Three additional findings further illuminate these dynamics. First, the credibility mechanism is most pronounced among citizens who are otherwise predisposed toward EU integration. Individuals with stronger liberal-democratic and cosmopolitan orientations perceive the gap between the EU’s values and interests more acutely, resulting in a sharper decline in their support. Second, government-aligned and opposition-aligned citizens process EU-related information through different frameworks. The credibility mechanism has a meaningful effect only among opposition supporters, citizens aligned with the student movement, and politically neutral respondents, whereas the attitudes of government supporters are shaped almost exclusively by economic expectations. Third, the student movement, which has elevated issues of democratic governance closely connected to the credibility concerns identified in this research, has emerged as the second strongest political force in Serbia, surpassing all formal opposition parties combined. Consequently, if the EU is perceived as credibly supporting democratic governance requirements, it could enter a potential political transition with an existing constituency inclined toward European integration.

These findings suggest several implications for future EU engagement. Since the credibility deficit is rooted in the EU’s actions rather than in communication failures, the Union should prioritise consistency between its stated values and its policies. Resources should be shifted away from communication campaigns and toward programmes that provide citizens with direct experience of EU standards. Economic engagement, as the most powerful source of support, should become more visible at the local and individual level and should be explicitly linked to reform conditionality in order to reinforce rather than weaken the credibility channel. Pro-European citizens should not be regarded as automatically supportive; their backing depends on tangible evidence of commitment to rule-of-law standards rather than values-based rhetoric. Furthermore, the divergence between government-aligned and opposition-aligned audiences implies that a single communication strategy cannot effectively address both groups: while the former respond primarily to concrete modernisation benefits, the latter seek evidence that financial engagement is contingent upon genuine reform. Finally, the accession process itself must regain credibility by appearing achievable. A clear and staged roadmap would help address both the credibility deficit and the widespread disengagement arising from doubts that accession will ever occur, particularly if the EU demonstrates willingness to support a membership target date proposed by Serbia once the country exhibits genuine political commitment and a credible trajectory of reform.

Članak Geopolitics and Values: In Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Download the report per policy area:

Step reports Digital

Step reports RoL&FR

Step reports Green

Step reports BE&PSD 2

The report in Serbian will be available soon.

Članak First Independent Monitoring Report on the Implementation of the Reform Agenda se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Članak Serbia and the European Union: Geopolitics and EU Values – in Tension or in Tandem? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

WeBER 3.0 continues to promote the crucial role of CSOs in PAR, while also advocating for broader citizen engagement in this process and inclusive reform measures which are user-tailored and thus lead to tangible improvements.

By grounding actions in robust monitoring data and insights, WeBER 3.0 will empower civil society to more effectively influence the design and implementation of PAR. To foster collaborative policymaking and bridge the gap between aspirations and actionable solutions, the project will facilitate sustainable policy dialogue between governments and CSOs through the WeBER Platform and its National PAR Working Groups. Finally, through small grants for local CSOs, WeBER 3.0 bolsters local-level PAR engagement, amplifying
the voices of citizens – the final beneficiaries of the public administrations’ work.

WeBER 3.0 products and further information about them are available on the
project’s website at www.par-monitor.org

Članak Western Balkan PAR Monitor: PUBLIC SERVICE AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 2024/2025 se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

1. Growth Slowdown & Socioeconomic Divergence: While the Western Balkans experienced solid growth in the early 2000s, the region has struggled to maintain momentum post-2008. Nicola highlights the “golden period” between 2000 and 2008 but warns that without significant reforms, convergence with the EU could stretch as far as 2093 in a pessimistic scenario.

2. Governance Deficit: Poor governance remains a significant roadblock. Nicola emphasizes that countries in the region must focus on improving the rule of law, combating corruption, and increasing government accountability to accelerate growth and reduce the trust gap with their citizens.

3. The Role of State-Owned Enterprises: The discussion provides a key insight into the incomplete transition to market economies in the region. Many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still dominate critical sectors like energy, limiting the private sector’s potential to drive growth. Privatization and the introduction of market competition are seen as crucial steps forward.

4. Digital Transition & Innovation as Key Catalysts: Excitingly, digital transformation can help bridge the institutional and governance gaps. Serbia has become a leader in digital innovation, spearheading initiatives in AI, biotech, and IT services. The region can leverage this momentum to modernize public services, increase transparency, and reduce bureaucracy.

5. Youth, Women & Brain Drain: Nicola calls for urgent reforms to integrate young people and women into the workforce. Improving educational curricula and fostering labour market flexibility will prevent further brain drain and ensure that economic benefits are more inclusive.

Looking forward, both experts agree that focusing on second-generation reforms is vital: deepening financial markets, boosting regional trade and connectivity, investing in human capital, and addressing the urgent need for green transition and sustainable development.

While challenges persist, especially in governance and institutional reforms, there is hope that with the right policies and an embrace of digital transformation, the region can achieve sustained growth and converge with the EU in the coming decades.

Find out more – www.par-monitor.org

Članak Bridging the Gap: Convergence strategies for Western Balkans’ EU future se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Soon after, however, its EU path started to stumble. Since 2016, Serbia’s overall level of preparedness for membership has remained stagnant, with a moderate rating of 3 on the 5-point scale that the European Commission uses in its annual assessment reports. Consequently, Serbia has opened 22 out of 33 negotiated negotiation chapters to date, having provisionally closed only 2. Since December 2021, there has been no progress in the negotiations. Improvements have been in short supply across all chapters, and the transformation of the country into a future EU member is all but evident.

At the same time, the past two years have seen an awakening of political motivation for enlargement in the EU – mainly prompted by Russia’s aggression on Ukraine and the realisation that enlargement remains the best policy to fend off external malign influences in the EU’s vicinity. The Commission proposed in November 2022 the New growth plan for the Western Balkans – set to step up the region’s integration with the internal market and augment investments into its socio-economic convergence with the EU. Against the backdrop of the current enlargement momentum, this article explores the reasons behind the slowdown in Serbia’s accession process and discusses the main reforms and political actions needed for its acceleration.

Main sources of Serbia’s EU accession slowdown

There are three main factors behind Serbia’s poor performance in EU accession negotiations in recent years: 1) lack of reforms in the fundamental reform areas, 2) reluctance to align with the EU’s sanctions policy towards Russia and 3) poor implementation of agreements in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo. This section discusses each of the three factors.

Serbia’s track record in the implementation of reforms designated as “fundamental” in the EU accession process has been sluggish at best over the past years. The “fundamentals first” approach in the accession process dictates that the overall pace of accession negotiations depends on the progress in improving the rule of law (chapters 23 and 24), functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, economic reforms and other chapters grouped in Cluster 1 – Fundamentals.[1] In line with the 2020 Revised Enlargement Methodology, this cluster is the first one to be opened and the last to be closed (chapter by chapter), which allows the assessments in these areas and chapters to shape negotiations until the very end. However, Serbia’s membership preparedness assessment in Cluster 1 has improved marginally since 2016, marking a certain degree of progress in economic reforms only. Namely, the functioning of market economy and capacity to withstand the competitive pressures of the single market have unimpressively improved from the grade 3.0 to 3.5 in the past seven years. The rest of the fundamentals have remained largely stagnant in this long period, seeing only sporadic and limited marks of progress. Arguably, the ‘functioning of democratic institutions’ sub-area has in fact been regressing,[2] leading to the country’s downgrading from a ‘semi-consolidated democracy’ to a ‘hybrid regime’ in the renowned Freedom House “Nations in Transit” reports.[3] In December 2021, despite limited progress in fundamental reform areas, the EU agreed to open Cluster 4 – Green agenda and sustainable connectivity – the last one Serbia has opened in its accession talks. Overall, the developments in fundamental reforms have fallen short of underpinning a more dynamic accession process for Serbia.

Furthermore, since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, another stumbling block in Serbia’s progress towards EU membership has stemmed from its reluctance to align with the EU’s sanctions policy towards the aggressor. Despite the formal requirement to progressively align with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU until membership, the war brought this policy to the forefront of the accession process. It has thus resulted in strong pressure on candidates to fully align and show political commitment to the EU’s stance on this internationally divisive issue. Serbia’s consistent voting with the EU on the United Nations’ resolutions relating to the war has been insufficient to demonstrate such resolve. Although Serbia has managed to improve alignment with CFSP decisions unrelated to Russia, its rejection of the sanctions policy has prevented its overall progress in the respective Chapter 31. The problem has been exacerbated by anti-European and pro-Russian political discourse fuelled by both senior government officials and pro-government media outlets. The 2022 Serbia Report thus identified backsliding in this chapter (the only chapter to ever register backsliding since the start of negotiations), while the 2023 Report marked ‘no progress’. Political pressures on Serbia to accept the EU’s sanctions policy have been building over the past two years, leading numerous member states to openly question Serbia’s political commitment to EU integration.

Finally, the process of normalising the relationship with its breakaway province Kosovo has become the third major obstacle in Serbia’s progress towards membership. This process, monitored as part of Chapter 35 – Other – has ‘blocking’ power in Serbia’s accession talks, and Serbia is expected to constructively engage in dialogue with Kosovo and implement all agreements achieved in the process. Early 2022 seemed to offer a breakthrough, when leaders of Kosovo and Serbia verbally accepted the ‘Ohrid Agreement’ – the EU’s proposal on normalisation of diplomatic relations between the two sides. Yet, the dialogue has been plagued with obstructions as well as divisive and hateful political discourse in both Serbia and Kosovo, culminating in a violent ‘Banjska’ incident in North Kosovo led by Serb militants in late 2022, leaving one Kosovar police officer and three attackers dead. This clash, dubbed by several observers a terrorist attack, has led the EU to increase pressures on Serbia to fully commit to the implementation of agreements reached to date and to work towards full normalisation of relations as a key precondition for further advancement of the EU accession process.  

Unpacking reforms towards membership

To further its path towards EU membership, Serbia is expected to deliver actions and reforms in all of the discussed areas, as well as advance in alignment and implementation of the EU law across all negotiated sectoral policy areas. The Commission offers specific recommendations for improvements in each of the areas and chapters of accession negotiations, many of which have been repeated over the last few years marked by poor progress. Without going into the details of recommendations in each of the 33 negotiated chapters and several sub-areas of Cluster 1, it is worth examining the key steps expected in the coming period, reiterated in the Commission’s 2023 report on Serbia.

First of all, following the ‘fundamentals first’ policy, Serbia will need to ensure a strong track record of reforms in Cluster 1. Starting with the rule-of-law chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), further reforms need to improve the independence and functioning of the judiciary, ensuring adequate implementation of the 2022 constitutional amendments and ensuing legislation in this area. Moreover, fight against corruption needs to improve significantly, ensuring real results in prosecuting high-level corruption cases. Freedom of expression is another area under Chapter 23 which needs significant improvement, particularly in relation to the protection of journalists and media pluralism. Continuing with Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security), Serbia needs to improve the operational autonomy of the police, better manage migration and asylum procedures and step up the fight against human trafficking and organised crime. Improvements are also necessary in the chapters and areas with more positive assessments of preparedness: public procurement, financial control, statistics, public administration reform and economic reforms. Importantly, the highly contested legitimacy of the December 2023 elections will likely spark heightened interest in the ‘functioning of democratic institutions’ area and lead to stronger calls by the EU to Serbian authorities to improve the basic democratic traits of the governance system. Ensuring progress across the entire Cluster 1 will thus continue to dictate the overall pace of accession negotiations, while a lack of reforms will surely lead to further stagnation.

Moreover, going forward, one can reasonably expect the EU to insist more vehemently that Serbia aligns with the CFSP, particularly regarding its sanctions policy vis-à-vis Russia. Not only will the government need to adopt and apply the restrictive measures, but it will also be under scrutiny regarding measures taken to avoid circumventing of sanctions on the Serbian territory and those preventing foreign interference and information manipulation. The EU will expect Serbia to unequivocally demonstrate that it stands with it in the ongoing war and extend its formal support beyond the votes in the UN. Considering the historically strong political – and, to an extent, economic – ties between Serbia and Russia, meeting this condition will require political courage and a change of pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric in the country. Failing to achieve these objectives, the political tension between Serbia and the EU – particularly the member states on the eastern flank of the Union – will likely increase, preventing any meaningful progress in Serbia’s membership negotiations.

Finally, on the Kosovo issue Serbia is likely to come under the highest pressure from the EU in the coming period, focused on the implementation of the EU-brokered Ohrid Agreement and its implementation annex. The Agreement requires that Serbia, among other things, recognises Kosovo’s official documents and national symbols (including passports, diplomas, licence plates and customs stamps), respects the aims and principles of the UN Charter related to sovereign equality of all states, peacefully settles disputes with Kosovo and ends is policy of objecting to Kosovo’s membership in international organisations. Moreover, its first provision insists on the development of normal good-neighbourly relations on the basis of equal rights. While in the short run the main emphasis will likely be on the implementation of the formal recognition actions (such as those related to state symbols), in the longer run Serbia’s political leadership will be expected to change its inflammatory political discourse towards Kosovo. A more reconciliatory political messaging will be essential to prepare the Serbian population for peaceful coexistence with their Kosovar neighbours and achieve full normalisation of relations.

Key questions going forward

The EU’s reignited interest and support to enlargement will only deliver results if it is met with equal enthusiasm in candidate countries to press on with reforms and solve outstanding political issues on their accession agendas. Considering that the source of this renewed interest lies in the continent’s East rather than South-East, the window of opportunity for the Western Balkans may indeed be a short one. Following hundreds of meetings and events with EU officials, experts, and academics, this author is convinced that the EU is eager to see a Serbia committed to reforms, sharing its foreign policy vision, and taking big steps towards meeting membership conditions. The largest economy in the Western Balkans, crucial for regional stability, would make for a perfect success story of enlargement – once deemed the most successful EU policy. As the EU is rethinking its enlargement policy in order to make it more incentivising – in line with the ‘gradual’ or ‘staged’ logic,[4] Serbia stands to benefit greatly from its accession process through increased funding, deeper market integration and potentially higher participation in the work of EU institutions. The key question, therefore, appears to be if the Serbian authorities are willing and prepared to take the necessary actions to advance the EU integration of their country. The statements of EU’s political leaders still suggest a belief that the present regime in Serbia might deliver on its verbal commitments. However, numerous experts and academics, as well as much of Serbia’s civil society, maintain that a deeper political change will be needed for Serbia to return to a genuine pro-European reform mentality.

At the start of 2024, the country is poised for more of ‘business as usual’ on all three key issues discussed in this article. Firstly, although a new government is yet to be formed following the parliamentary election of 17 December 2023, the main political force, personified in President Aleksandar Vucic, will remain in place, with an absolute majority in the parliament. The image of the election day, plagued with irregularities, does little to suggest a more democratic behaviour of the leading political party and reinforces abundant allegations of state capture and blatant disregard for the rule of law. Secondly, although the new government may take steps to distance Serbia from Putin’s Russia, there are no indications that the President will opt for the introduction of sanctions which have a particularly negative image among the Serbian population. Finally, the continuing inter-ethnic tensions and hateful political rhetoric bear little hope for the advancement of the normalisation of relations and reconciliation with Kosovo. Thus, despite the new carrots dangling on the accession path to the EU, the year 2024 begins with little hope for an acceleration of Serbia’s membership bid.

This article was written for and initially published in Vanguardia Dossier, a Spanish-language magazine known for its in-depth coverage of cultural, social, and political issues. It offers analysis and commentary from a wide range of experts across Europe.

[1] Those are Chapter 5 – Public procurement, Chapter 18 – Statistics, and Chapter 32 – Financial control.

[2] Although it is clearly recognised as part of the ‘Fundamentals’, this area is the only one for which the Commission does not provide the final marks of progress and membership preparedness. For the time being, the Commission only provides a descriptive analysis of the developments in this wide area. In 2023, CEP produced a series of policy papers identifying the deficiencies in the Commission’s current approach and offering methodological recommendations for the introduction of membership preparedness assessments using the standard 5-point scale. See: https://cep.org.rs/en/publications/quantifying-the-functioning-of-democratic-institutionsdeveloping-a-reliable-model-for-the-western-balkans/  

[3] Serbia was downgraded in the 2020 report and has remained in this category ever since. Countries receiving this score are typically electoral democracies where democratic institutions are fragile, and substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. See: https://freedomhouse.org/reports/nations-transit/nations-transit-methodology.

[4] A notable proposal for reforming the enlargement policy is laid out in Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU, European Policy Centre – CEP and Centre for European Policy Studies – CEPS, August 2022, https://cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Template-2.0-for-Staged-Accession-to-the-EU_web.pdf.

Članak Serbia’s Challenging Journey to the EU: Reforms Required for Membership se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

By Milena Mihajlović, Programme Director at the European Policy Center (CEP), Belgrade & Lukáš Macek, head of the Centre Grande Europe at Jacques Delors Institute, Paris

A stimulating new package in support of Western Balkan countries’ accession is on the EU decision-making table. Half a year after the big announcement by the Commission President, the details of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (the Plan) were presented on 8 November 2023, along with the standard annual Enlargement Package. The Commission’s proposal is in line with the European Council’s June 2022 invitation “to further advance the gradual integration between the European Union and the region already during the enlargement process itself in a reversible and merit-based manner”.

Aligned with the objective of “a determined geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united Europe” and accelerating “the speed of the enlargement process and the growth of [the Western Balkans’] economies”, the Plan rests on four key pillars: 1. Economic integration with the single market, 2. Regional economic integration through the Common Regional Market, 3. Fundamental reforms, and 4. Increased financial assistance through the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans (RGFWB, Facility). Rather than reforming the accession process, the Plan intends to stimulate and build on the existing approach – primarily based on the Stabilisation an Association Agreements and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) – with a view to increasing its effectiveness and bringing forward greater benefits for candidate countries.

Although the new funds needed for the RGFWB were only approved on 1 February 2024, in late 2023 the Commission already invited each Western Balkan partner to prepare a “Reform Agenda”. These documents will stipulate the socio-economic and fundamental reforms that will serve as the basis for disbursing the newly proposed funds. The Commission seems – more than ever in the past decade – eager to show to Member States that Western Balkan countries are deserving of an additional push in their integration efforts. At the same time, the region still seems lulled in its awkwardly comfortable position, in which the EU is to blame for the lack of progress and the dire state of its rule of law and democratic reforms.

In this article, we discuss the novelties of the proposed Plan, including proposals on market integration and links between funding and reforms. In addition, we assess the Plan’s shortcomings and certain potential risks associated with its implementation. In conclusion, the article discusses the current positions of the Western Balkan countries in the accession process, to determine how they affect their capacity to seize the new enlargement momentum and to leverage the potential offered by the Plan.

This publication was originally published on https://institutdelors.eu/

Članak New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: An important step forward, while much is yet to be done se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The Template on Staged Accession to the EU proposed in 2021 that funding for reforms and socio-economic development should substantially grow as (potential) candidate states improve their preparedness for membership, assessed annually by the European Commission. This proposal aims at incentivising politically sensitive reforms in the accession process while helping to gradually prepare beneficiaries for assuming membership obligations and opportunities in a gradual way.

The setting of the current third edition of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) appears to be neither financially sufficient nor designed for such a purpose. The recent announcement of a four-pil-lar growth plan for the Western Balkans by the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which includes a decision to increase pre-accession assistance, provides a timely opportunity to reflect on the effectiveness of IPA III and design appropriate measures to improve it. The rationale behind the funding proposal in the Template is threefold.

Firstly, if the candidates are to catch up with the EU proper in terms of socio-economic development, they need much higher levels of funding as early as possible in the accession process. Secondly, the countries need to start preparing for the absorption of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) once they become members, to avoid a scenario in which they absorb small portions of available funds in the first years of membership due to lack of capacity. Thirdly, more substantial financial support for socio-economic development can create more public awareness and support for EU accession, as well as a stronger incentive for governments in the region to press on with the ambitious reform agenda.

As the original Template did not include details regarding the funding instruments and conditions for access to increased funding, this paper probes deeper into these issues and proposes different policy options for the funding facet of the staged accession model. The paper starts with an analysis of the present IPA III, from the perspective of preparation of its beneficiaries for EU membership and especially the use of ESIF, providing an analytical basis for the Staged accession funding model. In section III, it proceeds to a discussion of several policy options for introducing additional funding as interim incentives and benefits during the accession process. It also lays out in significant detail the preferred option, which includes a proposal for a fully reformed IPA IV, and assesses its advantages and disadvantages. In sections IV and V, the paper discusses proposals for conditioning and reversibility mechanisms as well as for the development of absorption capacities among candidates. It concludes by drawing attention to the major prerequisites that will decide if a new, staged approach to the provision of pre-accession assistance will make it or break it.

Članak Reforming the EU’s pre-accession funding instrument se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

The Template for Staged Accession to the EU was first published in the autumn of 2021, following the European Commission’s publication of the revised enlargement methodology and the persistently stagnating accession process of the Western Balkan countries. The necessity to adapt EU enlargement policy has become ever more pronounced since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The geopolitical imperative for EU enlargement has prompted numerous proposals but ‘Staged Accession’ remains the only model which provides a predictable way forward for all present and future membership candidates in parallel with internal reforms aimed at smooth functioning of an enlarged EU.

Emerging from wide-ranging consultations and a series of issue papers that delved into the specific elements of the Model, this revised Template 2.0 presents a comprehensive proposal on how to amend the EU’s current accession policy. It presents the overall structure of the Staged Accession Model, with new specifications on the EU’s ‘fundamentals first’ approach. It lays out the ‘essential elements’ of the proposal, which the authors consider the bare minimum a new enlargement policy revision would need to entail to achieve the Model’s objectives. It unpacks the two pre-accession stages and the benefits of gradual institutional participation as well as increased funding proposed to (potential) candidates as incentives to press on with the most difficult fundamental reforms. The EU needs to use the momentum carefully to ensure that candidates go through a merit-based and predictable process, which will guarantee more reforms are rewarded with more benefits, while stagnation and backsliding are met with appropriate measures and reversibility in the integration process. The special arrangements of the Stage 3 ‘New Member State’ regime are detailed as well as the transition into the fourth and final stage envisaging conventional EU membership. Ideas on advanced sectoral integration (i.e. vertical ‘phasing-in’) and their possible relationship with the horizontal approach of the Staged Accession Model are also analysed.

Finally, the paper reviews the proposals for innovating the overall governance of the EU’s enlargement policy. Template 2.0 concludes by making important recommendations to the EU institutions, Member States and candidates that ought to be considered if the EU is to avoid missing another chance to restore the credibility and effectiveness of its once most successful foreign policy. Such proposals should be advanced in October 2023, at the latest, as part of the Commission’s next ‘Enlargement Package,’ with a view to agreement at the European Council’s December 2023 meeting.

Članak Template 2.0 for Staged Accession to the EU se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Yet, it is doubtful whether the Commission’s monitoring and assessment mechanisms are effective enough to allow it to act in the expected capacity. In practice, the Council has frequently disregarded or decided not to follow up on the Commission’s recommendations based on these reports. This is largely due to the fact that member states continue to demonstrate a notable level of mistrust when it comes to the Commission’s approach to reform monitoring and assessment. Such an inter-institutional rift in the EU sends inconsistent and even conflicting messages to (potential) candidates, thus undermining the credibility of the enlargement policy and discouraging domestic reform processes.

The 2020 Revised enlargement methodology (REM) was announced as a game-changer in terms of how assessment and monitoring are conducted, as the Commission took upon itself to increase the use of third-party indicators. Three years later, however, the Commission’s approach has remained largely unchanged. While clusterisation of chapters was introduced to simplify and streamline the negotiating process, most other elements of the REM have remained only ideas on paper, without proper operationalisation. As a result, countries in the region continue to stall with reforms on their path to the EU, prompting civil society organisations to actively and repeatedly call for more consistent and evidence-based monitoring and assessment, in order to render the annual reports more objective, accurate, impartial, verifiable, and comparable. It is, therefore, crucial to improve the Commission’s approach to tracking reforms and ensure greater credibility of its reports, especially in face of geopolitical turbulence in and surrounding Europe. This paper explores how the Commission’s approach can be improved, reviews several civil-society-led reform monitoring initiatives, and proposes a way forward with greater utilisation of their results as objective third party indicators in line with the REM.

Članak Monitoring reforms in the EU accession process: A Western Balkan civil society contribution se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Accessibility is considered a priority in a modern-day state administration. As an important precondition for achieving broader societal goals of social inclusion and welfare, accessibility has also become a clear-cut administration issue.

Rising demands for accessible administrations – services, building, workplaces – but also for more equitable opportunities for getting jobs, including civil service employment, result from the fast-paced socio-economic and technological changes, which in turn require to accommodate as many needs of the population as possible. The COVID-19 pandemic outbreak is only one, but largely important example of how suddenly such needs for fast adaptations occur.

On their EU accession path, the countries in the Western Balkan region must demonstrate that basic accessibility principles are sufficiently secured, as part of a broader, but fundamental public administration reform. According to international assessments that measure the compliance with such principles, the work is far from done – the legislative and policy frameworks are in place, the digital services accelerated, but mechanisms for improving the accessibility of services are weak across the region. The results of the surveys of civil servants and civil society organisations (CSO) implemented by the WeBER initiative, analysed in this brief, tell a similar story of weak guarantees for accessibility of state administrations. Specifically, their reflections on the opportunities for accessing civil service jobs, workplaces, facilities, and services, indicate that those most vulnerable have fewer chances and struggle the most.

Measuring perceptions has its limitations, from sampling errors, bias, to difficulties in capturing nuances. Also, survey results are largely affected by respondents’ motivation and availability to participate. As such, they should be interpreted with caution and used as a stimulus for further research. However, civil servants and CSOs are among the key actors from whom to obtain feedback regarding the application of the accessibility principle in practice. This is due to their respective roles as service and information providers to the public, in case of the former, and active participants in public affairs, especially as voluntary service providers to different population categories, in case of the latter.  Perception data alone cannot be used to remedy policy implementation but can additionally help to spotlight potential gaps. If legal and policy mechanisms largely fail to achieve their intended purpose, which is to allow unrestricted access to administration, it results not only in a waste of resources but also in the deprivation of different societal groups of their fundamental rights.

Članak Accessibility and Equal Opportunities in State Administrations in the WB: What Civil Servants and Civil Society Actors Have to Say? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Political influence on public administration is as old as administration itself. Given that civil servants are the ones who implement government policies, having control over them means controlling the institutions that execute political power and implement policies. This control also opens opportunities for rewarding loyalists and achieving political interests.
When reduced to a minimum, such political manoeuvre is less likely to have a lasting impact on an administration’s functioning, but when it becomes overwhelming, a state apparatus can be completely captured by transient political actors, in the service of interests other than public.

For a modern democracy, seeking to join the EU, professional and depoliticised civil service is necessary, not only for the sake of fulfilling membership conditions, but to enable society to achieve its socio-economic development potentials, and citizens to exercise their rights. In Serbia, however, international organisations and domestic civil society have reported on the issue of civil service politicisation since the start of democratic transition two decades ago. Still, the depoliticisation process, exceptionally prominent when it comes to the top echelon of the state administration senior civil service (SCS), has gone unaccomplished to the present day.

There are at least three inter-connected aspects of the SCS politicisation. First, acting senior civil servants, appointed temporarily until the right candidate is selected in the competition procedure, have become a regular instead of a temporary solution for filling in managerial positions, eliminating the principle of merit for recruitment.

Second, the very process of appointment of acting managers has become heavily compromised by frequent extensions of acting periods, beyond legal limits, constituting a perpetuated rule of law violation. Finally, even when competition procedures for SCS positions are implemented, there are additional and completely obscure political vetting procedures, due to which candidates proposed in the legal process often do not get appointed by the Government.

Since public administration reform belongs to the fundamental negotiation cluster that the EU microscopically observes, SCS politicisation has become an obstacle on Serbia’s EU path over the years. However, a more severe consequence is that, by politically controlling the administration, the Government makes decisions and policies at the expense of rule of law. Altogether, these bring forward principal concern that if politics does not let the civil service be, Serbia will simply entrench in weak institutions in an unforeseeable future, unable to unlock country’s development potential and improve citizens’ quality of life.

Članak The Neverending story of senior civil service depoliticisation in Serbia se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.