbia manages to fulfil before the relevant grace periods expire. Given the anticipated elections in Serbia – and the Commission’s warnings in its annual reports that electoral periods are times when reform progress tends to stall – the possibility that Serbia will make only minimal use of the Growth Plan should be taken seriously. Citizens would ultimately bear the greatest cost, particularly given that the Growth Plan was designed to help accelerate the accession process, strengthen domestic economic opportunities and, consequently, reduce the socio-economic gap with EU countries.

[1] The €5.6 billion figure represents what is genuinely available to the beneficiaries, as it excludes administrative and technical costs, as well as around €360 million set aside as insurance against loan default, from the total of €6 billion.

[2] In the summer of 2025, Serbia received pre-financing of €111 million, which was expected to serve as an initial impetus for the remaining reforms. That amount forms part of Serbia’s total allocation, and the calculations throughout the text deduct it proportionally to arrive at net figures.

[3] The Scoreboard under the Facility shows that Serbia has fulfilled 8% of the reform steps in its Reform Agenda for the period up to December 2025. That percentage has not been updated, even though Serbia has in the meantime fulfilled certain steps, because the preconditions had been called into question. Article 5 of the Facility stipulates that, alongside the dialogue on normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina, the preconditions require beneficiaries of the funds to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, free and fair elections, pluralistic media, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and to guarantee respect for all human rights obligations, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

[4]Although ten steps are envisaged for the first semester of 2026, it is unlikely that Koopman had that semester in mind as well, since the implementation deadline had only recently expired, meaning that the Commission will assess their fulfilment only in the period ahead.

[5] That is four steps more than civil society identified in its first independent monitoring report. The difference does not necessarily point to leniency on the Commission’s part, but rather to the fact that it has access to documentation that state institutions have not made available to civil society, as well as to the stricter criterion applied by the working group, according to which a step must not only be implemented but also be publicly verifiable.

Originally posted by Belgrade open school.

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Key Priorities under the Spotlight

Like other member states, Ireland will promote security; however, what makes it stand out is that it will do so as a militarily neutral country. As one of the rare non-NATO countries in the EU, its neutrality has defined its state identity, forged in the early days of the state as a means of asserting independence from Britain. What is more, it is even legally codified, insofar as the Irish Constitution prevents Ireland from joining a European army or mutual defence pact. On the EU level, its neutrality is further protected by legally binding guarantees in a Protocol attached to the Lisbon Treaty. This position allows Dublin to frame deeper cooperation not as abandonment of neutrality, but as a pragmatic response to cyber threats, hybrid warfare, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the wider geopolitical pressures created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and transatlantic uncertainty. While setting clear boundaries, the Presidency motto – “Strength with unity” – suggests that Ireland will seek to balance its distinctive position of military neutrality with security priorities, including the unification of the EU’s voice and accelerated defence integration of the Union. 

Besides continuing its support for Ukraine and maintaining punitive measures against Russia, the programme sets out a dense agenda for advancing the EU’s security and defence policy. First, Ireland will advance work on the new European Security Strategy by seeking to consolidate member-state positions on key security challenges ahead of its expected launch in the third quarter of 2026, ten years after the adoption of the EU Global Strategy. Second, it will seek to operationalise the measures contained in the White Paper on the Future of European Defence and the associated Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, including by promoting agreement on priority capability gaps and European Defence Projects of Common Interest. Third, it will focus on expanding joint defence procurement through and the revision of the Defence Procurement Directive, with the aim of making procurement more efficient, competitive and collaborative. Taken together, these points reflect Ireland’s stated ambition to promote the “evolution of the CSDP”.

Besides security – but nonetheless linked to it – from the first days of the Presidency, it is expected that competitiveness will be treated as a core priority across every Council formation. Concerning job creation, innovation and business growth, it is, as Irish Ambassador to Serbia Kevin Colgan framed it, a priority that most directly affects citizens. The centrepiece that will underpin the Presidency action in this area is the One Europe, One Market Roadmap, agreed by the EU Council, European Commission and the European Parliament in April 2026.  Shaped by the Draghi report and the shock of transatlantic trade tensions, the Roadmap rests on five building blocks: 1) reducing administrative burdens through “omnibus” simplification packages; 2) deepening the Single Market and lowering internal barriers; 3) securing economic and trade resilience by diversifying supply chains; 4) strengthening energy security alongside the green transition; and 5) boosting Europe’s digital and Artificial Intelligence capacity. The Presidency will also seek to advance flagship initiatives such as the EU Inc, among others. As the Roadmap contains half of the measures slated for the end of the year, the ability of the Irish Presidency to effectively coordinate this ambitious workload will determine the fate of the EU’s drive to make itself competitive again.

It is here that the MFF for 2028-2034 – a proposal worth close to €2 trillion – becomes the Presidency’s most delicate task, because the budget crystallises the deeper security and competitiveness dilemma dividing member states. For instance, Taoiseach Micheál Martin has pointed to “enormous pressure” from several capitals to spend more on defence and less on agriculture, while others defend or seek to increase Common Agricultural Policy funding. At the same time, the European Parliament will aim to maximise the MFF’s size, whereas multiple member states have already made it clear that the proposal, as it stands, already overextends realistic possibilities. Moreover, the time-pressure is high, particularly as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa want to secure a political agreement on the MFF before the end of 2026. In such a context, while drawing on its experience in successfully brokering an MFF in 2013, it will be up to Ireland, together with its Trio partners, to seize a narrowing window: with French elections approaching, President Macron is expected to grow more reluctant to take risky decisions, adding pressure to close a deal by the end of 2026.

What about Enlargement?

Crucially, enlargement is strongly embedded into Ireland’s priorities. Ireland held the Presidency of the Council in 2004, when the “Big Bang” enlargement took place. Now, Ireland explicitly states that it will work with all candidates and potential candidates to support them on their path to membership. It then differentiates by explicitly pointing out in its Programme that it will work towards “the completion of accession negotiations with Montenegro, and seek to make substantial progress in negotiations with Albania, Moldova and Ukraine”. Martin visited Montenegro in June and called completing everything in six months “challenging”, but confirmed it as Dublin’s goal to “break the back of this process” via intergovernmental conferences expected in the autumn. According to the Irish Ambassador to Serbia, that would be “the clearest signal that the system works”. Moreover, Dublin hopes to open the remaining clusters for Ukraine and Moldova, with Martin stating an ambition to open “as many as we possibly can” while insisting on a strictly merit-based approach. This explains why Marta Kos suggested the Irish Presidency could become “the most successful presidency after the 2004 big bang”.

While Serbia is not on the list of explicitly named countries in the Programme, it may be expected that Ireland will insist on the necessity to keep Belgrade close – where it has recently opened up an embassy as a token of recognition of its value – while insisting on the essential rule-of-law reforms to be conducted in a proper manner. As Serbia’s attempt to open Cluster 3 – with abruptly increased support by the European Commission and push by several member states – failed to materialise in the summer of 2026, this topic will surely resurface during the Irish presidency. While there is political goodwill in Dublin, it will not necessarily translate into automatic acceleration of Serbia’s path, as the outstanding issues still remain. Whatever might happen with Serbia – including other non-frontrunner countries of the region – Ireland is unusually well placed to carry the enlargement policy forward: it has never misused its veto right, has no bilateral disputes with any candidate, and is widely regarded in Brussels as a natural honest broker.

Finally, it will be up to Ireland to balance out the plans and ideas of member states on whether and to what extent to maximise the gradual integration and introduce new, specific post-accession arrangements for new member states. The ground was set for this, with several nonpapers being introduced during the summer, with Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Czechia, and Slovenia pushing for sectoral integration, Germany and France advocating for gradual institutional integration, and France and Germany coupled with the Benelux countries pushing for more robust post-accession safeguard clauses, while calling, among other things, for discussion on temporary veto limitations for newcomers. With consensus on any of these issues being far from reached, Ireland will have to account for a tight schedule for action, particularly as discussions on these matters are expected at the October European Council and possible decisions in December. This coincides with the acceleration of work on Montenegro’s Act of Accession, which is expected to be a suitable testing ground for new ideas, to be applicable to all the countries waiting in the queue.

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Among the earliest attempts to translate this diagnosis into a concrete, detailed, and structured proposal was the Staged Accession Model. Co-developed by the European Policy Centre (CEP-Belgrade) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 2021, the Model has set the stage for subsequent discussions on how to reanimate the enlargement policy. As 2026 marks five years since its inception, the following article situates the Model within the ongoing enlargement debate, examines which of its ideas have gained policy traction, and highlights those that are yet to be taken up.

Mapping out the Debates: Where does the Model stand?

The ongoing wave of discussions on how to reimagine enlargement policy has produced two categories of concepts. The first includes proposals that insist on the need for EU enlargement to become more gradual, credible, and politically rewarding before accession itself, so as to incentivise long-delayed reforms. On this front, the European Council adopted “gradual integration” in 2022 as the new official approach to enlargement. While often used interchangeably with terms such as “phasing-in” or “accelerated integration”, it was intentionally framed in broad terms, leaving enough space for more specific ideas to emerge as to how closer integration could be operationalised.

The second category includes ideas designed to address concerns that the Union might become dysfunctional as it acquires new members, assuming that the current institutional and decision-making system remains in place. Here, proxy models for full membership, such as “single market membership”, “associated membership”, and “reversed membership” come to mind as temporary solutions, offering interim steps for candidates while buying the Union more time to reform itself internally so that it can adequately absorb newcomers.

The reader might wonder where the Staged Accession Model fits within these debates. Its unique value lies in the fact that it bridges the two previously described categories of enlargement-related concepts, while having full membership as the final goal.

On the one hand, it envisaged linking access to increased institutional and financial benefits to the level of reforms achieved during the pre-accession period. By doing so in a gradual, merit-based, and reversible manner, the proposal was intended to increase the predictability and credibility of the entire process, thereby unlocking the political will of candidate countries to undertake essential reforms.

On the other hand, it addressed concerns about the difficulties of decision-making in an enlarged but unreformed Union by introducing temporary veto limitations and enhanced post-accession safeguards for new member states. This was intended to ensure that enlargement could proceed even if the EU’s internal reforms remained unfinished by the time a candidate country fulfilled the accession requirements.

Taken together, through these pre- and post-accession arrangements, the Model offered a unique and balanced response to the concerns of existing member states and the needs of candidate countries.

Tracking the Policy Uptake: How does the Model stand?

The Model’s ideas have made their mark on the EU’s approach to enlargement across four key policy areas, to varying degrees.

First, the Model’s proposal for more substantial but conditional financial incentives was brought to life in the form of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (NGP). When the Model originally came out with this approach, it highlighted that such a step would help reduce the socio-economic convergence gap, strengthen domestic absorption capacities, and reduce the space for the involvement of malign external actors.

Today, the Reform and Growth Facility for 2024–2027 links financial support to reform agendas, with payments conditional on concrete quantitative and qualitative steps. In the words of the head of DG ENEST, the NGP represents “a form of staged accession”, as it provides increased financial incentives to candidate countries in a gradual, merit-based, and reversible manner. Importantly, the NGP not only incorporates the Model’s underlying logic but also broadly reflects its approach to the scale of additional funding made available to candidate countries.

The Model is set to regain relevance as the EU prepares a new Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF 2028–2034), particularly in debates on increasing pre-accession funding and making it fully conditional on reforms.

Second, the Model’s proposal for gradual institutional participation has recently been taken up by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. In a letter to the heads of EU institutions, he called for the exploration of “innovative solutions”, including gradually opening the doors of EU institutions to candidate countries.

When the Model advanced this proposal, the intended benefits were threefold: it would provide a strong incentive for reforms by linking access to institutions with the level of progress, thereby complementing financial incentives; facilitate the socialisation of candidate countries’ representatives with their EU counterparts while giving them a voice in policy discussions; and encourage candidates to gradually build up their administrative capacities, enabling them to effectively assume membership obligations once negotiations are completed.

The Model’s focus was on the EU Council, while also advocating for inclusion of candidates in other EU institutions such as the European Parliament and Comitology, including different agencies. As Chancellor Merz has called for the establishment of a special Task Force on the matter, the Model’s blueprint for gradual institutional participation is well-placed to move from concept to concrete policy.

Third, the Model’s emphasis on post-accession safeguard clauses has now become a reality, with the Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos spearheading this approach. Recognising the dangers of keeping enlargement on hold pending the Union’s internal reform, the Model proposed enhanced safeguards to ensure that conditionality does not end on the day of accession, especially in areas such as the rule of law.

These can be understood as legal provisions set out in Acts of Accession that allow the EU to take corrective measures if a new member state fails to uphold its commitments during a predetermined period following accession. Building upon existing precedents, the Model made the case that longer, wider, and more precise safeguards should emerge not as a mere technical add-on to Acts of Accession, as was largely the case in the past. Instead, these are to be relied upon as important means of ensuring that newcomers are welcomed without undue delay, yet effectively kept in check even when the pre-accession conditionality is gone.

With Montenegro’s Act of Accession currently being drafted, it provides a good testing ground for a new generation of safeguard clauses, so that such an approach can be applied in future rounds of enlargement.

Fourth, the Model’s proposal to temporarily limit post-accession veto powers remains its most politically sensitive element, albeit one that is increasingly being contemplated. Accounting for member states’ credible fears that newcomers could unilaterally misuse their vetoes in areas such as foreign or enlargement policy, the Model presented veto limitations as a measure of last resort to ensure that candidate countries do not face closed doors despite having completed the required reforms.

The proposal may prove necessary to avoid such a damaging scenario, particularly as timely internal reform of the Union cannot be taken for granted. In that case, any limitation would be temporary, limited in scope, and subject to automatic expiry – all codified in an Act of Accession – thus avoiding the creation of a second-class membership.

In practice, given that it touches upon equality of member states, no institution or member state has overtly championed it. Nevertheless, the proposal has entered political discussions, as illustrated by the Albanian Prime Minister’s continued public support for the idea. Naturally, this issue will be of prime importance for the Union in considering Ukraine’s accession.

What is the Model’s legacy?

Five years on, the Model’s greatest legacy lies in the fact that it has succeeded in completely rehauling the enlargement conversation: no one now defends the old binary, all-or-nothing enlargement model. While it is far from being adopted as a coherent architecture, parts of the proposal have entered the EU’s core vocabulary and policy thinking.

Indeed, the language of gradual integration, intermediate benefits, conditional funding, and post-accession safeguards – all presented as innovative solutions to the challenges facing enlargement – has become part of the EU’s everyday discourse. Importantly, even with such a track record, the Model’s potential is far from being fully exploited.

Views expressed in the Opinion section belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of European Western Balkans.

Originally published on European Western Balkans.

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Autonomy in the first place.

Although Cyprus points out that Europe has faced complex and existential crises before – managing to respond to the demands of the times through evolution and strengthening of its capacities – this time it is recognised that the challenge is far greater. Cyprus warns that what is new is “intensity, plurality and complexity of the challenges”. For this reason, strengthening European autonomy is “the necessary next step of our evolving European integration project”. That is why the Cypriots have chosen “An Autonomous Union” as their slogan. However, the second part of the slogan refers to it being “Open to the World”. This is in direct contrast to US attempts to defend its national interests in the first place, at the expense of all the international achievements to date – such as the United Nations and the building of free trade regimes – to which it has contributed the most. In this way, the message is sent that a more autonomous EU – more self-sufficient and capable – will not contradict its current vision of the global order.

Achieving these objectives will primarily require strengthening the Union’s capacity to act as an autonomous security actor, with capacities capable of responding to growing challenges. As Cypriot President Christodoulidis pointed out, an autonomous Union is first and foremost a secure Union. As he further emphasizes, Cyprus has “first-hand knowledge of the importance of defending a state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence”. Building on the achievements of the Danish Presidency, Cyprus aims to accelerate the implementation of the so-called White Paper for European Defence, which entails the strengthening of all the Union’s capabilities by 2030, as well as all accompanying defence initiatives, such as the Common Defence Fund (SAFE) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) Essentially, Cyprus will continue to do what its Trio partners have been doing, which is to support a multidimensional security agenda.

At the same time, Cyprus can be expected to strive for a stronger EU engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Cyprus unreservedly supports its support for Ukraine, emphasis will also be placed on the immediate security environment of this member state. On the one hand, for Cyprus, nuanced relations with Turkey are of importance. Since Turkey invaded the northern part of Cyprus, Nicosia has no effective control over that part of the territory. This is an aggravating circumstance, given that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus either – and prevents its ships from sailing into Turkish ports or planes flying over Turkish territory – while at the same time Turkey is a member of the EU’s Customs Union and a necessary partner for managing numerous crises, from migration to Ukraine. On the other hand, geographically close to the Middle East, Cyprus will insist on  a New Pact for the Mediterranean as a way to strengthen the Union’s strategic interests in the region, including humanitarian efforts and assistance to Gaza. It is therefore not surprising that developments in the Mediterranean represent the alpha and omega, i.e. a key landmark for understanding Cypriot foreign policy, and that Cyprus will insist on placing an increased focus on this geographical area as well.

Competitiveness as an indispensable necessity

As has been seen in the first weeks since Cyprus  took over the presidency, the word competitiveness has dominated key European political and expert discussions. Cyprus is among the member states that undoubtedly recognise the fact that strengthening the EU’s autonomy at all levels is intrinsically linked to improving its global competitiveness. Since Mario Draghi published his report in 2024 – which pointed out that without changing the over-dependence on mainstream players, the Union cannot survive as a relevant and sustainable actor – Europeans’ eyes have been opened. In line with the newly acquired insights, the steps to be taken during the Cypriot presidency will relate to further work on simplifying procedures, cutting red tape and strengthening the single market. At the beginning of February, the members discussed the possibility, which Cyprus also spoke about at the very beginning of its mandate, to implement all these steps in 2026, without further delay.

These discussions are gaining importance because the Cypriot presidency is expected to intensify negotiations in the Council on the Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2028-2034. The key message of the proponents of its increase is that without significant budgetary breakthroughs, there can be no strengthening of competitiveness. The Commission has previously come up with an ambitious proposal to almost double the budget, reaching €2 trillion. While Cyprus will undoubtedly be – as a country that is a net recipient of funds from the EU budget – in favour of increasing overall financial allocations in the future, it will have the demanding task of reconciling the positions of its members, given that many net-recipients have stood by the Commission, while more frugal ones, such as Germany, have immediately expressed their scepticism and belief that the budget will have to be significantly revised and reduced. As in the case of competitiveness, Cyprus’ ambition is to reach a common position on the future financial framework this year. Practice, however, shows that this is an ambitious goal, especially if we take into account that negotiations on this “hot potato” are being conducted almost until the last day of the deadline.

Enlargement and the Sculpture Programme

There are several reasons why the Cypriot presidency comes at a turning point for many candidate countries.

• Ukraine has begun publicly demanding membership in the Union in 2027, and the events during the Cypriot presidency will certainly determine its further European path. Although it is widely known that it is impossible for it to meet all the conditions for membership by then, that is, to fully harmonize with the EU acquis and demonstrate its effective implementation, Ukrainian President Zelensky insists that by the end of the year, much-needed steps will be taken in the most important areas. The possibility of including a year of membership in an agreement that should end Russian aggression, and which should provide guarantees to Ukraine that it will be able to count on European partners in the future, is currently being scrutinised. Currently, the EU has informally opened three clusters with Ukraine through the so-called frontloading procedure proposed by Denmark. If the goal is to help Ukraine on its European path in a timely manner, the talks on the opening of the remaining clusters can be expected in the coming months.

• From the Western Balkans, this year is the most important for Montenegro. This is a country that has managed to close a large number of chapters with exceptional speed, and whose leadership insisted on completing all its reforms by the end of this year. This implied that the Union would also be proportionately responsive, i.e. that it would continue to close the negotiating chapters. With the support of Cyprus, the closure of up to ten chapters is being considered. The fact that, at the beginning of the Cypriot mandate, Chapter 32 was closed – which covers financial control (an area within the Fundamentals cluster) – is a step in the right direction. In addition, in line with the conclusions of the end of 2025, Cyprus intends to launch an ad hoc working group for the drafting of an accession treaty with Montenegro. As the Cypriot Ambassador to Serbia stated, the formation of this group would be a “point of no return”. If the described intentions of Cyprus are really realized, it will really send a message that Montenegro’s ambition to become the 28^th member in 2028 is within realistic possibilities.

• In addition to Montenegro, Albania has so far managed to break records, opening all six clusters in a very short time. During the Cypriot Presidency, the most significant step forward would be the adoption of a positive decision and the adoption of the interim benchmark assessment report (IBAR), in order to start closing the chapters. This would be a turning point for Tirana, given that Montenegro entered its final phase just after resolving the IBAR hurdle in 2024. With the support of Cyprus, the goal is to close several chapters. It is too early to know whether this ambition will be achieved, especially considering that the most difficult part of the job for Albania is just beginning. A breakthrough in this field would send a message that Albania can make progress towards becoming a member of the Union in the foreseeable future, right next to Montenegro.

• As for the other candidates, although they are less in focus, Cyprus will try to keep them on the Union’s agenda. For example, Moldova, like Ukraine, managed to informally open three clusters with the help of the frontloading procedure. Now the goal is to open the remaining clusters as well. Although there is no mention of a target year for its membership, there is a possibility of separating the Moldova and Ukraine processes, especially if they work with Ukraine to define the year of membership as part of the peace negotiations. When  it comes to Serbia, Cyprus will insist that Belgrade has met the  technical criteria for the opening of Cluster 3. Although it is too early to say whether Cyprus will be able to convince other member states to open the cluster, the fact is that the chances of doing so will increase only if Serbia further shows readiness to fulfil the key rule of law reforms it has committed to and to align its foreign policy with the vision of the Union. For these countries, therefore, the political benevolence of Cyprus will not mean an automatic acceleration of the process.

Taking all factors into account, Cyprus will face the delicate task of balancing geopolitical imperatives with the need to preserve the Union’s legal and functional integrity. Although the ultimate outcome of these processes cannot be known, it can be expected that Cyprus, as a traditional supporter of enlargement, will certainly seek to secure support for the candidate countries in order to send the message that membership is within reach for those willing to extend their hand. At the same time, given expectations that the Commission will present its pre-enlargement policy reviews, Cyprus is likely to promoting enlargement policy as an integral component of the Union’s broader, internal reforms.

Originally published on EUpravozato.

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This policy paper examines how Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio may evolve by 2035, combining the InvigoratEU External Influence Index with a structured strategic foresight approach. The Index documents a sharp decline and high volatility in Russian influence since 2013, driven by war dynamics, sanctions, and geopolitical rupture, alongside a more incremental expansion of Chinese and Turkish influence through economic engagement, connectivity initiatives, and socially embedded networks.

Building on these empirical patterns, the paper identifies key drivers of external influence, drawing on political, economic, and societal dimensions, and reorganising them into higher-order strategic clusters that underpin a two-axis scenario framework. The first axis captures the strength of EU anchoring in candidate countries, understood as the interaction between EU credibility and domestic alignment, while the second concerns the nature of the international system, ranging from a rules-based order to coercive, “might-makes-right” dynamics. Crossing these axes yields three plausible scenarios for 2035: Great-Power Chessboard, characterised by intensified external leverage and weakened EU anchoring; Resilient Europe, where credible EU engagement, gradual integration, and domestic governance reforms reduce vulnerabilities; and Strategic Tug-of-War, a baseline trajectory marked by sustained hybrid competition and partial EU anchoring.

Across all scenarios, the analysis shows that external influence is not predetermined but contingent on governance capacity, societal resilience, and the credibility and delivery of EU engagement. While Russia’s trajectory remains uniquely volatile and shaped by critical uncertainties linked to the war in Ukraine, China’s and Turkey’s influence evolves more predictably within structural constraints set by EU policy choices and domestic conditions. The paper concludes that strengthening EU anchoring – through credible enlargement, gradual integration, and sustained support for governance and societal resilience – remains the most effective strategy to limit destabilising external influence and reinforce long-term stability in the EU’s enlargement countries.

Članak InvigoratEU Foreign Interference of China, Russia and Turkey in the EU Enlargement Countries until 2035: Three Scenarios and Policy Implications (D6.4) se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

1 The original Model was published in 2021. Only with its second iteration, in the form of Template 2.0 for Staged Accession in the EU, the introduction of safeguard clauses. Milena Mihajlović, Steven Blockmans, Strahinja Subotić, and Michael Emerson, Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU, European Policy Centre (CEP) & Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), August 2023.

2 European Commission, EU Enlargement Forum, November 2025.

Članak Towards a New Generation of Safeguard Clauses: Making Conditionality Stick after Accession se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Against this backdrop, meaningful reform of enlargement policy, and its ultimate success, will depend on a forward-looking joint commitment between the EU and candidate countries. Rather than waiting for reluctant member states or candidates to ‘give in’ to peer pressure – whether to streamline enlargement or to accept post-accession specificities – this article outlines the following quid pro quo arrangement: the EU delivers simplification and predictability during the pre-accession period, while candidate countries accept transitional post-accession measures to safeguard the Union’s functionality.

The EU’s side of the commitment: marking enlargement work

The current enlargement policy still struggles to accommodate today’s geopolitical realities and the growing number of aspirants. To maintain both credibility and efficiency, the EU needs practical adjustments that can boost the accession process without requiring a treaty change. The following proposals outline how the Union could restore enlargement as a functional and credible policy for candidates.

1. Closing clusters instead of chapters

A practical way to streamline the accession process would be to start closing six thematic clusters rather than 35 individual chapters. When the revised enlargement methodology was introduced in 2020, it established that negotiations on each cluster would open as a whole rather than on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Such an approach has significantly simplified the decision-making process by reducing the number of Council decisions at the early stage of accession talks by about 80%. There is no reason why the same logic could not be applied at later stages as well. Although this would increase the political weight of each decision, the upside is that member states would need to agree only six times instead of 35.^[3] Revising the approach would not be a silver bullet, as vetoes would remain in place;^[4] it would nonetheless signal that the EU is serious about increasing the predictability of the process.^[5]

2. Reinforcing qualified majority voting

Although the debate on qualified majority voting (QMV) has resurfaced, a clear pathway toward its application in the enlargement process has been missing. Perhaps the EU needs to look beyond classical QMV; instead, a more balanced solution could be found in the lesser-known option of reinforced QMV. Unlike QMV, which requires 55% of member states representing at least 65% of the EU’s population, the reinforced one would require 65% of member states representing 72% of the EU population – raising the bar from roughly 15 to 21 states for a decision to be adopted. Opting for this approach would preserve member states’ sense of control to an extent, while preventing paralysis caused by a single veto.

3. Linking institutional participation to progress

Gradual integration, endorsed by the European Council in 2022, allows candidates to enjoy some membership benefits before accession. Thus far, however, the focus has been mostly on financial aspects such as grants or loans, as well as partial single market access. Yet the potential of gradual institutional participation remains largely unused. Linking progress on clusters and chapters to increased access to EU bodies would bridge the gap that currently exists between candidates and member states. The more a candidate advances, the more it should have opportunities to engage with EU institutions – and vice versa – allowing future members to ‘practice’ membership and strengthen preparedness before accession.^[6]

4. Establishing an accession calendar

Predictability is essential for credibility. The EU should formalise what it already does informally – support candidates’ internal timelines – by publishing an official Accession Calendar. Jointly prepared by the Commission and the Council, it would set indicative target dates for each candidate, regularly updated in the annual Enlargement Package and Council Conclusions. This would not guarantee membership for a fixed year but would create a shared roadmap, fostering accountability and coherence across institutions.

Candidates’ side of the commitment: safeguarding an enlarged Union

As the EU undertakes internal adjustments to make the process more workable, candidates would be expected to demonstrate their commitment by accepting post-accession transitional measures – designed to preserve the Union’s functionality and safeguard the application of accepted obligations and shared values. The logic behind these measures would be to increase the likelihood of successful enlargement even if the EU does not complete its own internal reforms in time, such as abandoning, or at least reducing, the use of the veto in the Council.

1. Introducing post-accession veto limitations

To ensure that the Union’s decision-making capacity is not hindered by enlargement, candidate countries could agree to temporary restrictions on their use of veto powers after accession.^[7] Depending on the outcome of political negotiations, these could cover all areas currently subject to unanimity or be limited to key fields such as foreign policy or further enlargements. Importantly, such limitations would not create second-tier membership as they would only apply for a predefined period (e.g. up to 10 years), while expiring automatically after it elapses. At the same time, a proposal of this kind would be accompanied by the so-called “emergency brake mechanism”, allowing candidates to protect their vital national interests. Such an arrangement would go a long way toward winning over those member states whose populations still hold a predominantly enlargement-sceptic view.

2. Embedding safeguard clauses

Building on existing precedents, safeguard clauses should be strengthened and systematically applied in all future accession treaties. Drawing on the Internal Market Safeguard Clause and the Justice and Home Affairs Safeguard Clause used in Croatia’s Accession Treaty, such provisions largely cover essential areas. Besides already being linked to justice, freedom and security (Chapter 24), public procurement (Chapter 5), economic criteria (a subarea of the Fundamental cluster), and four freedoms (Chapters 1-4), the clauses should be extended to cover rule-of-law and governance failures. If a new member were to undermine fair competition, judicial independence, or anti-corruption standards, these clauses should allow the Union to temporarily suspend access to funds, programmes, or specific cooperation mechanisms until compliance is restored. Moreover, extending the activation period from three (as referred to in prior Accession Acts) to ten years after accession would further enhance the EU’s capacity to respond to delayed backsliding.^[8]

3. Establishing a monitoring mechanism during the ratification period

Ending the accession talks should not mark the end of reform efforts but the beginning of their consolidation. The Monitoring Clause – introduced for the first time in Croatia’s Accession Treaty – enabled the Commission to closely monitor all commitments undertaken during the final phase of negotiations. Its strength lay in the fact that it fully covered the rule-of-law domain. Moreover, if issues of concern are identified, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, would have the power to “take all appropriate measures”. The exact measures are never listed, which is something future accession treaties should correct.

4. Introducing a postponement clause

Recognising the risks of premature accession, the Postponement Clause – first appearing in the Accession Act of Bulgaria and Romania – allowed the EU to delay entry if there was a serious risk that an acceding country would be “manifestly unprepared” to meet membership criteria by the scheduled accession date. The mechanism placed the European Commission at the centre of monitoring, assessing compliance with judicial, anti-corruption, and governance reforms. If compliance fell short, the Council could, on a Commission recommendation, postpone accession “by one year”: acting unanimously as a general rule, or even by qualified majority in certain cases specified for Romania. Applied in future enlargements, such a clause would give the EU additional leverage to secure final reform commitments before accession.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the success of both pre-accession and post-accession reform debates will depend on whether the EU and candidate countries can meet halfway. By accepting transitional post-accession measures as a gesture of solidarity, candidates can help address legitimate concerns among current member states about decision-making paralysis or governance backsliding in an enlarged Union. In turn, such political reassurance would make it easier for the EU to simplify procedures, reduce veto points, and increase predictability for candidates. Such an approach would render the enlargement policy fit to deliver and ensure that the Union can function effectively even as its membership grows.

[1] In just a few months, several new ideas have surfaced in the debate on reforming the EU’s enlargement policy. In September, the media reported that Austria, Italy, Germany, and Slovenia jointly called for proposals to simplify and streamline the accession methodology, reflecting growing recognition that the current framework is too cumbersome. Soon after, European Council President António Costa revived the discussion on introducing Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for the technical stages of enlargement, echoing the 2024 German-Slovenian non-paper. Together, these initiatives signal a renewed political appetite to modernise the process and reduce the role of unilateral vetoes in shaping the EU’s enlargement agenda.

[2] The debate, however, has not been limited to the pre-accession phase. What makes this period particularly notable is the concentration of proposals focused on the post-accession stage. It began with a POLITICO article suggesting that new members could face temporary limits on their veto rights upon joining the Union. Soon after, the Enlargement Commissioner confirmed that discussions were underway on a potential “probation period” with unprecedented restrictions, accompanied by robust rule of law safeguard clauses to deter and reduce the danger of post-accession backsliding. As one Commission official put it, the EU is entering an era of “new-generation accession treaties”.

[3] Such a shift would require that reforms and plans for closing individual chapters reflect the cluster structure, which may in turn mean either accepting later closure of certain chapters or accelerating work on others to ensure simultaneous closure.

[4] A potential criticism of this proposal is that it could risk de-dynamising the process, as a single member state’s veto might jeopardise the closure of chapters that are otherwise ready. This is a reasonable concern. However, the assumption here is that, by the time a cluster closure is feasible, the political cost of blocking an entire cluster would be substantially higher than that of objecting to an individual chapter. Accordingly, an act of cluster blockage would be an act of significant political escalation, one that member states would be far less likely to undertake except in cases of genuinely fundamental concern.

[5] Alternatively, moving toward closure at the cluster level could be understood as a political objective rather than a rigid rule. This would still allow the EU to navigate the final stages of accession talks with a candidate from a more structured, cluster-based perspective. It would also preserve the flexibility to withhold agreement on a specific chapter when a member state raises substantive concerns, without jeopardising the closure of other chapters within the same cluster.

[6] The proposal’s application entailed granting candidate countries the right to be invited to the Council’s working parties – once the Fundamentals Cluster is opened – in areas corresponding to the opened clusters. Participation would then evolve by inviting the candidates to COREPER and ministerial-level meetings – after receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) for the Fundamentals Cluster – in areas covered by closed chapters. In this way, participation would be both gradual and merit-based, while also giving greater political weight to the act of opening a cluster or closing a chapter.

[7] The optimal outcome, of course, would be for the Union’s internal reforms to be implemented in a timely manner, rendering any form of veto limitation for the newcomers unnecessary. However, experience demonstrates that this is not a realistic expectation at present. It all comes down to avoiding a scenario in which a candidate has fulfilled all membership criteria, yet its Act of accession cannot be successfully ratified in all member states. Consider France, where ratification requires either a three-fifths majority in the French Parliament or approval through a referendum. This proposal, therefore, offers a mechanism designed to ease the concerns of those member states that fear the Union could become more dysfunctional as it admits new members. It would allow the EU to preserve its capacity to advance internal reforms without the risk of newly admitted states misusing their veto power. The proposal, therefore, represents a measure of last, but potentially necessary, resort.

[8] The 2025 Enlargement Package shows that the Commission is on the right track when it comes to the development of safeguard clauses. It explicitly states: “To ensure that new Member States continue to safeguard and maintain their track-record on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, the Commission considers that future Accession Treaties should contain stronger safeguards against backsliding on commitments made during the accession negotiations”.

Originally posted to Friends of Europe.

Članak A Quid Pro Quo Approach to Enlargement Reform: Streamlining Accession while Safeguarding the Union se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

With such pertinent questions at hand, this paper examines how the hypothetical concurrent accession of all Western Balkan countries (WB6) would shape the EP. First, it estimates the implications for the allocation of seats by simulating two scenarios: 1) a short-term scenario in which temporary derogations from the treaty-based numerical cap are used to ensure immediate representation during the ongoing parliamentary term, and 2) a longer-term scenario in which seats are reallocated within existing treaty limits for the subsequent legislature. Second, the paper assesses the potential impact on parliamentary power dynamics if enlargement were to happen during the current term. It does so by mapping national party representation onto European political groups and proportionally translating domestic parliamentary strength into hypothetical EP seat distributions. Overall, the paper argues that, given the relatively small population size of the WB6, their accession would require only limited institutional adjustment of the EP’s composition while leading to a moderate reconfiguration of the EP’s political balance. Acknowledging that stable majorities across EP dossiers are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, the paper further suggests that the gradual involvement of candidate-country parliamentarians in the EP’s work could help support its post-enlargement cohesion and effectiveness.

Članak Impact of Western Balkan Accession on the European Parliament: Projecting Seat Allocation and Power Dynamics se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Ukraine (and Moldova) in focus

Although this approach had been in development for months, its “revelation” took place on 11 December 2025 at an informal meeting of EU Ministers for European Affairs in Lviv, Ukraine. The Council meeting was held there, given that, during that period, member states’ decisions were largely focused on providing strong political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support to Ukraine. While there is broad unity regarding this type of support, one of the EU’s key challenges has been the prolonged inability of member states to reach unanimity on opening negotiating clusters for Ukraine. Although Ukraine holds candidate status and has formally opened accession negotiations, Hungary has remained the sole member state strongly opposing further progress in Ukraine’s accession process. This has also posed a significant obstacle for Moldova, which has been blocked “as part of the package”. Despite repeated efforts by Member States to win Hungary over, these attempts have proven unsuccessful. It is at this point that Denmark stepped in with a creative solution.

Namely, having assumed the helm of the EU Council for the eighth time, Denmark committed to drawing on its extensive experience and strong credibility to break the deadlock. By emphasising, at the very outset of its mandate, that enlargement would be among its core priorities, Denmark clearly set the tone for its presidency. This was particularly noteworthy given that enlargement had not traditionally featured among Denmark’s principal political priorities. However, since the onset of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Denmark has adopted a markedly firmer position in favour of deeper EU integration, increased joint spending, and the expansion of the Union’s borders. Against this backdrop, Denmark was determined to identify a solution to the Ukrainian case. In practical terms, this meant that if Hungary could not be persuaded, alternative ways of circumventing its veto would need to be explored. Naturally, any immediate solution would have to be regarded as a temporary measure, as many Member States are awaiting political developments in Hungary, with parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2026.

Unlocking the negotiations

Denmark’s efforts built on the European Commission’s successful undertaking to respond, at maximum speed, to the requirements related to the screening of the degree of alignment of national legislation with the EU acquis. According to the Commission’s assessment, all six negotiating clusters are ready to be opened for Ukraine. However, it is not the Commission that decides on the opening of clusters, but the Council, where decisions are taken unanimously. Aware of how problematic it can be when a single member state abuses its veto power, especially at a time when Ukraine is striving to resist Russian aggression, Denmark, in agreement with all other Member States except Hungary, introduced an approach that allows technical negotiations in certain clusters to begin without a formal political decision on their opening. This arrangement was implemented informally, with the presiding country creatively using its procedural powers.

Specifically, instead of waiting for unanimity for the EU to adopt common positions on clusters – which specify what the Union expects candidate countries to fulfil in order to make further progress in the negotiations – the document was, on this occasion, issued by the presiding country itself, in its own name. In other words, it was a draft common position formally issued by the presidency alone, but whose content had been agreed by all Member States except one. Until now, the EU had strictly prohibited the transmission of such documents to candidate countries before negotiations on the relevant clusters had formally begun – a constraint that has now been effectively overcome. The aim was to enable Ukraine and Moldova to begin implementing all necessary reforms without waiting for Hungary to give the green light. In practice, the process has officially remained at the same stage as before, while unofficially – but substantively – these candidate countries now have a clear roadmap outlining everything that needs to be done on the path to EU membership.

De facto opening of clusters

With this kind of creative solution, Ukraine has been de facto enabled to open as many as three negotiating clusters, and the same applies to Moldova. Among them is Cluster 1 (Fundamentals), which covers the most demanding and most significant reforms. As with candidates from the Western Balkans, this cluster is opened first in order to place core reforms at the forefront, and progress achieved in this area determines whether, and to what extent, other clusters will be opened or individual chapters closed. In line with the revised enlargement methodology, in order for this cluster to be opened at all, Ukraine and Moldova had to meet the opening benchmarks, which included the adoption of roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration and democratic institutions, as well as an action plan on national minorities – documents that were positively assessed by the European Commission. In addition to this cluster, Cluster 2 (Internal Market) and Cluster 6 (External Relations) were also included. Ukraine and Moldova can already work on these clusters, and may even complete them in full, meaning that once Hungary lifts its blockade, their formal opening and closing could take place almost simultaneously.

With these advances, Ukraine and Moldova have surpassed the entire Western Balkans, except Montenegro and Albania, in terms of the number of (technically) opened clusters. Serbia, which until recently stood shoulder to shoulder with Montenegro, has thus been pushed, for example, to fifth place in terms of progress towards EU membership. This gap could widen further given that, as Cyprus takes over the Presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an informal agreement to open the remaining three clusters with Ukraine, and potentially Moldova, by mid-2026. Should Orban suffer an electoral defeat, it can be expected that technical negotiations will soon receive their political endorsement as well, meaning that unanimity among member states for the formal opening of negotiations would be achieved. All of this illustrates the extent to which geopolitical pressures can act as a powerful incentive for the Union to resort to creative solutions in order to overcome unilateral blockages in the accession process of candidate countries. For now, the only open question remains whether, and to what extent, this innovative approach can also be applied to the Western Balkans. The coming year, 2026, may soon provide an answer to that question.

Članak Frontloading – A New Term in the Enlargement Policy Jargon se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak What does the Western Balkans cost me? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak What gives OLAF jurisdiction in the Western Balkans? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This project is financed with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic. The content of this document represents the views of its authors and in no way represents the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

Despite having an EU perspective since 2003, the Western Balkans continues to face persistent corruption-related challenges, underscoring the need for stronger oversight mechanisms. As reflected in the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, Montenegro ranks as the least corrupt country among the Western Balkans Six (WB6) at 65^th place globally, followed by Kosovo (73), Albania (80), North Macedonia (88), Serbia (105), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (114), which ranks the lowest. Although some countries have registered modest improvements in recent years[1], others still struggle with long-standing problems such as weak institutions, limited oversight, and poor governance practices. These issues continue to slow institutional development and undermine public trust. These risks are not just abstract. The tragic canopy collapse in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024 further highlighted the consequences of unchecked corruption, weak procurement oversight, and misuse of funds. As the WB6 advance on their path toward EU membership, in particular Montenegro and Albania as frontrunners, the urgency of strengthening cooperation with European anti-fraud bodies becomes increasingly important.  Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to assess the current state of cooperation between the WB6 and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).

Although the role of these institutions is essential in safeguarding EU financial interests, their work remains largely unknown in the region and even underexplored in the existing analyses. Accordingly, and in line with the ongoing attempts to gradually integrate the region with the EU even before membership, the paper examines both the extent of existing engagement between these bodies and regional authorities and the prospects for its further enhancement. The research drew on an in-depth review of publicly available reports and documents, complemented by interviews with representatives of OLAF and the EPPO, as well as Western Balkan officials working in the area of anti-corruption. This multilayered approach ensured a comprehensive, evidence-based analysis that informed the development of policy recommendations intended to guide key stakeholders and raise awareness among the wider public. The basic argument is that deeper engagement with the OLAF and the EPPO is essential, not only to protect EU financial interests but also to reinforce the rule of law and enhance public confidence in these countries as they prepare to assume obligations of EU membership.

[1] Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Članak The Role of OLAF and EPPO in the Western Balkans: Combating Fraud Ahead of EU Membership se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.