The Western Balkan region might be considered a good example demonstrating that the European Union has lost its transformative power in enlargement policy, partly due to the process being too long, while the final results remain uncertain. Despite somewhat more positive rhetoric and the start of accession negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia, including granting candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Moldova (and conditionally Georgia), the EU still has not come to a consensus on how exactly to implement the enlargement policy and revive its transformative powers pivotal to achieving its strategic goals. Under such circumstances, two paths are available:  first, to keep the enlargement policy as it is while hoping that an ineffective approach might eventually generate a different outcome; or second, to establish a general consensus on European integration and define clear steps necessary to be taken by potential candidates to achieve EU integration and that the EU is ready for their accession.

Notably, in times of low levels of mutual trust and credibility among partners is necessary to build a “New Pan European Deal” between the EU member states and the candidate states for EU membership, which will reset the enlargement process and make them compatible with the needed reforms within the EU. A “Joint EU Integration Plan 2030” (Joint Plan) supported by all EU members and candidate states is essential. A Joint Plan would explicitly state the obligations of the EU member and candidate states in terms of strategic EU integration, together with clearly defined measures and deadlines for its implementation by 2030, which should be the indicative time frame[1] for the implementation.

The EU should define how it will resolve its internal issues, which represent an obstacle to continuing its necessary strategic enlargement. For instance, an example is changing the way decisions are being made in the Council from unanimous voting to the qualified majority (especially in the case of Common Foreign and Security Policy, enlargement, and other strategically important policies of the EU). In addition, establishing effective mechanisms for sanctioning member states whose governments undermine the EU’s fundamental values, particularly concerning democracy and the rule of law, is also highly desirable. These ideas are not new, and the EC President conveyed them to the European Parliament. However, there is still a lack of unambiguous political will and consensus of all member states to seriously consider implementing critical reforms to strengthen and make the EU more resistant to current and future challenges. The proposed Joint Plan could serve as a bond connecting Europe’s present and future.

Furthermore, for candidates, the Joint Plan would define priority reform areas of common strategic interest (strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, energy, transportation, common foreign and security policy, environmental and climate change policies, migration…), as well as, proclaim the necessary adjustments in the accession process to make it closer to the citizens and have them feel the effects of it on their everyday lives. Currently, there are multiple research papers in circulation, however, the most concrete suggestion on how to advance the accession process for candidates has been offered by the European Policy Centre (CEP) in Belgrade in cooperation with the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels.[2] The proposal is based on Staged Accession to the Union with concrete and measurable progress, which ensures that the candidates who reform more are offered to advance to the next stage and are granted all relevant benefits, such as structural financial support and participation in the EU institutions). Moreover, it should motivate decision-makers to persist in carrying out the necessary reforms, encourage positive competition among candidates, and strengthen the feeling of belonging to the Union.

Next year marks the 20th anniversary of the first summit between the EU and Western Balkans, at which the European future of the region was defined. Since the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, only Croatia has become a member state, while the remaining six are at different stages of the accession process. Twenty years is a long time. The time for leaving the ineffective vicious cycle and striving towards brave and novel solutions has come. It is high time for the EU to lead by example on how to make difficult decisions under challenging circumstances which will affect generations to come, as this is something the EU has been encouraging candidates in for the past two decades. It is now time for candidate states to demonstrate dedication to the proclaimed end goal of joining the EU and accepting its values, standards, and rules. These are the times of generational choice for the EU members and candidate countries. Will the uniting of the continent, initiated in the 1990’s, be completed, or will it concede? Achieving the consensus regarding the Joint European Integration Plan 2030 could be the beginning of a strategically unambiguous future for Europe.

[1] Although the mentioning of any set date and implying deadlines for the accession of candidate states at this moment is a taboo in the EU, it is necessary to define the timeframe which would be aimed at motivating political elites from both sides to hold their end of the bargain in accordance with the Joint Plan.

[2] https://cep.org.rs/publications/model-za-fazno-pristupanje-eu/

Članak Joint European Integration Plan 2030 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Find the paper here: https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/a-template-for-staged-accession-to-the-eu/ 

Članak Enlargement stuck in a rut? Staged accession model as a solution se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The issue of Kosovo is a very sensitive topic for the majority of Serbian citizens and is closely related to their national identity. The perception of the Democratic Party and the American establishment, which are now personified by Biden, is that they are not sympathetic to Serbia or its interests. For that reason, their support, or perhaps their liking, goes to the candidate they perceive as committed to resolving the Kosovo question in a way which will respect the views of Serbia. At the moment, most citizens think that Donald Trump will do so. President Trump presented the recently signed Washington Agreement on normalisation of economic relations between Belgrade and Priština as a great international success and personal contribution to the reconciliation of the Serbian and Albanian communities. In the absence of concrete progress in substantially normalising the relations between Belgrade and Priština under the auspices and with the mediation of the EU, this agreement was presented to the Serbian public as a step towards attracting the US investment for building capital projects connecting Serbia and Kosovo, which also has an impact on the US image in Serbia and creates public attitudes towards the upcoming US elections, i.e. public support for Trump’s re-election.

On the other hand, there is a popular perception in Serbia of Trump as a “defender of Serbian interests”, someone who is “against the American establishment” embodied in the previous administration which is targeted by domestic populists and nationalists. He is also seen as someone who has a favourable attitude towards the Russian president, which is also a reason why some Serbian citizens have sympathy for Trump. In addition, there is a naïve assumption or an expectation that Trump will provide more support for Serbian interests in the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština compared to Biden. Unfortunately, Trump also enjoys the support of some extreme nationalist groups who believe that he will support “Christian” Serbia rather than Albanians, “Muslims in Kosovo”.

Despite numerous stereotypes and mostly wrong expectations, it will be important for the citizens of Serbia that the future President of the US is ready to cooperate with the European Union who is the main mediator in the dialogue that aims to achieve substantial normalisation of Belgrade and Priština relations. Moreover,  he should support the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries in the region, as well as recognise the strategic interest of the US and EU to jointly contribute towards the economic and social development, democratization, settlement of bilateral disputes and prosperity of Serbia and the Western Balkans.

For the countries of the Western Balkans, the outcome of the American presidential elections will have a special significance. Depending on which candidate wins, the relations between the USA and the EU, whose members all countries of the Western Balkan region want to become, will also depend. The Western Balkans is strategically important for the EU. It is the only remaining region in Europe which, although to a large extent already integrated in the EU economic flows through free trade agreements and gradual regulatory alignment with EU regulations and standards, is still not formally part of it. This leaves the region susceptible to the influence of other foreign rivals and/or partners. At the moment, the interests of Russia, China, Turkey and some Gulf countries are intertwined in a very complex way in the Western Balkans. These actors have various reasons for their presence in the region – from purely political interests of a disruptive nature, through highly economic interests, to romantic dreams of returning to the old days of imperial glory.

The United States has traditionally been the EU’s partner in resolving conflicts in the region. However, during the mandate of President Trump, the EU had to accept the fact that it was left alone to deal with numerous international challenges, including those on the WB. In such circumstances, it is very important for the European future of the Western Balkans whether the White House will host a president committed to international relations based on international rules, multilateralism and transatlantic cooperation, or a president who pragmatically offers quick, unorthodox and unsustainable “solutions” to complex issues that could have a serious impact on the stability and relations of certain countries in the region with the EU.

The stability of the region depends on US-EU cooperation. At the moment, despite official statements addressed to the public, this cooperation often seems forced and insincere. This is not good because, in such a situation, the countries of the region are “lining up” on different sides playing the card of disunity between the USA and the EU. The countries of the Western Balkans are, therefore, very interested in the final outcome of the upcoming presidential elections and have their favourites depending on their own interests. For some, a possible change in the White House will be a desirable return to a time when the principles of American foreign policy were clearly defined and recognizable. For others, it will be a defeat of the possibility to solve the remaining open issues in the region in a pragmatic way through a transactional approach to international relations.

Članak The significance of the American presidential elections for the citizens of Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The EP appears more fragmented than ever before, with traditional political groups having suffered their worst results. Yet, it would be wrong to consider this outcome as purely negative. The pluralism of the contesting political actors and ideas in the EP reflect the shift in the mood of EU citizens. And while mirroring their concerns (the future of work, climate change, migration), it also better represents the new reality within the Union.

The election of Ursula von der Leyen as President of the European Commission (EC) was a product of this new reality. Her candidacy deviated from the Spitzenkandidaten process and was a direct product of back-room deals between the leaders of EU member states. In this context, she was confirmed as the new Commission president by a wafer-thin majority of nine votes in the EP (383/747). In her address before the EP, she vowed to tackle climate change, make the EU more democratic, deal with migrations, place a greater emphasis on social justice, strengthen the EU’s global role and lead an uncompromising fight for the rule of law. The circumstances of her election, however, will have a significant impact on her ability to steer her programme and the EU’s policies during her term.

EU policies will continue to be under the strong influence of the national politics of member states. This also includes the future of the EU enlargement process. One of the first signs of the EU’s intentions regarding the enlargement policy will be the composition of the new European Commission and the distribution of portfolios. A comprehensive, credible and efficient EU enlargement policy requires administrative, institutional and financial support with a name, a face and a telephone number in Brussels. Rumours about the future of DG NEAR are rightfully causing unease among candidates and potential candidate countries. Nevertheless, a good sign is that three EU member states are currently showing an interest in the Enlargement portfolio (according to diplomatic sources).

Regardless of the future composition and structure of the next EC, there are several key points that Western Balkan countries should address. First, they should put their differences aside and try to formulate a common vision of the Western Balkans as a future EU region. Joint vocal support for Albania and North Macedonia to start EU accession negotiations, and support to visa liberalisation for Kosovo citizens could mark a positive change in the regional atmosphere. Closer cooperation and regional integration is the right way for these countries to present themselves as credible future members. Second, resolving the legacy of the recent past and remaining bilateral issues represent preconditions to move forward. Without the comprehensive normalisation of relations in the region, Western Balkan countries will not be able to function and cooperate as EU members.

Third, the governments of the region should pay particular attention to reforms addressing the rule of law. The New Commission President noted that there will be no compromise with respect to the rule of law in EU member states. It is obvious that requirements for rule of law reforms in candidate and potential candidate countries will come into focus even more in the future. The announced introduction of an EU-wide Rule of Law Mechanism should be extended to candidate and potential candidate countries. That would enable better and more objective benchmarking for aspiring countries, more effective monitoring of progress and better leverage in assuring the sustainability of reforms in Western Balkan countries. Furthermore, by applying this mechanism simultaneously in EU member states and candidate countries, it would be a positive sign that the process of deepening the EU’s policies can happen in unison with the Union’s enlargement.

Fourth, requests for more democracy in the EU should also be mirrored in the Western Balkans. The announcement of a “Conference on the Future of Europe” (to start in 2020 and run for two years) and consultations with EU citizens should also include future members. This would provide a good opportunity to open dialogue, improve communication with citizens of the region significantly, and engage civil society in contributing to the debate.

Fifth, in parallel with the process of establishing a new institutional setting, discussion of the Multi-annual Financial Framework 2021-2027 is ongoing. Western Balkan countries should use the opportunity to jointly advocate for stronger structural support to the region, especially in areas of infrastructure, digital connectivity, energy, and the environment and climate change. Structural support in the Western Balkans is a strategic investment in future EU infrastructure.

The summer of 2019 is, in many ways, important for the future of both the EU and the Western Balkans. The EU is beginning a new institutional cycle with a large number of challenges that offer an opportunity for the current generation of decision-makers to address the concerns of EU citizens. The future of Europe depends on its ability to deal with global uncertainties imposed by allies, foes and contenders. One of the pieces of this multidimensional puzzle is the question of the Union’s ability to integrate Western Balkan countries and demonstrate confidence, capabilities and strategic autonomy. This is why the summer of 2019 is not (exclusively) for holidays; in fact, it is one of those treacherous summers that can define the future course of Europe.

This article was originally published in CorD magazine and on their website.

Članak The Treacherous Summer of 2019 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

This will have a negative influence on enlargement friendly Member States (which are anyway few these days) that honestly wants to help Serbia and the Western Balkans region in promoting their EU integration.

The Report provides an objective overview of the current state of affair in Serbia’s EU accession process. It stresses the importance of those crucial elements for the functioning of democratic institutions, rule of law and protection of fundamental rights. Its findings about urgent need to create environment for cross-party dialogue represent an invitation to the Government and ruling coalition to open up public dialogue with opposition parties on how to move out of a deadlock that was caused by the abuse of parliamentary procedures, abuse of office, lack of media freedoms, violence against political opponents, threats and attacks against journalists and civil society organizations, and infringements of freedom of expression. The latest has been particularly emphasized as a matter of serious concern since no progress has been achieved since last year Report. The lack of political will to address the issues concerning one of the major principles of a democratic society should certainly be a matter of concern for all citizens of Serbia.

After one year, some progress in the area of rule of law has been recognized. Unfortunately, Serbia is still far from making any progress regarding its level of preparedness to assume obligations deriving from the EU membership. Undue political influence on judiciary, prevalent corruption and uneven implementation of fundamental rights is, again, a matter of concern. European Commission found that the role of independent and regulatory bodies needs yet to be recognized. It means that the Government does not pay attention to the functioning of these institutions some of which are embodied in Serbia’s constitution. In the past five years, Parliament did not discuss nor adopt reports of independent institutions. Without proper conclusions by the Parliament, the Government is unable to introduce much-needed amendments that should improve implementation of important legislation implemented and monitored by independent or regulatory bodies. Thus, there is a serious question mark regarding the Government’s intentions if it fails to respect the existing institutions, while keeping them functioning with a lack of staff and resources and does not follow their recommendations.

Unsurprisingly, the Commission is using this Report to invite the Government to be objective in its communication about the EU as its main economic and political partner.

EC reminds that EU accession was Serbia’s strategic choice which should be more actively and unambiguously communicated in public debate. It is a strange but obvious reminder to the Government of EU acceding country that pretends to be a leader in the region while some of its ministers are openly questioning Serbia’s EU orientation. This is exactly ambiguity that 2019 Report refers to.

Serbian Government needs to reinvent its communication plans and work on its skills if it wants to leave a positive impression as a credible partner to the EC and EU Member States.

The European Policy Centre (CEP) every year prepares a statistical overview of findings in the Country Report. We have devised a methodology that translates the scoring system of the EU into a numerical scale. This year it shows that in the area of Political Criteria Serbia achieved an average score of 2,6 which is a lower level of progress then it was in 2017 and 2016 (2,8), while it remains at the same level of preparedness to assume EU membership obligations as in previous two years (2,2). It is a concerning sign of lack of transformative power of the EU accession process and a reminder that democratization of society does not necessarily coincide with its EU integration path. There is plenty of room for improvement and both EC and Serbia should draw lessons out of it.

Even in the Economic Criteria section which was widely acknowledged as the most positive one in the Report, there is no reason for excitement. Serbia has achieved a lower level of progress in 2018 (3) then in 2017 (3,5) and remained at the same level of preparedness to assume EU membership obligations as in past two years (3). Progress made in negotiation chapters is almost carbon copy of the last years Report. Some progress has been achieved in 63% (21), no progress in 24% (8) and good progress in 12% (4) out of 33 negotiating chapters. What is particularly worrying is that there is no progress in those areas in which Serbia has opened its accession negotiations (chapter 5 on Public procurement, negotiations started end of 2016 and Commission’s Report says there was no progress).

It seems that Serbia missed the opportunity that was announced in 2018 by the EC’s Communication on credible enlargement. The momentum to reciprocate credibility with unequivocal engagement in re-setting its political system and returning to the principles of dialogue and respect of democratic institutions was simply not recognized.

Perhaps being enchanted by the call of 2025, Serbia failed to recognize immediate challenges for its democratic legitimization. Instead of pushing full power forward, finally living up to the slogan and “doing it for ourselves”, Serbia is underperforming.

It behaves like a potentially most successful student in the class, with a clear prospect of bright future, but failing to achieve that being preoccupied with constant complaining about the fairness of the teacher and lack of appreciation of fellow students. It is becoming too obvious that Serbia’s EU integration process is being internally delayed. The complexity of the situation with Pristina is one of the reasons but should not be an excuse for not nominating a new candidate for the vacant position of Commissioner for data protection and freedom of information, or more efficient fight against corruption, or improvement of public procurement rules. Unfortunately, lack of democratic capacity in current political setting paralyzes smart initiatives, everyday work of institutions, evidence-based policy-making and potential to advance that still exists (although is becoming thinner due to emigration flows).

Country Report 2019 is a wake-up call. Years before us will bring new challenges and new composition of the European Commission and position of EU Member States with regards to the EU’s enlargement policy will seriously challenge Serbia’s political will and stamina to change into a better, rule of law regulated democratic society. After this year’s Report, Serbia needs to reflect and recognize new opportunity to re-think, re-set and re-start its EU accession agenda.

Članak Serbia needs to rethink, reset and restart its EU accession agenda se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In order to succeed, leaders from the region need to regain the credibility by unambiguously committing to the real transformation in the forthcoming period, especially during 2019. Next year is going to be marked by elections for the European Parliament and subsequently formation of the new European Commission. It is going to be the year of finalization of Brexit negotiations (eventually), heated debate on next EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework, framing of EU common migration policy and ongoing debate on future of Europe.

General political environment is not going to be sympathetic towards EU enlargement. This period needs to be utilized by the Western Balkan countries to prove their credibility and capability to push for transformation agenda further, resolve their bilateral and structural issues to be able to legitimately demand positive enlargement agenda from the EU and new European Commission.

Marking the 10th Anniversary of the existence of the European Fund for the Balkans, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG) have published European Balkans Partnership declaration. Declaration recognized the urgency to transform the positive attention into success, revitalizing reforms in the region and completing the EU in the WB. It called all stakeholders for more sincere and transparent relationship with a clear emphasis on democratic transformation of the region.

European Balkans partnership is set to promote “new togetherness” between EU and the Balkans based on four components: more vigorous EU engagement with the Balkans; more systematic efforts to promote a culture of learning to advance human capital; an honest and lasting regional rapprochement; and a tailor-made vision of closer cooperation in various EU policy areas. The spirit of Declaration calls for Europe without divisions, but a Europe of all its citizens. It steps out of traditional technocratic perspective of the EU integration procedures and invites all stakeholders to reimagine the region and to spark a new narrative of a European Balkans as embedded in the EU.

For the European future of the region it is important to start the accession talks with all Western Balkan countries as soon as possible. It is encouraging to see that based on the Council conclusions from June, the European Commission is preparing the start of the screening process for Albania and Macedonia. Preparation of the Action plans for Rule of Law chapters 23 and 24 should follow immediately after screening. Furthermore, screening should be open for remaining potential candidate countries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as observers, and both countries should prepare respective Action plans as well. EU’s conditionality based on European values needs to be revitalized to be more transparent, efficient, measurable and to deliver expected results from the candidates. In order to assess the progress and provide guidelines for improvement of the reforms high-level expert missions should be engaged more often.

One of the major challenges in the future will be further development of human capital in the region. Unfortunately, Western Balkan countries are facing different forms of social exclusion, primarily related to unemployment and poverty which is causing significant proportion of the population leaving the region. This challenge needs to be addressed by reversal of the brain drain, improvement of economic, social, health and educational policies, promotion of innovation initiatives, smart economy and digitalization. To support networking among the youth, facilitate creation of regional identity and increase the quality of education there should be coordinated activity to create regional education centre of excellence like College of Europe.

There is no joint future in the region without understanding and accepting common past. Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are key to the success of the region. Bilateral disputes need to be resolved as soon as possible. Small and fragmented markets and development of demanding infrastructure projects in the region requires further joint efforts started within the Berlin Process.

Finally, building on the EC’s Communication on credible enlargement perspective EU should explore every possibility for inclusion of the Western Balkan countries in broader scope of the EU policies and frontloading of the benefits of enlargement. Western Balkan countries should be invited to contribute to the more secure Europe. Europe that protects is the slogan of current Austrian presidency addressing the fears of citizens and improve security cooperation in the EU. Western Balkan countries are part of Europe and they can contribute to its security. Western Balkan countries are an obvious piece of the security puzzle in fighting against informal migrations, as they proved in 2015/16.

However, secure Europe needs to remain open Europe. Rediscovery of European integration as the regional attempt to cope with the challenges of globalization requires both deepening and enlarging of the EU. To raise the awareness about the positive impact of the European integration, EU and Western Balkan countries must work together in communicating benefits and explaining how cooperation based on EU’s founding values is influencing their common future. We share the common geography, history, presence, but more importantly we share the common future. Citizens of the Western Balkan countries need to be included in the European Citizens Consultation process launched by President Macron to have the chance to be informed and contribute.

Conclusions of the Council in June were not easy to reach due to fear and doubts expressed by some EU Member States. In given circumstances, it is encouraging to see that the path for the accession of Albania and Macedonia has been set. The only positive way to address fears and doubts is to prove the capability or the region to resolve the outstanding issues which are portraying bad image of the Western Balkans among the citizens in the EU, i.e. bilateral disputes, rule of law, good governance, division of power and free media. This is the way to prove region’s credibility and to enable EU Member States to prove theirs by intensifying enlargement efforts in the forthcoming period in parallel to the deepening of the EU. That should be the way to invest in building European Balkans partnership.

The text is firstly published at the European Western Balkans‘ portal.

Članak Secure Europe needs to remain open Europe se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

In February EC started a new initiative about credible Western Balkan enlargement based on a re-discovered strategic importance of the region for EU stability. The Strategy offered a potential timeframe for the accession to the EU of the leading candidates in 2025. Simultaneously, wording of the document stepped out of the frame of eurocratic jargon and for the first time, very clearly defined problems which the Western Balkan countries are facing, such as “captured state”, relationship between organised crime and authorities, political influence on judiciary, corruption, vulnerability of freedom of expression and media. The Strategy encountered divided stances among the Member States.

The report published on 17 April 2018 represents the first overview, after publishing the Strategy, of Western Balkan countries’ preparedness for becoming EU members and their progress compared to the previous report. That is why this report should be observed as a starting point from which candidate countries and potential candidates will start to prove their own credibility and determination to respond to EC proposition on possible 2025 accession. Report more specifically than before expresses the issues which candidates must pay attention to if they want to make progress in the upcoming period. EC is determined in intent to introduce more direct and more transparent language in reporting. This is very important since EC must preserve its own credibility and integrity with precise reporting about open issues and while at the same time defending its Strategy and 2025 membership perspective for leading Western Balkan countries. The report will be thoroughly analysed in capitals of the Member States as well. Based on its content European Council will scrutinize conclusions which should define further guidelines in regard to this process and EU enlargement policy, especially with regard to the recommendation of EC to open accession negotiations with Albania and Macedonia.

Report on Serbia represents a very clear and objective overview of the current state of affairs. Fundamental issues which are in focus of the EC, as well as the member states, are related to the rule of law, good governance, fight against corruption and organised crime, freedom of expression… Besides reform in stated fields, continuation of constructive dialogue with Pristina in order to achieve comprehensive agreement on normalisation of relations will have a great influence on pre-accession negotiations dynamics of Serbia and the EU.

Very poor functioning of the National Assembly is particularly emphasised. The report mentions that National Assembly is not performing its supervisory role over the work of the Government, i.e. it is not implementing its function defined in the Constitution. If this information is supplemented with scores on political influence on judiciary and media, as well as lack of dialogue with the opposition, a pretty bad image on the state of democracy and rule of law in Serbia is painted.

The emphasis on the necessity of strengthening and maintaining the capacity for European integration, as well as the need to preserve “institutional memory” which would ensure reform sustainability in the EU accession process, is worrying. This is the first time that Serbia is getting an estimation which implies a problem of quality and decreasing number of experts on European affairs. European Policy Centre published a study in 2017 on the need to produce a quality policy for retention of personnel as a prerequisite for a sustainable process of accession to the EU. This study has also referred to great commitment of employees working on European integration affairs and management of IPA funds. However, it also has shown that the employees are unsatisfied with unprofessional management, inadequate salary system, lack of recognition of their work, low income, inadequate human resources management, advancement… An alarming fact is that at the time of making the study 50% of respondents were considering the option of leaving public administration. It is clear that without experts Serbia won’t be able to respond to the challenges which are set before it with the 2025 membership perspective and it is about time to pay attention to this problem.

Certain positive changes are registered in the field of economic criteria, however, the delay in structural reform has been identified. Serbia’s constructive participation in regional initiatives has been complimented on, especially within the Berlin Process and contribution in the field of economic and infrastructure connection of the region.

Generally speaking, judgement of the EC is worrying since it is stated that, compared to the previous report from 2016, level of preparedness for the accession of Serbia to the EU has not improved in any of the 35 chapters, despite some progress in particular fields. On the contrary, comparative result analyses of the countries of the region show that some have made more significant progress that Serbia despite different status in EU accession process. These results show that despite the positive effect on the public and the impetus for further reform, the sole act of opening chapters is not necessarily an indicator of genuine progress. That means that citizens do not feel changes which were promised to them through opening individual chapters. This can cause a further decrease of citizen’s enthusiasm and undermine legitimacy for continuing European integration and necessary reforms. It is very important to show the citizens concrete progress through reform and concrete European standards in practice. This is especially important in the field rule of law. Citizens’ stance towards reform would be most affected by clear determination to fight corruption, to prove to the citizens that no one is “untouchable” when it comes to prosecuting suspects for organised crime and similar examples. In that way, credibility for the process would be reclaimed. Concrete results would finally confirm worn-out platitude that everything we do in the process of European integration we are doing primarily for ourselves. Concrete results would increase the country’s resistance to different influences, both internal and external, in whose interest it is that Serbia does not succeed in a realisation of Strategy 2025.

A year and a half since the last EC report, evidently Serbia did not do as much as it could and needed to, considering the constantly present pretention of having a role of leader in the region. It is clear that sole act of opening the negotiations doesn’t necessarily mean progress. That’s why this year’s report needs to be read in the right way in order to recognise wider, European and world context, in which Serbia’s success is being estimated. A timeframe for accession to the EU which was presented in the Strategy of EC is still not officially accepted by the EU member states. European Parliament elections will be organised next year and future composition of the EP will affect Parliament’s relationship towards EU enlargement. Having in mind the atmosphere in the public, certainly EU enlargement won’t be very popular, even though it will play an important role in the election campaign.

Everything stated implies that it is necessary to significantly change the previous reform approach in the process of Serbia’s accession to the EU. A genuine effort needs to be put in to respond to the evaluation of the EC. Having in mind EC recommendation on opening the negotiations with Albania and Macedonia, Serbia has an additional chance to take a position of a constructive and reliable partner which understands the values on which EU is based, such as solidarity, tolerance, reconciliation and developing cooperation in the region. Serbia must recognise this opportunity and offer its own experience to all interested partners in the region. New Macedonian authorities have shown that true political will must be present for true democratic reform. That is the only way to prove the credibility of political choice which Serbia accepted by submitting a request to join the EU.

Članak Is Serbia ready to read Progress Report 2018 correctly? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The previous year, 2017, was the year of annunciation of the return of the EU Enlargement Policy. The European Commission President J. C. Juncker, in his State of the Union Speech, and later in the letter of intent directed to the European Parliament in September, mentioned the need for defining a clear time perspective for the accession of the leading candidates Serbia, and Montenegro to the European Union by 2025. E. Macron, the President of France, reacted similarly in his speech on the future of the European Union in September at the Sorbonne, which is especially important for political legitimacy of the announced return of the enlargement policy into the focus of the EU. Even more importantly this idea did not meet any serious opposition, despite the obvious rise in populism and the lack of attractiveness of the topic of further enlargement in the EU Member States. All of this indicates that the relationship between the EU and its Member States towards the enlargement policy is beginning to change slowly from a very skeptical attitude from the beginning of the mandate of Juncker’s Commission to the announcement of a credible enlargement strategy and defining the time frame for the most successful candidates.

This paper attempts to draw attention to certain essential elements that should be included in a new, credible EU Enlargement Strategy. Proceeding from the assumption that the approach “business as usual” is unproductive and can lead to demotivation of candidates (and potential candidates), on the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, on the other.

Članak 2018 – the Year Credible EU Enlargement Policy Returns? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Serbia should step up its efforts to build up its institutional capacities and reinvent effective mechanisms for evidence-based and inclusive policymaking. Open dialogue between the government and civil society , as well as transparency in the accession process, are prerequisites in this regard. Serbia can and should do more to meet these preconditions if it is to effectively enforce the legislation aligned with the EU acquis and ensure collective ownership of this process, with the citizens aware and informed about the benefits and constraints of EU membership. This requires a reset of the relationship between the state and CSOs by (re)building mutual trust and raising the established patterns of cooperation to a higher level. The EC/EU should consider disclosing the findings of its expert/peer review missions to the public in order to maintain pressure on the Serbian executive in the wake of the more demanding phase in EU accession negotiations. This would also help to make the public debate on Serbia’s EU membership transparent and substantiated with facts, thus increasing the legitimacy of the accession process.

Članak Transparency and opacity in the EU accession negotiations se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.