Why did Australia change suppliers? In an ultimatum, the US trumps France

Let us first investigate the rationale behind Australia’s decision to replace its deal with France with one with the US and UK. First, Australia was dissatisfied with its deal with France. For example, there were significant cost overruns, with the initial €31 billion budget expected to be closer to €56 billion, excluding maintenance costs, which were estimated at €90.1 billion. At the same time, there were concerns about the project’s timeline from the start: delivery of the first new submarines was set for 2035 at the earliest, with the final delivery spanning into 2050. On top of that, a number of agreed-upon critical milestones were postponed. This was problematic because Australia’s fleet was scheduled to retire in 2026, and with China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Australia could not afford a gap in its naval capability. For example, China’s construction of several bases in the South China Sea ran counter to President Xi’s pledge in 2015 not to militarise the Spratly Islands, and Beijing’s maritime claims across the South China Sea are widely regarded as violating international law. The Australian government’s plan to spend $6 billion to extend the lives of its submarines can be seen as an attempt to make up for the country’s naval disparity. Furthermore, the company in charge of supplying submarines to Australia had its system hacked, and the agreed-upon 90% input of Australian workers, which Australia deemed a critical part of the agreement because it supported local jobs, was reduced to 60% in 2020, thus increasing scepticism about the project.

Second, in light of all of these issues, only a better deal was needed for Australia to scrap its current one, which the UK and US offered. Their proposed submarines were better – they are nuclear-powered, don’t need to be refuelled, have a longer range and are harder to detect. Moreover, PM Morrison referred to the submarines as the “first major initiative of AUKUS,” with the term “first” being key because, unlike the France-Australia deal, AUKUS goes beyond simply providing submarines. It involves the sharing of military capacity, to improve the UK, US and Australia’s “edge in military capabilities and critical technologies”, as president Biden put it, which France did not offer. Putting aside the specifics of the agreement, one can make a broader observation about Australia’s motivations for choosing AUKUS: US security trumps anything France (and Europe) has to offer. Indeed, it supports the idea that only the US is capable of standing up to China to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific”.

France’s and the EU’s reaction: an indication of wider strategic issues

France reacted to AUKUS with outrage and very publicly. Jean-Yves Le Drian, France’s foreign minister, denounced the pact and scheming that went on behind France’s back as a “stab in the back”. Indeed, two weeks before AUKUS was made public, Australian foreign and defence ministers met with their French counterparts and reaffirmed their commitment to purchasing French submarines. In a similar vein, the French Embassy to the US stated that the decision to “exclude” France “shows a lack of coherence that France can only note and regret”. The US went behind France’s back to rid it of its own strategic alliance. Accordingly, France made the unprecedented decision to temporarily recall its ambassadors in Australia and the US for consultation and cancelled a UK-French defence summit scheduled for the end of September.

France’s anger towards AUKUS is more than a reaction to feeling betrayed by an ally. First, France lost a contract that it described as the “deal of the century” in 2016. It was central to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, with the region having geopolitical significance for France due to its 1.5 million citizens living there. Second, it illustrates that even after Brexit, the US still wants the UK as its key military ally. Third, relatedly, it seems that the US does not consider France its equal but as an extension of US foreign policy. Despite Morrison, Biden and Johnson recognising that “the future of the Indo-Pacific will impact all our futures”, France was excluded from AUKUS, and the US did not consult France on its withdrawal from Afghanistan either. The former occurrence could be partly attributed to Macron’s cautious approach to China, preferring to take a middle way position between America and China, which the US does not trust. But then this reinforces the notion that the US regards France as a follower and will brush it aside if France does not conform. Lastly, following from this, France cannot take the US’ exclusion in its stride and operate alone. Although France is at pains to extol its strategic autonomy and nuclear power, AUKUS demonstrates the limits of its powers because countries always opt for the US security guarantee.

The EU was also caught off guard by AUKUS, with its spokesmen admitting that the EU was “not informed” of the defence pact and that it would “analyse its repercussions”. European Commission president, Ursula Von der Leyen, characterised the US’ treatment of France as “unacceptable”. However, the Commission’s deputy spokesman stated that there would be “no immediate effect on the discussions and relations with Australia” regarding a potential free trade agreement, with another Commission spokesperson commenting that “the EU is not in the business of punishing anybody”. This marks a separation between France and the EU’s strategic interests and that other member states do not want to strain transatlantic ties. However, admittedly, the negotiations for the EU-Australia free trade argument were pushed back by a month to October, which can be seen as a symbolic gesture of solidarity with France, as well as a pause to consider how this will affect the EU, given that France has the EU’s most powerful military force, second only to Russia in Europe.

Where should France, and the EU, go from here: 2022, the “year of European defence”

To avoid a repeat of this scenario, France needs to reassess its foreign policy. The upcoming 2022 presidential campaign provides the forum to do so, and if Macron is to be re-elected, he must cater to his voters as his far-right rival Marine le Pen will likely highlight France’s public humiliation with AUKUS to emphasise the need for a change in leadership. First, France needs to reconsider its stance towards the US. As Macron recognised in a press conference post-AUKUS, “Europeans must rid themselves of their naiveté” and “demonstrate that they can defend themselves” because the US “focuses on its strategic interests above all else”. France may also reassess its role in NATO, with Macron already describing NATO as “brain dead” in 2019. However, France must remain realistic in its options. A Gaullist foreign policy in which France is an independent actor exerting significant global influence on its own is not feasible. AUKUS demonstrates that allies prefer the American security guarantee in the face of rising Chinese and Russian assertiveness. As a result, France should continue to form alliances and, more importantly, initiate these alliances. While France may want to punish the British for their involvement in AUKUS, and more broadly for leaving the EU, the UK is Europe’s only other strong military power after Russia and France, and so Franco-British defence cooperation is too valuable to jeopardise. Third, Germany must move past the scars of the 20^th Century and match up its military capabilities with its economic presence.

Let us now consider where the EU fits into this. Part of France’s global strategy may involve building a European army. France’s ambition appears to be to carve a middle path between the US and China, which, as with trade, appears to be only possible by forging a centralised European defence policy that prevents individual nations from being intimidated. Already in 2018, Macron emphasised that Europe should establish a “true, European army,” an agenda that his predecessors had also raised. Even though many experts are sceptical of the project’s feasibility and benefits, discussions about it have resurfaced in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the announcement of AUKUS. Given France’s upcoming six-month presidency of the EU Council in January 2022, as well as the current shift in Germany’s political climate following Angela Merkel’s departure after 16 years, Macron is in a better position to push this agenda forward.

At the same time, this is clearly relevant to some EU officials’ pursuit of a more integrated EU, which entails greater cooperation in all areas, including defence, as well as the ability to defend oneself. In this context, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, recently shared his wish to make 2022 “the year of European defence”. However, this initiative is not without its challenges. First, it is subject to external opposition from the US and the UK, with the US historically compromising Europe’s defence ambitions. Second, there is internal opposition within the EU itself. At the citizen level, it seems that EU citizens are unlikely to support this project either – as people may be willing to die for their country, but not for Europe in the absence of greater political integration and European identity. At the level of member states, there is significant opposition, particularly from Eastern European countries like Poland and the Baltic states, who believe that the US is a more reliable defence partner and who remember France’s original opposition to Eastern enlargement. They are opposed to decoupling defence from NATO (unlike France). But a European army will require Poland’s and the Baltics’ endorsement given that they represent a necessary part of Europe’s defence against Russia. One need only look at their geographical proximity to Russia. To persuade these countries and carve out a unified and substantive position between the US and China, France needs to serve as a basis for a truly European foreign and defence policy that also addresses issues that are not of French interest, such as Russia.

To conclude, AUKUS has brought many implications about France’s and Europe’s future direction to the surface. The French rightly believe that Europe is integral to their military potential and global prospects. However, given that this has been debated since the unsuccessful attempt to establish the European Defence Community in 1954, which was influenced by France, there is scepticism that Macron will be able to move it forward, even if elected for a second term, or that his successors will want to do so.

Photo credit: Screenshot from South China Morning Post. 

The author is an intern in the European Policy Centre – CEP.

Članak AUKUS defence pact se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.

Although participation in French regional elections is always lower than in presidential elections, it was nevertheless at an all-time low this year. In fact, the 2021 regional elections saw the lowest voter turnout since the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958, with more than 2 in every three voters opting not to vote in the first and second rounds of voting – a 66.7% and 65.7% abstention rate respectively. These trends stem from the fact that few people understand the role of regional councils, and that regardless they are taken to have limited power. An increasing political disaffection may also have fed into this. This calls the decentralisation policy in France, instituted to revitalise local democracy, into question, not least because it showcases that voting in presidential elections is still seen as the main (and only) way of influencing how the country is run.

Looking now exclusively at the implications of the 2021 record high abstention rate, extrapolating about the outcome of the presidential elections in 2022 should be done with caution. Indeed, although Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen are definitively weakened from the regionals, the political scene of 2022 is still very much uncertain given that, as previous trends indicate, a significant part of the people who did not vote in the regionals will likely turn out for the presidential elections. This paired with growing political disaffiliation, which represents a “warning for democracy“, may provide opportunities for parties to capture new voters in the upcoming presidential elections, particularly for Macron and populist parties. After all, Macron, with his then newly formed centrist party La République en Marche (LREM), and Le Pen, with her populist far-right party Rassemblement National (RN), already largely capitalised on the fatigue with traditional parties and politics in the 2017 presidential elections.

What also made these elections stand out is the fact they marked “the revenge of the parties of the old world”. Namely, the mainstream centre-right, Les Républicains (LR), and their allies, retained their seven regional councils out of the twelve mainland French regional councils. The Parti Socialiste (PS) also fared well by retaining their 5 regions. Therefore, one might wonder if the redrawing of France’s political map, of which the 2017 presidential election is a prime example with no mainstream parties making it to the second-round run-off, has been halted. Furthermore, these results represent an opportunity for traditional parties in the upcoming presidential elections, given the strong rooted loyalty to their candidates at the regional level. For example, Xavier Bertrand, Valérie Pécresse and Laurent Wauquiez were comfortably re-elected, marking them out as potential centre-right presidential candidates. It remains to be seen whether Les Républicains unanimously allies around one candidate. If it manages to do so, the chances of the current President, Macron, being re-elected are likely to decrease to some degree.

Another noteworthy point is that the parties that made it to the second round run off of the 2017 Presidential elections, RN and LREM, did not maintain their momentum. In 2017, they had signalled a break with the left-right policy space that had long characterised France given that for the first time under the Fifth Republic, neither the PS on the left nor the LR (or its predecessors) on the right made it to the run-off.

Let us first turn to Le Pen and her far-right party RN. Pre-vote polls showed her party leading in six regions; she didn’t win a single one. Perhaps this is because candidates like Thierry Mariani, who were recruited from the mainstream right, failed to broaden the party’s appeal as intended. This initiative may even have alienated some of the RN‘s electoral base, who are dissatisfied with her recently tempered stance, explaining why the party’s usual reliable voters did not vote. In light of the regional elections, Le Pen may face renewed doubts within her party as well as a challenge from a far-right rival. This is because her electability in the 2022 presidential elections, which was already low following her loss to Macron in 2017, was further harmed in what was the last chance before the presidential elections to boost it.

Macron’s party, LREM, fared poorly as well, failing to win a single region, and receiving only 7% of the vote – a dismal result for a ruling party. In fact, LREM was unable to establish a local or regional presence. This demonstrates that running a national electoral campaign is a long way from forming a viable political party which can effectively operate on all levels. Moreover, the outcome of the regional elections casts further doubts on LREM’s future without Macron. It showcases that the party is not active at all levels in France in the eyes of the citizens, and that Macron, not the party, is important to them. This means that the party risks losing political appeal next year if Macron loses or after he has served the maximum two presidential terms allowed if he wins.

At the same time, we should not be too hasty in drawing conclusion for the upcoming presidential elections, given that a poor LREM showing on a regional level will not necessarily be problematic in a personality-based national election. Regarding the latter point, Macron and Le Pen continue to lead in polls conducted after the regional elections on vote intentions in the first round of the 2022 presidential elections, regardless of the right candidate being tested against them in the polls.  In a similar vein, Macron currently has almost 50% of favourable opinions.

In sum, while the record high rate of abstention in regional elections makes forecasting the outcome of the presidential elections difficult, they appear to point to a more dynamic competition than the long-forecasted runoff between Macron and Le Pen, given that it has drawn attention to opportunities for traditional parties and challenges for Macron and Le Pen.

The author is currently an intern at the CEP.

Photo: A voter casts her ballot at a polling station in Angers, western France, June 20, 2021. © Loïc Venance, AFP

Članak What Can the 2021 Regional Elections in France Teach Us? se pojavljuje prvo na European Policy Centre.